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been directed. When the substance of the world situation improves, the United Nations will be able to function with full effectiveness. Meanwhile we will continue our efforts in cooperation with other governments to improve the working of the United Nations under the Charter."



Proposals being advanced for changes in representation and voting in general international organization involve fundamental relationships among existing states. Two votes would be given each to the USSR, the UK, and the US. This amounts to 6 of the projected total of 10 votes in the Security Council. Since decisions would be carried by the majority of six, these three powers would have dominating control in the Security Council and in the International Court on all matters of the most vital consequence to all other states. This could signify domination of world organization by the three great powers.

Two votes would be divided between China and France, thus reducing France and China to a new status approximately that of a semigreat power. Since France occupies the position of the strongest power on the Continent of Europe defending the cause of democracy, such reduction would appear neither to be compatible with its security position nor with that of United States security interests in regard to Europe. Since China would be reduced similarly in status, the Far East and all oriental peoples would not be represented by a major power equal in status to others. In fact, under the above voting provisions, it would be without a decisive vote regarding world action concerning enforcement of international peace and security. It is difficult to see how the largest part of the world's population would be content with such an arrangement or would find it acceptable in the first instance. It is recalled that, like all of the proposals, such a change would have to be negotiated; the alternative would have to be the imposition of such a status by duress or force, the attempt to do so leading almost certainly to new forms of insecurity. It furthermore is difficult to find the ground on which reduction of the status of Far Eastern representation would be compatible with vital American security interests in the Pacific and Asia.

The small states of the world, as well as middle powers such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, Netherlands, and New Zealand to give illustrative examples only, would have but two representatives. In terms of the present membership of the United Nations (58), this would mean that 53 states would share 2 representatives instead of the present number of 6 on the Security Council. The acceptability of any such arrangement is not apparent. Many of the smaller states argued at San Francisco against an individual loss of veto right in the Security Council in enforcement measures. At the present time in the United Nations any five of the six middle powers and smaller states on the Security Council, acting together, have precisely the same veto power as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, or France. All decisions in the present Security Council require 7 out of 11 votes, meaning that at least 2 of the representatives of the 6 nonpermanent members must cast votes in favor of a proposition in order to reach a decision in any nonprocedural matter. This point is frequently overlooked, but it is a matter of considerable consequence to the smaller- and middle-size states in the world, and it corresponds to the influence and power of these states in attaining the objectives of the United Nations. There is no monopoly among great powers alone of strength and will to support the peace.

The present representation and vote accorded to the middle powers and smaller states brings to the Security Council, by the rotation of three of the six nonpermanent members every year, representatives of Belgium, the Netherlands, India, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, Canada, and many others. The role of the middle powers and the smaller states as members of the Security Council, with a collective voting power capable of preventing action deemed unwise or wrongful on the part of the great powers, is unquestionably one of the best influences in the world toward the pacific settlement of disputes. It could hardly be regarded as conforming with American tradition, our moral world leadership, and the several vital interests of the United States, to reduce the influence of these states to virtual impotence in the United Nations. Furthermore, it is at least problematical whether the middle powers and smaller states would remain in an organization presuming to subordinate their influence to rule by great powers alone.

It has also been proposed that a world court be established and empowered to render judgment in specific matters concerning aggression of governments and also of individuals. The line of separation of the authority and power between such a court and the Security Council is not evident. It is, for instance, not clear whether the Security Council or the court would act jointly or separately. The apportionment of jurisdiction would appear, in any event, to confer upon the court certain powers of political judgment. If this be true, the court as an organ of justice abiding by the law of nations would disappear or be impaired; at the same time it is said to be a principal objective of these changes to build a world order based upon law. Such law should be above the political arena where expediency and compromise play their necessary and inevitable role in the affairs of men. To blend law and politics is to subordinate law, not to erect it to the stature of the governing standard which guides and restrains politics.

