« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »
which would have its own special machinery for enforcement. The machinery of the United Nations is adequate.
I am pleased to hand you, Mr. Chairman, with a copy of my testimony our suggested draft convention for the implementation of article 51.
Chairman EATON. The document referred to will be included in the record at this point.
(The document referred to is as follows:)
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
SIXTH REPORT AND MEMORANDUM AND DRAFT TREATY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 512
(By the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations, Inc., New York, N. Y.)
The Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations, was organized in November 1939. In addition to many studies and statements on various aspects of world organization, the commission has published five reports. Its Preliminary Report was released in November 1940. A second report on The Transitional Period was issued in February 1942; and a third on The United Nations and the Organization of Peace, in February 1943.
The fourth report, January 1944, contained four parts: The Fundamentals of the International Organization: General Statement; Part I, Security and World Organization: Part II, The Economic Organization of Welfare and Part III, The International Safeguard of Human Rights.
The fifth report, Security and Disarmament Under the United Nations, released in June 1947, dealt with the problems of security and disarmament confronting the United Nations.
This, the six report, Collective Self-Defense Under the United Nations, carries forward in more concrete from proposals for collective security through implementation of article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
In its statement of policy of October 1946 the American Association for the United Nations recommended as follows:
"It is essential that all nations know that in case of aggression the armed forces of the United States would be at the service of the Security Council to restore peace.
1 The following members of the Commission have signed this report: James T. Shotwell (honorary chairman), Clark M. Eichelberger (chairman), Mary Noel Arrowsmith, Henry A. Atkinson, Dana Converse Backus, Cyril J. Bath, Clarence A. Berdahl, Frank G. Boudreau, Phillips Bradley, Harry J. Carman, Ben M. Cherrington, E. J. Coil, Kenneth Colegrove, John B. Condliffe, Earl F. Cruickshank, Marion Cuthbert, Mrs. Harvey N. Davis, Malcolm W. Davis, Monroe E. Deutsch, William Emerson, Edgar J. Fisher, Denna F. Fleming, Grace E. Fox, Harry D. Gideonse, Huntington Gilchrist, Arthur J. Goldsmith, Carter Goodrich, J. Eugene Harley, Walter D. Head, Melvin D. Hildreth, Arthur N. Holcombe, Edward H. Hume, Erling M. Hunt, Oscar I. Janowsky, B. H. Kizer, John I. Knudson, Hans Kohn, Beryl Harold Levy, Pauline E. Mandigo, Charles E. Martin, F. Dean McCluskey, Frederick C. McKee, William P. Merrill, Hugh Moore, Laura Puffer Morgan, Gustavus Ohlinger, James P. Pope, George L. Ridgeway, Leland Rex Robinson, Ruth Bryan Owen Rhode, James N. Rosenberg, Walter R. Sharp, Josephine Schain, Preston Slosson, Eugene Staley, Waldo E. Stephens, Amos E. Taylor, Sarah Wambaugh, Walter F. Wanger, Ernest H. Wilkins, Howard E. Wilson, C.-E. A. Winslow, and Quincy Wright.
2 Drafting committee: Clark M. Eichelberger (chairman), Malcolm W. Davis, Clyde Eagleton, Arthur N. Holcombe, James T. Shotwell, Sumner Welles, and Quincy Wright. 3 Commission To Study the Organization of Peace: James T. Shotwell, honorary chairman; Clark M. Eichelberger, chairman; Clyde Eagleton, chairman, steering committee; Margaret Olson, secretary.
4 American Association for the United Nations: James T. Shotwell, Sumner Welles, honorary presidents; William Emerson, president; Clark M. Eichelberger, director; and Frederick C. McKee, treasurer.
"It would be helpful if the American Government would indicate that in case the veto is used to prevent action by the Security Council against a state found by at least seven members of the Security Council to have made an attack upon a member of the United Nations, the United States, in cooperation with other members of the United Nations, would proceed under artible 51 of the Charter. This article reserves the 'inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.'
