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ciation our belief that a multilateral treaty open to all member states based upon article 51 of the Charter is the way to strengthen the security provisions of the United Nations within the framework of the Charter. This proposal would avoid on one hand the dangerous pitfalls of military alliances outside of the United Nations and on the other an impossible effort to revise the Charter. Later in this discussion, I shall present to you a draft text of such a treaty which has been prepared by some of the best experts.

But first let me give the reasons why our association is opposed to an immediate constitutional convention under article 109 to revise the Charter. We believe that such an effort would result in a considerable reduction in the membership of the United Nations. Some nations are unalterably opposed to revision. They might not even attend. They and others would refuse to approve its results.

As I interpret the spirit of some of the resolutions before your committee, particularly House Resolution 163, the United States would then proceed without the recalcitrant ones, either to take over the United Nations or to organize another one. In that way the United States would organize a very comfortable little club composed of likeminded peoples, but the club would not contain the members with whom understanding is essential to world peace.

Indeed, it is not certain that all of the like-minded ones would go with the United States in such an effort. The United Kingdom would not wish such a break with other members and it is certain that neither the Scandinavian countries nor France would relish being forced into such a choice.

I am aware of the obstacles that the Soviet Union has presented to the Security Council. But because I have not abandoned hope that an agreement with the Soviet Union can be found—an agreement without appeasement, but involving conciliation—I believe that it is vital that the Soviet Union and its friends be kept within the United Nations. And since elimination of the veto is at the heart of most of the plans for revision, I must say that I prefer the United Nations with the Soviet Union and its friends, and the veto, to a United Nations without the Soviet Union and its friends, and without the veto.

Last week the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, ended a 2 weeks' session. According to the press, the Commission approved a Swedish resolution calling for a committee to examine between now and the next session the desirability of establishing permanent organs within the Commission to deal with intra-European trade. The Secretariat is to prepare data on the possibility of speeding industrial development through improved trade between the eastern and western Europe. In this slight lessening of the tension between east and west through promoting intra-European trade, there may be a beginning of a turn toward conciliation and understanding. Might it not be better that we put up with vetoes in the Security Council for a while and have the continued cooperation of many nations in such efforts as the Economic Commission for Europe than have a drastic break which some of the advocates of these resolutions would risk?

Those appearing before you to advocate revision of the Charter fall into three general divisions. There are those who would start now to transform the United Nations into federal world government. There

are those who would create a federation of the Atlantic community within the framework of the United Nations. Others advocate the resolution you are most seriously considering—House Resolution 163.

As for the first group, there is much in their program which appeals, particularly the picture of a stronger world court which Mr. Finletter ably presented on May 11. However, a system by which the court could deal with an individual within the state and by which a world parliament would be elected by the people, while ideal goals, cannot be achieved in the immediate future. Other items on the world-government program, such as the international police force and wide reduction of armaments, can be accomplished within the Charter-if the nations are willing to do so.

As for the federal union of the Atlantic community, while the United States is not going to join such a federation, a spiritual rebirth of Europe seems under way in the move for union of the European states and should have every encouragement from this country. It may be the greatest byproduct of the ERP.

As for the Culbertson plan before this committee, House Resolution 163, it should command the support of everyone were it limited to two very important objectives: An international police force, and a rationing of the world arms production. However, accompanying these worth-while objectives is a rigid concentration of power in the hands of five great nations.

Certainly, history teaches that the power ratio never remains fixed. Consequently any eventual revision of the United Nations Charter should be made with the objective of greater flexibility and a wider distribution of power, rather than less. The rise in importance of the General Assembly in comparison with the Security Council is due to the fact that it is based upon a wider distribution of power. But House Resolution 163 would create a Security Council of 10, in which the 3 greatest powers would have 2 votes each, and the 2 lesser powers 1 vote each, or a total of 8 out of 10. Only 2 seats would remain to be rotated among over 50 small powers, as compared with 6 seats to be rotated among them under the present Security Council. And the arms production of the world would be divided among the nations in the same proportion. I do not see how any state other than the three greatest powers could possibly accept this plan.

On the other hand, the American Association for the United Nations believes that the United Nations Charter has much greater capacity for growth than has yet been realized. The American Association for the United Nations favors a considerable strengthening of the United Nations by the following means: A more loyal fulfillment of their obligations on the part of the governments; and additions to the United Nations in the form of new bodies and multilateral conventions to implement the Charter.

