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vided for in the United Nations Charter. We are depending upon you, the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the entire Senate for early ratification of this Charter. Public opinion is behind you. My personal appreciation

for your able work in this international movement toward peace. This is our ; last chance. We must not fail.

Mrs. LA FELL DICKINSON,

President, General Federation of Women's Cluba. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Claggett.

Mrs. Claggett will be remembered as the daughter of Senator McAdoo, one of our former distinguished Members of the Senate.

That, as I understand it, Mrs. Claggett, is the statement of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, with membership throughout the country?

Mrs. CLAGGETT. Yes; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your appearance and your testimony before the committee. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ewing Cockrell is the next speaker.

STATEMENT OF EWING COCKRELL, PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES

FEDERATION OF JUSTICE

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Cockrell. Please state your name, your residence, and whom you represent.

Mr. COCKRELL. My name is Ewing Cockrell. My permanent -address is Warrensburg, Mo. My Washington address is 2125 G Street NW. I am president of the United States Federation of Justice, which is interested in trying to learn and extend the successes of the administration of the law. I am speaking here this morning only for myself.

I am for the Charter as it is, without reservation or amendment. I am for it because, despite whatever defects it may have, those defects can be removed without amendment or reservation.

I have left a memorandum before you, gentlemen, on the table there

As a matter of fact, this Charter has more proposals, more provi. sions, for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of peace and economic and social welfare than any other international instrument ever drawn. It has also more provisions for blocking the use of this instrument, and my position is that that blocking can be overcome within the Charter-within the provisions of the Charter.

The provisions of the Charter by which this can be accomplished are in the 19 articles, numbered 2, 5, 6, 24, 25, 27, 33, 37, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, and 103.

Those articles contain full provisions for the United Nations to do any and all of the things necessary to preserve peace, to settle a dispute before it leads to war, to settle and prevent aggression, and everything else. They are dependent upon the action of the five permanent members acting unanimously.

Now, those provisions do not provide for any prohibition of action if the five or the Council fail to act. The chief provisions are these: For instance, the decisions of the Security Council on all matters are by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the Big Five. Unless those seven vote, there is no decision; there is no action whatever; the nations are left just where they were before.

The nations agree in the Charter to accept and carry out the deci. sions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Now, if for instance there is not an unlimited veto—and I am speaking especially of the difference between a limited veto and an unlimited veto—the limited veto would be if any of the 5 should veto action against themselves or the use of their forces against another state; the unlimited veto which is in the Charter allows them to veto any other action against or involving any other state where they are not parties or are not concerned. For example, whenever one of the 5 blocks action in the United Nations Organization—this is No. 6 on the list-he sets all the other 49 states free to take it outside the organization. There is no authority to prevent them from doing so. Thus, one man can prevent the organization from using provisions for peaceful settlement of disputes; using its forces to prevent aggression; enforcing any decisions of international courts or obedience to any international law; or guaranteeing or promising any protection to any nation. But whenever he does any of these things, he immediately and automatically permits any states to do them outside the organization.

For instance, there is no provision in the organization that guarantees peace or protections to any state.

The Act of Chapultepec, for instance, has a provision that an attack on one should be considered as an attack on all. There are no such provisions in the Charter. Argentina, for instance, may attack Uruguay

The ČHAIRMAN. She cannot under the Act of Chapultepec.
Mr. COCKRELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is now integrated with the Charter as a regional arrangement.

Mr. COCKRELL. Except that any one of the five members in the Charter can prevent any action by the United Nations organization.

The CHAIRMAN. In general that is true.

Mr. COCKRELL. Furthermore there is one prohibition in the Charter against action outside of it, and that is the provision that no enforcement by regional organization can be taken except by authorization of the Council.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Mr. COCKRELL. In other words, the Council may prohibit action outside of the Charter by a regional organization.

The CHAIRMAN. That was to preserve the authority of the world organization and not have all these other bodies interfering with its general policy.

Mr. COCKRELL. Yes; that is all right. If, however, we think we ought to interfere—we think we ought to protect Uruguay-we think the Act of Chapultepec ought actually to carry out a peaceful settlement-we can do that by the United States' vetoing any action by the United Nations organization.

