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DUMBARTON AND YALTA PROVISIONS
These are the provisions which confer these powers.
The Security Council consists of the five permanent members and six others elected by the other states, each with 'one vote. As stated by Secretary Stettinius, on March 5, 1945, it takes a majority of seven members plus
unanimous agreement among the permanent members for:
C) Approval of agreements for supply of armed forces;
(Ch. VIII, sec. B, also includes “determination of existence of an act of agression,” along with threat or breach of the peace.)
It is also provided that “* no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the security council" (ch. VII, sec. C).
There is no provision that restrains any state after one of the five fails to make this unanimous agreement.
Discussion and suggestions on these provisions were asked by Secretaries Hull and Stettinius and President Roosevelt last year and are again emphasized by the President March 3 of this year, when he said :
"Discussions by the people of this country, and by the peoples of the freedomloving world, of the proposals which will be considered at San Francisco, are necessary, are indeed essential, if the purpose of the people to make peace and to keep peace is to be expressed in action."
Accordingly, these 12 powers are presented in 12 questions, with some of their results. They are accompanied by proposals for a limited veto, which appears to avoid the evil results and at the same time to give the five powers all the authority they probably desire. The writer also seeks any corrections and any other proposals or suggestions.
THE TWELVE QUESTIONS Do you want any one of these five council members to have authority by his lone vote at any and all times to prevent the whole United Nations organization of 44 or more states from doing all these things:
1. Using force to prevent or repel aggression by any state, even if(a) It is not used against any of the five states ; (6) All the other 43 states except the aggressor want to have the force used;
(c) The actual forces used are all from other states than that of the lone member?
2. Determining the existence of an act of aggression or threat or breach of the peace from any source against any state, even if
(a) The aggression, threat or breach is not by any of the five;
4. Enforcing any decision of any international court, tribunal, or arbitrators in of the 44 members, even if
(a) The dispute does not involve any of the five;
(6) All the other states except the one objecting want the organization to enforce them ;
(c) The enforcement is solely by other states than that of the lone member?
4. Enforcing any decision of any international court, tribunal or arbitrators in any cases between any and all the 44 members, even if
(a) The dispute does not involve any of the five; (0) All the other states except the loser in the decision want it enforced ; (c) Both disputants agreed in advance to abide by the decision; (d! The enforcement is solely by other states than that of the lone member? Twenty American Republics are forming an organization for the use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression in the Western Hemisphere. Do you want such lone Security Council member to have authority to prevent us from:
5. Using that force to prevent or repel aggression just among ourselves? 6. Determining existence of aggression, peace threat, or breach among ourselves?
7. Making arrangements among ourselves for the supply of armed forces to protect each other?
8. Making regulations among ourselves to lighten the burden of our armaments, expressed as our aim in the Atlantic Charter?
If all the European nations form an organization among themselves to keep their peace, do you want such lone Security Council member to have authority to prevent that organization from:
9. Enforcing their peace?
10. Determining the existence of a threat or breach of the peace or act of aggression among themselves?
11. Making agreements among themselves for the supply of armed forces to protect each other?
12. Making regulations among themselves to lighten the burden of their armaments?
SOME RESULTS OF THESE PROVISIONS 1. The one-man veto is against the use of force only by the Organization. It at once turns loose all the states to act separately any way they please. For example: How war can come.
Greek and Bulgarian troops can fight. Ten Council members vote to compel Greece to pay damages. The American, Greek-sympathizing, Council member votes "No." All United Nations action for force is blocked. Greek troops march on. Russia sends in troops to defend the Bulgarians; Great Britain sends hers to defend Greece; all the other states line up on one side or the other or neither, as they please; and both sides want to get the United States in.
It is like five policemen called to a small neighborhood riot. If one of them says, “Let's leave them alone,” all five are forced to go home and let the rioters fight it out among themselves—and maybe against innocent bystanders (like Uncle Sam).
2. The unlimited veto may actually compel unilateral force by a peace-loving state to protect itself against an aggressor. For example:
Poland and Russia.-Future bitter Polish troops kill a hundred Russians across their border. A lone American Council member, who resents Russia's "unilateral partition" of Poland, votes against recompense. Whereupon Russia marches into Poland and by unilateral action secures recompense and protection which the lone member has prevented the United Nations Organization giving her by collective action. The peace machinery is stopped by a wheel that works back. wards. And the veto has worked not for one of the five but against it.
Russia and her former enemies--Injustice to all the five.—Russia has on or near her borders four more former enemies. Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Factions in them hostile to her could "frame" her-trump up a frontier or other clash. They could be craftily seeking world support or just wildly antagonistic-five wildcats baiting the big Russian bear. Any one of the four other Council members that at that time happened to have a government cool to her or warm to her opponent could, by his lone vote, put her in the wrong.
Any of the other four could be thus unjustly treated any time for any reason by any one of the four men.
