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carried and are now under way. At the same time we were in the midst of other proposals which involved the European recovery program. Now you are considering here, in the Congress, the problem of restoring more equilibrium in the military power sense.

All of those efforts are corrective measures. So we are not standing still; we are definitely doing things, taking definite actions, and I think that the general sum of these actions will produce very helpful results. If we were not doing anything, then I would be inclined to

you. When it comes to a resolution of Congress, I have already committed myself by expressing my own feelings that a resolution couïd be helpful in the formulation of world opinion. But if, by its phrasing, it threatens the continuance of the United Nations, then I think it would be an unfortunate action.

Mr. Judd. I agree with you.

Secretary MARSHALL. I think, also, Mr. Judd, that you would find that you had spread an acute sense of fear through a great many countries abroad.

Mr. JUDD. I feel we might scatter a lot of hope for a great many countries abroad.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes; I feel that we are already scattering some hope, but I do not want them to be afraid, of course, of our actions.

As I said before, I am a little embarrassed in talking of this in open session, but the reactions I get are that people abroad have a fear of our precipitating a situation in this respect that would be dangerous to a great many countries.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Secretary, what is being done on the implementation of the lend-lease policy on arms to western Europe?

Secretary MARSHALL. I was asked in a press meeting the other day if we were considering that issue, if we were considering the possibility of our committing ourselves to some armed support, and I said that of course we were considering it. I added that one could not read the paper without considering it.

With regard to what is being done, I cannot answer your question here.

Mr. FULTON. Consideration is being given to that?
Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. You have said this: That [reading] : maintenance of a comparable power relationship is fundamental to world security.

Then you talk about equilibrium leading to action. Then you come, on page 3 of your statement, to the consideration of [reading]: steps necessary to bring the National Military Establishment to the minimum level necessary to restore the balance of power relationships.

All through your statement, here, you talk of power relationships as being the basis of the United Nations. Why do you do that? I did not know that the United Nations was based upon power relationships.

Secretary MARSHALL. The condition of affairs, and the state of military power in the world at the time of the Convention in San Francisco which agreed upon this Charter which we now have, was

such that no one nation among the great powers could turn successfully on the others in terms of military power.

Since then, that equilibrium, as it has been referred to, has been very considerably altered, notably with respect to ourselves. This leaves a situation of doubt, of fear, of uncertainty in western Europe, particularly in view of the developments and in view of the propaganda which is current at the present time.

Our thought in the matter is that if we have a complete lack of power equilibrium in the world, the United Nations cannot function successfully under such a condition. What we hope for in the future is the

a gradual reduction of all armaments, but this has to be on a basis of parity.

At the present time we have, particularly in the European theater, a complete lack of equilibrium from a military point of view, and that results in great fears.

Our desire is to limit armaments. It is our desire to cut down the necessity for vast expenditures for armaments and to remove the temptation to resort to military power.

Mr. FULTON. Let me direct my question again: You have then said that without a power equilibrium in the world among the various powers of the world, based on military force, the United Nations cannot function.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have said that without the power equilibrium—talking about military power, not geographic alliances—the United Nations cannot function well.

Mr. FULTON. I disagree with you on that.

Secretary MARSHALL. I am referring particularly to the security field.

Mr. Fulton. In your statement you say [reading]:

The first necessary step was to insure the freedom and independence of the members meaning under the United Nations—that is, to secure the freedom of the United Nations members.

In addition, you say [reading]: The ability of democratic Peoples to preserve their independence in the face of totalitarian threats depends upon their determination to do so. That determination in turn depends upon the development of a healthy economic and political life and a genuine sense of security.

What has the Department done, in any sense, with respect to Czechoslovakia under that wording you have in your statement? Did Czechoslovakian independence depend upon such a political life and genuine sense of security ?

Secretary MARSHALL. At that particular time I would say that it did not, because they had a more successful economy than perhaps any other nation in the European theater, unless it was Belgium or perhaps Holland.

Mr. FULTON. Then Czechoslovakia does not fit into that statement, nor does Czechoslovakia fit into your statement that one of our fundamental tasks, under the United Nations, is to dispel the misconceptions of the Soviet leaders.

That did not fit either; did it?
Secretary MARSHALL. I missed the last part of the question.

Mr. FULTON. That in respect to Czechoslovakia, in its relations to Soviet Russia, certainly one of our major tasks in relation to that situation was not to dispel the misconceptions of the Soviet leaders; was it?

Did we not have the misconceptions, rather than the Soviet leaders, according to your statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. I am confused as to the meaning of your question.

Mr. FULTON. I am afraid we are all subject to confusion on the Czechoslovakian question.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would not put it quite that way, sir, because there is a great deal said and a great deal written that does not pertain to the actual facts of the matter.

Effort was made to deal with the general situation in the Security Council and it was not possible to get the action required there. The procedure which was followed in the subversion of Czechoslovakia has to be related to the general situation in all of the countries in western Europe, and their situation, as is well known, was one of very great insecurity, particularly because of the state of their economy, the low standard of living of their peoples, and the extreme difficulty confronting their governments in their efforts to maintain their countries on a stable monetary basis.

All of that was related to the Czechoslovakian situation when it came to the moment of endeavoring to do something to halt this subversion of countries in the manner that was followed in Czechoslovakia.

The remedies for the situation in France, for the situation in Greece and Italy, had not had time to work in a manner that would strengthen the whole European framework.

The situation was one of extreme difficulty to find a basis for action which would be realistic in relation to the Czechoslovakian matter.

