I have felt that we are gradually making some advance in that respect, but the present moment is possibly the most difficult. We are hopeful that by the operation of the European Recovery program we are going to secure a stabilization in Europe which will be ductive of a change in the views of people and will lessen tensions and make it much more possible to negotiate successfully.

pro

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if you would agree with me on a series of two or three points in that connection?

Certainly we all start with the premise that we hope a rupture can be averted. I think that is the universal feeling, almost, in this country.

A lot of emphasis is always placed, in your appearances before this committee, and also by other spokesmen, on the importance of negotiations with Russia. I do not believe that negotiations, per se, are essentially virtuous unless they achieve something. I think they can be a virtuous procedure, but they also can be a prelude to dfficulties, to harsh words and a breaking off of relationships. They can be a delaying tactic. I think, in order to determine whether negotiations are an asset or a liability, we have to know what is going on concurrently with these negotiations in other parts of the world.

Now, to get down to the meat in the coconut: The atomic bomb is a pretty serious weapon to loose on this world, and there is no great security for any one until and unless we have an effective international means of harnessing the atomic bomb.

According to the best intelligence we can find, we have less time. between now and the time when other important countries will have stock piles of the atomic bomb than has transpired since Hiroshima and the present time. So we must begin to move in the direction of harnessing that bomb and do it successfully and have international inspections, or something effective or else have a pretty grim world where people are stock piling atomic bombs while negotiating and quarreling.

It therefore seems to me that along with the value of negotiations there comes the matter of urgency from the standpoint of getting a concrete result concerning the control of something as awesome as the atomic bomb.

Unless we find some way to overcome the veto, or to detour the veto, or to modify the veto, what reason do you have, Mr. Secretary, for assuming that we can do within the next 24 months with the atomic bomb that which we have been unable to do in the past 30 months? That is a very serious situation.

Secretary MARSHALL. Well, I once was a soldier and I am pretty familiar, I think, with the worries that flow from a consideration of those facts. But I still feel, Mr. Mundt, that, as a practical proposition, this is not the moment to secure what we all want.

I feel, as I said in answer to Mr. Richards, that an expression by the Congress of its views has a very definite value in the formulation of general opinion on that subject. I feel that what we are now doingof course necessarily partly behind the scenes, as it were—is laying a firm foundation which will be very helpful, if we find that this European recovery program is getting off to a healthy development, and that the world picture will change considerably and our chances will be greatly improved.

As I said before, I am not completely discouraged over the possibility of getting an arrangement, even without a general conference for the amendment of the Charter, which will abate the delaying, stultifying effect of the veto. But, at the same time, I feel that the veto, in certain respects, is as essential to us as others seem to feel that it is to them.

I am referring again to the fact that I once was a soldier. I am very much concerned that the people of the United States do not find themselves committed to the use of their great power in a military way on a basis of a two-thirds vote. They must have an opportunity for a decision in relation to that.

Mr. MUNDT. May I point out that in these resolutions we do not provide for the elimination of the veto, from the standpoint of a commitment of our Military Establishment in war. That remains in the hands of the Congress.

Secretary MARSHALL. The use of the veto in connection with pacific settlements is, of course, the great irk of all. I am not hopeless in regard to an adjustment on that.

Chairman EATON. The chairman is anxious that all members of the committee have an opportunity to question.

I will ask Mr. Morgan to stay within the 5-minute limit.

Mr. MORGAN. On September 17, 1947, in an address to the United Nations you said that the United States was reluctant to have any change in the system of voting in the Security Council. Your views today are the same as they were September 17, 1947?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not quite recall that in the terms used.
Mr. RUSK. Have you a copy of that statement with you?
Mr. MORGAN. Yes. It is in the committee report.

