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The establishment of an effective world police force as outlined in House Concurrent Resolution 168 would eliminate the terrible strains in present diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia. Think also of how effective such a force would be in Greece or Palestine or Berlin.
We have tested American public opinion. We know that the great majority favor such a plan to strengthen the United Nations. Most people wish that such proposals could have been effected earlier. But these same people do not cry over the past. They look to the future. And they want for their future a strong world authority. They want Congress to act now on strengthening the United Nations.
We, the citizens of Middletown, Ohio, urge you to assume the world leadership which is now rightfully ours by taking the lead in the United Nations to bring about the amendments proposed in House Concurrent Resolution 168.
To complete our testimony, I would like to conclude by repeating to your committee my letter to you of May 10, 1948: "Hon. CHARLES A. EATON, Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, D. C. "DEAR MR. EATON : I am taking the liberty of writing to you because of Middletown, Ohio's, tremendous interest in the House Foreign Affairs Committee's present hearing. For 2 years now we have worked hard for congressional recognition of a plan for strengthening United Nations. The very plan we have struggled for so long is now before Congress in the form of House Concurrent Resolution 108.
"We are convinced that it is our hope for peace. It is the most important single issue before the American people today. Your committee must give it your most serious and thoughtful attention.
"For 2 years we have held town meetings, given speeches in surrounding communities, appeared on over 30 radio broadcasts, urged over 50 organizations on local, State, and national levels to adopt the Middletown plan (H. Res. No. 168). We have pointed out why time is of the essence, why a preventive war is too un-American, why appeasement is impossible with the Politburo, why an effective, strong, and democratic United Nations can, and will, keep the peace.
“One of the strongest groups that became convinced of the fairness and practicability of the Middletown plan was the American Legion. They are now spearheading the movement to bring their and our plan to the attention of Congress, our State Department, and the world. As recently as May 3, 1948, the executive committee of the American Legion urged the adoption of House Concurrent Resolution No. 168.
"Recently Secretary of State Marshall appeared before your committee and urgei a policy of appeasement. He wants the UN to remain as presently constructed.
"If this is allowed to happen you undoubtedly will be credited with the formal burial of the last great hope of the world-a United Nations. As now formulated, the United Nations cannot possibly maintain the peace. Examples are many. Greece and Palestine are ample eloquence.
“Our State Department never has been successful when following a policy of appeasement. I thought that with the Marshall plan they had finally realized that only by a strong offensive can you take the ball from the power-crazed Politburo. Certainly the Marshall plan has been eminently successful in Italy. It will bring future successes.
"But the Marshall plan is not a peace plan. It is a plan to rehabilitate Europe, to rebuild self-sustaining economies, to preserve free institutions, to thwart Communist expansion. With Europe thus revitalized, we will be free to join with other democratic and free nations in keeping the pease through a strong and effective United Nations.
"After the State Department's one forward move, they now want to retreat and return to appeasement of Mr. Wallace and of Russia.
"I hope you will not let this happen.
"Our committee believes that now is the time to push for the strengthened United Nations envisoned in House Resolution No. 168. With our victory in Italy we have a better chance than ever of convincing Russia that her desire for world domination has been stopped, that the world does not wish to live in slavery, that she must now decide if she will join with other nations to create a period of peace, or is her goal—her only goal-a world Communist state.
"Every fair-minded nation in the world wants a United Nations as charted in House Resolution No. 168. We know that most Americans want it, too. It is up to you and your committee to throw out, forever, a plicy of appeasement. We must go forward with firmness and fairness to create sufficiently strong world authority which can prevent future aggression and preparation for aggression.
“The citizens of Middletown, Ohio, believe that there is such a plan. We strongly recommend adoption of House Concurrent Resolution 168." Respectfully submitted.
WILLIAM VERITY, Chairman, Middletown Citizens Committee.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE FOUR SPONSORING GOVERNMENTS
ON VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 7, 1945 Specific questions covering the voting procedure in the Security Council have been submitted by a subcommittee of the Conference Committee on Structure and procedures of the Security Council to the delegations of the four governments sponsoring the Conference- The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China. In dealing with these questions, the four delegations desire to make the following statement of their general attitude toward the whole question of unanimity of permanent members in the decisions of the Security Council.
