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of terroristic methods, became apparent that the world fully realized what had been happening.
Mr. MALONEY. Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned Czechoslovakia. There is probably no question in the minds of anyone that the chang. ing government in Czechoslovakia was inspired by Russia and I do not think there is any doubt in your mind about it?
Secretary MARSHALL. No, sir; there is not.
Mr. MALONEY. Has the United Nations any authority to intervene in a civil war in a country when the war is inspired by an outside nation?
Secretary MARSHALL. The charter gives it the authority to intervene if the situation is endangering the peace and security of the world.
You have included in your statement the question of outside influence. It is always a subject of debate as to whether or not it exists or whether it does not.
Mr. MALONEY. In Greece it has been decided that it was outside influence?
Secretary MARSHALL. That was the decision. Mr. MALONEY. Still the civil war goes on there, and the United Nations appears to be impotent to do anything.
Secretary MARSHALL. The presence of the United Nations Commission in Greece has had an important deterrent effect on the guerilla action. That has been helpful. There would be a much more difficult situation in Greece if the United Nations did not have representatives on the ground.
Mr. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. .
Chairman EATON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you one question: In resolution 59, if the General Conference of the United Nations is called for the purpose of making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war, would that, in your judgment, seriously affect the continuance of the United Nations ? That is part of Resolution 59.
Secretary MARSHALL (reading):
Is that the one you refer to?
Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that this puts the President in the position of calling a conference of the United Nations pursuant to article 109 when the feeling is very general that such a meeting cannot be brought about. The draft reads:
Making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war.
That is in effect what we have proposed for improvement of the Charter in the efforts we have made and are making in the United Nations.
Chairman EATON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We greatly appre ciate your being here, as always, and we will adjourn until 2 o'clock to hear Ambassador Warren Austin.
(At 12:30 p. m. the committee recessed until 2 p. m.)
Chairman EATON. The committee will come to order. We have the very great pleasure today of welcoming back our distinguished colleague of happy days gone by, Senator Austin. He and myself worked together in the preparation of the United Nations Charter and we are delighted to welcome him back here today, to throw whatever further light he may have acquired on the subject since then, before us.
Ambassador Austin, you have the floor.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WARREN R. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SEAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS Ambassador AUSTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a very great pleasure for me to return and to have such a warm-hearted welcome. I must confess it can be a little uncomfortable. This is the first time I have ever occupied the witness chair. If I begin to ask you questions, I hope you will stop me, because that only represents a reversion to ancient form.
I am deeply moved by the desire to strengthen the United Nations that is demonstrated by the Congress in calling these hearings. Earnest and continuing support of the United Nations is clearly needed in a world which has suffered two devastating wars in 25 years, which is filled with fear of a third, and in which over half the people are both hungry and illiterate.
Building peace and security in such a world is a tremendous job. Fortunately, the work of securing agreement among sovereign nations on the plan for an international organization to maintain peace was begun while a majority of them were united in fighting a common enemy.
Let me hand in a paper which outlines the physical structure of the United Nations. "I should be glad to furnish additional copies if the committee should find it useful.
Chairman EATON. Can you provide copies for all members of the committee? Ambassador Austin. I shall be glad to provide them. (The document referred to appears in the appendix, pp. 552–557.)
Structure of the United Nations: The men who wrote the Charter at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco realized that an international organization formed to preservė the peace must include every major power in its membership, with no exceptions. That was true in 1945; it is true today. To attain that goal, each member had to pay a price. Each had to yield on some of its own desires as to the shape of the organization, and to accommodate itself to the wishes of others.
The Charter which resulted, clearly defined the effort which would be required if the peoples of the world were to find the peace, the freedom, and the decent living which they earnestly sought.
The first task was the removal of the cause of war. The Charter was framed to combine the efforts of the members of the United Nations in creating the conditions of peace through joint action.
The second task was to substitute for war pacific settlement of disputes.
The third task was to insure collective security by peace forces voluntarily agreed upon by members.
Assuming that the numerous and varied efforts of the Congress, of State legislatures, of towns and cities, as well as of important civic organizations, recognize the need for the United Nations, and are intended to strengthen it, then there must be a reconciliation among them, and with the members of the United Nations, which is based on reality. It goes without saying that such a reconciliation cannot occur if the purpose is something else. If the purpose should be to discredit the United Nations as impotent, or to dissolve it in order to try erecting a new organization with its rubble, there cannot be reconciliation.
What I have to say is based on the assumption that we all seek to take measures that are practicable and feasible for preserving and strengthening the United Nations.
In the beginning, we must consider the reality of the unanimity rule bearing upon amendment of the Charter. Årticle 108 provides that amendments cannot come into force without ratification by all of the permanent members of the Security Council. I can give you positive evidence that such unanimity is not now possible.
On January 19, 1948_that is, within the last 4 months—the five permanent members met at my request and considered suggestions to amend the Charter with respect to the use of the veto on matters of pacific settlement, and upon petitions for membership. You will recognize that these suggestions are far less drastic than any of the proposals for revision now before you. Only one of the five was willing to amend the Charter in this regard: That was the United States of America.
Now the significance of that, the meeting itself, and the evidence that only one of the five members was ready to modify the veto provisions of the Charter, becomes even more persuasive in light of the history leading up to the meeting.
I will ask you to be patient while I give you that history. This was a meeting resulting from formal resolutions. I begin the story with December 13, 1946, at the sixtieth plenary meeting of the General Assembly which was considering proposals on the veto.
