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States resolution, that the question be deemed one of procedure, received eight affirmative votes, with Syria abstaining and Poland and the U. S. S. R. voting in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. (NOTE.—19 and 20 could be considered one veto rather than two. Newspaper accounts listed these as two vetoes.)
21. Membership of Italy, October 1, 1947.-Upon reconsideration of the membership application of Italy nine members of the Security Council favored the admission of Italy, with U. S. S. R. and Poland voting in the negative. The application failed because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
22. Membership of Finland, October 1, 1947.-The application of Finland for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes, with U.S. S. R. and Poland voting in the negative. It failed to carry because of the negative vote of U. S. S. R.
23. Membership of Italy, April 10, 1948.—The reapplication of Italy for membership in the United Nations received nine affirmative votes, with U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine voting in the negative. The application failed to carry because of the negative vote of the U. S. S. R.
EXCERPT FROM ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE C. MARSHALL, SEC
RETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SEPTEMBER 17, 1947
The effective operation of the United Nations Security Council is one of the crucial conditions for the maintenance of international security. The exercise of the veto power in the Security Council has the closest bearing on the success and the vitality of the United Nations.
In the past the United States has been reluctant to encourage proposals for changes in the system of voting in the Security Council. Having accepted the Charter provisions on this subject and having joined with other permanent members at San Francisco in a statement of general attitude toward the question of permanent member unanimity, we wished to permit full opportunity for practical testing. We were always fully aware that the successful operation of the rule of unanimity would require the exercise of restraint by the permanent members, and we so expressed ourselves at San Francisco.
It is our hope that, despite our experience to date, such restraint will be practiced in the future by the permanent members. The abuse of the right of unanimity has prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its true functions. That has been especially true in cases arising under chapter VI and in the admission of new members.
The Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the only practicable method for improving this situation is a liberalization of the voting procedure in the Council.
The United States would be willing to accept, by whatever means may be appropriate, the elimination of the unanimity requirement with respect to matters arising under chapter VI of the Charter, and such matters as applications for membership.
We recognize that this is a matter of significance and complexity for the United Nations. We consider that the problem of how to achieve the objective of liberalization of the Security Council voting procedure deserves careful study. Consequently, we shall propose that this matter be referred to a special committee for study and report to the next session of the Assembly. Measures should be pressed concurrently in the Security Council to bring about improvements within the existing provisions of the Charter, through amendments to the rules of procedure, or other feasible means.
The scope and complexity of the problems on the agenda of this Assembly have given rise to the question whether the General Assembly can adequately discharge its responsibilities in its regular, annual sessions. There is a limit to the number of items which can receive thorough consideration during the few weeks in which this body meets. There would seem to be a definite need for constant attention to the work of the Assembly in order to deal with continuing problems. Occasional special sessions are not enough. The General Assembly has a definite and con
tinuing responsibility, under articles 11 and 14 of the Charter, in the broad field of political security and the preservation of friendly relations among nations. In our fast-moving world an annual review of developments in this field is not sufficient.
The facilities of the General Assembly must be developed to meet this need. I am therefore proposing, today, that this Assembly proceed at this session to create a standing committee of the General Assembly, which might be known as the Interim Committee on Peace and Security, to serve until the beginning of its third regular session next September. The Committee would not, of course, impinge on matters which are the primary responsibility of the Security Council or of special commissions, but, subject to that, it might consider situations and disputes impairing friendly relations brought to its attention by member states or by the Security Council pursuant to articles 11 and 14 of the Charter and report to the Assembly or to the Security Council thereon; recommend to the members the calling of special sessions of the General Assembly when necessary; and might report at the next regular session on the desirability of establishing such a committee on a permanent basis.
In our opinion, every member of the United Nations should be seated on this body.
The creation of the Interim Committee will make the facilities of the General Assembly continually available during this next year to all its members. It will strengthen the machinery for peaceful settlement and place the responsibility for such settlement broadly upon all the members of the United Nations. Without infringing on the jurisdiction of the Security Council, it will provide an unsurpassed opportunity for continuing study, after the adjournment of this Assembly, of the problems with which the United Nations must contend if it is to succeed. EXCERPT FROM ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR WARREN R. Austin, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SEAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BEFORE THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK CITY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1947.
We are not divided in all the councils of the United Nations. Quite to the contrary-we are in many and varied organs and activities united. The votes there are seldom close; they are almost always overwhelming.
This cooperation in votes and works develops strength and confidence to extend the front of collective security. Our task is to maintain the degree of unity we have achieved while patiently striving for agreement in those controversial areas where substantial change in old habits of thought and living are involved.
People are apprehensive over the continued obstruction of a small minority, particularly when a decisive majority requires one of those minority votes. Nevertheless, the determined unity of the many may ultimately win the cooperation of the few. In the United Nations every issue and every proposal is submitted to exhaustive discussion in the open. Representatives of member states patiently work out compromises and improve upon their original suggestions as a consequence of acquired understanding of varied interests.
