ling statute so as to produce the result which I have suggested, that some Senators would like to produce, at once you cover that attempt with bad faith. Is it not the part of good faith for those who want to raise the question to raise it in connection with ratification?

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to raise it, I see no legal or legislative objection to your raising it. On the other hand, if you raise it successfully, you will cut the insides out of the enforcement provision of the Charter.

In this connection, I beg to suggest that the very usefulness of the Security Council is that it is supposed to have at its disposal forces that it can use immediately and quickly in emergencies. If we have to wait to get somebody's consent, the war will be on, and we will not be able to control it, in my view.

Senator MILLIKIN. Dr. Fasvolsky, would you rather consider the relation of these matters to the Monroe Doctrine under the present chapter or when we come to the regional arrangements?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I should like to consider that question under article 51 of this chapter and under Chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements. Senator TUNNELL. Under the provisions in this Charter, is it contemplated that there be any standing force called for by the Security Council?

Senator HATCH. Do you mean an international police force?
Senator TUNNELL. Yes.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. No; there would be national contingents available for combined action.

Senator TUNNELL. They would be called in for particular difficulties?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. They would be called in for particular difficulties in particular cases. In some cases all the nations might be asked to contribute; in some, only a few nations. That would be decided by the Council.

Senator BURTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that there be inserted at this point in the record three paragraphs from the report to the President entitled "No Taxation Without Representation"? They deal directly with article 44 and point out that these rights of smaller nations to participate apply when they contribute members to the armed forces but do not apply when they contribute facilities. It also points out that only one member at a time may participate in the voting of the Council.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, but renewing my point of order that the report does not control the final Charter, that may be done.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION

One significant and constructive change resulted from the debate, in the adoption of a wholly new article, 44, which contains the substance of an amendment submitted at the Conference by the delegation of Canada and strongly supported by the other "middle powers." It gives realization on the level of international security arrangements to the cherished axiom of American history: "No taxation without representation." Once the Security Council has determined on the employment of armed forces, it must give to each state asked to contribute contingents a voice in the decisions concerning the employment of its

own forces. For the purpose of such decisions, in other words, the voting membership of the Security Council may be increased by one-but by no more than one for each decision.

Here is the way article 44 will work: If four states not represented on the Security Council are to be asked to furnish armed forces to cope with an emergency, they may, if they desire, send representatives to sit temporarily with the Council; but each of these four ad hoc representatives would participate only in the decision which concerns the use of the armed forces of his own country. No similar right is given to states when the contribution involved is only the use of facilities and assistance they have agreed to providę, and an amendment to give such a right was rejected. The Conference felt that there is a substantial difference between sending men to fight and, for example, making an airfield available.

It is particularly important to notice that the membership of the Security Council remains unchanged for all decisions leading up to and including the decisions to impose military sanctions. Thus the operation of the security machinery will not be dangerously slowed by the new provision. Moreover, the provision will not affect the use of the contingents of the great powers, which will doubtless constitute the bulk of the forces used to carry out the Council's decisions. Even the process of consulting the states that are not members of the Council should not appreciably delay the effective functioning of their contingents.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Pasvolsky.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I come now to chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements. I should like to preface that by a brief statement of the relationship of that chapter to chapter VII.

Senator MILLIKIN. Mr. Chairman, did the witness skip article 51? Mr. PASVOLSKY. I am coming back to that article in connection with the present subject.

In chapter VI and VII provisions are made for the actions or activities of the Security Council with respect to the whole subject of the maintenance of international peace and security.

Now, it is recognized that there has been a development in the direction of the creation of regional arrangements or regional agencies for this purpose, namely, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in such matters as may be appropriate for local or regional action. Chapter VIII provides [reading]:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The chapter also provides that these agencies should be used to their utmost in bringing about the peaceful settlement of disputes which arise within regions or between countries of a particular group.

The chapter further provides that if the Security Council finds that an agency of this character would be appropriate to assist it in en forcement action, it may use such an agency for that purpose.

But there is a provision that no enforcement action would be taken under these regional arrangements except with the authority of the Security Council. There is one temporary exception to that, and it relates to the question which was raised earlier this morning; namely, the operations of the Organization with respect to the former enemy states. As I said earlier, the Charter is built on the basis of a temporary exclusion of the handling of the enemy states from the field of competence of the Organization itself. So until this particular phase of the work of maintaining peace and security has been handed over to

the Security Council by the nations concerned, the arrangements which are made by the victorious nations in this war with respect to the former enemy states will continue. These nations will be in a position to take enforcement action, if necessary, against former enemy states, although they would be obligated under the Charter to keep the Security Council fully informed of their actions.

Senator MILLIKIN. Dr. Pasvolsky, have Poland and Russia had the relationship of enemies at any time during this war?

Dr. PASVOLSKY. I am not sure what the answer to that question would be. I do not think there has ever been war between Poland and Russia in this period.

Senator MILLIKIN. There is a popular impression that Poland and Russia at one stage of this war were formal enemies. I wondered whether technically they had been enemies. Is there anyone here who can answer that?

Dr. PASVOLSKY. On January 1, 1942, both Soviet Russia and Poland signed the declaration by United Nations.

Senator MILLIKIN. But I was referring to prior to that, at the time Russia and Germany together moved into Poland. Was there then a formal state of war between Poland and Russia?

