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Senator AUSTIN. I would like to know whether it includes Argentina ?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. She participated in the San Francisco Conference; therefore she is in the first category. In the second category are the countries which were signatories to the declaration by United Nations and did not participate in the United Nations Conference.

Senator AUSTIN. Argentina has not signed the declaration?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. No; but she participated in the Conference.
The CHAIRMAN. She expressed a desire to sign, did she not?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. In connection with the distinction that you made between the capitalized Members and those that are uncapitalized, may I draw your attention to chapter XVII, amendments ?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. Article 108. It says (reading]:

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

How can the members of the Security Council be Members of the United Nations?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Members of the Security Council are Members of the United Nations, of course.

Senator GREEN. The nations are not members of the Security Council, are they?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir. The seats on the Security Council are assigned to nations.

Senator GREEN. Then, if you refer to nations members of the Organization, why should not that be capitalized ?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Because the final reference to "members" in article 108 is to the nations which are members of the Security Council. They are also Members of the Organization and as such they are previously referred to by the capitalized word “Members."

Senator GREEN. How would you designate them if you referred to representatives of the nations on the Security Council?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. You would have to say “Representatives of the Members of the United Nations which are members of the Security Council.” In such a case the first “Member” would be capitalized and the second would not, in order to carry out this particular typographical device.

Senator GREEN. Thank you.

Senator MILLIKIN. Would those nations that were neutral during this war have to be admitted specially? I am thinking of Sweden or Switzerland.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir. Those are among the nations which are referred to in article 4."

Senator MILLIKIN. Will you be good enough to tell us the vote required in the Council and in the Assembly to suspend and to expel ?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes. It is a two-thirds vote in the Assembly, and a vote of seven members in the Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

Senator MILLIKIN. A unanimous vote of the permanent members?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE, Doctor, will you advise the committee whether the right of withdrawal was formally put forth for discussion before the Conference, before any particular committees? The Charter deals in articles 4, 5, and 6 with the right of suspension and the right of expulsion, but I have found nothing in it relating to the right of a member nation to withdraw.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. There was only one amendment proposed formally by anybody on the subject of withdrawal, and that was an amendment which would forbid withdrawal from the Organization.

Senator GEORGE. Forbid it?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir; forbid withdrawal. That amendment was defeated, and in the course of the discussion that took place in the committees which handled the matter it was decided that there should be no specific provision in the Charter as regards either the right to withdraw or the absence of the right to withdraw, but that there should be an understanding as to how the question of withdrawal would be handled if the circumstance arose where a nation wished to exercise the power to withdraw. And so a statement was prepared and approved by the committee which handled this matter, which I might perhaps read to the committee, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well for you to read that. It would throw a good deal of light on the matter to read what was put into the committee report and subsequently approved by the commission and by the full Conference.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. The statement was approved by the technical committee, by the commission, and by the Conference in plenary session. The statement is as follows [reading]:

The committee adopts the view that the Charter should not make express provision either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organization. The committee deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue their cooperation within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security. If, however, a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.

It is obvious, particularly, that withdrawals or some others forms of dissolution of the Organization would become inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the expense of law and justice.

Nor would a Member be bound to remain in the Organization if its rights and obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept, or if an amendment duly accepted by the necessary majority in the Assembly or in a general conference fails to secure the ratification necessary to bring such amendment into effect.

It is for these considerations that the committee has decided to abstain from recommending insertion in the Charter of a formal clause specifically forbidding or permitting withdrawal.

In the thought of the committee the emphasis should be on the continuity and stability and prestige and power of the Organization. But it in no way impaired the right of the state to withdraw for good reasons.

Senator Hill. I suggest you read that next paragraph. Mr. PASVOLSKY. It is a part of Mr. Stettinius' report: The result of the foregoing is a situation different from that which existed under the League of Nations. The League Covenant recognized withdrawal as an absolute right which any Member could exercise for any reason, or even without reason. In fact, the right was utilized primarily by would-be aggressors. Under the present Charter, withdrawal is permissible but it will have to be justified.

Senator GEORGE. The implication is that a Member Nation would not have the absolute right of withdrawal because he must make application justifying the request for withdrawal; is that right?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. The problem of withdrawal, in this connection, it seems to me is not the problem of the right to withdraw or not the right to withdraw. This is an international compact, an international treaty. The question is the terms on which, or the conditions under which, a country can absolve itself of an obligation which it has assumed.

There is one very interesting point in connection with this Organization, and that is involved in one of the Principles, the Principle under which theOrganization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. Will you give us the citation on that! Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is paragraph 6 in article 2.

There flows from that the proposition that withdrawing from the Organization does not relieve a state of the obligation to live up to its responsibilities stated in paragraph 6. The right of withdrawal of course remains, Senator George, but it has to be justified before the community of nations.

Senator VANDENBERG. Was not the unlimited right of withdrawal omitted, among other reasons, because in the experience of the League of Nations that was the escape clause which prospective aggressors always embraced?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is absolutely true. That is a very important part of the story; that is the escape.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator La Follette ?