By other changes the elimination of the veto is sought in matters of aggression, With respect to such a change, it is recalled that the construction of the Charter was made in the light of a belief, assumed from the history of peace and war to be a dependable fact, that the only strength capable of stopping a major power consisted in final analysis of the armed strength of other major powers. To put that strength into the service of law and order, through the decisions of the world community in maintaining peace and security, constituted the basic intent in requiring unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council of the United Nations. Such use of armed forces is the crucial aspect of the problem of stopping aggression. However, under the proposals the armed forces of the five major powers would be organized into five national contingents 'which could be employed upon majority decision of the Security Council and the World Court, "subject to the constitutional processes” of the major powers. Hence the ultimate veto is in fact not eliminated. In other words, even if six votes in the Security Council were cast in favor of using forces, the use of United States forces could be prevented by refusal of the United States Congress to approve such action. Similarly any dissenting major power could thus decline to honor a decision it opposed in the voting.

However, even though this ultimate power of veto is a real veto, situations could arise in which it would be unrealistic. This arises because the international decision to employ force is the point at which a veto is most nearly de cisive. Assuming that this primary veto on enforcement decisions was eliminated, the Soviet Union, for example, could immediately respond to the call of the Security Council by putting its troops and tanks in action, placing the United States in the position of having no practical alternative but to send its forces into action unless this nation were prepared to face consequences not in harmony with the plain objectives sought by the proposals. The existing arrangement, by which the instruction to the United States representative on the Council to vote yea or nay on the use of force carries out the considered decision by the Government and is controlled by the terms of the special agreement already subjected to the processes of ratification, avoids this difficulty.

Under the proposals the smaller states, which as has been seen would have no effective voice in a decision to employ forces, would provide the forces constituting an international contingent. These armed forces could be put into action by the vote of the major powers alone. A first consideration is one of military judg ment as to whether it is practical military action to commit to military hostilities any armed force without the certainty that replacements, reserves and logistic services would be available-since, under the proposals, they would not certainly be provided under the reserved veto discussed above. Such reserves and supplies are largely in the possession of the major powers. In this connection, also, the internationalization of bases on the territory of middle powers and smaller states, to be used by the international contingent, raíses a question of farreaching importance. The attitude of the smaller states toward making available parts of their territory for use as internationalized bases, when such states would be denied any controlling participation in decisions as to use of such basés, might appear to such states as a derogation of sovereignty without a quid pro quo satisfactory to them. These smaller states, under both these questions, would apparently run risks of being the scene of hostilities without their concurrence, and hence they might oppose proposals placing the onus of initial actions upon their citizens and their soil.

In this general connection it is noted that proposals have been advanced to allocate armaments corresponding with the voting strength allocated in the

Security Council. If it be the object to make it possible for the Security Council to act against violations of pledges on the part of a major power, close military study would be required to ascertain whether the 20 percent of world armaments allocated to the states taking the initial military action, namely the smaller and middle powers, would be sufficient against the forces of the major powers having an equal amount of armaments backed up by the vast array of military assets and the advantages of the military position enjoyed by any of the three largest powers—or France and China though their individual armaments would be but half as much. Additional question arises upon analysis as to whether most of the smaller states would be able to maintain their portion of the collective quota in such respects, for illustration, as naval power and air power. In any event, unless the armaments of the three largest powers were reduced, by agreement acceptable to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom, to levels beyond any ever seriously broached in international negotiations in past history, the difficult technical problems inherent in such proposals will require careful military and industrial studies.

One query which arises in the above connection should be noted here. Inasmuch as the percentage quota would be the same in the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom, complicated technical arrangements would be necessitated if security were to be provided by the means proposed. The Soviet Union relies heavily on manpower. The western powers rely rather on highy developed instruments and weapons in order to save lives in the event of armed hostilities. Without requiring any significant reduction of Soviet land forces, western powers could be required under the proposed allocation to give up the larger proportion of their major means of defense, or at the least to reduce their naval and air strength so far as to place in question the maintenance of United States security and United Kingdom security. All armaments are not for aggression, as is well recognized. While United States defense armament as such has been characterized as aggressive armament, United States citizens are well aware of the invalidity of this charge. In the effort to prevent aggressive armament, accordingly, reduction along the above lines would weaken our defensive ability. In addition, the effects of the proposals would appear likely to compel the United States to put many more men into military service to compensate for the loss of weapons, with the economic and social consequences this would entail.