"The United States should make it clear that if at any time armed action is necessary to stop aggression from any quarter of the globe, it will act through the Charter either under article 42, which authorizes the Security Council to proceed, or in cooperation with other members of the United Nations under article 51."
This suggestion was repeated in a statement adopted by the board of directors of the association on September 5, 1947. And in its fifth report in June 1947 the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace referred to article 51, pointing out that special armaments agreements, such as those contemplated for atomic energy, should recognize that certain violations are tantamount to an actual "armed attack" and therefore permit of collective action under article 51. Subsequently, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong has suggested that supplementary agreements be made providing for the implementation of collective defense under article 51 by appropriate action of the parties to such agreements.
Such supplementary agreements have actually been made by regional groups. The American countries in the Rio de Janeiro conference during the summer of 1947 agreed upon the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance providing for collective defense under this article. In March 1948, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg accepted a similar agreement referring to article 51.
The following memorandum and draft convention develop these ideas in greater detail by suggesting a supplementary convention under which the parties would oblige themselves to use earmarked forces in collective defense when necessity for such action has been determined by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, By thus making use of the General Assembly the defensive action is more closely tied in with the United Nations than was true of other suggestions for implementing article 51. At the same time, because the Assembly acts by a two-thirds vote, no power can exercise a veto in this procedure.
MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 51
At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco delegates of the middle and small states expressed the fear that the veto of the major powers in the Security Council might become an obstacle to the effective operation of the proposed system of collective security. They feared that the major powers would too easily yield to the temptation to use the veto to promote their own private purposes and that the consequences of the abuse of the veto would be to prevent the Security Council from acting promptly and vigorously in dealing with threats to international peace. They feared that such incapacity of the Council would not only prevent it from handling specific conflicts effectively but also would impair the prestige of the United Nations as an agency of world order. Representatives of the major powers at San Francisco issued a statement designed to allay these fears. They seemed to promise that the veto power would not be abused. Reliance upon this implied promise brought consent to the Yalta formula for voting in the Security Council and enabled the conference to agree to the privileges granted by the Charter to the major powers. The record of action by the Security Council unfortunately sustains the original fears of the representatives of the lesser powers at San Francisco. The veto has been used in the Security Council more frequently than the members of the United Nations Conference were led to expect. Its use has tended to produce the evils which were anticipated. Particularly the frequent use of the veto by the Soviet Union has been a great disappointment to the other major powers, as well as to the lesser powers in the United Nations. What has appeared to be the willful and persistent blocking of action in the Securtiy Council has created a situation which may not constitute an immediate threat to the peace of the world, but which has caused leading members of the United Nations to consider other means under the Charter for protecting their national interests and promoting international peace.
The first measures of the nations, who are determined to make the best of their opportunities under the Charter, was to exploit the possibility of increasing the influence and usefulness of the General Assembly in order to supplement action by the Security Council. The General Assembly has no authority under the Charter to make binding decisions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. It has authority to make recom mendations to the Security Council and to the members when, in its opinion, such action may be necessary on account of threats to the peace and when the matter is not on the agenda of the Security Council. At its last session, the General Assembly decided to create a standing committee of the whole Assembly, the so-called Little Assembly, which can sit permanently, consider matters referred to it by the Assembly, consider and if necessary investigate any dispute or situation proposed for the agenda of the Assembly and not on the agenda of the Security Council, and suggest a special session of the General Assembly if deemed desirable. This action by the General Assembly may create an atmosphere favorable to more effective action by the Security Council than heretofore, but it does not furnish a satisfactory remedy for the abuse of the veto by major powers.
