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This provision is much like the provision in article 39 of chapter VII, requiring the Security Council to make recommendations with a view to maintaining international peace and security.

"Should these two powers of recommendation be subjected to identical voting procedure, and if so, what voting procedure? Should a distinction be made between chapter VI and chapter VII recommendations: This point and others which could be mentioned illustrate the complexity of the problem. In the main, however, it seems that reasons of principle do not require special voting procedures in the case of chapter VI action, or as regards organizational matters, including the election of new members."

V. THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

The United States on March 19, 1948, submitted to the Interim Committee certain proposals concerning the veto, a copy of which is attached hereto. (See pp. 479-480 for attachment.) During the technical discussions in the Interim Committee and its subcommittees, the United States has modified and somewhat expanded certain details of its proposals, but the most important features remain unchanged.

These proposals would result in the elimination of the veto in connection with applications for membership in the United Nations, and in connection with decisions under chapter VI of the Charter. They would further result in complete clarification of just where the veto was applicable and where it was not applicable in connection with many miscellaneous decisions of the Security Council, and would make it impossible for any state to enlarge the scope of the veto by claiming that a precedural matter is in fact substantive and using the veto to enforce that claim. The United States proposals, however, would not in any way affect the veto under chapter VII or under decisions in certain other sections of the Charter which are analogous to chapter VII decisions.

The United States has proposed two steps to implement these changes: First, that the General Assembly adopt a resolution recommending the change, and second, requesting that the permanent members of the Security Council agree on the changes. What are the prospects that such agreement will be obtained? Before answering that question it should be noted that very little progress can be made without such agreement. It is not possible to amend the Charter without the consent of all of the permanent members of the Security Council (article 108 and article 109).

Most of the changes which the United States is advocating are in reality interpretations or clarifications rather than alterations of Charter provisions, and therefore can be achieved without formally amending the Charter. It should be noted that certain of the most important of the United States proposals, including all of those relating to application for membership and at least one proposal relating to the veto under chapter VI may in fact require a Charter amendment. Whether with or without Charter amendment, only limited progress can be made without agreement among the permanent members.

Regardless of whether a Charter amendment is required, the first and most important task is to attempt to secure agreement among the permanent members and one of the primary purposes of the United States has been to build the firmest possible foundation for such an agreement. We believe that the best possibility of securing agreement of the U. S. S. R. to a liberalization of voting procedure is through first securing overwhelming support among the remaining members of the United Nations for any suggested changes. Past discussions in United Nations of the veto problem have disclosed no such agreement.

In the first place, a considerable number of states, particularly in Latin America, objected to the veto because it was the privilege of only five states. They preferred the League of Nations situation where the Council must act unanimously-in other words, where all states possessed a veto.

Second, a substantial number of small states considered the veto as a protection to them even though they did not possess it. These states felt that their relations to one or more of the permanent members were so close that their interests were sure to be protected.

Third, a number of states, particularly those in close geographic proximity to the U. S. S. R., feel strongly that no important action should be taken in the United Nations without agreement among all the permanent members and, therefore, support the veto in its entirety.

Finally, even among the strongest critics of the veto there has been a great difference of opinion as to a substitute voting formula in case of its elimination.

With this complete absence of agreement among critics of the veto, it is small wonder that the U. S. S. R. has up to this time refused to consider seriously proposals for its modification.

The great purpose that is being served by the current discussions in the Interim Committee is to clarify the problems. As a result today the differences of viewpoint concerning the veto are much less than formerly.

There is almost unanimous agreement that the veto should be eliminated in connection with applications for membership and, likewise, that the various ambiguities in the voting formula should be clarified. There is strong support for relaxing the veto under chapter VI to the extent that this can be accomplished without amending the Charter. We believe that the veto can in fact be eliminated in connection with the vast majority of decisions under chapter VI through interpretation agreed to by the permanent members and without Charter amendment. This would correspond to the approach which led to the growth, through interpretation and use, of the United States Constitution.

