UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, PRESS RELEASE No. 401, MARCH 10, 1948-UNITED STATES PROPOSALS TO THE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

By a resolution adopted on November 21, 1947, the General Assembly requested its Interim Committee to

"1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;

"2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to cooperate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;

"3. Report, with its conclusions, to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General not later than 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Member States and to the General Assembly."

On January 9, 1948, the Interim Committee, by resolution, asked that proposals on the problem of voting in the Security Council be transmitted to the Secretary-General on or before March 15, 1948.

In accordance with these resolutions, the United States delegation will submit the attached proposals.

UNITED STATES PROPOSALS TO THE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I. Study of categories of Security Council decisions

A. The Interim Committee should study the categories of decisions which the Security Council is required to make in carrying out the functions entrusted to it under the Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and should report to the General Assembly those categories of decisions which in its judgment, in order to ensure the effective exercise by the Security Council of its responsibilities under the Charter, should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, whether or not such categories are regarded as procedural or nonprocedural. (A provisional proposed list of such categories is attached.)

B. The Interim Committee should recommend to the General Assembly:

(1) That the General Assembly accept the conclusions of the Interim Committee's Report; and

(2) That the General Assembly as a first step recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that they mutually agree that such voting procedures be followed, and that steps be taken to make their agreement effective.

II. Consultation among permanent members

The Interim Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that in order to improve the functioning of the Security Council the General Assembly recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that wherever feasible consultations should take place among them concerning important decisions to be taken by the Security Council.

[Attachment]

Provisional list of categories of Security Council decisions which the United States proposes should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, whether or not such categories are regarded as procedural or nonprocedural

1. Decisions with respect to admission of states to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to article 4 (2).

2. Decisions to bring a question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security before the General Assembly pursuant to article 11 (2). 3. Decisions to request the recommendation of the General Assembly concerning a matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security being dealt with by the Security Council pursuant to article 12 (1).

4. Decisions to cease dealing with a matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security pursuant to article 12 (2).

5. Decisions with respect to the consent of the Security Council to the notifications made by the Secretary-General under article 12 (2).

6. Decisions with respect to the request directed by the Security Council to the Secretary-General that he convoke a special session of the General Assembly under article 20.

7. Submission of annual and special reports from the Security Council to the General Assembly pursuant to article 24 (3).

8. Decisions of the Security Council as to whether a matter is procedural within the meaning of article 27 (2).

9. Determination of the parties to a dispute and the existence of a dispute for the purpose of deciding whether a member of the Security Council shall be required to abstain from voting pursuant to article 27 (3).

10. Decisions concerning the manner of the organization of the Security Council pursuant to article 28 (1).

11. Decisions concerning the time and place of its regular and periodic meetings pursuant to article 28 (2) and article 28 (3).

12. Establishment of subsidiary organs pursuant to article 29.

13. The election of a President pursuant to article 30.

14. Adoption of Rules of Procedure pursuant to article 30.

15. Decisions to permit the participation of members of the United Nations in the discussion of any question where the Council considers that the interests of the member are specially affected pursuant to article 31.

16. Decisions to invite a member state which is not a member of the Security Council or a state not a member of the United Nations which is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council to participate without vote in the discussion relating to the dispute pursuant to article 32.

17. Decisions with respect to conditions for the participation of a state which is not a member of the United Nations in the Security Council discussions in accordance with article 32.

18. Decisions to consider and discuss a matter brought to the attention of the Council.

19. Decisions to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle their dispute by peaceful means of their own choice pursuant to article 33 (2).

20. Decisions to investigate a dispute or a situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, pursuant to article 34.

21. Decisions to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment of a dispute or situation endangering the maintenance of international peace and security, pursuant to article 36 (1).

22. Decisions of the Security Council pursuant to article 36 (3) to recommend to the parties to a legal dispute that the dispute should be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with provisions of the statute of the Court.

23. Decisions to make recommendations at the request of all parties to a dispute with a view to its pacific settlement, pursuant to article 38.

24. Decisions to request assistance from the Economic and Social Council pursuant to article 65.

25. Reference of a legal question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion pursuant to article 96 (1).

26. Decision to convoke a conference to review the Charter prior to the tenth

annual session of the General Assembly pursuant to article 109 (1). 27. Decision to convoke a conference to review the Charter subsequent to the tenth annual session of the General Assembly pursuant to article 109 (3). 28. Election of judges of the International Court of Justice pursuant to article 4 (1), article 10 (1) of the Statute of the Court (art. 10 (2) of the statute).1 29. Decisions of the Security Council determining the conditions under which a state which is a party to the present statute of the International Court of Justice, but which is not a member of the United Nations, may participate in electing the members of the Court pursuant to article 4 (3) of the statute of the Court.

