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upon the sovereign member states for the weapons both of persuasion and to force through which it will attempt to keep the peace. But its dependence upon the member states is realistically adapted to the situation of the member states. The Council is to use the power of the member states in accordance with the realities of the distribution of power. The voting procedure of the Security Council is expressive of the actualities of the possession and the exercise of power in the modern world. The five principal military powers of our time are made permanent members of the Council. Furthermore, in order that their possession of power and their use of power may be made to serve the purpose of peace, it is provided that they shall exercise their power only in agreement with each other and not in disagreement.

A similarly realistic acceptance of the facts of the actual world limits the General Assembly to discussion and deliberation without the power to legislate, since the power to legislate would necessarily encroach upon the sovereign independence of the member states. So too the Economic and Social Council has no power or right to interfere with the domestic affairs of the states composing the United Natins. And for the same reason the jurisdiction of the Court is limited. These adaptations to the realities of the existing situation in the contemporary world do not decrease, but on the contrary increase, the likelihood that the instruments borrowed by the Charter of the United Nations from the history of the ancient struggle for peace and order among individual men will serve their purpose in the newer struggle for peace and order among nations.

Upon the belief that the Charter as Constitution will furnish effective means for the realization of the purposes fixed by the Charter as Declaration; and upon the belief that the Charter as Declaration will set noble and enduring goals for the work of the Charter as Constitution, I base my firm conviction that the adoption of the Charter is in the best interests of the United States and of the world.

If we are earnestly determined, as I believe we are, that the innumerable dead of two great holocausts shall not have died in vain, we must act in concert with the other nations of the world to bring about the peace for which these dead gave up their lives. The Charter of the United Nations is the product of such concerted action. Its purpose is the maintenance of peace. It offers means for the achievement of that purpose. If the means are inadequate to the task they must perform, time will reveal their inadequacy as time will provide, also, the opportunity to amend them. The proposals of the Sponsoring Powers on which the Charter is based were published to the world six months before the Conference to consider them convened. In these six months the opinion of the world was brought to bear upon their elements. Subsequently, at the Conference itself, every word, every sentence, every paragraph of the Charter's text was examined and reconsidered by the representatives of fifty nations and much of it reworked. For the first time in the history of the world, the world's peoples directly, and through their governments, collaborated in the drafting of an international constitution. What has resulted is a human document with human imperfections but with human hopes and human victory as well. But whatever its present imperfections, the Charter of the United Nations, as it was written by the Conference of San Francisco, offers the world an instrument by which a real beginning may be made


upon the work of peace. I most respect fully submit that neither we nor any other people can or should refuse participation in the common task.




With the outbreak of war in Europe it was clear that the United States would be confronted, after the war, with new and exceptionally difficult problems. Whether or not we became a belligerent, it was inevitable that we would be drawn into situations created by the war and its aftermath. Special facilities were obviously required to deal with the enlarged responsibilities of the Department of State. Accordingly, a Committee on Post-War Problems was set up before the end of 1939 to analyze developments which were likely to influence the post-war foreign relations of the United States. The Committee consisted of high officials of the Department of State. It was assisted by a research staff, which, in February, 1941, was organized into a Division of Special Research.

The work on post-war problems was greatly enlarged and intensified after the attack on Pearl Harbor. By direction of the President; the research facilities were rapidly expanded, and the Departmental Committee on Post-War Problems was reorganized into an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policies.

The new Committee was headed by Secretary Cordell Hull as Chairman. Under Secretary Sumner Welles was Vice Chairman. The membership of the Committee consisted of Assistant Secretaries of State Dear Acheson, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Breckinridge Long; of high officials of other Departments of the Government; of a number of members of Congress; and of a group of distinguished experts from outside the Government. The Congressional group included, from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Honorable Tom Connally of Texas, the Honorable Walter F. George of Georgia, the Honorable Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, the Honorable Warren R. Austin of Vermont, and the Honorable Wallace H. White, Jr. of Maine, and, from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Sol Bloom of New York, the Honorable Luther A. Johnson of Texas and the Honorable Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey. The group from outside the Government included Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Mr. Isaiah Bowman, Mr. Norman H. Davis, Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick, Mr. James T. Shot well, and Mr. Myron C. Taylor. Other officials of the Department of State participated continuously in the work of the Committee. These included Mr. Green H. Hackworth, Mr. James Clement Dun, and Mr. Leo Pasvolsky, the latter serving as the Committee's Executive Officer and Director of Research.

The Advisory Committee had a number of Subcommittees, including one on Political Problems, presided over by the Secretary or the Under Secretary of State; one on Security Problems, presided over by Mr. Davis; one on Territorial Problems, presided over by Mr. Bowman; and one on Economic Problems, presided over by Mr. Taylor.

The Advisory Committee and its Subcommittees had a broad and comprehensive program of work, embracing all of the important


aspects of post-war foreign policy. The execution of its assignment required on the part of the Department of State constant contact with the other Departments and agencies of the Government, as well as with the Congress. In this way international conferences were prepared and machinery created for the solution of such problems as relief and rehabilitation, food and agriculture, and aviation. The important Bretton Woods Conference, in which the Treasury Department took a leading role, dealt with problems in the monetary and financial field. The question of the post-war treatment of enemy states was under continuing study in the Departments of State, War and Navy. At the same time, work was carried forward in many other fields.

From the very beginning, however, the problems of post-war peace and security organization were paramount. In the Atlantic Charter, four months before Pearl Harbor, President Roosvelt and Prime Minister Churchill focused the world's attention on the supreme need for “a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries" and for the "establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security.” On January 1, 1942, all of the nations then at war with the Axis, by signing the Declaration by United Nations, affirmed their adherence to the purposes and principles of the Atlantic Charter. It was the task of the Department of State, of its various Committees and of the other Departments of the Government associated with it, to devise ways and means by which the United States could make its contribution toward the translation of these high purposes and ideals into an institutional structure of organized international relations.

