regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

USES OF THE VETO IN PUBLIC MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The Syria-Lebanon case, February 16, 1946.-The United States proposed a resolution under which the Security Council would have expressed confidence that foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon would be withdrawn as soon as practicable and that negotiations to that end would be undertaken without delay, and would have requested that it be informed of the results of the negotiations. The following vote occurred on this resolution: For-Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Mexico, Netherlands, and United States; against-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; abstentions-Poland, France, United Kingdom. After indication approval of the resolution during the discussion, France and the United Kingdom abstained, but did not say they were parties to the dispute.

Even though France and the United Kingdom did not specifically concede that they were parties to a dispute, it seems clear that their abstention was not intended to be the equivalent of a negative vote, especially since after the resolution failed of adoption both the United Kingdom and France indicated their intention to abide by its terms. The President of the Council, after discussion, specifically ruled that the resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

2. The Spanish case, June 25, 1946.-A resolution was proposed to adopt the amended recommendations which the subcommittee on Spain made after its study of the Spanish question. Nine votes were cast in favor of the adoption of the resolution, with the U. S. S. R. against and the Netherlands abstaining.

3. The Spanish case, June 26, 1946.-Australia and the United Kingdom proposed a resolution to keep the Spanish case on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized without prejudice to the rights of the General Assembly. All members voted in favor except the Soviet and Polish representatives, who voted in the negative, as they objected to the final "without prejudice" clause. The President of the Council ruled that the Australian-United Kingdom resolution was a question of procedure. This ruling was put to a vote. Eight members voted that the matter was procedural; France and the U. S. S. R. voted that it was not; Poland abstained.

4. The Spanish case, June 26, 1946.-Australia proposed a resolution to add the "without prejudice" clause to the previously approved paragraphs of the Australian-United Kingdom resolution. All members voted for the inclusion of this clause except the Polish and Soviet representatives, who voted against it. 5. Membership of Transjordan, August 29, 1946.-The application of Transjordan for membership in the United Nations received eight affirmative votes. Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried.

6. Membership of Portugal, August 29, 1946.-The application of Portugal for membership in the United Nations received eight affirmative votes. Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried.

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7. Membership of Ireland, August 29, 1946.—The application of Ireland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes. U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting. negative vote of the U. S. S. R prevented the proposal from being carried.

8. Second Greek case, September 20, 1946.—In the second Greek case the United States proposed a resolution to appoint a commission to investigate the situation alleged to exist on the northern frontier of Greece. This resolution received eight affirmative votes, Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

9. Corfu Channel case, March 25, 1947.-A resolution was introduced by the United Kingdom, finding in substance that the mine field in the Corfu Channel which caused the destruction of two British ships with loss of life and injury to their crews cannot have been laid without the knowledge of Albanian authori ties" and recommending that the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments settle the dispute on the basis of the Council's finding. This resolution received seven affirmative votes; Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Syria abstained from voting. The United Kingdom as a party to the dispute under

consideration was precluded by article 27 (3) of the Charter from participating in the vote. The resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

10. The Third Greek case, July 29, 1947.—The resolution proposed by the United States to adopt the proposals for the maintenance of international peace made by the majority of the members of the Committee of Investigation, established by the Security Council, received nine supporting votes, with Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

11. Membership of Transjordan, August 18, 1947.-The application of Transjordan for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council, received nine affirmative votes, with Poland abstaining. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried.

12. Membership of Ireland, August 18, 1947.—The application of Ireland for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council, received nine affirmative votes, with Poland abstaining. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried.

13. Membership of Portugal, August 18, 1947.-The application of Portugal for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council, received nine affirmative votes, with Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from carrying.

14. The Third Greek case, August 19, 1947.-The resolution proposed by Australia and amended by the United States finding the existence of a threat to the peace on the northern border of Greece and calling upon the parties involved to cease all acts of provocation and to enter into direct negotiation to relieve the tension, when put to a vote, received nine supporting votes with two votes in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

15. The Third Greek case, August 19, 1947.-The resolution proposed by the United States, finding that the support given to guerrillas fighting the Greek Government by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia constituted a threat to the peace and calling upon Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to desist from rendering further support to the guerrilla fighting and to cooperate with Greece in the settlement of the dispute by peaceful means, received nine supporting votes in the Security Council, with two votes in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

16. Membership of Italy, August 26, 1947.—The resolution proposed by Australia that the Security Council find that Italy is a peace-loving state able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and recommend its admission to membership in the United Nations at such time and under such conditions as the General Assembly may deem appropriate, received nine affirmative votes, with the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative and Poland abstaining. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

17. Membership of Austria, August 26, 1947.-The resolution of Australia, finding that Austria is a peace-loving state able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and recommending its admission to membership in the United Nations at such time and under such conditions as the General Assembly may deem appropriate, received eight affimative votes, with the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative and Poland and France abstaining. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

18. Second Indonesian case, August 25, 1947.-A joint Australian-Chinese resolution which ultimately was carried proposed that members of the Security Council that have career consuls in Batavia instruct them to prepare joint reports on the situation in Indonesia for the benefit of the Council. An amendment to this resolution proposed by the U. S. S. R. substituted a commission composed of states members of the Security Council in somewhat broadened terms of reference of the Commission. This amendment received seven affirmative votes, with France and Belgium voting in the negative and China and the United Kingdom abstaining. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of France.