30. Appointment of conferees in connection with election of judges of the International Court of Justice pursuant to article 12 of the statute of the Court (art. 10 (2) of the statute).1

31. Determination of the date of election of judges of the International Court of Justice pursuant to article 14 of the statute of the Court.

1 These decisions are made by "an absolute majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the Security Council."

EXCERPT FROM ARTICLE BY MR. HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OCTOBER 1947

We are right to be dissatisfied with the condition of the world 2 years after the victory, but we would be wrong to let our sense of bafflement persuade us to change the direction of our policy. The direction remains the same; and so long as our Government keeps its compass set by the same star the public will leave it free to show the greatest resourcefulness and vigor of which it is capable. We no longer boast, as Ambassador George Harvey did with such ineffable complacency in 1923: "The National American policy is to have no foreign policy." We have a foreign policy and we believe in it. Its cornerstone is support for the principles and purposes of the United Nations as set forth in articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, and we should like to build on and up from this cornerstone in accordance with the blueprint agreed upon at San Francisco. The United Nations has had successes, notably in dealing with the Iranian crisis and the affair of the Corfu Channel. But its attempts to solve the fundamental problems which are today causing the world's greatest anxieties have left many of its adherents wondering whether, all differing ideas as to procedure aside, the members at present do really have identical aims. For its efforts to agree on methods for controlling atomic energy, providing forces for international police purposes, limiting armaments, discouraging and restraining aggression, even for concerting action for economic recovery, have been paralyzed, directly or indirectly, by what Mr. Stimson elsewhere in these pages calls the "everlasting no" of one power.

In attempting to carry out the purposes of the United Nations we have already been forced in one instance to go outside its framework. We have launched the attempt to restore the self-support and self-reliance of the battered European nations by direct cooperative action, not because we or the other nations concerned wish to ignore the United Nations but because its economic organs are still in a formative stage and because the work to be done cannot wait on the veto of one power.

SO.

Similarly, if there comes from that power only an "everlasting no" to every attempted preparation for dealing with aggression we may be forced to find a way of reinforcing the United Nations itself, to the end that its faithful members who wish to carry out their obligations under the Charter may have the means to do A possible method would be for a group of members of the United Nations to enter into a supplementary protocol binding themselves to resist aggression if two-thirds of them agreed that the terms of the Charter required action and if the Security Council had failed to act. The obligation to resist aggression is laid upon all members in articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, which set forth the Organization's purposes and principles; the suggested supplementary action would be taken by virtue of article 51, which reserves to members the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if a member is the victim of armed attack and if the Security Council fails to take the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. The two-thirds majority suggested for bringing the protocol into effect would correspond to that fixed at Rio for starting action under the new hemisphere treaty. Remembering that the failure of the Geneva protocol of 1924 was the real turning point in the history of the League of Nations, we might consider whether an instrument supplementing the Charter while remaining true to its spirit might not give a new impetus to the deliberations at Lake Success and Flushing Meadows.

FEDERAL UNION, INC.: THE FEDERAL UNION PLAN AT A GLANCE

The federal union plan would secure freedom, recovery, and peace by uniting the United States and other civil liberty democracies in a federal union of the free, modeled on the United States Constitution. This new republic would be the nucleus for a world government. That is, it would be designed to grow by federating with other nations as this became practicable, much as the United States grew from 13 to 48 States. Pending its growth into a government of, by, and for all the people on earth, it would be a member of the UN.

Civil-liberty democracies are those nations that have proved most capable of assuring the individual freedom of speech, press, and other basic liberties covered by, our term, bill of rights. They include the United States, Canada, Britain, Eire, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, New

As

Zealand, Australia, the Union of South Africa. You might add a few more. the free peoples center mainly on the Atlantic, their union is often called a transAtlantic union.

A federal union of the free is an interstate government so made as to keep you, the citizen, free and sovereign. In the union, as in your nation or state, you elect the lawmakers, and their laws are enforced on you individually. Power is divided between the union and your national government with a view to advancing thereby your liberty, prosperity, peace.

The division of powers between the union and the national governments, and the character of the union's executive, legislative, and judicial departments, would be decided by a constitutional convention, subject to ratification by each democracy.

The union's powers should include the sole right to conduct foreign relations, maintain armed forces, issue currency, regulate commerce and communications between member nations, grant union citizenship. It should, of course, have the power to tax, and to uphold its bill of rights.

The first federal union of the free was formed by the United States. The Swiss, Canadians, and South Africans have made successful multilanguage federal unions.

Freedom for all men equally through an ever-growing federal union of the freethat, in short, is the federal-union plan.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR UNITED NATIONS REFORM, INC.: THE QUOTA FORCE PLAN FOR UNITED NATIONS REFORM

FIRST REFORM: ABOLISH THE VETO IN MATTERS OF AGGRESSION

1. Define aggression in the Charter, as an attack with weapons of violence by a state or its citizens against the territory of another state.

