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Mr. Fulton. That in respect to Czechoslovakia, in its relations to Soviet Russia, certainly one of our major tasks in relation to that situation was not to dispel the misconceptions of the Soviet leaders; was it?
Did we not have the misconceptions, rather than the Soviet leaders, according to your statement?
Secretary MARSHALL. I am confused as to the meaning of your question.
Mr. FULTON. I am afraid we are all subject to confusion on the Czechoslovakian question.
Secretary MARSHALL. I would not put it quite that way, sir, because there is a great deal said and a great deal written that does not pertain to the actual facts of the matter.
Effort was made to deal with the general situation in the Security Council and it was not possible to get the action required there. The procedure which was followed in the subversion of Czechoslovakia has to be related to the general situation in all of the countries in western
Curope, and their situation, as is well known, was one of very great insecurity, particularly because of the state of their economy, the low standard of living of their peoples, and the extreme difficulty confronting their governments in their efforts to maintain their countries on a stable monetary basis.
All of that was related to the Czechoslovakian situation when it came to the moment of endeavoring to do something to halt this subversion of countries in the manner that was followed in Czechoslovakia.
The remedies for the situation in France, for the situation in Greece and Italy, had not had time to work in a manner that would strengthen the whole European framework.
The situation was one of extreme difficulty to find a basis for action which would be realistic in relation to the Czechoslovakian matter.
I have heard a great many discussions of the matter by a large number of able people within and outside of the State Department. Nobody was able to give us a very logical proposal as to what might be done at the time other than that attempted through the Security Council.
Mr. FULTON. When I was speaking of confusion and misconception I was speaking of the public as well as the Department, and not just the Department alone.
Chairman EATON. Mr. Javits.
Mr. Javits. Mr. Secretary, if it is a fact that one of the main purposes of the reorganizers—that is, those who propose the reorganization of the United Nations Charter-is to control atomic weapons, then the place we want to control them is in Russia ; is that not so?
Secretary MARSHALL. We want them controlled all over.
Mr. Javits. Primarily, we want to be sure that they are not going to be used as instruments of aggression in the other great-power nation, Russia; is that not a fact?
Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct.
Mr. Javits. Is it your view that if the ABC resolutions are enforced, there is a reasonable likelihood that Russia will get out of any world organization?
Secretary MARSHALL. What is the ABC!
Mr. Javits. That is this resolution for the reorganization of the UN now before us.
Secretary MARSHALL. That is the fear that arises in connection with that procedure.
Mr. Javits. Then, if they do pull out, of course the very nation we want most in a controlled authority will be out; is that not a fact?
Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. Mr. JAVITs. Mr. Secretary, what is your view as to the most promising line of action that will bring about the acceptance by the Soviets, as well as ourselves, of the atomic development authority plan which we have proposed, or something like it which will give effective international control over atomic weapons ?
Secretary MARSHALL. The answer to that is very much the same answer I have given to the other aspects of the amendment of the Charter. I think it first requires a general improvement in the entire situation in Europe economically, and in the feeling of security and a development of a better understanding all around.
There is no escaping the fact that at the present time it is not only a question of what the devious intentions of the Soviet Union might be, but also, undoubtedly, a feeling of deep suspicion on their part regarding us. I am at times worried because I think they have been victims, somewhat, of their own propaganda. If one keeps on repeating and repeating and repeating things as facts which are not facts, one finally ends up by believing at least a little of the misrepresentations himself
. They have their suspicions of us, and one of our great problems is to disabuse them of those suspicions. That is particularly difficult because we have very definite feelings about the procedure that they have been following in relation to the extension of their influence and their control of other nations through the infiltration procedure of Communist groups.
The root of most of our difficulties, really, is in the field of suspicion. So the matter becomes surcharged with these various influences.