I 1. The Yalta voting formula recognizes that the Security Council, in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, will have two broad groups of functions. Under chapter VIII, the Council will have to make decisions which involve its taking direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to peace, removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of breaches of the peace. It will also have to make decisions which do not involve the taking of such measures. The Yalta formula provides that the second of these two groups of decisions will be governed by a procedural vote—that is, the vote of any seven members. The first group of decisions will be governed by a qualified vote—that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members, subject to the proviso that in decisions unde: section A and a part of section C of chapter VIII parties to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
2. For example, under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire section D of chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; determine the method of selecting its president; organize itself in such a way as to be able to fund on continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; invite a member of the Organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that Member's interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute.
3. Further, no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consider ation and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its atten. tion under paragraph 2, section A, chapter VIII. Nor can parties to such dispute be prevented by these means from being heard by the Council. Likewise, the requirement for unanimity of the permanent members cannot prevent any mem ber of the Council from reminding the members of the Organization of their general obligations assumed under the Charter as regards peaceful settlement o international disputes.
4. Beyond this point, decisions and actions by the Security Council may wel have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which
i Ch. VIII in the Dumbarton Oaks proposal became chs. VI, VII, and VIII in the Charter.
might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under section B, chapter VIII. This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation, or determines that the time has come to call upon states to settle their differences, or make recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute.
5. To illustrate: In ordering an investigation, the Council has to consider whether the investigation-which may involve calling for reports, hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inquiry, or other means-might not further aggravate the situation. After investigation, the Council must determine whether the continuance of the situation or dispute would be likely to endanger international peace and security. If it so determines, the Council would be under obligation to take further steps. Similarly, the decision to make recommendations, even when all parties request it to do so, or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfill their obligations under the Charter, might be the first step on a course of action from which the Security Council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its responsibilities.
6. In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to decisions of the League Council. Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by the unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of parties to a dispute under article XV of the League Covenant. Under article XI, under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute.
7. The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system nonpermanent members of the Security Council individually would have no veto. As regards the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right; namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had. The formula proposed for the taking of action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity.
8. It should also be remembered that under the Yalta formula the five major powers could not act by themselves, since even under the unanimity requirement any decisions of the Council would have to include the concurring votes of at least two of the nonpermanent members. In other words, it would be possible for five nonpermanent members as a group to exercise a veto. It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the nonpermanent members would use their veto power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.
9. In view of the primary responsibilities of the permanent members, they could not be expected, in the present condition of the world, to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred. Therefore, if majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible, the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of nonprocedural decisions, for unanimity of the permanent members plus the concurring votes of at least two of the nonpermanent members.
10. For all these reasons, the four sponsoring governments agreed on the Yalta formula and have presented it to this Conference as essential if an international organization is to be created through which all peace-loving nations can effectively discharge their common responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.
II In the light of the considerations set forth in part I of this statement, it is clear what the answers to the questions submitted by the subcommittee should be, with the exception of question 19. The answer to that question is as follows:
1. In the opinion of the delegations of the sponsoring governments, the Draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council.
2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.
USES OF THE VETO IN PUBLIC MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE
1. The Syria-Lebanon case, February 16, 1946.-The United States proposed a resolution under which the Security Council would have expressed confidence that foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon would be withdrawn as soon as practicable and that negotiations to that end would be undertaken without delay, and would have requested that it be informed of the results of the negotiations. The following vote occurred on this resolution: For-Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Mexico, Netherlands, and United States; against-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; abstentions-Poland, France, United Kingdom. After indication approval of the resolution during the discussion, France and the United Kingdom abstained, but did not say they were parties to the dispute.
Even though France and the United Kingdom did not specifically concede that they were parties to a dispute, it seems clear that their abstention was not intended to be the equivalent of a negative vote, especially since after the resolution failed of adoption both the United Kingdom and France indicated their intention to abide by its terms. The President of the Council, after discussion, specifically ruled that the resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
2. The Spanish case, June 25, 1946.-A resolution was proposed to adopt the amended recommendations which the subcommittee on Spain made after its study of the Spanish question. Nine votes were cast in favor of the adoption of the resolution, with the U. S. S. R. against and the Netherlands abstaining.
3. The Spanish case, June 26, 1946.-Australia and the United Kingdom proposed a resolution to keep the Spanish case on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized without prejudice to the rights of the General Assembly. All members voted in favor except the Soviet and Polish representatives, who voted in the negative, as they objected to the final "without prejudice” clause.
The President of the Council ruled that the Australian-United Kingdom resolution was a question of procedure. This ruling was put to a vote. Eight members voted that the matter was procedural; France and the U. S. S. R. voted that it was not; Poland abstained.