19. Third Greek case, September 15, 1947.-The United States resolution, requesting the General Assembly to consider the dispute between Greece and her northern neighbors and to make any recommendations which it deems appropriate under the circumstances, received nine affirmative votes but failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

20. Third Greek case, September 15, 1947.-The United States challenged the ruling of the President that the decision set forth in 19 was one of substance and therefore failed to carry because of the opposition of the U. S. S. R. The United

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States resolution, that the question be deemed one of procedure, received eight affirmative votes, with Syria abstaining and Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (NOTE.-19 and 20 could be considered one veto rather than two. Newspaper accounts listed these as two vetoes.)

21. Membership of Italy, October 1, 1947.-Upon reconsideration of the membership application of Italy nine members of the Security Council favored the admission of Italy, with U. S. S. R. and Poland voting in the negative. The application failed because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

22. Membership of Finland, October 1, 1947.-The application of Finland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes, with U. S. S. R. and Poland voting in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of U. S. S. R.

23. Membership of Italy, April 10, 1948.—The reapplication of Italy for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes, with U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative. The application failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.

EXCERPT FROM ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE C. MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SEPTEMBER 17, 1947

The effective operation of the United Nations Security Council is one of the crucial conditions for the maintenance of international security. The exercise of the veto power in the Security Council has the closest bearing on the success and the vitality of the United Nations.

In the past the United States has been reluctant to encourage proposals for changes in the system of voting in the Security Council. Having accepted the Charter provisions on this subject and having joined with other permanent members at San Francisco in a statement of general attitude toward the question of permanent member unanimity, we wished to permit full opportunity for practical testing. We were always fully aware that the successful operation of the rule of unanimity would require the exercise of restraint by the permanent members, and we so expressed ourselves at San Francisco.

It is our hope that, despite our experience to date, such restraint will be practiced in the future by the permanent members. The abuse of the right of unanimity has prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its true functions. That has been especially true in cases arising under chapter VI and in the admission of new members.

The Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the only practicable method for improving this situation is a liberalization of the voting procedure in the Council.

The United States would be willing to accept, by whatever means may be appropriate, the elimination of the unanimity requirement with respect to matters arising under chapter VI of the Charter, and such matters as applications for membership.

We recognize that this is a matter of significance and complexity for the United Nations. We consider that the problem of how to achieve the objective of liberalization of the Security Council voting procedure deserves careful study. Consequently, we shall propose that this matter be referred to a special committee for study and report to the next session of the Assembly. Measures should be pressed concurrently in the Security Council to bring about improvements within the existing provisions of the Charter, through amendments to the rules of procedure, or other feasible means.

The scope and complexity of the problems on the agenda of this Assembly have given rise to the question whether the General Assembly can adequately discharge its responsibilities in its regular, annual sessions. There is a limit to the number of items which can receive thorough consideration during the few weeks in which this body meets. There would seem to be a definite need for constant attention to the work of the Assembly in order to deal with continuing problems. Occasional special sessions are not enough. The General Assembly has a definite and con

tinuing responsibility, under articles 11 and 14 of the Charter, in the broad field of political security and the preservation of friendly relations among nations. In our fast-moving world an annual review of developments in this field is not sufficient.

The facilities of the General Assembly must be developed to meet this need. I am therefore proposing, today, that this Assembly proceed at this session to create a standing committee of the General Assembly, which might be known as the Interim Committee on Peace and Security, to serve until the beginning of its third regular session next September. The Committee would not, of course, impinge on matters which are the primary responsibility of the Security Council or of special commissions, but, subject to that, it might consider situations and disputes impairing friendly relations brought to its attention by member states or by the Security Council pursuant to articles 11 and 14 of the Charter and report to the Assembly or to the Security Council thereon; recommend to the members the calling of special sessions of the General Assembly when necessary; and might report at the next regular session on the desirability of establishing such a committee on a permanent basis.

In our opinion, every member of the United Nations should be seated on this body.

The creation of the Interim Committee will make the facilities of the General Assembly continually available during this next year to all its members. It will strengthen the machinery for peaceful settlement and place the responsibility for such settlement broadly upon all the members of the United Nations. Without infringing on the jurisdiction of the Security Council, it will provide an unsurpassed opportunity for continuing study, after the adjournment of this Assembly, of the problems with which the United Nations must contend if it is to succeed.

EXCERPT FROM ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR WARREN R. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SEAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BEfore the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK CITY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1947.

* * * We are not divided in all the councils of the United Nations. to the contrary-we are in many and varied organs and activities united. votes there are seldom close; they are almost always overwhelming.

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This cooperation in votes and works develops strength and confidence to extend the front of collective security. Our task is to maintain the degree of unity we have achieved while patiently striving for agreement in those controversial areas where substantial change in old habits of thought and living are involved.