3. The unlimited veto can tempt the five to use it and resort to separate action. Requiring all five to act together for United Nations action is not inducing them to do so. It induces them to act separately.
If Russia has such trouble with any neighbor, why risk the United Nations blocking its settlement when she can attend to it separately and satisfactorily to her? Why not inform the Council in advance that she will do so? Just as Germany and Austria in 1914 informed the Council of Vienna or Concert of Europe that they would attend to Serbia alone. Or if another Pancho Villa repeatedly robs and kills Americans across the border and is not stopped by the Mexican Government, should we let any of the Council members prevent the United Nations Organization even from "determining" there was "an act of aggression."
Why should not any one of the five veto United Nations action any and every time it thinks it can legitimately benefit by its own separate action?
4. The unlimited veto nullifies the recent agreement for å pan-American or. ganization to keep our peace. For example:
Pan-America and Europe held up.-Complaint has been made of Argentina arming against her neighbors. Suppose she invades Uruguay. Any future corrupt French Laval or Chinese war lord on the Council, who is bribed by Argentine Nazis, would have anthority to keen all the other 20 American Republics from protecting Uruguay through their organization.
The British. Russian, and French Council members and all the nations of Europe could vote for a European organization to protect by force one European state
against another. Any American or Chinese Security Council member could, for any reason he chose, prevent the Organization from using wholly European forces against any state or government he favored.
THE WORLD'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM HELD UP 5. The unlimited veto creates a new judicial system, with five bad features.
For example: A court approved by Greece hears her dispute with Bulgaria and awards Bulgaria damages and Greece refuses to pay. Any one Council member can, for any reason, prevent collective Organization action with force. And thereby allow all unilateral action by everybody.
Here are the five bad features:
(a) In power each of the five Council members would become the supreme court of the world. For any state to be sure to receive the dues that any court or tribunal may award it, it must, first or last, get the approval of each of these five men or avoid their disapproval.
(b) All these five would be political appointees of their political governments. Each would be rightly interested in working for the interests of his party or country. It would be as if our Supreme Court today had to have the enforcement of all its decisions unanimously 0. K.'d by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Thomas E. Dewey, Norman Thomas, Earl Browder, and Gerald L. K. Smith. And this required by law.
(C) In nominal authority no one of these five is supreme over the other. But in action he is supreme if he decides one way, that is against enforcement. As if either Roosevelt, Dewey, Thomas, Browder, or Smith could reverse our Supreme Court's decisions but it took all five to affirm them.
(d) In our system today an appellant has one chance in two of winning. In this new world system. he would have one out of two repeated five times. A losing government could have varied inducements, from its own popular opinion to make such "appeals."
In the past, states have nearly always obeyed decisions of courts to which they have submitted their cases. But there has never been in the past a judicial system which gave them so many temptations not to obey them.
(e) There could be a new era in diplomacy and in mixing international bargaining, politics, and justice. A full 62 United Nations Organization can have 3,080 pairs of nations with any number of disputes, in no one of which any of the five is a party. Yet any one of the five can prevent United Nations enforcement of all the 3,000.
There can be 283 different pairs of nations with disputes between 1 of the 5 and 1 of the other 57.
In this total of 3,365 possible pairs of disputes at any one time, foreign offices could try to get one of the five to use his “influence" in any negotiation whatever.
When the five veto United Nations Organization force against themselves, they are to that extent uniting for their protection. But it is a menace to their unity for any one of them to block all the other four and all the other states in repelling aggression among themselves and enforcing peaceful settlements of their own disputes. Who gains by the authority in the 12 questions?
Many would claim the Big Three. That Russia wants to be able to veto Council collective action to settle Balkan disputes peacefully so she can use unilateral action to settle them her way. That is the same way, Britain wants to settle Mediterranean disputes with her fleet, and the United States Central American disputes with her marines.
Actually, however, the writer does not believe any of the five government heads want all this authority, when the following limited veto would bring them the same protection and benefits and none of the evils and unlimited headaches.
FOUR SUGGESTED ADDITIONS
First. All Council decisions to be by a simple majority vote, with a limited veto as follows: “Provided, That any permanent Member may veto the use of the United Nations Organization of armed forces (or economic sanctions) against itself or the use by the Organization of such Member's armed forces (or cooperation in economic sanctions) against any other state."
This addition appears to have the following results:
1. The limited veto gives every one of the five just as much protection and the other states no more power than from the unlimited veto. Even though in any case, all the five voted against use of force and the six voted for it, all that happens is that the five don't prevent the other states from using against aggressors Organization forces solely from the other states and from any of the five if they want to go along.
2. The 39 (or 57) nonpermanent Members would be encouraged to turn their forces over without restrictions to the United Nations Organization for their protection. For they would be assured (a) that United Nations protection would not be blocked by any one man and (b) they would not have to use their separate forces for their protection.