On the other hand, the United States is the only permanent member of the Security Council that has expressed its willingness at this time to advocate an amendment to the Charter to eliminate the veto under chapter VI, although the United States may be supported in such a move by the majority of the smaller states. As stated previously, there is no substantial support by any states-large or small-for changes under chapter VII.

We believe, therefore, that the General Assembly will be in a position to make recommendations along the general lines of United States proposals that will have overwhelming support. We hope that such recommendations will result in agreement among all the permanent members to carry them into effect through establishment of rules, procedures, and practices, and where necessary through amendment of the Charter. The General Assembly is entitled to recommend Charter amendments which can come into effect through ratification pursuant to article 108 of the Charter without any general conference to review the Charter.

A general conference under article 109 would, from the practical standpoint of international negotiation, be premature until the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations have agreed upon Charter changes and until efforts have been exhausted to secure the agreement of all of the permanent members of the Security Council to such changes. Such general conference is inherently a consummating or last step, not the first step. For the present, therefore, we believe that the United States proposals in the Interim Committee and General Assembly furnish the best opportunity for improving the func tioning of the Security Council. It should be borne in mind, in this regard, that in the Security Council itself attention is being given to such improvements, though the most thoroughgoing effort is being made by the Assembly and its Interim Committee.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this memorandum, we have mainly stressed the practical question of just what changes in the veto furnish a real promise of improvement. There is another and even more important side of the problem-the security of the United States. At San Francisco and ever since, we have recognized that we cannot base our national policy solely on our own independent action. However, at the same time, we cannot place our vast resources of manpower, skill, and materials at the disposal of any numerical majority of the nations of the world without our consent. The veto under chapter VII was our protection and is certainly no less necessary in the conditions of today than in those prevailing 2 years ago.

It is not enough to consider this problem solely from a standpoint of procedures of United Nations and voting techniques. The uses made of the veto are merely a symptom of the underlying disagreements among the great powers of the world. This was expressed by the Secretary of State in his statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 5:

"The problems today presented to those who desire peace are not questions of structure. Nor are they problems solvable merely by new forms of organization. They require performance of obligations already undertaken, fidelity to pledges already given. Basic human frailties cannot be overcome by Charter provisions alone, for they exist in the behavior of men and governments.

"It is not changes in the form of international intercourse which we now require. It is to changes of substance that we must look for an improvement of the world situation. And it is to those changes of substance that our policy has

been directed. When the substance of the world situation improves, the United Nations will be able to function with full effectiveness. Meanwhile we will continue our efforts in cooperation with other governments to improve the working of the United Nations under the Charter."

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM ON PROPOSALS ADVANCED FOR NEW INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING ARMAMENTS, ARMED FORCES FOR INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT, AND VOTING AND REPRESENTATION

Proposals being advanced for changes in representation and voting in general international organization involve fundamental relationships among existing states. Two votes would be given each to the USSR, the UK, and the US. This amounts to 6 of the projected total of 10 votes in the Security Council. Since decisions would be carried by the majority of six, these three powers would have dominating control in the Security Council and in the International Court on all matters of the most vital consequence to all other states. This could signify domination of world organization by the three great powers.

Two votes would be divided between China and France, thus reducing France and China to a new status approximately that of a semigreat power. Since France occupies the position of the strongest power on the Continent of Europe defending the cause of democracy, such reduction would appear neither to be compatible with its security position nor with that of United States security interests in regard to Europe. Since China would be reduced similarly in status, the Far East and all oriental peoples would not be represented by a major power equal in status to others. In fact, under the above voting provisions, it would be without a decisive vote regarding world action concerning enforcement of international peace and security. It is difficult to see how the largest part of the world's population would be content with such an arrangement or would find it acceptable in the first instance. It is recalled that, like all of the proposals, Such a change would have to be negotiated; the alternative would have to be the imposition of such a status by duress or force, the attempt to do so leading almost certainly to new forms of insecurity. It furthermore is difficult to find the ground on which reduction of the status of Far Eastern representation would be compatible with vital American security interests in the Pacific and Asia. The small states of the world, as well as middle powers such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, Netherlands, and New Zealand to give illustrative examples only, would have but two representatives. In terms of the present membership of the United Nations (58), this would mean that 53 states would share 2 representatives instead of the present number of 6 on the Security Council. The acceptability of any such arrangement is not apparent. Many of the smaller states argued at San Francisco against an individual loss of veto right in the Security Council in enforcement measures. At the present time in the United Nations any five of the six middle powers and smaller states on the Security Council, acting together, have precisely the same veto power as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, or France. All decisions in the present Security Council require 7 out of 11 votes, meaning that at least 2 of the representatives of the 6 nonpermanent members must cast votes in favor of a proposition in order to reach a decision in any nonprocedural matter. This point is frequently overlooked, but it is a matter of considerable consequence to the smaller- and middle-size states in the world, and it corresponds to the influence and power of these states in attaining the objectives of the United Nations. There is no monopoly among great powers alone of strength and will to support the peace.