People are apprehensive over the continued obstruction of a small minority, particularly when a decisive majority requires one of those minority votes. Nevertheless, the determined unity of the many may ultimately win the cooperation of the few. In the United Nations every issue and every proposal is submitted to exhaustive discussion in the open. Representatives of member states patiently work out compromises and improve upon their original suggestions as a consequence of acquired understanding of varied interests.

The representative who casts a negative vote usually records the reasons for his opposition. If the frequent obstruction of the will of the majority appears contrary to the policies and principles of the United Nations, such continued opposition strengthens rather than weakens the unity of the many. In the long run enlightened self-interest of the minority will be found in giving life. not death, to the Charter principles. It is far too early in the short life of the United Nations to discount the possibility of winning unanimity through the patient formulation of majority positions. If the majority firmly adheres to the great objectives of the Charter, I believe we can work our way up to unanimity.

Now let me refer to some applications of the foregoing, in particular, to the use made of the veto which has raised doubt and forebodings.

As the United Nations was conceived, three great principles animated it; namely, universality, soverign equality, and unanimity of the great powers as the only sure guaranty of perfect collective security. Perfection alone is invulnerable. Our awareness of present human and governmental characteristics, however, impels action approximating, though not reaching, the goal. We continue to regard the unanimity of the great powers as the best guaranty of collective security. If peace is the objective of the great powers, as I believe it is, the world will have peace because of their unanimity. Pray God the world may have peace in spite of disunity of the great powers.

Realism in respect of need for the veto calls for balanced thought regarding proposals to eliminate or severely restrict its use.

We favor use of the rule of unanimity only for the purpose intended. Such use can be defined more precisely than it has been. If world opinion is convinced and determined that all issues being considered under the pacific settlements provision of chapter VI, and such matters as applications for membership in the United Nations should be immune from the veto, I believe these objectives could be reached. This would comprehend such functions of chapter VI as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and the like. The United States is not wedded to any particular method or to any timetable in the pursuit of our objective to increase the effectiveness of the Security Council. It is my hope that the Security Council itself will develop its own rules and practices in a way that will contribute substantially toward this goal.

Many questions which have been regarded as substantive could be classified as procedural and not subject to veto by the adoption of an appropriate rule with the concurrence of the permanent members.

It is our desire to extend a most thorough and searching examination into all the aspects of this question. We, therefore, have proposed that the Assembly establish a committee to study the entire issue and make suitable recommendations to the next session. Moral energy generated among the peoples of all nations would promote achievement of the committee's objective.

The scope of this inquiry would not now include the application of the unanimity principle to the enforcement provisions-rupture of diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, or use of force-which are found in chapter VII of the Charter.

A striking evidence of our reliance on the development of a broad collective will is our proposal for a General Assembly Interim Committee on Peace and Security. Between its yearly meetings we believe the General Assembly should have the means of carrying out its authority as described in articles 11 and 14. Thus this body of all the member nations could conduct on-the-spot investigations in troubled areas. It could call to the attention of the Security Council situations threatening the peace. It could recommend the calling of a special session of the Assembly. And it could study various ways of making existing machinery operate more effectively.

I know this plan to enable all the member states to act effectively together in support of the Charter will be welcomed by the members of this association. I recall that the idea of permanent Assembly committees was contained in the thoughtful report made recently by your research affiliate, the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace. I feel sure that the authors of that proposal will favorably regard this effort to make continuously available to the nations of the world the powers of the General Assembly to promote friendly relations between states.

The Charter in its very first article introduces the key words "effective collec tive measures." These words and the many other action phrases throughout the Charter clearly establish the United Nations as means for mobilizing and using the power and authority of the member states to carry out the pledges and principles to which they subscribed.

As you know, I have recently returned from the Rio Conference. There the nations of this hemisphere set an example in agreements for "effective collective measures" to maintain peace. At Rio, 19 members of the United Nations strengthened the World Organization by undertaking specific responsibilities for collective security in our hemisphere and for discharging their obligations as a group under the Charter.

The treaty drawn at Rio provides us with machinery to carry out both the methods of pacific settlement and of self-defense as referred to in the Charter of the United Nations. It creates effective organs of consultation and collective action to function in accordance with a system of specific measures to insure peace in this hemisphere. That treaty, therefore, builds a foundation of security on which to rear the superstructure of the economic and social progress of this hemisphere. From this huge reservoir of peace and orderly progress the United Nations may draw strength and increased authority in its world-wide effort to apply the principles of neighborly relations.

The use of the veto in the Security Council, which prevented a majority of nine from taking "effective collective measures" to prevent aggression upon Greece, does not prove that the United Nations is powerless to perform this function. The General Assembly will have an opportunity to consider collective defense of her territorial integrity and independence. A majority of the United Nations has the power and the authority, within the Charter, to take effective collective measures which they agree may be necessary for the defense of Greece. This is an illustration of the capacity of the United Nations to activate its principles and policies aimed at the maintenance of peace.