38 Appropriations for the budget of Peace and Defense, under control of the Chamber of Guardians, as proposed by the Chamber at the beginning of each term for the whole duration thereof, shall be submitted by the President to the Council, in conformity with Art. 13. But if a state of emergency is declared, in the manner and limits as specified hereinbefore [Art 28, last paragraph], the Chamber shall have power to demand and appropriate such additional funds as the emergency demands, subject to auditing and sanction by the Council when the emergency is closed; whereafter, if sanction is denied, the Guardians responsible shall be liable to impeachment and prosecution for usurpation of power with the same procedure as specified for the President and the Tribune of the People hereinbefore [Art. 15 and 34]. 39 The Chamber shall have power to propose by absolute majority, subject to approval by two-thirds majority votes of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal concurrently, extraordinary powers, world-wide or local, to be conferred on the President beyond those assigned to him by this Constitution, when a state of emergency, as provided in Art. 28, is proclaimed; such powers not to be granted for periods exceeding six months each and to be relinquished before the expiration of any such period as soon as the state of emergency, in conformity with Art. 28, is proclaimed closed. 40 The Chamber of Guardians shall answer interrogations from the Council on its general and administrative directives, but no vote shall be taken after discussion thereof, except as otherwise provided in Art. 28 and 39; and the decisions of the Chamber in matters technical and strategic shall be final, and withheld from publicity when the Chamber so decides. 41 The Chamber of Guardians, assisted by a General Staff and an Institute of Technology whose members it shall appoint, shall determine the technological and the numerical level that shall be set as limits to the domestic militias of the single communities and states or unions thereof. Armed forces and the manufacture of armaments beyond the levels thus determined shall be reserved to the World Government. THE FEDERAL CAPITAL AND FEDERAL LANGUAGE AND STANDARDS 42 Within one year of its foundation the World Republic shall choose a Federal Capital, or a site therefor, with eminent domain over it and an adequate Federal District. 43 Within three years of its foundation the Federal Government shall designate one language, which shall be standard for the formulation and interpretation of the federal laws; and for analogous purposes, relative to communication, taxation, and finances, it shall establish in its first year a federal unit of currency with a federal system of measures and a federal calendar. THE AMENDING POWER 44 Amendments to this Constitution, recommended concurrently by a two-thirds majority of the Council and of the Grand Tribunal, shall be in force when approved by a two-thirds majority of the Federal Convention in the Constitutional Session following the recommendation. Constitutional Sessions, of thirty days or less, as the discussion may require and the majority may decide, shall be held immediately after the ordinary electoral session in the third Federal Convention and thereafter every ninth year. [But no amendment altering the electoral units as listed in Art. 5, or the assign ment to them of seats in the Council and the other federal bodies, shall be recom. mended to the first of such Sessions.] [RATIFICATION AND PRELIMINARY PERIOD] 45 The first Federal Convention shall be the Founding Convention. The ratio of representation therein shall be based on the world population figures as ascertained or authoritatively approximated in 1948. The ways and means for the convocation of the Founding Convention, and the regulations for its inaugural and voting procedures, shall be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 46 The thirty-day electoral session of the Founding Convention shall be preceded by a preliminary session of thirty days or less for the discussion and approval of this Constitution, such preliminary session to be extended for thirty additional days or less as the discussion may require and the majority may decide. The delegates to the Founding Convention shall vote individually, and not by delegations; except on the assignment to the nine Electoral Colleges or Regions of such optional states or zones as listed hereinbefore [Art. 5]; in which matter the vote of the majority, within the delegation from the state or zone concerned, shall be binding upon the minority; and Art. 5 shall be adjusted accordingly. 47 The Founding Convention having discussed and approved by individual majority vote this Constitution, ratification by collective majorities within as many delegations of states and nations as represent two-thirds of the population of the earth, shall be sufficient for the establishment of the Federal Republic of the World.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, To: The Honorable Robert B. Chiperfield, House of Representatives. Subject: Information concerning the veto and certain aspects of proposals relating to armaments, armed forces for international enforcement, and voting representation. I understand from Mr. Rusk that in conversation with him you and some other members of the Foreign Affairs Committee expressed a desire to have further information from the Department concerning the veto and certain aspects of the proposals relating to armaments, armed forces for international enforcement, and voting representation. The attached memoranda have been prepared in response to that request. I hope that you will find them useful. I am also sending copies of the memoranda to Chairman Eaton and to Representatives Vorys, Jonkman, Javits, and Lodge. DURWARD V. SANDIFER. THE VETO I. MEANING OF THE TERM "VETO" The term "veto" is not found in the Charter. It refers to the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council in decisions on questions not procedural in character. It appears in the voting provisions in one, and only one, of the organs of the United Nations, the Security Council. The veto, in other words, does not apply to decisions of any other organ of the United Nations-the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice. It does not apply to decisions of the numerous subsidiary organs of the United Nations. Article 27 of the Charter reads as follows: "1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. "2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. "3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting." That is, under paragraph 3 of article 27 of the Charter, the concurrence of the United States, the United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, and