cast a light once again on the dilemma with which we are faced if the Soviet refuses to cooperate. On the other hand, we might make some progress.

As to Resolution 163, are you familiar with that, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have it here in front of me.

Mr. LODGE. The following thought occurs to me, that if the Soviet Union were to refuse to accede to the revisions in the Charter, proposed in 163, it would seem to me there would be no purpose in going ahead with the change which has to do with the veto.

In other words, the reason the veto has been an obstruction is because of the way it has been used by the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union were not to accede to these changes and were therefore to exclude herself-if that could be done, and I do not know quite how it could be under the Charter-then there would be no particular point in going ahead with the deletion of the veto. Would you say that was an accurate statement?

Secretary MARSHALL. Our desire, of course, would be to remove the veto aspect in those sections of the Charter under chapter VI relating to peaceful settlements and the sections concerning admission to membership.

Mr. LODGE. Would you say that the suggestions with respect to the veto in 163 coincided with your ideas along that line?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think you have removed the veto on aggression in that resolution; have you not? It provides for elimination of the veto right by a permanent member in the Security Council "but only in the matters of aggression, armament for aggression, and admission for membership in the United Nations."

We do not want to remove the veto on matters of enforcement. It is on peaceful settlements and admission of other nations to membership that we are in favor of the removal of the veto.

Mr. LODGE. Would you also say, Mr. Secretary, that since the changes recommended in 163 are, it would seem, inspired largely by the actions of the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union were to exclude herself none of these changes would become as necessary as they now seem to be?

In other words, if the action proposed under 163 were adopted, there would be two possible results. One would be that the Soviet Union would accede and the other would be that she would not. If she did not, it seems to me that the reason for the changes would, to a considerable extent, disappear.

Secretary MARSHALL. If I understand you correctly, that is all right, but I am altogether uncertain as to what I am hearing of what you are saying.

Mr. LODGE. One of the three changes proposed is that there shall be a quota allocation of heavy armament as follows: 20 percent to the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations, 10 percent to France, 10 percent to China, and 20 percent to the other small nations.

It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that the one field in which we have predominance with respect to our Military Establishment is heavy

armament.

Therefore, I question the desirability of limiting ourselves in that field while not limiting the other nations in the field where they might have predomination.

Would you care to comment on that, sir?

Secretary MARSHALL. In the first place, we have had lengthy discussions regarding the regulation of armaments and it is difficult to reach any agreement. This is outside of the veto. It has been confined to discussions. It is exceedingly hard to get a sound basis of agreement in relation to armaments.

You introduced another factor along with that, which is very pertinent to the same issue: The exact method of procedure to establish_a balance that will mean stability and a general feeling of security. It is questionable up to the present time, I would say, because of the extreme difficulty of reaching a practical agreement with all these various nations in view of their feelings and their set-ups. We have had a very difficult time, as everybody knows, in connection with agreement concerning the provision of armed forces, to the Security Council under the Charter. We have not yet reached agreement on that. There we have complete divergence of view between one nation-the Soviet Union, where its power is largely represented in manpower-and other nations under certain different set-ups.

In our case, we are more or less limited in the use of man-power, with a tremendous employment of technical devices and heavy implements and instruments, such as ships, planes, tanks, and so forth.

On the other side, the Soviets are opposed to the use of such materials and such instruments, since on their side manpower is one of the factors that lends itself most readily to their set-up and the European theater. Therefore there is a complete disagreement as to what allocations are to be made. We cannot afford to surrender the basic conditions under which we operate, particularly in the geographical field where we deal with oceans and with far reaches of distance. So it may seem, on the part of some people, on the part of some Americans possibly, that we have been unduly stubborn in our attributing these negotiations. That is not the case. It is a very critical matter for us, one which might imperil our future security and our position in the world if we did not treat it with greatest care.

Mr. LODGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman EATON. Mr. Maloney?

Mr. MALONEY. Mr. Secretary, you have stated that many small nations are fearful of the destruction of the United Nations. Has the United Nations been able to prevent any aggressive measures attempted by the Soviet Union?

I get considerable mail stating, "Will the United Nations be able to stop the Soviet Union from going any further." Or "Have they done anything in the past to stop them?"

Secretary MARSHALL. I think the United Nations has had a very definite influence on several occasions, for instance, with regard to Iran, in Greece and Indonesia.

It has been helpful definitely in connection with the situation in Kashmir. It is making an effort to meet the situation in Korea.

Up to the present time the United Nations has not been successful in deterring the subversion of governments. I might say in connection with Czechoslovakia, the first action there indicated on the surface that it was purely political, entirely within the scope of the normal governmental procedures of the Czechoslovakian nation. It was only a few days later when the concrete evidences of force and tyranny,

of terroristic methods, became apparent that the world fully realized what had been happening.

Mr. MALONEY. Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned Czechoslovakia. There is probably no question in the minds of anyone that the changing government in Czechoslovakia was inspired by Russia and I do not think there is any doubt in your mind about it?

Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; there is not.

Mr. MALONEY. Has the United Nations any authority to intervene in a civil war in a country when the war is inspired by an outside

nation?

Secretary MARSHALL. The charter gives it the authority to intervene if the situation is endangering the peace and security of the world.

You have included in your statement the question of outside influence. It is always a subject of debate as to whether or not it exists

or whether it does not.

Mr. MALONEY. In Greece it has been decided that it was outside influence?

Secretary MARSHALL. That was the decision.

