dealing with new types of aggression which might develop. As you yourself indicated, early attempts to define "aggression" have left loop holes. We had in mind new techniques of aggression such as, the indirect kind of penetration which we see going on today.

The Security Council has a completely free hand under article 39 which the Secretary just read, to find what constitutes an act of aggres

sion.

Secretary MARSHALL. I might say, in that connection, that one of the great difficulties we have had, which has proved insurmountable at least for the time being in relation to the Austrian Treaty, was the definition of "force or duress."

We wished to use the words, "force or duress." At that moment we encountered opposition regarding what "force or duress" meant. When we got into definitions we were just as far from agreement as we were at the start.

To you and to me, "force and duress" have a generally accepted significance, but in treaty-making and negotiating, we broke down entirely on trying to define what was meant and agreeing on what terms we would use.

I think what Mr. Rusk has just said is very pertinent to the matter. It is an advantage to have a definition, provided we have not ended up by unduly limiting ourselves by the terms of the definition.

Mr. VORYS. As I understand it, the Act of Chapultepec and the following legislation in our regional arrangements in the Western Hemisphere defined at least certain types of aggression where there would be action, but the only similar definition in the Charter is in article 51 which is "armed invasion (see attack)." Is that about correct? Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. Shall I read article 51? Mr. VORYS. It might be a good thing.

Secretary MARSHALL (reading):

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

It is under that paragraph and that article of the Charter, that the American Republics developed the Rio Pact.

It was not developed under the regional arrangements of Articles 52 and 53, because there the action would have been restrained until the Security Council had done certain things. We wished to be certain that there could be immediate action, if any aggressive act occurred within the zone defined.

Mr. VORYS. Is the possibility of our furnishing military supplies to Members of the United Nations under Article 51 consistent with the Charter?

You mention in your statement that one thing is to preserve a balance of power which of course is one of the things we talked about in 1945 as being eliminated.

Is it under Article 51, that we furnish military supplies to Members?

Secretary MARSHALL. The issue would be one of assisting other nations.

I would like to refer to your comment about balance of power, because we are opposed to a balance-of-power basis of settlement politically. I was referring to a balance of military strength.

The factor of military strength is of immediate and major importance in the present military situation, but is not the element which will be paramount in the long run.

What has occurred has been a change in the general situation in military power from that which existed in 1945 to an extent which has developed a great uncertainty and a great many fears in the world.

The use of the term, "balance of power," though we were talking exclusively about military power, was probably not the best expression or phrasing to employ. I am trying now to clarify it.

Mr. VORYS. You said in your prepared statement:

The United States Government is now considering the steps necessary to bring the National Military Establishment to the minimum level necessary to restore the balance of power relationships required for international security.

This is an extremely difficult and perplexing matter and I do not want to trap you with the use of certain words. We are not playing on words here. In general, however, in 1945 we talked about the fact that we were going to have a security organization that would preserve military security without having a military balance of power. Now, there is a situation which we all recognize, regardless of the precise words we use, but it is expressed in this statement you gave in your opening remarks.

Secretary MARSHALL. I believe that the use of the term "balance of power" is subject to criticism, because it is an equilibrium of military power with which we are now concerned. The ordinary accepted use of the expression, "balance of power," refers more to territorial line-ups and political groupings.

At the time of the San Francisco Conference it was quite apparent that no one great power could with any hope of success turn on the others, and that situation constituted an equilibrium.

Now, through our own rapidity of demobilization, a similar case in England, and the fact that France has relatively little military power, we reached a situation in Europe where there was a complete Îack of equilibrium and a very massive power on the part of one nation. The United Nations cannot function satisfactorily under such a state of affairs. It was to that condition I was referring.

Mr. VORYS. Thank you.

Chairman EATON. The Chair would like to say that we have a number of gifted members here who would like to ask questions, and I would like to suggest that each Member endeavor to mercy in the use of time.

Mr. Richards, please.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Secretary, do you think it would be helpful or do you support the idea that the United Nations Charter, so far as the veto is concerned in matters of aggression, should be revised? If you do not care to answer that question now, I will withdraw it.

Secretary MARSHALL. Would you repeat the question again so that I can make certain I have it?

Mr. RICHARDS. We have a number of resolutions before Congress suggesting that the United Nations Charter should be revised in matters pertaining to aggression. Do you think it would be helpful to the Organization, to the aims of the Organization, for the Charter to be revised at this time?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will have to answer that by referring to chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," and say that it would be to the advantage of the United Nations procedure if the Charter could be so amended or an understanding could be reached so that there would be no veto in connection with article 33 and article 34 on pacific settlement of disputes.

On the other hand, in chapter 7, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace and Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”—article 39, article 40, article 41, article 42, and article 43-there we think the veto should remain for our protection, in order not to have the manpower and the material power of the United States committed to enforcement action by a two-thirds vote.

In those cases I think the veto should continue.

In connection with "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," I think the veto should be eliminated.

The real problem in the answer to your question is whether it is a practical procedure at the present time to secure alteration of procedure in relation to pacific settlement of disputes.

We feel in the first place that it cannot be done through a revision conference or convention. Furthermore, we think we are now working toward a solution.