Under article 51 of the Charter there is another possibility for effective action by members of the United Nations in cases where the Security Council fails to act with sufficient promptness. This article provides that nothing in the Charter "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense should, of course, be immediately reported to the Security Council. They should not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take such action as it might deem necessary to keep the peace. This inherent right of self-defense in case of armed attack, it should be emphasized, is both individual and collective. That is to say, any member of the United Nations, which may be attacked, has a right to defend itself by its own forces until more effective measures are taken by the Security Council, or a coalition of members under the same circumstances may use their combined armed forces to repel an attack. The latter possibility furnishes what seems to be an important opportunity for joint military action by members of the United Nations, should the abuse of the veto under the Yalta formula paralyze the authority of the Security Council in a case of aggression.
Article 51 originated with members of the United Nations who wished to keep their hands free for action under regional arrangements for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace as may be appropriate for regional action. The representatives of the American Republics at the United Nations conference in San Francisco were particularly desirous of securing their freedom of action in cases primarily affecting the security of the Western Hemisphere. Their purpose to assume special responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere had been made plain by the Act of Chapultepec, and they wished to prevent the frustration of this Pan-American program by the existence of any obligations inconsistent with such action under the Charter of the United Nations. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janerio, September 2, 1947, provided for collective defense by the American countries under this article. The same is true of the five power western European agreement signed March 17, 1948.
It is clear, however, that the provisions of article 51, although designed to permit regional arrangements for the American Republics of other geographical groups, also permit arrangements for collective action in self-defense by any group of members of the United Nations. This article makes it possible, for instance, for a group of members of the General Assembly itself to take decisive action in case of armed attack against any one of them. The language of article 51 seems to be clear that, if such an attack occurs against a single member of the United Nations, the right of self-defense inheres not only in that individual member, but in a group of members who wish to make common cause in self-defense until effective action is taken by the Security Council.
It would be possible, therefore, for the General Assembly, acting by the twothirds majority prescribed by the Charter for decisions by it on important questions, to recommend that states exercise their inherent right of collective self-defense under article 51. This possibility, however, is not enough by itself alone to give a due sense of security to members of the United Nations in view of the abuse of the veto in the Security Council under the Yalta formula. What
is needed is a permanent arrangement under which members of the United Nations may know in advance what action may be expected by such members as may be disposed to exercise their inherent right of self-defense. The desired sense of security can be obtained by an appropriate convention approved by a sufficient number of the members of the United States in which the parties oblige themselves to act in defense of a state found by the Assembly to be the victim of aggression. Such a convention could become effective between those members of the United Nations who should subsequently ratify the convention in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. It would have the dual effect of giving authority to recommendations of the General Assembly in this field and of establishing obligations among the cooperating states to use ear-marked forces to prevent aggression.
Collective self-defense under article 51 of the Charter is a form of action for promoting international peace which is manifestly superior to unilateral action by a single member of the United Nations. Under the terms of the arrangement between the members who agree to exercise their right of collective self-defense each member might be bound to join in taking measures necessary to keep the peace, when the Assembly recommends or a suitable majority of the group decides that an armed attack against a member has made such action necessary. This would be a more effective arrangement than that contemplated by the Truman doctrine plus the Vandenberg amendment. The Truman doctrine, as amended, contemplates assistance by the United States, unless the General Assembly should expressly determine that the need for such assistance no longer existed.
Under the proposed plan for a general arrangement between members of the United Nations under article 51, action would be taken under the inherent right of collective self-defense in pursuance of a finding by the General Assembly or the prescribed majority of the members associated in the arrangement that action is necessary. Each member of the group would then have the obligation to take the measures it had agreed upon. Under such an arrangement the United States, when duly authorized to exercise the right of collective self-defense as one of a group, would be in a stronger position, both military and moral, than when exercising its right of individual self-defense upon its own individual responsibility.