Senator LA FOLLETTE. May I ask this: What would be the procedure, and who would determine whether the right to withdraw had been justified?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. It would be like any other procedure in the relationship between a Member state and the Organization.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Would it be decided by the Security Council or how would it be decided? What body would pass on it?' Assume some nation made application to withdraw; who would determine whether the reasons given were justified or not?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. You see, there is no sanction in the Organization to hold a state as a Member. There is a power in the Organization to

say whether or not the reasons which are advanced by the state are good and sufficient reasons.

Senator La FOLLETTE. Which arm of the Organization would pass upon that question? Suppose nation A 10 years from now desired to withdraw, what would be the procedure and who would determine upon whether the reasons given were, in the view of the Organization, justified ?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Well, the problem of membership, that is the admission of new members, the suspension of members, the expulsion of


members, is a joint responsibility of the Security Council and the General Assembly; therefore, presumably, discussion of such a question would also be a joint responsibility of the Security Council and of the Assembly.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Was that understood at San Francisco, or do you just draw that as your own individual inference from the language of the document?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. The question of mechanics, as to which body would handle that particular question and in what way, was not discussed. That was left for future determination. But I did want to call attention to the fact that in all matters relating to membership, the two organs act concurrently,

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question right there: Is it not true that there is no application required if a nation desires to withdraw? Moreover, there is no specific procedure to be followed. The theory of the whole withdrawal proposal, as I understood it, was that the nation affected would have to be the judge of the circumstances which it claimed had altered its position, and the penalty would be simply a mobilization of world opinion as to whether its cause was a just one or an unjust one. Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is quite right.

The CHAIRMAN. And that there was no compulsive power to keep a nation within the League if it desired to withdraw?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It was simply a question of leaving the world to judge whether they had adequate causes for withdrawal. They were the ones, however, to determine whether or not their circumstances had so changed as to make withdrawal justifiable.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.
Senator AUSTIN. May I ask a question?
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, Senator Austin.

Senator AUSTIN. Can the Security Council have any jurisdiction over the subject of withdrawal if withdrawal is not found by the Security Council to be a threat to international security and peace! In other words, to put it the other way around, is it not necessary for jurisdiction of the Security Council to make a preliminary finding that the condition that it undertakes to consider threatens international security and peace?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Since the Security Council is charged with functions in connection with admission to membership, suspension of rights and privileges of membership, and expulsion, I should think that the Security Council—this would be a matter of interpretation, of course, and the Security Council would have to make its own rules of procedure on this—would take the position that it had the right to discuss the matter. The whole matter would be in the realm of discussion and pronouncements, because there are no sanctions.

Senator Austin. May I ask another question ?
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator Austin. Assume that the Security Council undertakes an investigation; can it investigate beyond finding whether the condition threatens international security and peace?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. No; it should not, under the terms of the Charter. Senator TUNNELL. Doctor, in the absence of a surrender of the right of withdrawal, would not a sovereign state retain that right?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. That was the theory we proceeded upon, was it not?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. We proceeded upon that theory in drafting this report of the committee. Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I sat in with the committee when that report was prepared.

Senator GEORGE. Then, Doctor, is it your answer that the Member state has an absolute right to withdraw you

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, Senator.
Senator GEORGE. Absolute?
Senator GEORGE. Unqualified ?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes. But it is on notice that it will have to justifiy it.

Senator GEORGE. You mean that it might incur the displeasure of the peace-minded people of the earth?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, Senator. Senator MILLIRIN. If the Security Council found that a projected withdrawal threatened the peace and security of the world, what would happen so far as the nation is concerned that wanted to withdraw; would it be compelled to stay in or would it be allowed to withdraw and suffer the penalties that any other nation might suffer if it threatened the peace and security of the world?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That would depend upon the decision of the Security Council.

Senator MILLIKIN. The Security Council would have that decision?

Mr. PASTOLSKY. The Security Council would have the decision as to whether or not the first part of your question applied; that is, as to whether or not this is a threat to the

peace. Senator Mullikin. May it be fairly inferred from what you have said that there is no such thing as a unilateral withdrawal without action by the Security Council ?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. If a nation announced that it was withdrawing and the Security Council decides not to do anything about it, not even to discuss the matter, then obviously the Security Council does nothing about it. But the Security Council cannot be estopped from discussing the matter and from raising the question as to whether or not the condition to which you refer applies, and if it does, what should be done.

Senator MILLIKIN. And it follows from that that the Security Council could bring coercive measures to stop the withdrawal ?

Mr. PasvoLSKY. No; it could not bring coercive measures to stop the withdrawal. What it could do is to say that, “Since you are no longer a Member and since some action of yours threatens the peace, you have got to put a stop to that action." That it has a right to do irrespective of whether a state is one which used to be a Member and withdraws or never was a Member, so long as it is a non-Member.

Senator MILLIKIN. In other words, the probable decree of the Security Council would be to come back into the Organization?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Not necessarily.

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