China is required for nonprocedural decisions. Thus, any of these states may veto a decision of this nature by voting against it. In the Security Council itself, the veto does not apply to every decision. Procedural decisions are taken by a vote of any seven members. Furthermore, in a Security Council decision in connection with the pacific settlement of a dispute, a member of the Security Council which is a party to a dispute is required to abstain from voting. Finally, a Security Council practice has developed under which, if a permanent member of the Security Council abstains from voting on a nonprocedural decision of the Council, such abstention is not considered to be a veto. At the same time, it should be noted that nonprocedural decisions require seven votes, two of which, obviously, must be cast by nonpermanent members. There are six such members. Accordingly, if as many as five of these vote "No" on a nonprocedural decision, they can exercise a veto in fact as effective as a veto cast by a permanent member, II. ORIGIN OF THE VETO At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, which originated the proposals which became the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, there was considerable discussion of the problem of voting in the Security Council. No agreement was reached. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals contained the following note on this subject: "NOTE. The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration." In December 1944 and January 1945, in order to resolve the voting question undecided at Dumbarton Oaks, the United States made certain proposals which were agreed to at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 by Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. They were then incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations as article 27. While it is true that the United States offered the Yalta formula, nevertheless, this proposal was submitted as a compromise and the veto, as provided therein, was less stringent than originally desired by the U. S. S. R., which would have extended even to voting by a permanent member in a dispute to which it was a party. At the San Francisco Conference in May and June 1945, which adopted the Charter of the United Nations, the proposed voting formula was sharply criticized by many of the smaller states. Such criticisms were of two types. In the first place, the smaller states contended that the formula was ambiguous. They therefore submitted to the great powers a questionnaire intended to clarify the ambiguities. In response to this questionnaire the United States, U. S. S. R., United Kingdom, and China prepared the so-called Four Power Statement of June 7, 1945. The United States believed that the Four Power Statement, in fact, would clarify the voting formula and as a result of the attitudes expressed in that statement, the veto would not, in fact, present a serious problem once the Security Council commenced its operations. However, as will be pointed out subsequently, the U. S. S. R. has interpreted the Four Power Statement in a manner which the United States believes has resulted in seriously diminishing the effectiveness of the Security Council. The second objection raised by the smaller states to the Yalta proposals concerned the existence of a veto in connection with Security Council decisions under chapter VI of the Charter (pacific settlement of disputes). At San Francisco, it was conceded by substantially all states, large and small, that a veto was essential under chapter VII of the Charter. The following statement of the Secretary of State, in his report to the President on the San Francisco Conference as the basis of the veto was, in fact, the view of practically all states in the Conference as well as the United States: "This war was won not by any one country but by the combined efforts of the United Nations, and particularly by the brilliantly coordinated strategy of the great powers. So striking has been the lesson taught by this unity that the people and Government of the United States have altered their conception of national security. We understand that in the world of today a unilateral national policy of security is as outmoded as the Spads of 1918 in comparison with the B-29 of 1945, or the rocket planes of 1970. We know that for the United States and for other great powers-there can be no humanly devised method of defining precisely the geographic areas in which their security interest begin or cease to exist. We realize, in short, that peace is a world-wide problem and the maintenance of peace, and not merely its restoration, depends primarily upon the unity of the great powers. * * *19 However, a substantial number of States felt that the veto should not be extended to chapter VI where the Security Council was not using enforcement measures but was acting rather in a mediating capacity. Australia proposed an amendment to the voting formula which would have eliminated the veto under chapter VI. Despite the opposition of all the great powers, the Australian amendment received 10 affirmative votes-Australia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Iran, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand and Panama-making it apparent that even at San Francisco there was strong opposition to the veto under chapter VI. However, it must be emphasized that there was no support at San Francisco for the elimination or restriction of the veto under chapter VII of the Charter. In the four power statement of June 7, 1945, to which we have previously referred, the United States, U. S. S. R., United Kingdom, and China stated (pt. 1 par. 8): "In other words, it would be possible for five nonpermanent members as a group to exercise a veto. It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members any more than the nonpermanent members would use their veto power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council." It thus was understood that the veto would be used sparingly and only in connection with the most important of issues. Unfortunately, this expectation has not come to pass. III. EXPERIENCE OF THE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL The veto has been used in the Security Council on 23 occasions, 22 times by the U. S. S. R., with France joining with the U. S. S. R. in connection with one of the vetoes, and once by France alone. Eleven of these vetoes have been in connection with applications from states for membership in the United Nations. Nine have been in connection with decisions relating to pacific settlements of disputes (ch. VI) and three, including the French veto, have been taken under chapter VII. The significance of the vetoes lies