Mr. MALONEY. Still the civil war goes on there, and the United Nations appears to be impotent to do anything.

Secretary MARSHALL. The presence of the United Nations Commission in Greece has had an important deterrent effect on the guerilla action. That has been helpful. There would be a much more difficult situation in Greece if the United Nations did not have representatives on the ground.

Mr. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you one question: In resolution 59, if the General Conference of the United Nations is called for the purpose of making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war, would that, in your judgment, seriously affect the continuance of the United Nations? That is part of Resolution 59.

Secretary MARSHALL (reading):

That it is the sense of the Congress that the President of the United States should immediately take the initiative in calling a General Conference of the United Nations pursuant to article 109.

Is that the one you refer to?

Chairman EATON. Yes.

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that this puts the President in the position of calling a conference of the United Nations pursuant to article 109 when the feeling is very general that such a meeting cannot be brought about. The draft reads:

Making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war.

That is in effect what we have proposed for improvement of the Charter in the efforts we have made and are making in the United Nations.

Chairman EATON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We greatly appreciate your being here, as always, and we will adjourn until 2 o'clock to hear Ambassador Warren Austin.

(At 12:30 p. m. the committee recessed until 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman EATON. The committee will come to order.

We have the very great pleasure today of welcoming back our distinguished colleague of happy days gone by, Senator Austin. He and myself worked together in the preparation of the United Nations Charter and we are delighted to welcome him back here today, to throw whatever further light he may have acquired on the subject since then, before us.

Ambassador Austin, you have the floor.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WARREN R. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SEAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador AUSTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a very great pleasure for me to return and to have such a warm-hearted welcome. I must confess it can be a little uncomfortable. This is the first time I have ever occupied the witness chair. If I begin to ask you questions, I hope you will stop me, because that only represents a reversion to ancient form.

I am deeply moved by the desire to strengthen the United Nations that is demonstrated by the Congress in calling these hearings. Earnest and continuing support of the United Nations is clearly needed in a world which has suffered two devastating wars in 25 years, which is filled with fear of a third, and in which over half the people are both hungry and illiterate.

Building peace and security in such a world is a tremendous job. Fortunately, the work of securing agreement among sovereign nations on the plan for an international organization to maintain peace was begun while a majority of them were united in fighting a common enemy.

Let me hand in a paper which outlines the physical structure of the United Nations. I should be glad to furnish additional copies if the committee should find it useful.

Chairman EATON. Can you provide copies for all members of the committee?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I shall be glad to provide them.

(The document referred to appears in the appendix, pp. 552–557.) Structure of the United Nations: The men who wrote the Charter at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco realized that an international organization formed to preserve the peace must include every major power in its membership, with no exceptions. That was true in 1945; it is true today. To attain that goal, each member had to pay a price. Each had to yield on some of its own desires as to the shape of the organization, and to accommodate itself to the wishes of others.

The Charter which resulted, clearly defined the effort which would be required if the peoples of the world were to find the peace, the freedom, and the decent living which they earnestly sought.

The first task was the removal of the cause of war.

The Charter was framed to combine the efforts of the members of the United Nations in creating the conditions of peace through joint action.

The second task was to substitute for war pacific settlement of disputes.

The third task was to insure collective security by peace forces voluntarily agreed upon by members.

Assuming that the numerous and varied efforts of the Congress, of State legislatures, of towns and cities, as well as of important civic organizations, recognize the need for the United Nations, and are intended to strengthen it, then there must be a reconciliation among them, and with the members of the United Nations, which is based on reality. It goes without saying that such a reconciliation cannot occur if the purpose is something else. If the purpose should be to discredit the United Nations as impotent, or to dissolve it in order to try erecting a new organization with its rubble, there cannot be reconciliation. What I have to say is based on the assumption that we all seek to take measures that are practicable and feasible for preserving and strengthening the United Nations.

In the beginning, we must consider the reality of the unanimity rule bearing upon amendment of the Charter. Article 108 provides that amendments cannot come into force without ratification by all of the permanent members of the Security Council. I can give you positive evidence that such unanimity is not now possible.

On January 19, 1948 that is, within the last 4 months-the five permanent members met at my request and considered suggestions to amend the Charter with respect to the use of the veto on matters of pacific settlement, and upon petitions for membership. You will recognize that these suggestions are far less drastic than any of the proposals for revision now before you. Only one of the five was willing to amend the Charter in this regard: That was the United States of America.

Now the significance of that, the meeting itself, and the evidence that only one of the five members was ready to modify the veto provisions of the Charter, becomes even more persuasive in light of the history leading up to the meeting.

I will ask you to be patient while I give you that history. This was a meeting resulting from formal resolutions. I begin the story with December 13, 1946, at the sixtieth plenary meeting of the General Assembly which was considering proposals on the veto.

In that meeting a resolution was passed which contained the following paragraphs [reading]:

The General Assembly:

Earnestly requests the Permanent members of the Security Council to make every effort in consultation with one another, and with fellow members of the Security Council to insure that the use of the special voting privilege of its Permanent Members Does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly;

Recommends to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27, and to assure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions; and

Further recommends that in developing such practices and procedures, the Security Council take into consideration the views expressed by the members of the United Nations during the Second part of the First Session of the General Assembly.

Two of the members of this great committee will recall that debate. They will recall that many of the members who are not permanent members on the Security Council expressed great desire to have a change made in the voting procedure and especially in respect of the unanimity rule, which we often refer to as the veto.