The present representation and vote accorded to the middle powers and smaller states brings to the Security Council, by the rotation of three of the six nonpermanent members every year, representatives of Belgium, the Netherlands, India, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, Canada, and many others. The role of the middle powers and the smaller states as members of the Security Council, with a collective voting power capable of preventing action deemed unwise or wrongful on the part of the great powers, is unquestionably one of the best influences in the world toward the pacific settlement of disputes. It could hardly be regarded as conforming with American tradition, our moral world leadership, and the several vital interests of the United States, to reduce the influence of these states to virtual impotence in the United Nations. Furthermore, it is at least problematical whether the middle powers and smaller states would remain in an organization presuming to subordinate their influence to rule by great powers alone.

It has also been proposed that a world court be established and empowered to render judgment in specific matters concerning aggression of governments and also of individuals. The line of separation of the authority and power between such a court and the Security Council is not evident. It is, for instance, not clear whether the Security Council or the court would act jointly or separately. The apportionment of jurisdiction would appear, in any event, to confer upon the court certain powers of political judgment. If this be true, the court as an organ of justice abiding by the law of nations would disappear or be impaired; at the same time it is said to be a principal objective of these changes to build a world order based upon law. Such law should be above the political arena where expediency and compromise play their necessary and inevitable role in the affairs of men. To blend law and politics is to subordinate law, not to erect it to the stature of the governing standard which guides and restrains politics.

By other changes the elimination of the veto is sought in matters of aggression. With respect to such a change, it is recalled that the construction of the Charter was made in the light of a belief, assumed from the history of peace and war to be a dependable fact, that the only strength capable of stopping a major power consisted in final analysis of the armed strength of other major powers. To put that strength into the service of law and order, through the decisions of the world community in maintaining peace and security, constituted the basic intent in requiring unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council of the United Nations. Such use of armed forces is the crucial aspect of the problem of stopping aggression. However, under the proposals the armed forces of the five major powers would be organized into five national contingents which could be employed upon majority decision of the Security Council and the World Court, "subject to the constitutional processes" of the major powers. Hence the ultimate veto is in fact not eliminated. In other words, even if six votes in the Security Council were cast in favor of using forces, the use of United States forces could be prevented by refusal of the United States Congress to approve such action. Similarly any dissenting major power could thus decline to honor a decision it opposed in the voting.

However, even though this ultimate power of veto is a real veto, situations I could arise in which it would be unrealistic. This arises because the international decision to employ force is the point at which a veto is most nearly decisive. Assuming that this primary veto on enforcement decisions was eliminated, the Soviet Union, for example, could immediately respond to the call of the Security Council by putting its troops and tanks in action, placing the United States in the position of having no practical alternative but to send its forces into action unless this nation were prepared to face consequences not in harmony with the plain objectives sought by the proposals. The existing arrangement, by which the instruction to the United States representative on the Council to vote yea or nay on the use of force carries out the considered decision by the Govern ment and is controlled by the terms of the special agreement already subjected to the processes of ratification, avoids this difficulty.