Secretary MARSHALL (reading):

The United States would be willing to accept, by whatever means appropriate, the elimination of the unanimity requirements with respect to matters arising under chapter VI of the Charter and such matters as applications for membership. Mr. MORGAN. You would have a change in chapter VI, where we would not have the veto power, where it involves admitting new members of the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. MORGAN. That is all.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Jonkman.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Secretary, you referred to the "Little Assembly" now making a study of proposed provisions of the Charter. That is under the direction of the General Assembly, is it not?

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. JONKMAN. I think, if I remember correctly, they are to report in July.

Mr. RUSK. There is a report to the regular session in September. They will try to draft their report by July on many of these questions. Mr. JONKMAN. Are they covering the whole range of proposed amendments as we are discussing here, do you know?

Mr. RUSK. Their principal effort is being applied to the veto, in respect to which they are working very intensively on a series of 30 or 40 suggestions. They are also working on new techniques for pacific settlements of disputes, such as conciliation, and questions of that

sort.

Mr. JONKMAN. That is under the direction of the General Assembly, but was it at the request of the United States? I asked that because the Secretary said we were the only Nation who asked for a revision of the veto.

Mr. RUSK. The Secretary said we were the only ones of the permanent members, the Big Five, who had indicated a desire to amend the Charter with respect to the veto.

Mr. JONKMAN. I still did not quite get the attitude of the State Department on this kind of legislation. I understood you to say, Mr. Secretary, that you are not in favor of the revision or of pressing for revision at the present time.

Secretary MARSHALL. We are not in favor of pressing for revision at the present time.

Mr. JONKMAN. You would not be opposed to a resolution something along the lines recommended?

Secretary MARSHALL. No; I think that is along the line of crystallizing public opinion, which, incidentally, is the most potent force of the United Nations Organization. It gradually mobilizes world opinion until it is very difficult for one country or a small group of countries to resist the continual impact of such world opinion.

Mr. JONKMAN. Would you be in favor of that to such an extent as to bring it before the United Nations for the purpose of creating favorable or unfavorable opinion, as the case might be, on the stand of any participating nation?

Secretary MARSHALL. I lost the first part of the sentence.

Mr. JONKMAN. Would you be in favor of carrying it to the United Nations for the purpose of placing any nation that, for instance, would oppose such a move before the bar of public opinion?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would think that this was an inadvisable time for such a procedure.

I have one concurrent resolution here, No. 59, and it has this provision [reading]:

The President is to take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Nations pursuant to section 109 of the Charter.

I would not be in favor of that.

Mr. JONKMAN. Under the discussion we have had so far it would be futile, anyway, as long as the veto can be used almost to any extent. For instance, one nation could stop it with the veto.

Secretary MARSHALL. We will always have that condition until we get the Charter amended. The point is that when are confronted with the situation that we must rupture the organization, in order to eliminate the veto in the respects I have indicated, we will not necessarily find that to be the case a little later.

Mr. JONKMAN. This is probably purely guesswork, but would you think there would be any chance of the Soviets, for instance, voluntarily accepting certain restrictions of the veto power.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have been surprised quite a bit both ways, and I am prepared to be surprised again.

I repeat again that I think the general attitude will be very definitely affected by the development of the situation in Europe.

Mr. JONKMAN. I have one more question.

I think you stated your position as being in favor of progress along the lines of regional organizations.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. JONKMAN. To what extent would you carry that? It seems to me that it has been intimated here that you could create, within the spirit of the Charter, a regional organization that embraced all of the members except the 10 that are not getting along so well.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would not say that is in the spirit of the Charter. I think we would convict ourselves, by any such procedure, of a lack of sincerity.

In these regional arrangements, notably the one that was given form at Rio, we had endless debates among ourselves-with Senator Vandenberg, Senator Connally, Mr. Bloom, and others-as to just how consistent we were. In other words, we carefully measured whether we were entirely sincere in our conviction, and we came to the conclusion that we were so, entirely.

I recall in Senator Vandenberg's radio address on his return from Rio that he analyzed that point very carefully, mentioning that we have been as careful as we could be to see that we did conduct ourselves within the spirit of the Charter. And I would say again that if such a line-up was developed as you have just indicated, it would be frankly a deliberate ignoring of the spirit of the Charter.