I have heard a great many discussions of the matter by a large number of able people within and outside of the State Department. Nobody was able to give us a very logical proposal as to what might be done at the time other than that attempted through the Security Council.

Mr. Fulton. When I was speaking of confusion and misconception I was speaking of the public as well as the Department, and not just the Department alone.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Javits.

Mr. Javits. Mr. Secretary, if it is a fact that one of the main purposes of the reorganizers—that is, those who propose the reorganization of the United Nations Charter—is to control atomic weapons, then the place we want to control them is in Russia; is that not so?

Secretary MARSHALL. We want them controlled all over.

Mr. Javits. Primarily, we want to be sure that they are not going to be used as instruments of aggression in the other great-power nation, Russia; is that not a fact?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. Javits. Is it your view that if the ABC resolutions are enforced, there is a reasonable likelihood that Russia will get out of any world organization?

Secretary MARSHALL. What is the ABC?

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Mr. JAVITs. That is this resolution for the reorganization of the UN now before us.

Secretary MARSHALL. That is the fear that arises in connection with that procedure.

Mr. Javits. Then, if they do pull out, of course the very nation we want most in a controlled authority will be out; is that not a fact!

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. Mr. JAVITs. Mr. Secretary, what is your view as to the most promising line of action that will bring about the acceptance by the Soviets, as well as ourselves, of the atomic development authority plan which we have proposed, or something like it which will give effective international control over atomic weapons ?

Secretary MARSHALL. The answer to that is very much the same answer I have given to the other aspects of the amendment of the Charter. I think it first requires a general improvement in the entire situation in Europe economically, and in the feeling of security and a development of a better understanding all around.

There is no escaping the fact that at the present time it is not only a question of what the devious intentions of the Soviet Union might be, but also, undoubtedly, a feeling of deep suspicion on their part regarding us. I am at times worried because I think they have been victims, somewhat, of their own propaganda. If one keeps on repeating and repeating and repeating things as facts which are not facts, one finally ends up by believing at least a little of the misrepresentations himself.

They have their suspicions of us, and one of our great problems is to disabuse them of those suspicions. That is particularly difficult because we have very definite feelings about the procedure that they have been following in relation to the extension of their influence and their control of other nations through the infiltration procedure of Communist groups.

The root of most of our difficulties, really, is in the field of suspicion. So the matter becomes surcharged with these various influences.

At the risk of being unduly repetitious, I go back again to the things we are working on which I think in general will be helpful to the situation, but which certainly are not going to accomplish any miracle in a short time. If the proposals that we made at the meeting of the Assembly last fall, which are now under way and which are related to the veto, can be worked out, that will help us in our relations with the Soviet Union. The development of the European recovery program is going to have a very definite effect on the Soviet Union. The effect of the action by our Congress in restoring some of our military power will also have a very definite effect, if it is carried out by the Congress.

The Soviet Union will have a healthier understanding and a feeling of respect for our determination to stand firmly for what we think is right, and not just sit and look on.

Atomic control really must be universal, if there is to be an effective guaranty of security against its horrors.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask one nonrelated question-and I ask this not invidiously but with a real desire to get information—what lessons do we in the United States draw as to how the United Nations needs to be reorganized from its impotence to date on the Palestine situation?

Chairman Eaton. The Chair would like to say we are going to have an investigation of the Palestine situation and I will rule out of order questions on that subject in this investigation.

Mr. Javits. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in lieu of that which has nothing to do with Palestine?

Chairman EATON. You can cover the world except Palestine.

Mr. Javits. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate the chairman's view. I was not here yesterday when that announcement was made and I am glad to get the precise information on our Palestine hearing. I shall avoid questions on Palestine in this particular hearing hereafter.

Just to conclude the other point you were on, would you agree that there are three alternatives on bringing about real control of atomic weapons: (1) A preventive war against Russia—the take-it-or-leave-it theory; (2) some form of accommodation with them, which I gather is your view; or (3) some form of international government which will govern everybody, ourselves including the Russians; and that United States policy, accurately put, is that we are still trying to arrive at some real accommodations.

Secretary MARSHALL. We have not changed our view from that of Mr. Baruch's report on the question. It has been impractical to implement up to the present time, but that represents our thought of what is desirable to do and the conditions under which it must be done if our security and world security is to be safeguarded.

Mr. JAVITS. Thank you very much.
Chairman Eaton. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Lodge.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Secretary, I am personally very happy to see you back again. I understood you to say, sir, that you do not favor Resolution 59, but that you would have no objection to a similar form of resolution provided it did not seem to carry with it any implication which might destroy the United Nations?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. LODGE. I do not quite understand that position of yours, sir, because Resolution 59 seems to me to be an expression of the desire only that a meeting should be called under article 109.

If you have objections to it I wonder if you would be kind enough to submit to us some resolution in lieu of that, since you say

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have no objection to a resolution along that line?

Secretary MARSHALL. As I understand you, Mr. Lodge, you are asking me if we would attempt to give you a draft of a resolution ? Is that it?

Mr. Lodge. Yes, sir; the point occurs to me that the only point of Resolution 59 is to call a conference of the United Nations under 109 for the purpose of devising ways and means to improve the Charter. However, you express opposition to that while expressing approval of some resolution along that general line.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would undertake in the Department to submit to the committee a draft of a proposed resolution which we think would be helpful in crystallizing world opinion in the matter and yet would not be harmful from the point of view that I have previously expressed.

Mr. Lodge. Thank you, sir.

My thought in connection with 59 was simply this: That to call a meeting could do no harm, it seemed to me, because it would simply

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