The further query which warrants mention here concerns safeguards. Security with respect to the maintenance in fact of quotas which may be proposed requires certain forms of inspection. Inspection of free countries is relatively easy, in view of the competence of the free press and the traditions of democratic self-rule. Comparable assurance of the integrity of inspection is not perceived in the case of police states. Indeed, considering certain difficulties, it is quite possible that a police state with its intricate controls would be able under the proposed arrangement, to render Security Council inspection ineffective.

Various additional general considerations affect the problem of security currently being discussed. Among these mention is made of the following:

The United States considers the international control of atomic energy as the crucial aspect of armaments control at this time, and the one which must, therefore, be given first consideration. The United States, the sole known possessor of the bomb, offered to dispose of its atomic weapons, to turn over to an international authority its facilities for the manufacture of atomic weapons, and to make available to an international authority the know-how for the production of atomic energy, provided only that an effective system for the control of atomic energy has been agreed upon and put into effective operation first. The majority of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has agreed upon the essential basis for an effective system for the international control of atomic energy. When an effective system for the international control of atomic energy has been established and put into effective operation, the United States hopes that the world conditions of security will be such that

(a) The United Nations could be endowed with enforcement machinery adequate to maintain the peace of the world; and

(b) Plans for the control of other weapons of mass destruction and for the control of conventional armaments formulated by the Security Council

or subsidiary organs could be put into effect. The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the regulation of armaments (art. 26) and to the provision of armed force (art. 43 and 45) appear still today to represent the best judgment of the members of the United Nations as a whole concerning the most effective procedure to achieve the regulation of armaments and the establishment of United Nations enforcement machinery.

A program for the regulation of armaments must be negotiated between sovereign states. The only existing alternative to such a negotiated agreement or agreements is imposition of armament regulations through duress and force

It is axiomatic that there can be no effective control in the fields of armaments without universal acceptance. There is no indication at the present that the Soviet Union, or others, would be ready or willing to accept such controls Consideration of the world factors affecting the achivement of such agreement or agreements points to the necessity not only of persistent efforts to improveworld conditions and to raise the present degree of international confidence but also, of patience with the amount of progress which can meanwhile be made by direct approach to the problem.

The United Nations is necessary fundamentally because peoples and nations differ on matters important to peace and security. There is no short cut ir dealing with such matters. Durable settlements are agreed settlements. Foi such settlements, time and effort alike are indispensable.


Washington, May 12, 1947. Hon. JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Jr.,

Speaker of the House of Representatives. MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: There is transmitted herewith a copy of the Conven tion on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations which was approved by the General Assembly by a resolution adopted on February 13, 1946, pro posing the convention for accession by each member of the United Nations This agreement is designed to implement articles 104 and 105 of the Charter o the United Nations, which read as follows:


“The organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members sucl legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes."


"1. The organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members suc) privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes

“2. Representatives of the members of the United Nations and officials 0 the organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as

ar * necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with th organization.

“3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to deter mining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article or ma; propose conventions to the members of the United Nations for this purpose.”

The convention is submitted to you with the request that the Congress givi. consideration to the passage of a joint resolution authorizing the President to accede to it on behalf of the United States. A draft of a proposed join resolution is enclosed.