A major obstacle to the success of the United Nations today is that a number of nations, including the United States, have not made that fundamental change in national behavior to make the United Nations the foundation of their foreign policy rather than an instrument of their foreign policy. At times the American Government has used the United Nations as though it were the foundation of its foreign policy; at other times it has bypassed the United Nations, or has used it as an instrument of short-sighted policy. It interpreted

the Charter liberally when urging the Security Council to take responsibility for Trieste; it interpreted the Charter narrowly when it wished to reduce the responsibility of the Security Council in Pales. tine. It is with the greatest reluctance that I assert that the vacillation of the United States in the Palestine crisis has done more harm to the United Nations than any single veto cast by the Soviet Union.

Indeed, while fully recognizing the harm that the veto has done the United Nations we must recognize that it is not solely responsible for certain failures of the United Nations.

I could interpose that the veto has been used in a surprisingly narrow class of cases. No veto prevented the nations from working out the Marshall plan through the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. No veto has been involved in the Palestine question, in which the United States and the Soviet Union were originally agreed on the solution of that unhappy problem.

Is there a means by which the security potentialities of the United Nations can be increased without losing any members and without undertaking the immediately impossible task of revising the Charter? Is there a way in which the United States may give necessary military guaranties within the Charter, and consequently avoid the dangerous temptation of outside military alliances?

The association has sought diligently for such an answer. We believe that we have it in a suggested draft treaty based upon article 51 which recognizes the right of individual or collective self-defense if the Security Council is not performing its duties. This article is permissive. We propose to make it positive through the United States proposing a multilateral treaty open to all members of the United Nations. In case of aggression and in the absence of action by the Security Council, the signatories would call for a special assembly and if requested to do so by the normal two-thirds vote of this body they would immediately go to the aid of the nation attacked.

Should the danger require automatic action, as is frequently the case in self-defense, the signatories would nevertheless call a special assembly and report to it and ask for its approval.

Each signatory would earmark certain armed forces and facilities for use of

action in such a situation. Such a treaty would have the following advantages : 1. It would provide a way around the veto.

2. It would keep the United Nations membership intact. Nonsignatories would no more be excluded from the United Nations than were those nations excluded who did not participate in the little assembly.

3. It would be a way in which the United States could make military guaranties within the framework of the Charter and enforceable with the authority of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, rather than signing military alliances outside of the United Nations as is being advocated in some quarters.

4. It would provide for armed contingents for use as an international police force, as is envisaged under article 43, without having to wait until the Military Staff Committee has worked out a seemingly impossible system of ratios.

I want to make it clear that we are not advocating a united nations within the United Nations. We are not advocating a federation which would have its own special machinery for enforcement. The machinery of the United Nations is adequate.

I am pleased to hand you, Mr. Chairman, with a copy of my testimony our suggested draft convention for the implementation of article 51.

Chairman EATON. The document referred to will be included in the record at this point.

(The document referred to is as follows:)




(By the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace,' research affiliate of the

American Association for the United Nations, Inc.,* New York, N. Y.)


The Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations, was organized in November 1939. In addition to many studies and statements on various aspects of world organization, the commission has published five reports. Its Preliminary Report was released in November 1940. A second report on The Transitional Period was issued in February 1942; and a third on The United Nations and the Organization of Peace, in February 1943.

The fourth report, January 1944, contained four parts: The Fundamentals of the International Organization: General Statement; Part I, Security and World Organization: Part II, The Economic Organization of Welfare and Part III, The International Safeguard of Human Rights.

The fifth report, Security and Disarmament Under the United Nations, released in June 1947, dealt with the problems of security and disarmam confronting the United Nations.

This, the six report, Collective Self-Defense Under the United Nations, carries forward in more concrete from proposals for collective security through implementation of article 51 of the United Nations Charter,


In its statement of policy of October 1946 the American Association for the United Nations recommended as follows:

"It is essential that all nations know that in case of aggression the armed forces of the United States would be at the service of the Security Council to restore peace.