The work involved finding answers to many difficult questions and problems. There was need, first of all, for fundamental decisions as to whether or not United States membership is a strong international organization should be recommended, and, if so, on what terms and in what kind of organization. A particularly difficult question was whether there should be a single organization for international security and the advancement of human welfare, or whether the security organization and the organization for the improvement of economic and social conditions should be separate.

Another recurring problem was that of regional arrangements. What should be their relation to the world organization? Should the world organization be built on regional arrangements, or, on the contrary, should regional arrangements be built into a world organization deriving its authority from individual states?

There were many other problems to be considered. Granted that the organization was to have a general assembly and a security council, what should be the difference between the functions of the two, and what should be their relations to each other? Should the council be an executive committee of the assembly or a separate body? Should the organization be empowered to employ force for purposes of peace and security? If so, should it have an international police force of its own, or should it rely on military contingents supplied by the several states? What should be the relation of the World Court to the organization; should it be one of its branches or a separate organ?

These and many other questions raised in part by the experience of the League of Nations and in part by the nature of the problem

of international organization as such, occupied the Department and its Committees from the beginning of the work to its end.

By the middle of 1943, a question of the highest importance came to the fore. It was that the principal United Nations were fully resolved to carry the war to a successful conclusion, and military developments on the Eastern front, in the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific made it apparent that their victory was only a matter of time, steadfastness of purpose, and intensity of effort. "In all of the United Nations public opinion was moving strongly in support of post-war arrangements to maintain the peace. In the United States, public opinion with reference to our participation in an international security organization was developing rapidly under Congressional leadership. The Fulbright Resolution was introduced in April, 1943. The Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill Resolution, the Connally Resolution and others were also introduced during the summer and fall of 1943. In September of that year, the Republican Party adopted its important Mackinac Declaration.

It was in these circumstances that, by direction of President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull went to Moscow for the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Out of that meeting came a clear and unequivocal answer of the principal Allies as to their intentions after the war. In a ringing declaration, to which China was a party, the four powers proclaimed their determination to continue, after the war, the close cooperation which had characterized their war effort; their recognition of the fact that the maintenance of international peace and security after the war would require the creation of an international organization, open to membership by all peace-loving states, large and small; and their resolve to work together for the creation of such an organization. The Moscow Declaration was confirmed and strengthened, at Cairo and Teheran, by the joint statements of the heads of government of the four nations.

The ideas and even many textual expressions which went into the Moscow Declaration were developed in the course of the Department's work and in the continuing discussions which took place, especially in the Subcommittees on Political Problems and on Security Problems referred to above.

The emphasis in the Moscow Declaration on the desirability of establishing a world security organization "at the earliest practicable date" served as a renewed impetus for the work being done by our Government and by the governments of the other principal United Nations. The Advisory Committee had already completed, in the political field, its extremly valuable general review of post-war problems. The time had come to set up in the Department committees of a more technical character. One of these committees was specifically charged with the preparation of concrete proposals for an international peace and security organization of the kind envisaged in the Moscow Declaration.

Building on the immense amount of materials gathered and prepared in connection with the work of the Advisory Committee and its Subcommittees, the new Committee proceeded to formulate a set of concrete proposals for eventual transmission to the other governments as a basis for further four-nation discussions contemplated at the Moscow Conference. The work was done under the immediate

direction of Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Stettinius. Its results were, at various stages, submitted to the President for his approval. By midsummer of 1914 the main ideas had become sufficiently crystallized to enable the President, on June 15 of that year, to issue a statement giving a basic outline of the kind of international organization the Government of the United States considered desirable.

At various times during this period, Secretary Hull consulted with a non-partisan group of members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, including the Honorable Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Committee, the Honorable Walter F. George of Georgia, tl:e Honorable Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky, the Honorable Guy M. Gillette of Iowa, the Honorable Elbert D. Thomas of l'tah, the Honorable Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, the Honorable Wallace H. White, Jr., of Maine, the Honorable Warren R. Austin of Vermont, and the Honorable Robert M. La Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin, as well as with a non-partisan group of members of the House of Representatives, including the Honorable Sam Rayburn of Texas, Speaker of the House, the Honorable Sol Bloom of New York, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Honorable John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, Majority Leader, the Honorable Robert Ramspeck of Georgia, Majority Whip, the Honorable Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, Minority Leader, the Honorable Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Honorable Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, Minority Whip. From time to time, Secretary Hull also consulted with other Congressional leaders and with outstanding experts outside the Government.

From the latter part of 1942, there was another feature of the Department's work which proved to be of very great value. In order to make possible an overall review and direction of the many activities that were being carried on in the various fields by the Department itself and by its Committees, President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull established a small informal steering group, which consisted of Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. Green H. Hackworth, Mr. James Clement Dunn, Mr. Norman H. Davis, Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Mr. Isaiah Bowman, and Mr. Leo Pasvolsky. In September of 1943, Mr. Stettinius, upon becoming Under Secretary of State, replaced Mr. Welles as a member of this group. The group met frequently with Secretary Hull and from time to time with the President. The discussions were informal and wide-ranging. Sometimes they included the critical examination of prepared memoranda, more often they dealt with the broad perspective of major policy questions. They kept the planning and thinking of the technical staffs and of the specialized committees closely coordinated with the highest political judgments.

DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS On July 18, 1944, an American draft proposal which had resulted from more than two years of study and consultation, was submitted to the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments. Shortly thereafter, these governments submitted corresponding papers to the Department of State. The four documents taken together constituted the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations which took place in Washington

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