Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, RealismLongmans, Green & Company, 1910 - 696 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
Absolutism abstract admit affirm analysis Appearance and Reality apprehend Apriorism Aristotle aspect assertion axioms belief belong Bradley Bradley's causal action cognition concept concrete consciousness contradiction Criticism Critique of Judgment data of experience determined Ding-an-sich distinct doctrine epistemology explain external fact feeling Fichte finite function Hegel Hence human knowledge Ibid Idealism ideas Immanence implies independent individual inference intellect introspective judgment Kant Kantian logical matter means merely metaphysical method mind nature notions objective idealists Panpsychism perceive perception philosophy of Pure postulation and experiment Pragmatism pragmatist predicate present presupposes principle Professor James psychology Pure Experience purpose qualities rational realise reason recognise regard relations Schiller seems sensation sense sense-experience sentient experience Shadworth Hodgson significance Studies in Humanism subject and object Subjective Idealism substance synthesis teleological theory of knowledge things thought tion true truth ultimate unity universe validity whole
Popular passages
Page 97 - We perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist, must be to fall within sentience. Sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. We may say, in other words, that there is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence.
Page 540 - They turn us towards direct verification ; lead us into the surroundings of the objects they envisage; and then, if everything runs on harmoniously, we are so sure that verification is possible that we omit it, and are usually justified by all that happens. Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs 'pass' so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank notes pass so long as nobody refuses them.
Page 540 - The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.
Page 541 - True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.
Page 255 - Proof of such a doctrine, in the ordinary sense of the word, from the nature of the case there cannot be. It is not a truth deducible from other established or conceded truths. It is not a statement of an event or matter of fact that can be the object of experiment or observation. It represents a conception to which no perceivable or imaginable object can possibly correspond, but one that affords the only means by which, reflecting on our moral and intellectual experience conjointly, taking the world...
Page 226 - ... relations in the way of change or by which change is determined. But neither can any process of change yield a consciousness of itself, which, in order to be a consciousness of the change, must be equally present to all stages of the change; nor can any consciousness of change, since the whole of it must be present at once, be itself a process of change.
Page 423 - ... spread as little as possible: we keep unaltered as much of our old knowledge, as many of our old prejudices and beliefs, as we can. We patch and tinker more than we renew. The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is also tinged by what absorbs it. Our past apperceives and co-operates; and in the new equilibrium in which each step forward in the process of learning terminates, it happens relatively seldom that the new fact is added raw.
Page 407 - Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, except in so far as it may be compelled by impressed forces to change that state.
Page 423 - The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions.