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Senator MILLIKIN. What I am driving at is, How do you reach the specific question of withdrawal? Here is an important power that wants to withdraw. Now, would you mind describing to us the circumstances under which it can withdraw unilaterally and the circumstances under which it must submit its withdrawal to the Security Council, or any other conditions that might affect the right to withdraw?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Clearly, if a nation wants to withdraw from any organization, it has to serve notice on the organization that it is withdrawing Suppose that when notice is served on the Organization the Organization, through whatever organ wishes to take up the matter, begins a discussion of it. Now, the nation which withdraws says, "I am not here; I have recalled my representatives, and I am through. Nobody is going to go to war against that nation and force it to come back into the Organization. It will obviously have to fulfill its obligations to the Organization. If it does not fulfill its obligations, it will be for the Organization itself to decide what the situation will be. But I cannot imagine that a sanction of forcing a state against its will, contrary to the official interpretation which I have just read, would be a measure adopted by the Security Council.
You see, this interpretation states that
If, however, a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.
Senator MILLIKIN. May I invite your attention to the fact that that is one of those "Stop beating your wife” statements. A country might withdraw because the other countries were not upholding their burdens.
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, I suppose so. Senator MILLIKIN. Would you mind telling us from the standpoint of international law, under what circumstances a nation may withdraw unilaterally from a treaty, or would you prefer to have Dr. Hackworth tell us about that?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. I would prefer to have Dr. Hackworth answer that. He knows more about it than I do.
The CHAIRMAN. If the fact of withdrawal itself, in the opinion of the Security Council, resulted in a threat to peace, would it not be treated just like any other incident that threatened the respect to membership or whether the state came back in or whether it did not?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Of course, it would. That is the important point about it. If it constitutes a threat to the peace, then it would have to be treated as any threat to the peace would be treated.
Senator Lucas. It does not necessarily follow, however, that if a nation withdraws from the Charter here, that that is an act of war.
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Oh, no.
Senator Lucas. There are reasons why it might withdraw and still maintain the peace of the world?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Surely.
The CHAIRMAN. It is the purpose of the committee, without objection from anyone, to recess at 12:30 and convene again at 2 o'clock. Is there any objection from any of the committee on that?
peace without (No response.) The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m.)
(The recess having expired, the committee reconvened at 2 p. m.) The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Senator Pepper sends word that he wishes me to announce to the members of the committee and any other interested persons that his absence from the hearings is due to the death of his father last night.
Dr. Pasvolsky, you may resume your statement.
STATEMENT OF LEO PASVOLSKY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SECURITY AFFAIRS Resumed
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Mr. Chairman, this morning we were on chapter II. This is the chapter which relates to the definition of the original Members of the Organization. It states the provisions under which other nations could be admitted to membership. It states also the circumstances under which the Organization would have the right to suspend a Member from the exercise of its rights of membership, the circumstances under which the Organization could expel a Member, and by inference indicates the method by which an expelled Member could be reinstated. It indicates how a Member whose privileges and rights have been suspended can be relieved of that disability.
Senator VANDENBERG. Doctor, may I ask you a question?
Senator VANDENBERG. When you finished this morning, you were dealing with the subject of withdrawal. I do not think the subject was left in sufficiently specific form. I want to ask you this question. Is not this an arcurate statement of the American position in the event that the United States wishes to withdraw:
First. The United States can withdraw at its own unrestricted option. Its only obligation is to state the reasons.
Second. The only penalty is in the adverse public opinion, if our reasons do not satisfy the conscience of the world, and the action of the San Francisco Conference simply suggests certain criteria upon this score.
Third. When we withdraw, we are simply in the same position as if we had never joined; namely, we are subject to the Organization's discipline if we threaten the peace and security of the world.
Is not that the situation?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. I think that that is precisely the situation, Senator.
Senator THOMAS of Utah. I wonder, while we are on that subject, if we cannot move a little further in the theory of withdrawal. I should like to know, Doctor, whether there is not both the right and also the obligation resting upon every nation and the community of nations in regard to this withdrawal proposition. If we go back to the League and note the states that did withdraw, they withdrew without impunity of any kind. They knew why they were withdrawing, and probably that was the only honorable thing that the two rations did who did withdraw. They said they wanted no more of this, because they were going to war.
Now, in your discussion about withdrawal, was the theory advanced to the place that it was deemed by all present that there was such a thing as a community of nations and that the community of nations could speak its will to the individual members? To make it more specific and make it more plain than that, individuals within any community have not the right to withdraw from that community; they have obligations.
I cannot say, “I do not want to pay my taxes in America.” I cannot say, "I do not want to bear arms.
Have you moved forward in these fine ideals, which you expressed in the preamble, to that place where there is a conscious recognition of the fact of the existence of a community of nations in the world, responsible for laying down the standards of action of the individual nations?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. I think, Senator, that the whole enterprise was based on the basic proposition that there is an overwhelming common interest of all nations which are devoted to peace and want to live at peace. That is the common interest: To see to it that peace can be maintained and that it can be enjoyed.
There was certainly a basic recognition of the fact that that can be accomplished most effectively through an arrangement of this kind. Now, the arrangement is based on voluntary association; it is not based on compulsory participation. Therefore, the question, of withdrawal has to be considered in relation to that. That is why the statement which was adopted by the Conference, and which I read this morning, lays particular stress on the fact that the underlying purpose here is joint participation in a system directed toward the maintenance of international peace and security.