At the risk of being unduly repetitious, I go back again to the things we are working on which I think in general will be helpful to the situation, but which certainly are not going to accomplish any miracle in a short time. If the proposals that we made at the meeting of the Assembly last fall, which are now under way and which are related to the veto, can be worked out, that will help us in our relations with the Soviet Union. The development of the European recovery program is going to have a very definite effect on the Soviet Union. The effect of the action by our Congress in restoring some of our military power will also have a very definite effect, if it is carried out by the Congress.
The Soviet Union will have a healthier understanding and a feeling of respect for our determination to stand firmly for what we think is right, and not just sit and look on.
Atomic control really must be universal, if there is to be an effective guaranty of security against its horrors.
Mr. Javits. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask one nonrelated question—and I ask this not invidiously but with a real desire to get information—what lessons do we in the United States draw as to how the United Nations needs to be reorganized from its impotence to date on the Palestine situation?
Chairman Eaton. The Chair would like to say we are going to have an investigation of the Palestine situation and I will rule out of order questions on that subject in this investigation.
Mr. Javits. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in lieu of that which has nothing to do with Palestine ?
Chairman Eaton. You can cover the world except Palestine.
Mr. Javits. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate the chairman's view. I was not here yesterday when that announcement was made and I am glad to get the precise information on our Palestine hearing. I shall avoid questions on Palestine in this particular hearing hereafter.
Just to conclude the other point you were on, would you agree that there are three alternatives on bringing about real control of atomic weapons: (1) A preventive war against Russia—the take-it-or-leave-it theory; (2) some form of accommodation with them, which I gather is your view; or (3) some form of international government which will govern everybody, ourselves including the Russians; and that United States policy, accurately put, is that we are still trying to arrive at some real accommodations.
Secretary MARSHALL. We have not changed our view from that of Mr. Baruch’s report on the question. It has been impractical to implement up to the present time, but that represents our thought of what is desirable to do and the conditions under which it must be done if our security and world security is to be safeguarded.
Mr. JAVITs. Thank you very much.
Mr. LODGE. Mr. Secretary, I am personally very happy to see you back again. I understood you to say, sir, that you do not favor Resolution 59, but that you would have no objection to a similar form of resolution provided it did not seem to carry with it any implication which might destroy the United Nations?
Secretary MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.
Mr. LODGE. I do not quite understand that position of yours, sir, because Resolution 59 seems to me to be an expression of the desire only that a meeting should be called under article 109.
If you have objections to it I wonder if you would be kind enough to submit to us some resolution in lieu of that, since you say that you have no objection to a resolution along that line!
Secretary MARSHALL. As I understand you, Mr. Lodge, you are asking me if we would attempt to give you a draft of a resolution ? Is that it?
Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir; the point occurs to me that the only point of Resolution 59 is to call a conference of the United Nations under 109 for the purpose of devising ways and means to improve the Charter. However, you express opposition to that while expressing approval of some resolution along that general line.
Secretary MARSHALL. I would undertake in the Department to submit to the committee a draft of a proposed resolution which we think would be helpful in crystallizing world opinion in the matter and yet would not be harmful from the point of view that I have previously expressed.
Mr. LODGE. Thank you, sir.
My thought in connection with 59 was simply this: That to call a meeting could do no harm, it seemed to me, because it would simply
cast a light once again on the dilemma with which we are faced if the Soviet refuses to cooperate. On the other hand, we might make some progress.
As to Resolution 163, are you familiar with that, sir? Secretary MARSHALL. I have it here in front of me. Mr. LODGE. The following thought occurs to me, that if the Soviet Union were to refuse to accede to the revisions in the Charter, proposed in 163, it would seem to me there would be no purpose in going ahead with the change which has to do with the veto.
In other words, the reason the veto has been an obstruction is because of the way it has been used by the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union were not to accede to these changes and were therefore to exclude herself—if that could be done, and I do not know quite how it could be under the Charter—then there would be no particular point in going ahead with the deletion of the veto. Would you say that was an accurate statement? Secretary MARSHALL. Our desire,
of course, would be to remove the veto aspect in those sections of the Charter under chapter VI relating to peaceful settlements and the sections concerning admission to membership.