4. The Spanish case, June 26, 1946.—Australia proposed a resolution to add the "without prejudice” clause to the previously approved paragraphs of the Australian-United Kingdom resolution. All members voted for the inclusion of this clause except the Polish and Soviet representatives, who voted against it.
5. Membership of Transjordan, August 29, 1946.-The application of Transjordan for membership in the United Nations received eight affirmative votes. Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting. The negative vote of the U, S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried,
6. Membership of Portugal, August 29, 1946.-The application of Portugal for membership in the United Nations received eight affirmative votes. Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried.
7. Membership of Ireland, August 29, 1946.—The application of Ireland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes. The U. S. S. R. voted in the negative and Australia abstained from voting. The negative vote of the U. S. S. Ř prevented the proposal from being carried.
8. Second Greek case, September 20, 1946.-In the second Greek case the United States proposed a resolution to appoint a commission to investigate the situation alleged to exist on the northern frontier of Greece. This resolution received
ight affirmative votes, Poland and the U. S. S. R. voted in the ne tive and Australia abstained. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
9. Corfu Channel case, March 25, 1947.-A resolution was introduced by the United Kingdom, finding in substance that the mine field in the Corfu Channel which caused the destruction of two British ships with loss of life and injury to their crews cannot have been laid without the knowledge of Albanian authori ties” and recommending that the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments settle the dispute on the basis of the Council's finding. This resolution received seven affirmative votes; Poland and the U.S.S. R. voted in the negative and Syria abstained from voting. The United Kingdom as a party to the dispute under
consideration was precluded by article 27 (3) of the Charter from participating in the vote. The resolution failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
10. The Third Greek case, July 29, 1947.—The resolution proposed by the United States to adopt the proposals for the maintenance of international peace made by the majority of the members of the Committee of Investigation, established by the Security Council, received nine supporting votes, with Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
11. Membership of Transjordan, August 18, 1947.—The application of Transjordan for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council, received nine affirmative votes, with Poland abstaining. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried.
12. Membership of Ireland, August 18, 1947.- The application of Ireland for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council, received nine affirmative votes, with Poland abstaining. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from being carried.
13. Membership of Portugal, August 18, 1947.-The application of Portugal for membership in the United Nations, upon submission for the second time to the Security Council, received nine affirmative votes, with Poland and the U.S. S. R. voting in the negative. The negative vote of the U. S. S. R. prevented the proposal from carrying.
14. The Third Greek case, August 19, 1947.—The resolution proposed by Australia and amended by the United States finding the existence of a threat to the peace on the northern border of Greece and calling upon the parties involved to cease all acts of provocation and to enter into direct negotiation to relieve the tension, when put to a vote, received nine supporting votes with two votes in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
15. The Third Greek case, August 19, 1947.—The resolution proposed by the United States, finding that the support given to guerrillas fighting the Greek Government by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia constituted a threat to the peace and calling upon Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to desist from rendering further support to the guerrilla fighting and to cooperate with Greece in the settlement of the dispute by peaceful means, received nine supporting votes in the Security Council, with two votes in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
16. Membership of Italy, August 26, 1947.-The resolution proposed by Australia that the Security Council find that Italy is a peace-loving state able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and recommend its admission to membership in the United Nations at such time and under such conditions as the General Assembly may deem appropriate, received nine affirmative votes, with the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative and Poland abstaining. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
17. Membership of Austria, August 26, 1947.-The resolution of Australia, finding that Austria is a peace-loving state able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and recommending its admission to membership in the United Nations at such time and under such conditions as the General Assembly may deem appropriate, received eight affimative votes, with the U.S. S. R. voting in the negative and Poland and France abstaining. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
18. Second Indonesian case, August 25, 1947.-A joint Australian-Chinese resolution which ultimately was carried proposed that members of the Security Council that have career consuls in Batavia instruct them to prepare joint reports on the situation in Indonesia for the benefit of the Council. An amendment to this resolution proposed by the U. S. S. R. substituted a commission composed of states members of the Security Council in somewhat broadened terms of reference of the Commission. This amendment received seven affirmative votes, with France and Belgium voting in the negative and China and the United Kingdom abstaining. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of France.
19. Third Greek case, September 15, 1947.-The United States resolution, requesting the General Assembly to consider the dispute between Greece and her northern neighbors and to make any recommendations which it deems appropriate under the circumstances, received nine affirmative votes but failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
20. Third Greek case, September 15, 1947.-The United States challenged the ruling of the President that the decision set forth in 19 was one of substance and therefore failed to carry because of the opposition of the U. S. S. R. The United