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larging the authority over what we possess now. We are always sending groups abroad-Congressmen, Senators, and others, to take care of the war situation, to look after the UNRRA and all that sort of busi

ness.

I suggest that we had better recess now until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m.)

AFTER RECESS

(The recess having expired, the committee reconvened at 2 p. m.) The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

STATEMENT BY LEO PASVOLSKY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SECURITY AFFAIRS

Resumed

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question before the doctor proceeds?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. This morning I asked you about paragraph 2 of article 77, and as I understood your answer, it was to the effect that these territories which might be brought under the trusteeship system, that it would be brought about as the result of agreements entered into by the nations concerned and would not be taken up by the organization de novo. Now, I wanted also to ask you one question with relation to that, which I neglected to ask, and that is in relation to article 79 which says [reading]:

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power—

et cetera.

How is it to be determined whether a state is directly concerned in any of these trusteeship problems?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I imagine that would be determined by negotiations among the states which claimed to be concerned.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Could any state come in and claim that it was concerned, under this language?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. I imagine any state could claim that it is concerned, but there are certain guiding principles with respect to the particular categories with which we are dealing here. One category is formed by the mandates. The states concerned there are clearly the principal allied and associated powers of the last war, with the enemy states in this war subtracted.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Outside of that category, take some of the territories which were not under the mandate system of the League. How would it be determined as to which states were directly concerned?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. There would be only two other categories in addition to the mandates. One would be the territories detached from the enemy in the course of this war. And the states directly concerned would be determined by agreement among the United Nations or the nations at war with the particular enemy.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. You mean then that it would come up, perhaps, in the Assembly, or would that be a matter of negotiation outside of the United Nations organization?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That would be entirely outside of the Organization. Senator LA FOLLETTE. So that if countries A and B claimed a direct interest, and country C claimed it, it would be a question of negotiation between the countries A and B and C?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Doctor, proceed.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. We had reached chapter XVII this morning, Mr. Chairman, the chapter entitled "Transitional Security Arrangements." There are two articles in this chapter. Article 106 relates to a situation which is bound to exist after the Organization comes into effect. Once the Organization is established, the Security Council will be in a position to exercise its functions with the exception of the functions for the exercise of which it would have to have armed forces and facilities at its disposal. Since the agreements by which these armed forces and facilities would be placed at the disposal of the Security Council will be negotiated after the Charter comes into effect and the Organization is established, there will be a gap, a period during which the Council will not be able to exercise those functions.

Article 106 provides that during that period, the four signatories to the Moscow declaration of October 30, 1943, and France, will continue to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that declaration that is, they would consult with one another, and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations, with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

This is the arrangement for filling that interval, that gap, which will exist between the time of the Organization coming into effect, and the time when the Security Council has at its disposal sufficient forces to exercise its responsibilities under the enforcement provisions. The next article, article 107, relates to the situation which we have already discussed this morning-that is the fact that the handling of the enemy states will be in the hands of the governments which have the responsibility for action in that field as the result of the war. And in accordance with the article which we touched on this morning, this situation will continue until this phase of security work is turned over by the governments concerned to the Organization and the Security Council becomes responsible for it.

Senator MILLIKIN. May I ask a question there?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Millikin, yes.

Senator MILLIKIN. I think we touched on much the same thing earlier today, but I would like to ask you, Doctor, whether the Russian-Polish relationship is affected in any way by article 107? Mr. PASVOLSKY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Doctor.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. The next chapter, chapter XVIII, relates to amendments. It is in two parts.

There is the regular amendment process described in article 108. Under that arrangement, amendments to the Charter will have to be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General As

sembly. Then these amendments would be submitted for ratification to all the Members of the Organization, and amendments would come into force when they had been ratified by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, with all of the permanent members of the Security Council included in that number. That is the regular amendment process.

Now, under the terms of article 109

Senator MILLIKIN (interposing). Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Millikin.

Senator MILLIKIN. Yesterday the witness said that he would discuss withdrawal when he got to the subject of amendments. I wonder if he would care to discuss the subject any further?

The CHAIRMAN. When he finishes on amendments.
Senator MILLIKIN. He had finished, had he not?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand that he had.
Mr. PASVOLSKY. There is a second part to this chapter.

The CHAIRMAN. As soon as he gets through that, we will take up the question of withdrawal, if you like.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Article 109 provides for the holding of a General Conference at some future date for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter and its operations, and for the purpose, therefore, of determining whether or not any alterations in the Charter should be made. It provides in a sense for a more generalized review from the point of view of possible amendments.

Such a General Conference would be held at a date and a place to be fixed by a two-third vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of the Security Council, the Council vote being taken by any seven members. Unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council is not required for this vote.