Under the proposals the smaller states, which as has been seen would have no effective voice in a decision to employ forces, would provide the forces constituting an international contingent. These armed forces could be put into action by the vote of the major powers alone. A first consideration is one of military judg ment as to whether it is practical military action to commit to military hostilities any armed force without the certainty that replacements, reserves and logistic services would be available-since, under the proposals, they would not certainly be provided under the reserved veto discussed above. Such reserves and supplies are largely in the possession of the major powers. In this connection, also, the internationalization of bases on the territory of middle powers and smaller states, to be used by the international contingent, raises a question of farreaching importance. The attitude of the smaller states toward making available parts of their territory for use as internationalized bases, when such states would be denied any controlling participation in decisions as to use of such bases, might appear to such states as a derogation of sovereignty without a quid pro quo satisfactory to them. These smaller states, under both these questions, would apparently run risks of being the scene of hostilities without their concurrence, and hence they might oppose proposals placing the onus of initial actions upon their citizens and their soil.

In this general connection it is noted that proposals have been advanced to allocate armaments corresponding with the voting strength allocated in the

Security Council. If it be the object to make it possible for the Security Council to act against violations of pledges on the part of a major power, close military study would be required to ascertain whether the 20 percent of world armaments allocated to the states taking the initial military action, namely the smaller and middle powers, would be sufficient against the forces of the major powers having an equal amount of armaments backed up by the vast array of military assets and the advantages of the military position enjoyed by any of the three largest powers or France and China though their individual armaments would be but half as much. Additional question arises upon analysis as to whether most of the smaller states would be able to maintain their portion of the collective quota in such respects, for illustration, as naval power and air power. In any event, unless the armaments of the three largest powers were reduced, by agreement acceptable to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom, to levels beyond any ever seriously broached in international negotiations in past history, the difficult technical problems inherent in such proposals will require careful military and industrial studies.

One query which arises in the above connection should be noted here. Inasmuch as the percentage quota would be the same in the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom, complicated technical arrangements would be necessitated if security were to be provided by the means proposed. The Soviet Union relies heavily on manpower. The western powers rely rather on highy developed instruments and weapons in order to save lives in the event of armed hostilities. Without requiring any significant reduction of Soviet land forces, western powers could be required under the proposed allocation to give up the larger proportion of their major means of defense, or at the least to reduce their naval and air strength so far as to place in question the maintenance of United States security and United Kingdom security. All armaments are not for aggression, as is well recognized. While United States defense armament as such has been characterized as aggressive armament, United States citizens are well aware of the invalidity of this charge. In the effort to prevent aggressive armament, accordingly, reduction along the above lines would weaken our defensive ability. In addition, the effects of the proposals would appear likely to compel the United States to put many more men into military service to compensate for the loss of weapons, with the economic and social consequences this would entail.

The further query which warrants mention here concerns safeguards. Security with respect to the maintenance in fact of quotas which may be proposed requires certain forms of inspection. Inspection of free countries is relatively easy, in view of the competence of the free press and the traditions of democratic self-rule. Comparable assurance of the integrity of inspection is not perceived in the case of police states. Indeed, considering certain difficulties, it is quite possible that a police state with its intricate controls would be able under the proposed arrangement, to render Security Council inspection ineffective. Various additional general considerations affect the problem of security currently being discussed. Among these mention is made of the following:

The United States considers the international control of atomic energy as the crucial aspect of armaments control at this time, and the one which must, therefore, be given first consideration. The United States, the sole known possessor of the bomb, offered to dispose of its atomic weapons, to turn over to an international authority its facilities for the manufacture of atomic weapons, and to make available to an international authority the know-how for the production of atomic energy, provided only that an effective system for the control of atomic energy has been agreed upon and put into effective operation first. The majority of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has agreed upon the essential basis for an effective system for the international control of atomic energy. When an effective system for the international control of atomic energy has been established and put into effective operation, the United States hopes that the world conditions of security will be such that(a) The United Nations could be endowed with enforcement machinery adequate to maintain the peace of the world; and

(b) Plans for the control of other weapons of mass destruction and for the control of conventional armaments formulated by the Security Council or subsidiary organs could be put into effect.

The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the regulation of armaments (art. 26) and to the provision of armed force (art. 43 and 45) appear still today to represent the best judgment of the members of the United Nations as a whole concerning the most effective procedure to achieve the

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