Mr. JONKMAN. I want to say that I am in accord with you, but it has already been mentioned as a possibility.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the integrity of the position of the United States must be very carefully guarded.

Chairman EATON. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, I am sure you appreciate that Members of Congress and especially members of this committee are today receiving a lot of mail from constituents wanting to know what can be done while this veto situation exists in the United Nations Organization. There is a great deal of confusion, I think, in the minds of Members of Congress, to say nothing about the general public.

Would it be possible for the State Department to set forth in simple terms just what is involved in this matter of the veto. You have stated that the veto should be retained in one part of the Charter and eliminated in another. That is what puzzles us and the public.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think that is a reasonable proposition, sir. Mr. SMITH. That is all.

Secretary MARSHALL. I was trying to outline that a little in what I was saying earlier this morning in my formal remarks. Chairman EATON. Mr. Judd.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Secretary, you say that the public does not fully recognize the dangers involved in calling a conference to see if it is not possible to get agreement on some changes. I think that probably is true. But I am sure that the public realizes very fully the difficulties and dangers involved in going along as we are.

I think they are more disturbed, and I am myself, by the certain dangers of going along as we are, than by the possible dangers involved in making a genuine, sincere attempt to get the Charter amended so the organization can be effective.

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think I said quite that, sir.

I referred to the dangers involved in the proposals and that I thought it was very important that the public should thoroughly understand that aspect of the matter.

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The difficulty of an effort to bring about the conference for the amendment of the Charter is a failure to get the agreement for the conference. One starts with that. I do not know whether you would call that a danger. I do not know that in any case it would be a danger, unless we embarked on a separate course without the Soviets. There one would be in the area of danger, I would say.

However, on balance, there is no particular danger involved in the fact that we cannot get agreement to have the conference.

Mr. JUDD. There is a recognition, as you yourself, said, that the Charter was devised to meet a situation which does not exist. The conditions contemplated did not materialize. In other words, we made a wrong diagnosis at San Francisco.

Usually, when you make a wrong diagnosis, you choose a wrong remedy.

It is not time to make a reexamination and reevaluation of the situation that does exist and see if we can arrive at a more correct diagnosis?

You said this is not the time to do it but to wait until conditions get better. I am afraid that is like saying to a man driving 20 miles an hour behind a man going 40 miles an hour, "Wait until I catch up with you."

Secretary MARSHALL. If we were not doing anything, I would agree with you. But we are doing several things, important things, and are about to do others, all of which should have, I think, a stabilizing effect to a certain extent, and should restore the possibility of some of the conceptions we had in 1945.

Mr. JUDD. Are not those actions such as ERP, being outside the United Nations, generally interpreted as a blow to the United Nations? I agree with you that we had to take those actions, and I supported them wholeheartedly.

Secretary MARSHALL. My own reaction to all of this was that it would directly support the United Nations because it was to make a healthier world, and that was the attitude in which the United Nations was originally conceived to operate.

Mr. JUDD. I agree thoroughly, but many regarded it as a blow by us to the UN. Should we not take advantage of this opportunity to go ahead and try to get an improvement in the basic organization? Although changes in structure will not themselves solve the problems, they can improve the mechanisms by which alone we can hope to solve the problems.

Let me put it frankly: Does the Secretary feel that it would be harmful to the interests of the United States and world peace for us to pass a resolution expressing the view of the Congress that the United States should take the initiative in calling a world conference to reexamine the sick patient and see if we cannot get agreement or how to treat it? What harm can come out of that?

Secretary MARSHALL. If such a resolution does not, in its phrasing, threaten the continuation of the United Nations, then I would see no particular objection to it. But I would like to go back to the remarks made just ahead of that question.

The implication I get from them is that we have stood still. Now it so happens that I personally, at the Assembly of the United Nations, made certain definite proposals to correct these difficulties. They were