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We may here observe farther, that it is in SERM. itself fit and reasonable, that God, the one IV. eternal being, perfect and happy in himself, if he forms a world, or worlds of beings, fhould concern himself for them, provide for them, and over-rule and direct all things with wisdom, righteoufneffe and goodneffe.

Thus then, virtue, or moral righteousneffe, is, and appears to be, in itself fit and reafonable, and has a tendence to promote the happineffe of particular beings, and of fo

cieties.

4. This fitnesse and reasonableneffe of things is itself an obligation or lays an obligation upon every rational being, by whom it is perceived. For whatever is fit, reasonable and equitable, must be right, and the contrarie wrong. He therefore that does what is fit, reasonable, and equitable, and which he difcerns to be right, approves himself, and his conduct, and has fatisfaction therein. He that does otherwise, knows he has done wrong: and, if he reflect, will condemn himself.

5. Befide the forementioned obligation, (of intrinfic fitneffe and reasonableneffe,) there is another, arifing from the will of God, the

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SERM. creator and the governour of the universe, and IV. particularly of his rational creatures. These

fitneffes of things, before-mentioned, are a rule of action to the Deity himfelf. And it muft be his will, that the fitneffe, or reason, of things fhould be observed by his rational creatures : or that they should do those things, which are conducive to their own, and each others welfare.

And when it is confidered, that moral good is the will of God, and moral evil contrarie to his will; even to the will of him, who is fupreme, and Lord of all; it is reafonable to conclude, that he should beftow rewards or inflict punishments, either now immediatly, or hereafter in fome future time, upon those who obferve or neglect the reafon of things and the welfare of their fellow-creatures: that is, who obey, or tranfgrefs the law of nature: which is also the law of God, the author of nature.

6. Virtue, morality, or moral righteoufneffe, is a thing of great extent, comprehending every thing that is in itself fit and reafonable: mens duty to God and to each other: the duties of every relation, and the due regulation

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gulation of thoughts and affections, as well as SERM. outward actions. IV.

For in the more ordinarie and just sense of the expreffion, as before fhewn, it takes in every thing that is fit and reafonable: and therefore must include honorable fentiments, as well as outward worship, and reverential expreffions concerning the Deity. It requires likewife kind affection, as well as good of fices, to men. It comprehends not only strict justice, but goodneffe, and mercie, and equity: yea forgiveneffe of injuries and offenfes, when acknowledged. For this alfo is fit in a world of creatures, that are weak and fallible, and often offend against each other, through mistake, or paffion.

This law of nature, or reafon, does more
over teach repentance to all those who offend.
For, fince virtue is right, as before shewn,
he who has tranfgreffed, and done what is
wrong, muft turn from his course, and a-
mend it. It is the only way of becoming
good, and of being accepted in the fight of
the holy, wife and impartial sovereign and
judge of all.

7. It is commonly said of the law of na-
mure, that it is of eternal obligation: but yẹt
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SERM, I would add, that every branch of moral righteousnesse cannot be practised in every state.

IV.

The law of reason, I fay, is of eternal obligation: that is, fuppofing fuch cafes and circumftances, or beings to bear fuch and fuch relations to each other; fuch and fuch actions will be always obligatorie. Suppofing a world, in which there are parents and children, mafters and fervants, rich and poor, fome in profperous, others in afflictive circumstances, fome governours, others governed, and a great variety of other circumstances fubfifting: fuch and fuch a behaviour toward each other is fit and reasonable. And though there be no fuch beings, with those several relations; yet it is true, that if there were fuch beings, fuch actions would be in themselves fit and reasonable. Nor can any authority diffolve, and fet afide their obligation.

Thus these things are of everlafting obligation. But when thofe relations and circumftances cease, divers branches of duty muft ceafe alfo. So in a future ftate of recompenfe, for fuch as have been truly and fincerely good in this world, many branches of duty, neceffarie here, will cease. Where there is perfect holineffe, and perfection of happineffe, there

cannot

cannot be the exercife of forgiveneffe to offen- SERM. ders, nor of mercie to the miferable. Nor IV. will there be room for patience under afflictions, and fuch like virtues which are neceffarie in this state of frailty: though still the love of God, and the love of each other, the great and effential virtues, with branches fuitable to a ftate of glorie and happineffe, will be always fit, and reafonable, and incumbent upon every one.

8. The duties of moral obligation are dif cernible by rational beings, with a due exercise of their powers and faculties. For those duties being founded in the powers and circumftances of thofe very beings themselves, and their relations to each other, and being therefore fit and reafonable in themselves; they may be difcerned by fuch as exercise their reason, and attend to the nature, and circumftances of things.

There may be perplexed cafes, when what is duty, what is best and fittest cannot be determined without fome difficulty: and the evidence of what is right amounts to no more than probability, or is fhort of certainty. But the general obligations of virtue, the great branches of duty, toward God and men, are

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