Any recommendations for alterations in the Charter that might come out of this Conference must be made by a two-thirds vote of the Conference, and must be submitted for ratification to the Member States. They would go into effect just as would ordinary amendments when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

This particular article was the subject of a great deal of discussion at the conference. There were some countries that wanted to fix a definite date on which a conference of this sort would take place. There were other delegations that thought that that would be too limiting, that the Assembly and the Council ought to be left free to determine a date and place.

As a result of that discussion, there emerged the idea which is embodied in paragraph 3 of article 109. There a provision is made that if a general conference of this sort has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session, and if a majority of the General Assembly-a simple majority in this case rather than a two-thirds majority-and any seven members of the Security Council are in favor of holding such a conference, the conference should be held at a time and place to be fixed by the General Assembly.

These are the two methods by which the Charter can be amended. When we discussed yesterday the question of withdrawal from the Organization, I said that the question of withdrawal came up particularly in connection with the amendment process, because under these amendment provisions an amendment, whether resulting from the regular amendment process-that is action by the General Assembly-or by the action of the General Conference, would go into effect when ratified by two-thirds of the Member States, including the permanent members of the Security Council. There would be then one-third, at most one-third, of the Member States who might be bound by the amendment whether they ratified it or not. I mean, if they did not ratify it, they would still be bound by it.

So the question arose as to whether or not such states should be bound by an amendment irrespective of how that amendment affects them or their relationship to the Organization. It was in connection with that issue that the withdrawal question arose.

I read yesterday, Mr. Chairman, the statement on withdrawal which was incorporated in the Report of the Conference, and in that statement you recall there was a special reference made to the connection between withdrawal and amendment. Perhaps I ought to read that statement again, or a part of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator WHITE. What page is that on?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. That is on page 48 of the report to the President. The statement was as follows [reading]:

The Committee adopts the view that the Charter should not make express provision either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organization. The Committee deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue their cooperation within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security. If, however, a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.

It is obvious, particularly, that withdrawals or some other forms of dissolution of the Organization would become inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the expense of law and justice.

Nor would a Member be bound to remain in the Organization if its rights and obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept, or if an amendment duly accepted by the necessary majority in the Assembly or in a general conference fails to secure the ratification necessary to bring such amendment into effect.

It is for these considerations that the Committee has decided to abstain from recommending insertion in the Charter of a formal clause specifically forbidding or permitting withdrawal.

I think it is clear from that language that since the possibility of withdrawal is not prohibited in the Charter, the interpretation of withdrawal given here yesterday is the complete answer to the question of withdrawal.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senator Millikin?

Senator MILLIKIN. Let us assume, Doctor, that the character of one of the principal powers changed. Let us assume, first, that a principal power became annexed to one of the other principal powers, or came under the political domination of one of the other political powers

would that be such a radical change in the framework of the Charter as to warrant withdrawal?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, I should think that a situation like that if it arises, would be a situation which would have to be faced at the time in the light of the circumstances at the time.

Senator MILLIKIN. I mean, it is the well-known rule in a contract, and I think it is also-I do not know whether it is a rule in treatiesbut in contract law, if the parties with whom you enter upon a contract die and provisions are not made for succession, the contract becomes of no effect. Do you not think or could you not say right now that if one of the principal parties disappeared and became a part of some other principal government that that would be a radical circumstance and a radical change so important as to warrant withdrawal?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, wouldn't that be a question of whether or not, as a result of such a development the Organization could continue to function for the purpose for which it was created? That is, it is an abstract question as you state it.

Senator MILLIKIN. It seems to me it is a question of interpretation of an agreement. A certain group of people under the circumstances that confront them at the time enter into an agreement. Then the group changes. Is that a situation which makes a sufficient change in the contract to warrant the declaration of a breach of it or to withdraw from it?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, it seems to me that that would depend on the decision of the particular state as to whether it considers that situation an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of the interpretation, so that it feels constrained to withdraw-whether a nation considers that as a sufficient reason for it to withdraw.

Senator MILLIKIN. And if concluded to withdraw, would you think it would be subject to censure?

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, there is no sanction provided for withdrawal.

Senator MILLIKIN. I agree with you. But there is a distinction between doing something out of sheer power and doing it as a matter of right. We can always withdraw in the exercise of our sheer power. The other class of withdrawal goes to what might be called whether you have a right to withdraw just as you have a right to pull out of a contract where the subject matter is destroyed or where a part of the parties no longer exist, or where there has been a breach of the contract, and so forth and so on. I am not talking about our sheer power to do something, but I am wondering whether under those circumstances we could withdraw without getting ourselves into a justly censurable position.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. Senator, don't you think that would depend upon. the reason for which we withdrew and the circumstances at the time? Senator MILLIKIN. I stipulated an hypothesis that would give a

reason.

Mr. PASVOLSKY. It is a little difficult to answer definitely a question like that, but I should think that the language of this statement which I read meets the situation which you have in mind.

Senator MILLIKIN. Now, we go into this arrangement and in going into it we weigh the character of our principal associates, and we

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