Furthermore any regional organization can do anything it pleases under or without the Charter, provided it is a member of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all you have, Mr. Cockrell?
Mr. COCKRELL. No; just a moment, and I shall be finished.

I shall be glad to answer any questions. I am especially interested in the fight made at San Francisco by the Australian people to make a change in the veto, and would like to say that they can do it any time they please by agreeing to go outside of the organization.

75608—45—30

All right. Now, that agreement can be overcome, first, by any of the five getting together and saying, “We will not use this unlimited veto. If you want to settle a dispute peacefully, you can do it. If you want to make a recommendation, you can do it.”

They can do it by joint declaration. Furthermore, states can provide in advance, if they want, that whenever the Security Council fails to make a decision, any of those who so desire can act on the matter in which a decision has not been made.

In other words, the Charter of the United Nations is like a great big bus with 50 passengers in it. As to five of them, each has a separate brake with which he can stop the whole bus. Now, the nations can, if they want, provide an auxiliary bus, a safety bus, an extra one, that can come along afterward; and whenever one of the Big Five stops the big bus, all the others have to do is to get out and get into the safety bus. That safety bus can be called an Auxiliary United Nations, if they want to call it that. They can provide in advance who shall compose it. They can provid

They can provide for the same members of the Council serving in this Auxiliary United Nations whenever the first one fails to act. They can do everything always within the Charter.

Now, any regional organization can operate and do anything that it desires, simply by one of the major members being a member, who will undertake to veto any action by the United Nations against them. We can form a Pan American organization and make any provision we please. We can do anything we please provided the United States will keep the United Nations off.

We can act without United Nations authorization, but if they do act, the United States can prevent them from doing anything about it.

* I shall not undertake to pass on the values of the change or not. The present provision has one great value: That there is a pride and prestige of the five to act together. It gives them a lot of credit to act together. It creates a great many responsibilities. If they fail to come up, they may feel badly about it and for that reason have a great many responsibilities and a great many temptations.

No decision of the International Court can be enforced if one of the five says "No."

The CHAIRMAN. There is an obligation, though, on the parties to abide by the decision.

Mr. COCKRELL. As Secretary Stettinius brought out very well, one of the five can veto any kind of enforcement. If Greece and Yugoslavia right now got into a row that had to be settled and the Court passed on it and rendered a decision, Greece could say, "No, we will not"; and Great Britain could protect her. The veto is solely a blocking measure; it does not enforce anything on anybody else. It only keeps the five from acting. If the five all act together, there is not one chance that all five will get together and impose upon one poor little state. There will be some one of the five, or two, that will prevent that. But when anyone vetoes, then all the rest are left to do what they please. They can stop the bus and get into another bus, unless they want to walk.

The CHAIRMAN. You have only 2 minutes left.

Mr. COCKRELL. I shall be glad to answer any of your questions before I stop.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions of the witness?
(There was no response.)
The CHAIRMAN. There are no questions. Go ahead, Judge.

Mr. COCKRELL. Any time this can be done, this agreement—the safety provision can be made—any nation so desiring under it, they can do anything they want to do, and cannot be compelled to do anything they do not want to do. It is a voluntary provision which has worked and can work again.

I will leave this and some other notes.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony. We appreciate it very much.

(The papers submitted by Mr. Cockrell are as follows:) OUTLINE OF STATEMENT BY EWING COCKRELL, BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS

CENTRAL FEATURE OF THE STATEMENT An auxiliary agreement by the states that so approve can overcome all defects of the unlimited veto and enable the states to take outside of the United Nations Organization any action provided in the Charter despite any veto.

No reservation, amendment, or withdrawal is necessary.

1. The Charter contains more practical provisions to settle disputes peacefully, maintain peace, and promote social and economic welfare than ever before agreed upon by the nations of the world.

2. Its unlimited veto gives each one of the five chief powers unique authority to prevent the use of such provisions to prevent peace enforcement and to permit war. (The situation in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.)

3. Nevertheless this authority can be overcome any time by the nations, individually or collectively, acting outside of the United Nations Organization.