in their number than in their nature. In connection with most of the USSR vetoes on membership applications, the USSR did not even claim that the states lacked the qualifications of membership as set forth in article 4 of the Charter, but based their opposition on purely political grounds. In connection with three of the vetoes dealing with pacific settlement of disputes (two in the Spanish case and one in the Syria-Lebanon case), the USSR actually agreed with the proposed Security Council action as far as it went but vetoed the proposals because the USSR felt that they should go farther. Two of the vetoes were exercised in decisions as to whether a question required only a procedural vote,' thus broadening the scope of the veto in the Security Council to include decisions which the majority of the Security Council considered procedural and not subject to the veto. In this connection, the USSR has attempted, by its interpretation of certain language in the Four Power Statement, to make virtually any decisions of the Security Council subject to the veto despite the express language of article 27, paragraph 2. It should be noted that none of these abuses of the veto relate to chapter VII of the Charter. They concern (a) applications for membership, under chapter II, article 4; (b) chapter VI of the Charter; and (c) the method of determining whether or not the voting procedure permitting a veto is applicable to a given 1 Pt. II of the Four Power Statement at San Francisco reads: "In light of the considerations set forth in pt. 1 of this statement, it is clear what the answers to the questions submitted by the subcommitee should be, with the excepion of question 19. The answer to that question is as follows: "1. In the opinion of the delegations of the sponsoring governments, the Draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council. "2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including concurring votes of permanent members." decision. The existence of a veto under chapter VII has not to date materially interfered with the functioning of the Security Council. However, the abuse of the veto in membership matters and under chapter VI has been a most serious matter. IV. BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VETO UNDER CHAPTER VI AND VETO UNDER CHAPTER VII It may be asked why we are prepared to give up the veto under chapter VI and not under chapter VII. There are a number of answers: First, as set forth above, the veto under chapter VI has proved to be harmful to the Security Council, but such has not so far been the case in connection with chapter VII. Second, there is great support in the United Nations for the elimination or the restriction of the veto under chapter VI, and also in membership matters, but very little support for changes in chapter VII. As set forth above, there was substantial sentiment at the San Francisco Conference for elimination of the veto under chapter VI. Since San Francisco, there have been three extensive discussions in the United Nations on the problem of the veto. The first two of these took place in the second half of the first session and the second session of the General Assembly. The third discussion is now in progress before the Interim Committee. It is a noteworthy fact that no proposals have been made in any of these discussions which would have the effect of eliminating the veto in connection with enforcement measures-that is, sanctions, military or nonmilitary, under chapter VII of the Charter. A few proposals have been made which affect comparatively minor phases of the veto in connection with certain chapter VII decisions, but these proposals have developed no substantial support. During the thorough discussions of all phases of the veto problem that have recently taken place in a working group of a subcommittee of the Interim Committee, consisting of representatives of 10 states, including the most violent critics of the veto, it was unanimously agreed that there should be no change in the voting procedure in connection with chapter VII. The third and most important reason for differentiating between the veto under chapter VI and under chapter VII is based upon principle. It is because of this distinction in principle that, as outlined above, great support has developed in the United Nations for elimination of the veto under chapter VI, and no substantial support has developed for its elimination or modification under chapter VII. The distinction in principle was clearly expressed to the first committee of the General Assembly on November 18, 1947, by Mr. John Foster Dulles as representative of the United States: "Let us now look at the Charter, to see the area within which Security Council decisions, as a matter of principle, ought not to be taken except with a large degree of unanimity. Broadly speaking, it would seem that Security Council action-under chapter VII-action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, should, as a matter of principle, be subject to stringent voting requirements. The power of action is so vast, so unrelated to any defined law, so subject to considerations of national policy and expediency, as to create a danger of despotism unless there is such unanimity that the action can fairly be said to reflect the judgment of the overwhelming majority of the world community. The present voting procedure is calculated to assure that, and is thus a protection of a minority against possible arbitrary majorities. "The situation is different as regards chapter VI, dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes. There, in the main, Security Council action is not so much substantive as procedural, using the word 'procedural' in a liberal sense. Within this chapter there lurks little risk of despotism. The Security Council may call upon the parties to a dispte to settle it by pacific means of their own choice, under article 33. The Security Council may investigate the facts of any dispute, under article 34. It may recommend measures of adjustment, taking into account the fact that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice, as provided under article 36. The Security Council may, if all the parties so request, make recommendations with a view to the pacific settlement of a dispute, under article 38. "It would not seem that, as a matter of principle, stringent voting procedure should be required as a condition to the Security Council's acting on such matters. There is perhaps one provision of chaper VI as to which special voting procedure could reasonably be urged. That is the provision of article 37, paragraph 2, which authorizes the Security Council, irrespective of the consent of the parties, to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. |