1 The following members of the Commission have signed this report : James T. Shotwell (honorary chairman), Clark M. Eichelberger (chairman), Mary Noel Arrowsmith, Henry A. Atkinson, Dana Converse Backus, Cyril J. Bath, Clarence A. Berdahl, Frank G. Boudreau, Phillips Bradley, Harry J. Carman, Ben M. Cherrington, E. J. Coil, Kenneth Colegrove, John B. Condliffe, Earl F. Cruickshank, Marion Cuthbert, Mrs. Harvey N. Davis, Malcolm W. Davis, Monroe E. Deutsch, William Emerson, Edgar J. Fisher, Denna F. Fleming, Grace E. Fox, Harry D. Gideonse, Huntington Gilchrist, Arthur J. Goldsmith, Carter Goodrich, J. Eugene Harley, Walter D. Head, Melvin D. Hildreth, Arthur N. Holcombe, Edward H. Hume, Erling M. Hunt, Oscar I. Janowsky, B, H, Kizer, John I. Knudson, Hans Kohn, Beryl Harold Levy, Pauline E. Mandigo, Charles E. Martin, F. Dean McCluskey, Frederick C. McKee, William P. Merrill, Hugh Moore, Laura Puffer Morgan, Gustavus Ohlinger, James P. Pope, George L. Ridgeway, Leland Rex Robinson, Ruth Bryan Owen Rhode, James N. Rosenberg, Walter_R. Sharp, Josephine Schain, Preston Slosson, Eugene Staley, Waldo E. Stephens,

Amos E. Taylor, Sarah Wambaugh, Walter F. Wanger, Ernest H. Wilkins, Howard E. Wilson, C.-E. A. Winslow, and Quincy Wright.

2 Drafting committee : Clark M. Eichelberger (chairman), Malcolm W. Davis, Clyde Eagleton, Arthur N. Holcombe, James T. Shotwell, Sumner Welles, and Quincy Wright.

3 Commission To Study the Organization of Peace : James T. Shotwell, honorary chair. man ; Clark M. Eichelberger, chairman ; Clyde Eagleton, chairman, steering committee; Margaret Olson, secretary.

4 American Association for the United Nations: James T. Shotwell, Sumner Welles, honorary presidents; William Emerson, president; Clark M. Eichelberger, director; and Frederick C. McKee, treasurer.

"It would be helpful if the American Government would indicate that in case the veto is used to prevent action by the Security Council against a state found by at least seven members of the Security Council to have made an attack upon a member of the United Nations, the United States, in cooperation with other members of the United Nations, would proceed under artible 51 of the Charter. This article reserves the `inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.'

"The United States should make it clear that if at any time armed action is necessary to stop aggression from any quarter of the globe, it will act through the Charter either under article 42, which authorizes the Security Council to proceed, or in cooperation with other members of the United Nations under article 51."

This suggestion was repeated in a statement adopted by the board of directors of the association on September 5, 1947. And its fifth report in June 1947 the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace referred to article 51, pointing out that special armaments agreements, such as those contemplated for atomic energy, should recognize that certain violations are tantamount to an actual "armed attack" and therefore permit of collective action under article 51.

Subsequently, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong has suggested that supplementary agreements be made providing for the implementation of collective defense under article 51 by appropriate action of the parties to such agreements.

Such supplementary agreements have actually been made by regional groups. The American countries in the Rio de Janeiro conference during the summer of 1947 agreed upon the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance providing for collective defense under this article. In March 1948, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg accepted a similar agreement referring to article 51.

The following memorandum and draft convention develop these ideas in greater detail by suggesting a supplementary convention under which the parties would oblige themselves to use earmarked forces in collective defense when necessity for such action has been determined by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, By thus making use of the General Assembly the defensive action is more closely tied in with the United Nations than was true of other suggestions for implementing article 51. At the same time, because the Assembly acts by a two-thirds vote, no power can exercise a veto in this procedure.


At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco delegates of the middle and small states expressed the fear that the veto of the major powers in the Security Council might become an obstacle to the effective operation of the proposed system of collective security. They feared that the major powers would too easily yield to the temptation to use the veto to promote their own private purposes and that the consequences of the abuse of the veto would be to prevent the Security Council from acting promptly and vigorously in dealing with threats to international peace. They feared that such incapacity of the Council would not only prevent it from handling specific conflicts effectively but also would impair the prestige of the United Nations as an agency of world order. Representatives of the major powers at San Francisco issued a statement designed to allay these fears. They seemed to promise that the veto power would not be abused. Reliance upon this implied promise brought consent to the Yalta formula for voting in the Security Council and enabled the conference to agree to the privileges granted by the Charter to the major powers.

The record of action by the Security Council unfortunately sustains the original fears of the representatives of the lesser powers at San Francisco. The veto has been used in the Security Council more frequently than the members of the United Nations Conference were led to expect. Its use has tended to produce the evils which were anticipated. Particularly the frequent use of the veto by the Soviet Union has been a great disappointment to the other major powers, as well as to the lesser powers in the United Nations. What has appeared to be the willful and persistent blocking of action in the Securtiy Council has created a situation which may not constitute an immediate threat to the peace of the world, but which has caused leading members of the United Nations to consider other means under the Charter for protecting their national interests and promoting international peace.

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