Dr. PASVOLSKY. I could not answer that question offhand; I would have to find out. I do not think that there was.

The CHAIRMAN. We will check with the State Department at the noon hour.

Senator MILLIKIN. It seems to me that might have some bearing on that language.

Senator GREEN. May I ask a question in that connection, Mr. Chair

man.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green.

Senator GREEN. In regard to article 53, paragraph 2—

The term "enemy state" as used in paragraph 1 of this article applies to any states which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Suppose a nation, like Italy, becomes a member: Would that section still apply?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Presumably when any one of these nations becomes a Member of the Organization, this exception would not longer apply to it.

Senator GREEN. But it still says that it applies to any state which has been an enemy.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

Senator GREEN. You cannot change the fact that it has been an enemy.

Mr. PAVOLSKY. The question would be whether or not the exception under paragraph 1 would apply, not whether the definition would apply.

Senator GREEN. Well, would it?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Presumably it would not, because a nation which joined the Organization would be on a basis of complete equality with all the other Members of the Organization.

Senator GREEN. Then, measures against that nation which did become a member later would come under that exception?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I should say that this would mean that with respect to that particular nation the governments concerned would have agreed to hand over to the Security Council the function of seeing to it that that nation did not again become an aggressor.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in conjunction with the provisions of this chapter I would like to say a word about article 51 of the preceding chapter. That is the self-defense article which states that nothing in the Charter shall impair, the inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken all necessary measures.

Senator VANDENBERG. I think you left out three very important words-"individual or collective self-defense.'

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I am just coming to that.
Senator VANDENBERG. All right.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I wanted to say that the right of self-defense is defined as "individual or collective."

Senator VANDENBERG. Yes.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That word "collective" relates in part to the regional arrangements that I have just described, but it relates also to any group action that may be taken for purposes of self-defense.

The effect of this provision in article 51, taken in conjunction with the provisions of chapter VIII, would certainly be, Senator Milliken, an answer to the question of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is completely safeguarded under these provisions.

Senator MILLIKEN. Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Millikin.

Senator MILLIKIN. I should like to suggest to the witness that the Monroe Doctrine is not a regional arrangement, first. Second, I suggest that that Doctrine goes much further than self-defense against an actual act of aggression. It covers the imposition of a system, a foreign system, upon the governments of this hemisphere; and I should suggest that there should be some observations on the full scope of that Doctrine.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. The Monroe Doctrine, I think Senator Millikin will agree, is a doctrine of nonintervention. That is what the Monroe Doctrine says-that any intervention in the domestic affairs of any American territory in terms of an attempt to impose a political system or political systems would be considered by the United States a threat to itself. That is not the exact language, but that is the idea. Now the whole international Organization is based on the principle of nonintervention; so that as long as the Organization functions, the Monroe Doctrine does not need to come into play. It is only if the Organization should fail to function in the sense of maintaining international peace and security in terms of the stated principles and purposes of the Organization, that the Monroe Doctrine might have to be invoked. This contingency is covered by the provisions for self-defense, which are stated in article 51.

The Monroe Doctrine, as a result of the development of the interAmerican system, has been gradually strengthened and extended. The Havana Conference of 1940 and the Mexico City Conference of 1945 have gone a long way toward establishing a system under which each American Republic regards an attack upon itself as an attack upon

every other American Republic. That type of action is covered by the phrase "collective self-defense."

Senator MILLIKIN. Doctor, is not the effect of these multilateral agreements simply the adoption by all of the countries of this hemissphere of the Monroe Doctrine each for itself?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I think so.

Senator MILLIKIN. Is it your understanding that in entering into those multilateral engagements we abandoned the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument of our own?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. No, sir.

Senator MILLIKIN. Then let me suggest to you that this reservation of the right of self-defense against aggression might not necessarily cover the full scope of the Doctrine which was not only intended to prevent the occupation by foreign governments of lands in the southern part of this country, and later extended by President Roosevelt to the whole hemisphere, but also to systems of government. Where does the Monroe Doctrine retain its validity as to systems of government under the language of this Charter?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I call your attention to the principle of the Charter which relates to the political independence and the territorial integrity of any state.

Senator MILLIKIN. You might point to that specifically.
Mr. PASVOLSKY. It is article 2, principle 4. [Reading:]

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Senator MILLIKIN. Do you interpret that as a prohibition against propaganda in this hemisphere of foreign political systems?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, I should say that handling propaganda would be a matter that was up to the individual country itself.

Senator MILLIKIN. But if the propaganda were of a nature to threaten peace or to threaten the overthrow of governments in this hemisphere, would that come under the language that you are speaking of?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. If a state in this hemisphere considered such propaganda a threat to it, it would certainly be free to bring up that question, either before the world organization or before an interAmerican organization, or in any other manner that it chose.

Senator MILLIKIN. If we were to reach our own conclusions that an attempt was being made to force foreign systems, whatever they might be, on the governments of this hemisphere, could we act independently to stop that?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That would depend on what you mean by acting to stop that. What action would we undertake?

Senator MILLIKIN. Supposing that in the last resort we moved a force in to upset a situation that was accomplished by those methods? Mr. PASVOLSKY. I should say that that would be intervention by us in the internal affairs of another country.

Senator MILLIKIN. And it would probably be considered a violation of the Charter?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. It would be considered a violation of our own established policy, a long-established policy.