2. Define preparation for aggression in the Charter, as the production of atomic weapons, production of other important armament beyond agreed quotas, or refusal to submit to inspection.

3. Abolish the veto in the Security Council in matters specifically concerning aggression and preparation for aggression. It is not the "abuse" of the veto, but the legal right to veto, which must be abolished if the Security Council is not to remain a perpetually hung jury. The United States has officially proposed that the veto be abolished in chapter VI. This is not enough. We must eliminate the present right of a major power, under chapter VII, to rearm for aggression, attack its neighbor, and then veto any attempt of the Security Council to do anything about it.

4. Reorganize the Security Council so that, without the veto, the six nonpermanent members from the smaller states cannot outvote the five permanent members. Suggested representation: Two members each from United States, Britain, and Russia; one each from France and China, and two selected collectively by the smaller member states. This new representation recognizes the present power position of the major nations, but gives the smaller states a new collective power. 5. Establish a world court (or reorganize the International Court of Justice) to decide when aggression and preparation for aggression has occurred, to interpret the reformed UN Charter, and to enforce its provisions on both governments and individuals. The composition of the court should be similar to that of the reformed Security Council. A strong judiciary will thus balance the executivelegislative power of the reformed Security Council.

Results: The first reform establishes a higher law (no aggression or preparation for aggression) and a strong and workable body to administer that law (reformed Security Council and world court). But the United States and other members need give up only what they have already surrendered in principle-the "right" to wage aggressive war.

SECOND REFORM: CONTROL ATOMIC ENERGY AND LIMIT ALL OTHER IMPORTANT WEAPONS

1. Control of atomic energy: Establish an Atomic Development Authority, responsible to the reformed, vetoless Security Council, for the rigid control of atomic weapons in accordance with the official United States plan (Baruch proposal). Follow a similar procedure with other weapons of mass destruction, such as bacteriological weapons. The illegal production or use of these atomic and other super weapons shall be absolutely prohibited.

2. World quota disarmament in other important weapons (war planes, warships, etc.): Give the Security Council the right to fix yearly the total quantity in specified categories that may be produced in the world. Of this total quantity each of the five major powers will have the right to produce a certain quota, specified in the Charter, which it may not exceed; the remaining member states will have a collective quota, to be produced in their territories by an Armament Authority responsible to the Security Council. Thus the amount of important armament produced in the world can gradually be reduced almost to zero. But the relative strength of the major powers and the collective of small nations will remain constant, as determined by their production quotas. Suggested quotasenough for defense, not enough for aggression are: United States, Britain, and Russia, 20 percent each; France and China, 10 percent each; the smaller member states through the Armament Authority, 20 percent collectively.

3. Enforcement: Give the Security Council the power and responsibility of enforcing the above provisions, by maintaining adequate staffs of inspectors with full rights of access to the territories of member states.

4. In the event that any major state refuses to participate in the world quota disarmament, the quotas of other major states shall be increased proportionately. The Security Council may also decree an extra quota of production, to make certain that any outside state will be faced with overwhelming organized strength. The outside state should soon realize the folly of trying to compete with the rest of the world, and join in the quota disarmament.

Results: The second reform achieves humanity's goal of controlled disarmament, eliminates the back-breaking load of the armament race, and implements resolutions already passed by the UN General Assembly.

THIRD REFORM: ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE BUT TYRANNY-PROOF WORLD POLICE FORCE

The world police force will consist of two parts: The active force will be an international contingent, recruited from the small nations only; the reserves will be five national contingents, from the major powers. It will be organized as

follows:

1. Set up an international contingent, maintained by the Security Council under its direct control, consisting of volunteers from the smaller member states only. This will be a professional army, highly paid and highly trained, stationed in special internationalized bases and temporarily in Germany and elsewhere as the only troops of occupation.

2. Equip the international contingent with the collective quota of heavy armament produced by the armament authority in the smaller member states. Its strength will thus be automatically limited by the small nations' production quota of armament.

3. Give the Security Council the power to move the international contingent immediately against any state (or citizens) found guilty by the world court of aggression or preparation for aggression. The international contingent is certain to support the authority of the UN, since its members come from the smaller states, whose only hope of survival is an effective international organization.

4. Use the national armed forces of the five major powers as national contingents, to serve as reserves to the international contingent if necessary. These national armed forces will remain under complete control of their respective governments; but their strength will be automatically limited by their production quotas of armament, as provided in the second reform.

Results: Since the international contingent is limited to one-fifth of the world's armed strength, it cannot become a world tyranny. Since the national armed forces of the five major powers are also limited, none of them can successfully defy the UN; but they retain their own armed forces for defense.

Once the international contingent is organized, it will very probably not be necessary to use it. The fact that it is there, ready for instant action, backed up if necessary by the national contingents, is enough to deter any government from making the fatal decision of resort to force. No government is likely to commit aggression if it knows in advance that it cannot win.