Mr. LODGE. Would you say that the suggestions with respect to the veto in 163 coincided with your ideas along that line!
Secretary MARSHALL. I think you have removed the veto on aggression in that resolution; have you not? It provides for elimination of the veto right by a permanent member in the Security Council “but only in the matters of aggression, armament for aggression, and admission for membership in the United Nations."
We do not want to remove the veto on matters of enforcement. It is on peaceful settlements and admission of other nations to membership that we are in favor of the removal of the veto.
Mr. LODGE. Would you also say, Mr. Secretary, that since the changes recommended in 163 are, it would seem, inspired largely by the actions of the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union were to exclude herself none of these changes would become as necessary as they now seem to be?
In other words, if the action proposed under 163 were adopted, there would be two possible results. One would be that the Soviet Union would accede and the other would be that she would not. If she did not, it seems to me that the reason for the changes would, to a considerable extent, disappear.
Secretary MARSHALL. If I understand you correctly, that is all right, but I am altogether uncertain as to what I am hearing of what you are saying
Mr. LODGE. One of the three changes proposed is that there shall be a quota allocation of heavy armament as follows: 20 percent to the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, 10 percent to France, 10 percent to China, and 20 percent to the other small nations.
It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that the one field in which we have predominance with respect to our Military Establishment is heavy armament.
Therefore, I question the desirability of limiting ourselves in that field while not limiting the other nations in the field where they might have predomination.
Would you care to comment on that, sir?
Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place, we have had lengthy discussions regarding the regulation of armaments and it is difficult to reach any agreement. This is outside of the veto. It has been confined to discussions. It is exceedingly hard to get a sound basis of agreement in relation to armaments.
You introduced another factor along with that, which is very pertinent to the same issue: The exact method of procedure to establish a balance that will mean stability and a general feeling of security. It is questionable up to the present time, I would say, because of the extreme difficulty of reaching a practical agreement with all these various nations in view of their feelings and their set-ups. We have had a very difficult time, as everybody knows, in connection with agreement concerning the provision of armed forces, to the Security Council under the Charter. We have not yet reached agreement on that. There we have complete divergence of view between one nation—the Soviet Union, where its power is largely represented in manpower—and other nations under certain different set-ups.
In our case, we are more or less limited in the use of man-power, with a tremendous employment of technical devices and heavy implements and instruments, such as ships, planes, tanks, and so forth.
On the other side, the Soviets are opposed to the use of such materials and such instruments, since on their side manpower is one of the factors that lends itself most readily to their set-up and the European theater. Therefore there is a complete disagreement as to what allocations are to be made. We cannot afford to surrender the basic conditions under which we operate, particularly in the geographical field where we deal with oceans and with far reaches of distance. So it may seem, on the part of some people, on the part of some Americans possibly, that we have been unduly stubborn in our attributing these negotiations. That is not the case. It is a very critical matter for us, one which might imperil our future security and our position in the world if we did not treat it with greatest care.
Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. MALONEY. Mr. Secretary, you have stated that many small nations are fearful of the destruction of the United Nations. Has the United Nations been able to prevent any aggressive measures attempted by the Soviet Union?
I get considerable mail stating, “Will the United Nations be able to stop the Soviet Union from going any further.” Or "Have they done anything in the past to stop them?"
Secretary MarshaLL. I think the United Nations has had a very definite influence on several occasions, for instance, with regard to Iran, in Greece and Indonesia.
It has been helpful definitely in connection with the situation in Kashmir. It is making an effort to meet the situation in Korea.
Up to the present time the United Nations has not been successful in deterring the subversion of governments. I might say in connection with Czechoslovakia, the first action there indicated on the surface that it was purely political, entirely within the scope of the normal governmental procedures of the Czechoslovakian nation. It was only a few days later when the concrete evidences of force and tyranny,