3. These forces of the nonpermanent Members all combined could so overwhelm any state among their number that it would probably never resist them! if it did, it could be quickly overcome.
ALTERNATIVE LIMITED VETO
Second. An alternative proviso to cover the veto power would be in substance:
"Provided, That the United Nations armed forces used against any permanent Member shall be only those of the states which vote therefor or otherwise so approve. The means for expressing such approval shall be as each state may provide.”
This provision appears to have these features:
1. The forces used against any one of the five would be no more than what the states voting for it and approving it could use anyhow, outside of the Organiza. tion, whenever the unlimited present veto prevented Organization use.
2. No forces of any state are used against its will against any of the five. 3. All forces of all states that so desire may be used-the big and little. 4. It lessens the odium of special privileges to the five. Third. Regional organizations.
Omit the unlimited control of the Council over regional organizations and add: "Any dispute between states as to whether a matter between them shall be proceeded with under the United Nations Organization or a regional organization shall be decided at any stage of the proceedings by the Security Council or by any court or agency approved by the disputing parties.”
This decision of the Council would also be by simple majority.
Any regional organization that would be formed would be authorized to do some or many of the same things as the United Nations Organization. Disputes as to which should be used are bound to arise. A simple majority vote of the Council (or ('ourt) settles it one way or the other—no blocked decision by one man or a minority that leaves them in the air. All parties could thus use either organization they prefer.
ENFORCEMENT OF COURT DECISIONS Fourth. A logical addition could be:
"The Security Council shall enforce any decision in a matter between two or more states which they have submitted to any court or body and agreed to abide by the decision. "Proraded, That any permanent Member may veto such enforcement by the Organization against itself or with its forces against any other state."
This appears to meet the present situation that nowhere in the United Nations Organization is there any guaranteed peace. Not for any state even under the most deserving circumstances.
This addition and other fine prorisions in the present Dumbarton proposals at least guarantee the nonpermament many Members that decisions in all disputes between them will be carried out-no enforcement hung up by one of the five. And the power to enfone them will be at least that of all the other 39 (er 57) states and so great that it would not be resisted and the de'ision would be percefully oberech
SOME GENERAL RESUITS OF THE ADDITIONS 1 Prevent substantial mullification of the strong Senate Connally resolution pass by more of Siro. It farenti:
the maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the morld."
Present unlimited veto adds to these words the following in effect :
“Provided, That any one of the five men representing the five chief states may:
"Prevent the international authority from using any such power with force to prevent or repel any or all aggressions by any and all states;
"Prevent it from making any determination that there has been an act of aggression by any or all states;
“Prevent it from effecting the enforcement of peaceful settlements of any and all disputes between any and all states.
“He may do all these things by his separate, unilateral action for any reason he chooses."
2. Prevent a possible new armament race. With the Organization liable to be blocked any time from the use of Organization force to protect them, Members would rely more on their separate forces and would build these up more and more.
3. Prevent weakening the whole United Nations Organization. Separate armaments for protection could naturally be followed by alliances and then counteralliances. These, even with their evils, could dominate just as the League of Nations was dominated.
4. Prevent autocracy in a world organization intended to promote democracy. In the liberated countries, the Allies are rooting out fascism and autocracy. But in the vital use in their own United Nations Organization of force to prevent war and aggression, they establish five separate autocracies with unlimited authority to prevent the use of that force.
The CHAIRMAN. The next speaker is Mrs. T. W. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF MRS. THOMASINA W. JOHNSON, LEGISLATIVE
REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL NONPARTISAN COUNCIL ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF THE ALPHA KAPPA ALPHA SORORITY
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mrs. Johnson. Please state your name, address, and whom you represent.
Mrs. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am Mrs. Thomasina Walker Johnson, legislative representative of the National Non-Partisan Council on Public Affairs of the Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, whose national office is 961 Florida Avenue NW., Washington 1, D. C.
Our organization maintains and supports the National Non-Partisan Council on Public Affairs for the sole purpose of presenting our collective thinking and that of our communities on legislation, administration of public agencies, and public affairs of all kinds. This is an organization composed of 165 chapters in 46 States with a total membership of some 6,000. Our membership is significant because most of the women might well be considered leaders; they are all college, university, or above in training. Most of them are professional women. Some of the most highly educated women in America belong to this organization; they are physicians, lawyers, teachers, nurses, social workers, musicians, et al., housewives, and voters.
Our membership is composed also of a group of women in America, who by training, background, and experience are prepared to add their thinking to that of all other intelligent leadership in our country in efforts for the judicious solution of the many and difficult problems that face us now; for in a democracy we work for and with each other.
Our membership is composed also of wives, mothers, sisters, families, and loved ones of thousands of men now fighting in the jungles of the South Pacific. It is composed of those women who wait” for the thousands who fought gallantly, courageously, and victoriously in Europe. It is composed of those who belong to the Gold Star Legion