In that meeting a resolution was passed which contained the following paragraphs (reading]:
The General Assembly :
Earnestly requests the Permanent members of the Security Council to make every effort in consultation with one another, and with fellow members of the Security Council to insure that the use of the special voting privilege of its Permanent Members Does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly;
Recommends to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27, and to assure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions; and
Further recommends that in developing such practices and procedures, the Security Council take into consideration the views expressed by the members of the United Nations during the Second part of the First Session of the General Assembly.
Two of the members of this great committee will recall that debate. They will recall that many of the members who are not permanent members on the Security Council expressed great desire to have a change made in the voting procedure and especially in respect of the unanimity rule, which we often refer to as the veto.
Now, that was the resolution of December 13. Did we get unanimity among the five great powers on that resolution ! Oh, no.
Those voting for it were 36. Those voting against it were six. Those who did not vote at all but abstained were nine.
Among those that voted against it was one of the permanent members, the Soviet Union. In fact, the six negative votes were cast by eastern European states. It is important that among the nine abstainees you find France and China. Therefore, what do you have here as a significant event leading up to that meeting of last January 19? You have just two of the permanent members—the United States and the United Kingdom-willing to take even this small step toward amendment of the voting procedure and the unanimity rule.
Now, we come to the second step in which the Secretary General called this resolution to the attention of the permanent members.
On August 27, 1947, the Secretary General brought to the attention of the Security Council the problem of implementation by the Security Council of the General Assembly resolution of December 13. The Security Council, on the motion of the United States, referred the matter to its committee of experts, with instructions to consider specific proposals and report to the Security Council.
The United States stipulated to the members of the Security Council, specific proposals for rules of procedure. The United States position in this matter is set forth in a position paper entitled, “United States Course of Action in Connection with the Security Council Implementation of General Assembly Resolution on the Subject of Voting on the Security Council.” I believe you have copies of this position paper.
On the 21st of November 1947, the next step leading up to that meeting of January 19, occurred in the General Assembly. This evidence is taken from the report by the President to the Congress for the year 1947, with which you are familiar.
I refer you to page 163 thereof, which is Appendix I, General Assembly Resolutions. The following resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 38 to 6, with 11 abstaining. It is important to examine it to see if it anywhere nearly aproaches the radical change which is contained in the proposals now before you. This is the resolution [reading]:
The General Assembly, in the exercise of its power to make recommendations relating to the powers and functions of any organs of the United Nations (Article X of the Charter) :
Requests the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, in accordance with Paragraph 2 (a) of the Resolution of the General Assembly of 13 November 1947, establishing that committee to:
(1) consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by the Members of the United Nations or to the Second Session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee.
(2) Consult with any comittee which the Security Council may designate to cooperate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problems. That committee referred to is the committee of experts, which I have already mentioned; it is at work now, as it was then.
(3) Report, with its conclusions to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary General not later than the 15 of July 1948.
That is next July. It has not yet arrived. And by the Secretary-General to the member states and to the General Assembly.
Now note this:
Requests the Permanent Members of the Security Council to consult with one another on the problem of voting in the Security Council, in order to secure agreement among them on measures to insure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions.
Now, what is the story on the adoption of that resolution? First, it had to go through a committee of the General Assembly, Committee No. 1. Did it get approval of all the five permanent members when they voted in the committee? No, it did not.
There is no record of the roll call vote but there is a record prepared by the United States Mission to the United Nations of the vote in Committee No. 1. This is our record. As chief of the Mission, I vouch for its accuracy:
The preamble received 44 affirmative votes; and 6 negative votes were cast by the eastern European states.
Chairman EATON. The Soviet Union!
Ambassador AUSTIN. The Soviet Union bloc. There were no abstentions.
Faragraph 1 received 30 affirmative votes and 7 negative votes—the 6 eastern European States plus Chile. There were 11 abstentions.
Paragraph 2—that is the one that requests the permanent members to get together and consult-received 43 affirmative votes, 1 negative vote, Yugoslavia, and 8 abstentions.
Now, those abstentions were the remaining eastern European states—that would be five of them, including the Soviet Union—and thiree Arab states.
As a whole, the resolution received 36 affirmative votes and 6 negative votes, all eastern European countries, with 11 abstentions and they were the 5 Arab States, Yemen, Ethiopia, Vuatemala, Sweden, and Iceland and there were 4 abstaining, including the Philippines, so you see even in committee we could not get unanimity between the 5 great powers.
The plenary session of the General Assembly adopted this resolution by 38 in favor, 6 against, and 11 absentions. The eastern European Štates constitute those that were against it, and among them, of course, was the Soviet Union.
This resolution was adopted on November 21, 1947. On January 19, 1948, we had the consultation it calls for. In the meantime, much had been done to try to work out more definite proposals than had yet been made. None of these proposals, however, reach as far as chapter VII; the enforcement part of the Charter. All of them up to that date had been confined to pacific measures, chapter VI, and to the admission of new members to the United Nations.
The meeting of January 19 was a very significant meeting of the Five Great Powers. It tested the question of whether it would be futile or useful to ask under the Charter for the calling of a convention for the purpose of considering an amendment of the Charter with respect only to those matters considered under chapter 6, and admission of new members. This does not encompass so extensive and so great a change as you would make if you went into chapter VII, as would be done by these resolutions that you have under consideration.