The convention gives certain privileges and immunities to the United Nations as an organization, and to its employees and representatives of member state who are designated in their respective capacities to the United Nations. Man of the privileges and immunities for which provision is made in the conventioj have already been conferred upon the United Nations by virtue of the provi sions of the International Organizations Immunities Act, approved December 29 1945 (Public Law 291, 79th Cong., 1st sess.). In some respects, however, th: Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations goes beyon. the terms of the International Organizations Immunities Act. Thus, there i provision in section 19 for giving the Secretary General and all Assistant Sec retaries General of the United Nations, their spouses and minor children, th privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomati envoys in accordance with international law. There is provision in secton 2: for extending certain limited privileges and immunities to experts on mission for the United Nations. In other respects the convention is less liberal than th provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act. For example

section 11 (b) and (g) limit the free-entry privilege to "personal baggage,” a term which is narrower in scope than the term "baggage and effects," as used in section 3 of the act. The effect, therefore, of approval of the enclosed draft resolution will be to supplement or replace certain provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act, and the draft joint resolution provides that in the case of absolute conflict the provisions of the convention shall prevail.

Since our acceptance of this convention will give effect to articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Department of State believes that the convention should submitted to Congress for its approval by joint resolution.

At the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in February 1946. the United States delegation voted for the General Assembly resolution opening the Convention on Privileges and Immunities for accession by each member of the United Nations. At that time Senator Vandenberg reserved the position of the United States with respect to provisions in the convention regarding tax immunities and regarding national-service exemptions in these words:

"I rise only to make the position of the delegation of the United States perfectly plain in regard to the reports of the fifth and sixth committees. We have reserved our position in respect of tax immunities in regard to the reports of both committees. The Constitution of the United States gives the American. Congress sole power to exempt American citizens from taxation. The distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom made a very interesting and moving appeal in respect of rival allegiances, and suggested that a man cannot serve two masters. Quite in the spirit in which the able delegate of the United Kingdom spoke, the delegation of the United States does not propose to serve two masters. Its master is the Constitution of the United States. This does not, however, mean that the attitude of the Government of the United States is: not totally at one with a cooperative attitude, and wholly hospitable in regard to all cooperation which we, as the host country, shall undertake to give to this great institution when it goes upon its way. Indeed, even so far as privileges and immunities are concerned, I am very happy to say that the last session of the American Congress has already passed a statute which includes, I should say, about 95 percent of the things which the report and the general convention from the sixth committee anticipate.

"The delegation of the United States also reserves its position in respect of national-service exemptions under the general convention reported by the sixth committee. This again is due to the fact that the Constitution of the United

States permits no authority other than the American Congress to deal with this normatter, and we are not in a position to prejudge that ultimate consideration.

"With these exceptions, we have been very happy to accept the balance of the pici report of the fifth Committee, and we are very glad to vote, with these reservations, for the general convention. File "So far as the special convention is concerned, we shall abstain from voting, because the special convention is one to which the Government of the United States will be a party, and we consider it would be inappropriate for us to prejudge lemne case here.

"In this entire attitude, I want to repeat that the purpose and the intention, and heartfelt desire, not only of the delegation of the United States, but of the American people, I am sure I speak with complete justification, is to extend every consideration, and to give every possible cooperation, to the United Nations Organ

zation as it proceeds upon the greatest and most hopeful adventure in the history DNI human kind."

With respect to the question of income-tax immunity for officials of the United.

Nations, I wish to point out that section 116 (h) (1) of the Internal Revenue conreude, as amended, exempts alien employees of public international organizations

rom the payment of a Federal tax on income received from such international Prganizations.

United States nationals employed by international organizations, however, are ubject to the Federal tax on income received from the United Nations. Section

8 (b) of the enclosed convention would extend this tax exemption now granted s. lien officials of international organizations to American nationals who are officials istof the United Nations. It would also grant immunity from State income taxes on ildik uch income both for aliens and United States citizens. diming The General Assembly of the United Nations has considered whether or not

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fficials of international organizations, regardless of their nationality and place inf residence, should be exempt from national taxation. The Assembly concluded altit its first session in London that “there is no alternative to the proposition that

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