The representative who casts a negative vote usually records the reasons for his opposition. If the frequent obstruction of the will of the majority appears contrary to the policies and principles of the United Nations, such continued opposition strengthens rather than weakens the unity of the many. In the long run enlightened self-interest of the minority will be found in giving life, not death, to the Charter principles. It is far too early in the short life of the United Nations to discount the possibility of winning unanimity through the patient formulation of majority positions. If the majority firmly adheres to the great objectives of the Charter, I believe we can work our way up to unanimity.
Now let me refer to some applications of the foregoing, in particular, to the use made of the veto which has raised doubt and forebodings.
As the United Nations was conceived, three great principles animated it; namely, universality, soverign equality, and unanimity of the great powers as the only sure guaranty of perfect collective security. Perfection alone is invulnerable. Our awareness of present human and governmental characteristics, however, impels action approximating, though not reaching, the goal. We continue to regard the unanimity of the great powers as the best guaranty of collective security. If peace is the objective of the great powers, as I believe it is, the world will have peace because of their unanimity. Pray God the world may have peace in spite of disunity of the great powers.
Realism in respect of need for the veto calls for balanced thought regarding proposals to eliminate or severely restrict its use.
We favor use of the rule of unanimity only for the purpose intended. Such use can be defined more precisely than it has been. If world opinion is convinced and determined that all issues being considered under the pacific settlements provision of chapter VI, and such matters as applications for membership in the United Nations should be immune from the veto, I believe these objectives could be reached. This would comprehend such functions of chapter VI as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and the like.
The United States is not wedded to any particular method or to any timetable in the pursuit of our objective to increase the effectiveness of the Security Council. It is my hope that the Security Council itself will develop its own rules and practices in a way that will contribute substantially toward this goal.
Many questions which have been regarded as substantive could be classified as procedural and not subject to veto by the adoption of an appropriate rule with the concurrence of the permanent members.
It is our desire to extend a most thorough and searching examination into all the aspects of this question. We, therefore, have proposed that the Assembly establish a committee to study the entire issue and make suitable recommendations to the next session. Moral energy generated among the peoples of all nations would promote achievement of the committee's objective.
The scope of this inquiry would not now include the application of the unanimity principle to the enforcement provisions-rupture of diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, or use of force-which are found in chapter VII of the Charter.
A striking evidence of our reliance on the development of a broad collective will is our proposal for a General Assembly Interim Committee on Peace and Security. Between its yearly meetings we believe the General Assembly should have the means of carrying out its authority as described in articles 11 and 14. Thus this body of all the member nations could conduct on-the-spot investigations in troubled areas. It could call to the attention of the Security Council situations threatening the peace. It could recommend the calling of a special session of the Assembly. And it could study various ways of making existing machinery operate more effectively.
I know this plan to enable all the member states to act effectively together in support of the Charter will be welcomed by the members of this association. I recall that the idea of permanent Assembly committees was contained in the thoughtful report made recently by your research affiliate, the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace. I feel sure that the authors of that proposal will favorably regard this effort to make continuously available to the nations of the world the powers of the General Assembly to promote friendly relations between states.
The Charter in its very first article introduces the key words "effective collective measures. These words and the many other action phrases throughout the Charter clearly establish the United Nations as means for mobilizing and using the power and authority of the member states to carry out the pledges and principles to which they subscribed.
As you know, I have recently returned from the Rio Conference. There the nations of this hemisphere set an example in agreements for "effective collective measures” to maintain peace. At Rio, 19 members of the United Nations strength. ened the World Organization by undertaking specific responsibilities for collective security in our hemisphere and for discharging their obligations as a group under the Charter.
The treaty drawn at Rio provides us with machinery to carry out both the methods of pacific settlement and of self-defense as referred to in the Charter of the United Nations. It creates effective organs of consultation and collective action to function in accordance with a system of specific measures to insure peace in this hemisphere. That treaty, therefore, builds a foundation of security on which to rear the superstructure of the economic and social progress of this hemisphere. From this huge reservoir of peace and orderly progress the United Nations may draw strength and increased authority in its world-wide effort to apply the principles of neighborly relations.
The use of the veto in the Security Council, which prevented a majority of nine from taking "effective collective measures” to prevent aggression upon Greece, does not prove that the United Nations is powerless to perform this function. The General Assembly will have an opportunity to consider collective defense of her territorial integrity and independence. A majority of the United Nations has the power and the authority, within the Charter, to take effective collective measures which they agree may be necessary for the defense of Greece. This is an illustration of the capacity of the United Nations to activate its principles and policies aimed at the maintenance of peace.
UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, PRESS RELEASE No. 401,
MARCH 10, 1948—UNITED STATES PROPOSALS TO THE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
By a resolution adopted on November 21, 1947, the General Assembly requested its Interim Committee to
"1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;
“2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to cooperate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;
“3. Report, with its conclusions, to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General not later than 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Member States and to
the General Assembly." On January 9, 1948, the Interim Committee, by resolution, asked that proposals on the problem of voting in the Security Council be transmitted to the Secretary-General on or before March 15, 1948.