HOW THE STATES CAN ACT OUTSIDE OF THE ORGANIZATION

4. Nineteen articles cover the essential obligations of the members and their relations in and out of the Charter. These are Nos. 2, 5, 6, 24, 25, 27, 33, 37, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, and 103.

They contain full provisions for the Security Council acting but none when it fails to act. None of them restrains any member from taking any action provided by the Charter which the Council has failed to take. There is no general, blanket prohibition on action outside of the organization. The only exception is against regional enforcement and that exception can be overcome.

5. All actions of the Security Council are by its “decisions" by a seven-member vote including all the five. All obligations of the members are to obey these decisions. There is no obligation to obey a vetoing power.

HOW THE CHARTER AND VETO OPERATE 6. Whenever one of the five blocks action in the United Nations Organization, he sets all the other 49 states free to take it outside the organization. There is no authority to prevent them doing so.

Thus one man can prevent the organization from
(a) Using provisions for peaceful settlement of disputes.
(6) Using its forces to prevent aggression,

(c) Enforcing any decisions of international courts or obedience to any international law.

(d) Guaranteeing or promising any protection to any nation. But whenever he does any of these things, he immediately and automatically permits any states to do them outside the organization.

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS FOR ACTING OUTSIDE OF THE ORGANIZATION 7. An agreement by all the states that desire to join in it that whenever there is no decision by the Security Council on any matter within the Charter they will act on it outside the organization in behalf of all who approve the particular action.

They may call themselves an Auxiliary United Nations and provide for Council members and national forces to act within it. (They may, if desired, direct their same Council members, national forces, and other personnel to act in both the United Nations and the Auxiliary, according to which one does act. There seal be no conflict between them.)

In the Auxiliary the members may agree to be bound by a majority vote in a large council in which every member has a vote, weighted as agreed. Or may be bound as each agrees for each action.

Any kind of provisions that the members desire may be put into the auxiliary agreement. All would follow and none violate the Charter.

8. B. An agreement for a Pan American or any other regional organization. If any one of the five joins in such an organization, it may have a constitution under which it can do anything it pleases provided in the constitution, whether it be within the United Nations Charter or not. This power would come from the permanent Council member of it vetoing any action by the United Nations Organization against it.

SOME VALUES OF THE VETO AND OF ACTIONS TO OVERCOME IT 9. There is no need for action outside of the organization if the five make the actions they are authorized to make, when needed or helpful.

10. The veto has great value in causing the five to practice the art of acting together. It specially helps to prevent war involving one of them.

11. It has danger in causing honest differences between the five over matters not directly involving them, e. g., Russia and Great Britain over Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

12. It can encourage future heads of the five to act unilaterally to promote aggression.

13. It can cause endless temptations to influence court decisions. (See accompanying "Twelve Questions for the United Nations” for examples.)

C. AN ALTERNATIVE AGREEMENT 14. An agreement by the five (approved by the other states) to retain a limited veto instead of the present unlimited one. This would be to allow all Security Council decisions to be by a simple majority vote provided that any one of the five may veto the use by the United Nations Organization of armed forces against itself or the use of its forces by the organization against any other state. (Economic sanctions may also be included with the armed forces.)

SAFETY FIRST 15. The United Nations is like a big bus with 50 passengers, 5 of whom have ench a separate brake to stop it. The Auxiliary United Nations is an extra or safety bus for the passengers who want it; when the other bus stops they get in the safety and go ahead. They have two pieces of machinery to produce pence instead of one.

TWELVE QUESTIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
(By Ewing Cockrell)

APRIL 11, 1915. I'nder the present Dumbarton Oaks-Talta proposals it appears that each memher of the Sexurity Council from China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States has 12 great, unlimited reto powers to prevent the enforcement of price

Wide discussion has been had on the power of these fire to veto force against themselves. Thes 12 pwers are in addition to that 1. They are powers to Here actiens in which ther are not concerned. They are retoes that any one of tive men can make apirist the voies of all the other nations in the world. And he can do so for anr nusen he' cheuses even though his reto leads directly to war.

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