A nation which for good reason, from its own point of view, decides that it does not choose to be a participant in the Organization which is carrying on these functions, but prefers to take its place as one of the non-Members of the Organization and become subject to the discipline, as Senator Vandenberg said a moment ago, which is provided for through this Organization, that nation has a right to do so. That is its decision. It does expose itself to the opinions of mankind, and it would certainly, as a responsible nation, want to do so with due regard to the opinions of mankind. If it is an irresponsible nation and wishes to withdraw for the same reason that, as we know, some nations withdrew from the League of Nations, then there is created a situation in which there is danger in the world, and the community of nations, or rather those nations which are banded in this association, as well as nations which for one reason or other do not choose to be in the Organization, will be on notice that there is at work in the world a force to which they must be alert.
Senator THOMAS of Utah. You think then, Doctor, that what we might call the force of public opinion in the world will be enough of a restraining influence to enforce the obligation upon a given nation to withdraw only for the most serious reasons imaginable?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Well, Senator, the whole idea—the whole enterprise—is based on the willingness and the determination of the nations which will compose this Organization to do the things which they agree are necessary in order that peace and security may be maintained. If some of those nations change their minds, if some of those nations decide that they no longer want to participate in this effort, then that very fact creates in the world a new situation to which all of us, in the light of bitter experience, have to be most alert and about which all of us would have to be most vigilant, certainly and particularly those nations which remain Members in full standing and good standing in this Organization.
Senator THOMAS of Utah. If I understand your argument and your explanation, then, Doctor, you feel that the Charter is in reality stronger without any reference to withdrawal rights and obligations than if those rights and obligations were expressed?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, I do.
Senator TUNNELL. Doctor, the suggestion that Senator Thomas has made, that there is an obligation upon a person to pay his debt to the Government, would not be removed, I take it, if any particular state had a financial obligation to the international organization? It certainly would remain as an international obligation ?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Oh, I should think that that would unquestionably
Senator TUNNELL. But the tax which Senator Thomas referred to, of course, is a financial obligation?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes."
Senator AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, before leaving this point, I should like to ask Dr. Pasvolsky a question.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Austin.
Senator Austin. I should like to ask, Dr. Pasvolsky, regarding this, which appears in the report to the President by the Secretary of State on page 48:
Theymeaning a number of delegationspointed out that this protection was needed because it might be possible for the Organization, acting through its normal amending procedure, or through a general conference, to increase the obligations of Members without their consent.
Let us assume that that held in the case of several members. Can you tell us the minimum number of members that could take that position and still have the amendment prevail?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, I was hoping that the whole question of withdrawal would come up in detail in connection with the amendment process; but I can indicate now, if you like, what the amendment procedure would be.
An amendment would have to be adopted by two-thirds of the Assembly, and it would have to be ratified by two-thirds of the Members of the Organization, including the five permanent members of the Security Council.
Senator HATCH. That would be all of the five?
Mr. PASVOLSKY, All five. That means that if any particular amendment goes into effect, it will have been accepted by two-thirds of the Members of the Organization; and in that two-thirds would be included the five permanent Members—that is, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France. That would mean that the countries which might be affected by the statement noted by Senator Austin would be at most one-third of the membership.
Senator Austin. Thank you. Just one more question. I interpret what you say to mean also this: That there never would be a time when the United States would have as a cause for withdrawing, its inability to agree to an amendment.
Mr. PASVOLSKY. No, sir; there would not; because no amendment can go into effect unless the United States as one of the five permanent Members ratifies it.
Senator Hatch. That would apply also to all the other five Members?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. That will apply to all the five permanent Members.
Senator MILLIKIN. Mr. Pasvolsky, if the United States proposed an amendment which was vital and it was not adopted, would that be ground for withdrawal?
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Under the interpretation which is made, I think that could be ground for withdrawal.
Senator MILLIKIN. I think Senator Vandenberg has stated those things which we can do as a matter of power. We can withdraw, as a matter of power, arbitrarily and capriciously, with or without a statement of our reasons. When you discuss the situation in connection with amendments, I wonder if you would be.good enough to develop the theme of how we can withdraw as a matter of right, such, for example, as under change of parties, such, for example, as under a radical change of subject matter, and so forth, and so on. There are quite a number of instances, well developed in international law, where we can withdraw as a matter of right. I think, to have a complete picture, that that phase should be fully developed.
The CHAIRMAN. I feel sure, Doctor, when you reach that point that questions will be directed to you if you do not develop it.
Mr. PASVOLSKY. Good. I shall be prepared.
There is an important point in connection with articles 5 and 6. In both cases, both in the case of suspension and in the case of expulsion, the General Assembly acts on the recommendation of the Security Council. In the case of the restoration of the rights and privileges under
suspension, the act of restoration is performed by the Security Council alone; that is, it has the power to reinstate a nation in that sense. The reason for that is that the conditions under which a Member State may be suspended from the exercise of its rights and privileges as a Member are that there must be preventive or enforcement action taken against that state by the Security Council. Therefore, the condition which in the first instance gives the Security Council and the Assembly the right to suspend is a condition the existence of which is determined by the Security Council. It was thought that as soon as the Security Council determines that that condition no longer exists, it would be only fair not to wait for action by the Assembly but to permit the Security Council to state that the condition which led to the original suspension of rights and privileges no longer exists and that the state may again exercise its rights and privileges of membership.