The advantages of such an arrangement under article 51 become clear upon considering the manner in which this right of collective self-defense would be actually exercised. Under the vigorous leadership of the United States and in view of the present sense of frustration caused by the abuse of the veto in the Security Council under the Yalta formula, the accession of a considerable number of the members of the United Nations to such an arrangement as is proposed may be confidently expected. If a majority of the members should ratify the proposed convention, the plan would become effective. Action by the United States in case of armed attack would then be contingent, not upon agreement by all the major powers with permanent seats in the Security Council, but upon action by such a number of the powers as would constitute the prescribed majority in the General Assembly. The balance of power would no longer be held by a single major power, but only by such a number of lesser powers as would be necessary to block action by the members adhering to the agreement for collective selfdefense.
The balance of power under such a plan for collective security would in fact lie with those nations which could prevent effective action in the General Assembly. For example, the 20 Latin American republics, acting together, would clearly have such a power. The democracies of western Europe, together with other democracies of the middle rank, would be in a similar position. No one major power, not even the United States, under such an arrangement, could dictate the measures to be taken in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, but an opportunity would be created for the exercise of a more effective leadership in dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace than can be expected under the Charter of the United Nations, if advantage is not taken of the opportunity afforded by article 51.
Loyalty to the United Nations is the cornerstone of American international policy. It is to the interest of the United States to use to the utmost the facilities afforded by the Charter for the maintenance of international peace. Full employment of the opportunity furnished by article 51 is not to be regarded as a means of camouflaging a resort to force for the settlement of international disputes. The effective implementation of the inherent right of collective self-defense should increase the practical security for the settlement of disputes without resort to force. Such an arrangement as proposed for organizing action in the exercise
of the right of collective self-defense, properly understood, is the most promising means of promoting the settlement of international disputes by political methods, so long as the abuse of the veto in the Security Council is in danger of paralyzing the action of that important agency in the general system of collective security. DRAFT FOR A TREATY FOR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE UNITED STATES CHARTER
The High Contracting Parties, Members of the United Nations,
Determined to achieve the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace (art. 1, par. 1),
Recognizing their inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against any state until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (art. 51),
Recognizing their freedom to use force, except in the settlement of international disputes or against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (art. 2, par. 3 and 4),
Recognizing their obligation to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter (art. 2, par. 5),
Considering the primary responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security (art. 24), but
Considering the power of the General Assembly to make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations on any matter within the scope of the Charter (art. 10), or any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (art. 11, par. 2), and on any situation resulting from a violation of the provisions of the Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations (art. 14), providing that the Security Council is not exercising its functions in regard to that matter (art. 12)
Have resolved to conclude the following treaty:
Article 1. Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to maintain for immediate use by the United Nations the land, sea, and air forces and facilities which it has designated in the schedule attached to this treaty. It will maintain these forces in efficient and modern conditions and will not reduce them without one year's notice to the other parties.
Article 2. Should the Security Council, exercising its powers under Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter, decide to take action by land, sea, or air forces to maintain or restore international peace and security, the parties to this treaty will at once make available to the Security Council the whole or such part of the forces set aside in accord with Article 1 as that Council may request.
Article 3. Should it be alleged that any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred, and should the Security Council fail promptly to make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken in accord with Article 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security (art. 39), the parties to this treaty agree to place the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly, and if the matter is on the agenda of the Security Council, those parties who are members of the Security Council will take such steps as may be required to remove it therefrom. If the General Assembly is not in session, the parties to this treaty will initiate a call for a special session.
Article 4. Should the General Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of those present, consider that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred, and recommend measures not involving the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security, the parties to this treaty will at once give effect to such recommendations.
Article 5. Should the General Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of those present, including at least three of the permanent members of the Security Council, consider that an armed attack has occurred against any state and recommend the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security, the parties to this treaty will place at the disposal of the General Staff, constituted in accord with Article 6 of this treaty, the whole or such part of the forces set aside in accord with Article 1 as may be requested by that body.
Article 6. In case the emergency described in Article 5 should occur, the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council parties to this treaty and cooperating to maintain the recommendations of the General Assembly shall at once meet and assume the responsibilities and exercise the functions of a