Mr. RICHARDS. In any event, you take the position that it cannot be brought about without the consent of the big powers on the Security Council.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDS. Then there must be a change of heart all around to get it done?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes. And that, I think, will come through a gradual change in feeling, not only in the United States but all over. That change will occur more rapidly among those powers who have agreed on most of the procedures, but I am not without hope that we will get concessions with relation to this particular chapter VI before we ever get to the convention stage.

Mr. RICHARDS. Have you any reason to expect a change of heart on the part of Russia with regard to the veto?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am not without hope that we will get an arrangement, eventually, with relation to chapter VI, without having to go to the formal procedure of the convention for the modification of the Charter, but not at the present time.

Mr. RICHARDS. Do you feel that it would be helpful or harmful for the Congress of the United States to express its viewpoint on this question?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that would be helpful because it tends to help form world opinion.

Mr. RICHARDS. You would not oppose a resolution expressing the viewpoint of the Congress and stating that the Charter should be amended in certain particulars, would you?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. RICHARDS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, it is the hope of us who are sponsoring this resolution that these changes and modifications of the veto can be carried out within the framework of the United Nations Charter, thereby continuing to enable us to have a United Nations Organization, but on the functioning, operating level, which cannot be stymied by the will of any one country at any given time.

What we are trying to do this morning is find a way through which that can be achieved. Through our resolution we have suggested a possible method, which, as I envision it, would be this: That the President or you-I do not know whether it should be the President or the Secretary of State of the United States-take the leadership by calling together a meeting of the member nations of the United Nations, outside the framework of the ordinary General Assembly, for the purpose of sitting down and looking at the 30-month history of the Organization to determine what lessons experience has taught. So far as I have expressed it, is that procedure a possible procedure, as you understand it?

Secretary MARSHALL. There is something of that procedure going on at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you mean through the little assembly?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, and the discussions we are having with the representatives of the various nations with regard to these matters.

Mr. MUNDT. That is right. But we tend to crystallize it and make it more definite if we call a special conclave for the purpose of examining the operating history. Secretary MARSHALL. There are three factors involved in any such procedure.

First, we must determine exactly what we want. I just gave an expression here, offhand, of what parts of the veto I thought should be preserved and what factors should be removed.

Then I think we start in with negotiation with others.

We have a practical question, there, as to whether we would do better to get them all together and start a debate, or to negotiate individually and gradually build up a general support and understanding of what we are after, and then move on to the more general procedure of endeavoring to get the Charter amended.

I commented, a little while ago, on my understanding of the present situation, where, among the five great powers, we are the only ones who seem to want to have a Charter amendment considered at the present time.

Of course there are a good many reasons behind that.

Mr. MUNDT. We have very good reasons in that we are spending billions of dollars trying to rehabilitate the world.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it goes beyond that, sir, because there is a great fear that we may run into an impasse that would dismember the United Nations Organization.

There are countries in deadly fear of that happening. They would like to see a stronger organization. They would like to see it have a power which would give them a genuine feeling of security. That is their desire. Parallel to that is a very great fear that something

will happen, and particularly will be precipitated by this Government, which will dismember the United Nations and divide the world, you might say, into two armed camps, with a group of smaller nations which would hold aloof, on account of their geographical location, in a position of desperate neutrality.

Then all we have done to bring this Organization together, this forum of negotiation, which I understand in the past 12 months developed some 2,000 meetings and conferences would be dissipated and leave the situation in Europe one of tragic despair.

Mr. MUNDT. The difficulty has been that the conferences have been much more expansive than the conclusions. There have not been too many good conclusions.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is not confined to the United Nations. Mr. MUNDT. Of course not, but that is our problem here.

Secretary MARSHALL. It is a principal objective of our foreign policy to find peaceful solutions to our differences with the Soviet Union. We do not wish to widen this gap or to intensify the tension in the postwar world.

The United Nations is a forum in which many of the questions involving the Soviet Union can be negotiated. Under the auspices of the United Nations we are meeting with the Soviet Union on hundreds of matters each year. It would be a tragic misfortune, in my opinion, to break off this relationship. It is easy to terminate negotiations, but it is difficult to resume them, and it is hard to tell what might occur in the interim.

The United Nations is a world forum in which we can challenge foreign policies which we do not like and attempt to correct the misconceptions of Soviet leaders about what can and cannot be done in their relationship to the rest of the world.

Although we believe that somehow their policies are not in accord with the Charter, their membership in the United Nations is benefiicial to the world community.

If the Soviet Union withdraws, or is driven to withdrawal from the United Nations, a number of nations near Russia may find themselves in an impossible position and may well refuse to retain membership in the United Nations, which would then appear to be a grand alliance against the Soviet Union.

We would not wish to place such nations in such a dangerous and awkward position. Hence we believe the universality of the United Nations should be maintained, if at all possible. If we split the United Nations into two pieces we may find that we have splintered it into many more, and we may be left in the unenviable position of being responsible for the loss of a highly useful world Organization with nothing to put in its place.

I think I should say, though I am hesitant to say it in an open session, that I am under constant pressure from other nations to try in every conceivable way to avoid a rupture. They are very fearful, and they do not have the Atlantic Ocean, or our great power, or our great feeling of security to reassure them.

The problem narrows down-in attempting to answer your question-to what is the best procedure for working toward an improvement of the Charter so that we will not find so many impasses as we do at the present time.