Mr. PASVOLSKY. It states that the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation. Suppose the situation arises out of a condition created by a treaty: The General Assembly would necessarily have to consider whether or not the situation arose out of a lack of performance under the treaty or out of the onerousness of the terms themselves or the applicability or nonapplicability of the terms of the treaty.

Senator AUSTIN. Then, carried to its logical conclusion, if the Assembly should decide that the terms of the treaty were onerous, and that that was the cause of the situation, the record indicates that article 14 gives authority to recommend a modification of those onerous terms; is that right?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Of course, that would be included among the measures for the peaceful adjustment of the situation, which the Assembly is given the right to recommend.

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to comment on that question. When this article was originally written it specifically included reference to the revision of treaties. There was objection to the specific identification of revision of treaties lest it seem to be an invitation to take apart these international contracts, the integrity of which necessarily goes to the very roots of sound international relationships. Properly the objection was made that the reference to the revision of treaties might seem to be an invitation for the revision of the peace treaties with our enemies. Therefore, since the objective was not the revision of treaties, but the revision of conditions, this substitute language was agreed upon, referring to the peaceful adjustment of any situations, regardless of origin, "which it deems likely to impair the general welfare of friendly relations among nations," and so forth.

In other words, we said what we meant. We did not mean to put the emphasis upon the revision of treaties; we meant to put the emphasis upon the revision of conditions. Those conditions may arise out of any source, regardless of origin. They may arise out of the failure to enforce a treaty. They may arise out of the onerous conditions of a treaty. There may be many other reasons besides the revision of treaties which are responsible for these conditions which impair the general welfare. The revision of treaties is not identified, because when it was identified it seemed to be the sole objective of the article. On the contrary, the objective is to review conditions and revise conditions which are deemed likely to impair the general welfare, and those conditions can be examined regardless of origin, which obviously includes treaties.

Senator WHITE. I would like to ask a question, if I may.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator White.

Senator WHITE. As I understand you, the article is intended to give authority to review and correct conditions even though those conditions might arise out of or be dealt with in a treaty?

Senator VANDENBERG. That is correct. Of course, the power is solely one of recommendation.

The CHAIRMAN. May I make an observation there? Of course, the function to be performed by the Assembly in this connection is that it must first find that it is a situation which is likely to impair

the general welfare or friendly relations among nations; and when it finds that, then it may go into the question regardless of whether it arose from the operation of a treaty or from any other cause; the primary thing being that there is a situation which is likely to impair the general welfare or impair friendly relations among nations. that a fair statement?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Perfectly fair, Senator.

Is

The CHAIRMAN. And the origin of it is immaterial. The question is its existence, no matter whether it crawled out of a cave or came down from the heavens. It is a question of whether or not the situation exists, regardless of what caused it. Is that right? Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right, sir-a situation of the kind you have just described.

Senator VANDENBERG. May I add that when it includes situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations, it includes the principle of equal rights and self-determination.

Senator AUSTIN. One further question. Is it true that there is no sanction involved in the execution of article 14, and that its validity and vitality rest upon the self-discipline of the nations involved?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I think so; I think that is right. There is no sanction there except a moral sanction.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have a sanction, because there is no jurisdiction in the Assembly to do anything except to make a recommendation to the Security Council which is the organ that does have jurisdiction to do something about the situation.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right. Sanction is provided only for breaches of the peace or threats to peace.

Senator AUSTIN. It is true, is it not, that throughout this document there is a conscious effort to stimulate self-discipline of nations in order to prevent war?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Most assuredly. That is one of the basic considerations here.

Senator VANDENBERG. It is the paramount consideration.
Senator MILLIKIN. Mr. Chairman-

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Millikin.

Senator MILLIKIN. In addition to the subject matter of the article going to any situation regardless of origin, does it go to any situation regardless of the time of origin?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Oh, yes.

Senator MILLIKIN. Was your answer yes?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. My answer is yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator MILLIKIN. May I ask another question, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MILLIKIN. Does the General Assembly have any power to recommend measures for the forcible adjustment of any situation? Mr. PASVOLSKY. No. The General Assembly has no such power. The CHAIRMAN. I think perhaps you misunderstood. He means: has the Assembly any authority to recommend to the Security Council? Mr. PASVOLSKY. The Assembly may recommend to the Security Council any measure that it wishes to recommend, but the Security Council is bound by its own terms of reference when it deems that

the continuance of a situation is likely to endanger international peace or security.

Senator MILLIKIN. There is no limitation on the nature of the recommendation which the Assembly may make to the Council? Mr. PASVOLSKY. Oh, no.

Senator MILLIKIN. It may be a recommendation for a peaceful adjustment or for a violent adjustment?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. The Assembly can make any recommendation that it wishes to. The Security Council is obligated to act within the framework of its authority and its functions.

Senator MILLIKIN. I understand that.

Senator BURTON. Article 14 says

the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.