In accordance with these resolutions, the United States delegation will submit the attached proposals.
UNITED STATES PROPOSALS TO THE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF
VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
1, Study of categories of Security Council decisions
A, The Interim Committee should study the categories of decisions which the Security Council is required to make in carrying out the functions entrusted to it under the Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and should report to the General Assembly those categories of decisions which in its judgment, in order to ensure the effective exercise by the Security Council of its responsibilities under the Charter, should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, whether or not such categories are regarded as procedural or nonprocedural. (A provisional proposed list of such categories is attached.) B. The Interim Committee should recommend to the General Assembly:
(1) That the General Assembly accept the conclusions of the Interim Committee's Report; and
(2) That the General Assembly as a first step recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that they mutually agree that such voting procedures be followed, and that steps be taken to make their agreement effective. II. Consultation among permanent members
The Interim Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that in order to improve the functioning of the Security Council the General Assembly recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that wherever feasible consultations should take place among them concerning important decisions to be taken by the Security Council.
(Attachment] Provisional list of categories of Security Council decisions which the United States
proposes should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, whether or not such categories are regarded as procedural or nonprocedural 1. Decisions with respect to admission of states to membership in the United
Nations, pursuant to article 4 (2). 2. Decisions to bring a question relating to the maintenance of international 6. Decisions with respect to the request directed by the Security Council to the
peace and security before the General Assembly pursuant to article 11 (2). 3. Decisions to request the recommendation of the General Assembly concerning
a matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
being dealt with by the Security Council pursuant to article 12 (1). 4. Deèisions to cease dealing with a matter relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security pursuant to article 12 (2). 5. Decisions with respect to the consent of the Security Council to the notifica
tions made by the Secretary-General under article 12 (2).
Secretary-General that he convoke a special session of the General Assembly
under article 20. 7. Submission of annual and special reports from the Security Council to the
General Assembly pursuant to article 24 (3). 8. Decisions of the Security Council as to whether a matter is procedural within
the meaning of article 27 (2). 9. Determination of the parties to a dispute and the existence of a dispute for
the purpose of deciding whether a member of the Security Council shall
be required to abstain from voting pursuant to article 27 (3). 10. Decisions concerning the manner of the organization of the Security Council
pursuant to article 28 (1). 11. Decisions concerning the time and place of its regular and periodic meetings
pursuant to article 28 (2) and article 28 (3). 12. Establishment of subsidiary organs pursuant to article 29. 13. The election of a President pursuant to article 30. 14. Adoption of Rules of Procedure pursuant to article 30. 15. Decisions to permit the participation of members of the United Nations in
the discussion of any question where the Council considers that the interests
of the member are specially affected pursuant to article 31. 16. Decisions to invite a member state which is not a member of the Security
Council or a state not a member of the United Nations which is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council to participate without
vote in the discussion relating to the dispute pursuant to article 32. 17. Decisions with respect to conditions for the participation of a state which is
not a member of the United Nations in the Security Council discussions
in accordance with article 32. 18. Decisions to consider and discuss a matter brought to the attention of the
Council. 19. Decisions to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle their dispute by.
peaceful means of their own choice pursuant to article 33 (2). 20. Decisions to investigate a dispute or a situation which might lead to inter
national friction or give rise to a dispute, pursuant to article 34. 21. Decisions to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment of
a dispute or situation endangering the maintenance of international peace
and security, pursuant to article 36 (1). 22. Decisions of the Security Council pursuant to article 36 (3) to recommend to
the parties to a legal dispute that the dispute should be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with provisions
of the statute of the Court. 23. Decisions to make recommendations at the request of all parties to a dispute
with a view to its pacific settlement, pursuant to article 38. 24. Decisions to request assistance from the Economic and Social Council pursu
ant to article 65. 25. Reference of a legal question to the International Court of Justice for an
advisory opinion pursuant to article 96 (1). 26. Decision to convoke a conference to review the Charter prior to the tenth
annual session of the General Assembly pursuant to article 109 (1). 27. Decision to convoke a conference to review the Charter subsequent to the
tenth annual session of the General Assembly pursuant to article 109 (3). 28. Election of judges of the International Court of Justice pursuant to article 4
(1), article 10 (1) of the Statute of the Court (art. 10 (2) of the statute).' 29. Decisions of the Security Council determining the conditions under which &
state which is a party to the present statute of the International Court of Justice, but which is not a member of the United Nations, mav participate in electing the members of the Court pursuant to article 4 (3) of the statute
of the Court. 30. Appointment of conferees in connection with election of judges of the Inter
national Court of Justice pursuant to article 12 of the statute of the Court
(art. 10 (2) of the statute).! 31. Determination of the date of election of judges of the International Court of
Justice pursuant to article 14 of the statute of the Court. 1 These decisions are made by "an absolute majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the Security Council.”