It does not say anything else. Therefore, is it not limited?
The CHAIRMAN. But you cannot ignore article 13.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Article 14 relates to those situations which do not involve a possible violation or possible impairment of international peace or security. Article 14 relates to the situations which involve impairment of the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. Situations which involve the possible impairment of international peace and security are dealt with in the earlier articles; that is, articles. 11 and 12, and particularly in numbered paragraph 2 of article 11, where the General Assembly can make recommendations regarding situations which may involve the maintenance of international peace and security, but only under the conditions which are described in article 12 and subject to the provisions that questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council.

Senator MILLIKIN. It very clearly refers to recommendations for peaceful adjustment, but is there anything else in the Charter which might modify that, so that there is power in the Assembly to make a recommendation touching the subject matter of article 14 either by way of peaceful adjustment or by way of forcible adjustment?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I should say, Senator, that so far as situations which are referred to in article 14 are concerned, so long as they arise out of conditions which are likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations and are not deemed to be a threat to international peace and security, there is no authority in the Charter for any forcible measures. If those same situations became transformed or aggravated in such a way that it became possible for the Organization-and in this case, the Security Council-to determine that a situation like that is of such a nature that its continuance may threaten the peace, the Organization still has no power to take forcible action. It is only when the Security Council determines that an actual threat to the peace exists or that a breach of the peace has occurred, that the Organization has the right to take forcible action.

Senator MILLIKIN. I think that is very clear; but does the General Assembly have the power to recommend to the Security Council that those conditions do exist which might call for forcible action?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, I should say that the implication of this language is that the character of the recommendation to be made by the General Assembly is left to the discretion of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not specifically provided for under article 11?

It says:

The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament * **, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

Going on into the second paragraph of that article:

The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations * * and may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned

* *

I think it is perfectly clear that the Assembly can make recommendations, but it has no power to act.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It simply leaves the matter to the Security Council where authority to act resides.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

Senator WHITE. Would it not be true, notwithstanding the language of article 14, that if the Security Council considered a question which called for the possible use of force or which pointed directly toward the use of force by the Security Council, the General Assembly would be prohibited, under article 12, from making any recommendation with respect to that subject matter?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I am still not clear on this, Doctor. Suppose that the Assembly has taken under discussion and consideration a situation which it believes is inimical to the general welfare or threatens friendly relations, and comes to the conclusion that it has developed to the point where the Security Council should take jurisdiction. Is the Assembly free to recommend that the Council take action and, if so, can it make any recommendations as to kind or character of action to be taken?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, as long as the Security Council is not handling the situation

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I am assuming it is not, because I stated that the Assembly was considering it.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Then the Assembly is free to make any kind of recommendation it wants to. If the Assembly comes to the conclusion that the situation which it is handling is developing badly, it itself is really under an obligation to ask the Security Council to look at it, because this article says that the General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. I realize that; but as I understand your answer to my question, the Assembly could, if it thought best, recommend to the Security Council not only that it take jurisdiction, but the type of action which it should take, that is, the Security Council.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. It could do that. It probably would not.

Senator HILL. But the Security Council would have to make its. own findings, would it not?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Oh, yes. The Security Council would have to make its findings in the case of peaceful settlement, that it is a situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance

of international peace and security, and in the case of enforcement action, that an actual threat exists or an actual breach has occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement that the Assembly would have the right or the power but probably would not exercise it, is based not upon the lack of authority, but because of comity and the respect which the Assembly has for the jurisdiction of the Security Council?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, sir. I am referring to the kind of action that ought to be taken. The Assembly obviously would consider itself under an obligation to bring to the attention of the Security Council any condition which it felt threatened the peace; but since the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is lodged in the Security Council, the chances are that the General Assembly would leave it to the Security Council to make its own determination of the type of action required.

Senator BARKLEY. Doctor, not withstanding the fact that article 14 seems to limit the Assembly to making recommendations for the peaceful adjustment of situations which might not be interpreted forcible adjustment of the situation, is it not true that article 10 is much broader than that and is not limited by article 14 when it says:

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

So, that seems to give the General Assembly the right to consider any question that is brought within the functions of any of these various organizations set up in the Charter, and is not limited by article 14 which seems to limit the functions to the peaceful adjustment of the situation. Is that a proper interpretation?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes, Senator. I think article 10 is a general article which really serves as a cover for articles 11, 12, 13, and 14. But articles 11 and 12 deal with situations which threaten international peace and security. Articles 13 and 14 deal with situations which relate to the promotion of cooperative effort and to the peaceful adjustment of situations likely to impair the general welfare.

Senator BARKLEY. All of them are included in the provisions of article 10 which is a cover-all of the jurisdiction of the Assembly to look into the situations?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Yes. Article 10 is made subject to the provisions of article 12, which says that there shall be no recommendations made by the Assembly with respect to a dispute or situation relating to peace and security except when the Security Council is not exercising in respect of the dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the Charter, or unless the Security Council so requests. But the situations which are referred to in article 13 and article 14 are, by definition, the kind of situations with which the Security Council would not deal, because they are situations which do not involve a threat to international peace and security. They have not reached that stage of acuteness.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Doctor.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Then the rest of the functions of the Assembly are stated in terms of the right to receive and consider reports, in terms of the functions with respect to the international trusteeship system,