States, so that it virtually is optional to the United States by virtue of its position as a permanent member of the Security Council to determine whether or not action in this hemisphere will be taken in the first instance through the Security Council, or whether we will vote against action by the Security Council, thereby automatically leaving it to the hemispheric defense to act.

Senator MILLIKIN. Let me repeat my question in a slightly different form.

So that there is nothing either in the Act of Chapultepec or in this Charter that impairs the Monroe Doctrine if we should ever have occasion to use it, or to put it in another way, if these regional multilateral arrangements should fail or if the Security Council should fail, we have not abandoned the Monroe Doctrine, and it stands there as, I might call it, as a club behind the door, as something that we can use in self-defense if we have to use it, is that correct?

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Senator MILLIKIN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Senator TUNNELL. I would like to ask you this: In case the United States or any other of the five great nations wanted to withdraw getting back to the idea of withdrawal-it would seem to me that any one of them would be a pretty undesirable member to the rest of them having the power of veto over any positive action, so that if they want to get out the chances are that the remaining nations would want them to get out, wouldn't they?

Mr. DULLES. I think you are entirely right about that. I often have in my law practice to deal with these contracts which establish a rather intimate personal relationship between people, and sometimes they want to have them run for an absolute period of years, 10 or 15 or 20 years. I always tell them that that is a foolish arrangement to make because if one of the parties to that arrangement wants to get out, it is a lot better that he should get out; and certainly any nation who did not want to be there could make itself so objectionable that the others would end up by expelling it. So we had better let it get out anyway.

Senator TUNNELL. So that the difficulty in getting out is not likely to bother any of the five nations?

Mr. DULLES. I would not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George would like to ask a question. Senator GEORGE. Mr. Dulles, speaking of the agreement or agreements which are to govern the numbers and types of forces and the degree of readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided, as set out in article 43, subsection 2, is it your opinion that the. United States in making available to the Council military contingents could restrict the place of the use of the forces aside from the question of whether we could want to?

Mr. DULLES. There is no doubt in my mind but what we can do that. Senator GEORGE. Aside from the wisdom of doing it. I quite agree that it would be an unwise thing, from my point of view, but I simply wanted your view on that question.

Mr. DULLES. I have no doubt that it can be done and I have no doubt that in a number of states it will be done.

Senator GEORGE. And that would not bring us-if Congress should subsequently in an implementing statute insert any provisions restricting the use of the military force made available to the Security

Council, that would not, in your judgment, bring us into collision with any affirmative grant or any affirmative obligation that we have assumed under this treaty?

Mr. DULLES. No. You speak of doing it by statute. The procedure will be by treaty-agreements submitted to the Senate for ratification.

Senator GEORGE. That is true with respect to the force, but it might become necessary for the Congress, or the Congress might deem it advisable to implement by purely domestic law, certain conditions that would apply to the representative of the United States or persons whom the United States should select.

Mr. DULLES. If restricted use of our military contingent were desired, Senator, I would think the wise thing to do would be to make provision for that in your basic military agreement which will come before the Senate for ratification.

In other words, you may assume commitments by that treaty which you could not honorably thereafter alter merely by statute. If you contemplate their alteration subsequently by statute, it would be wise, I think, to make provision to that effect in the basic military agree

ment.

Senator GEORGE. But aside from where it should be made, it is your opinion that a limitation of that kind could be, consistently with the obligations assumed under the Charter, inserted?

Mr. DULLES. There is no doubt in my mind whatever as to that. Many of the smaller member states already are clear in their own minds that they will not agree to make contingents available except for use in relatively near areas. Whether or not a great power wants to do that is a question of policy. As to the fact that it may do it, there is no doubt whatever in my mind.

Senator GEORGE. My question was as to the power. I thank you very much, and I want to take occasion to say that as one member of the committee I fully appreciate the very strong statement that you have made in defense of the Charter.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to call attention, on the line of Senator George's questions, to article 44. Under article 44, when the Council decides to use force, it shall before calling on a member not represented on the Security Council to provide armed forces in fullfilment of the obligations assumed under article 43, invite that member, if that member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that member's armed forces. In other words, upon the request of any member not a member of the Security Council, it may sit with the Security Council in considering what employment and where will be sent the troops from that particular country. It is not binding except that they have an opportunity to be represented.

Senator AUSTIN. I would like to have you refer to page 198 of the report to the President, article 43. This provides in section 1:

All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call; and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Is there anything inconsistent in that provision with the interpretation you have just stated to the effect that an individual nation like

the United States might impose a limitation on the area in which its armed forces could be assigned to duty?

Mr. DULLES. No. In my opinion, Senator Austin, the phrase that they are "to be made available in accordance with a special agreement or agreements" enables the states to make any conditions which they want to attach, and I would think it quite probable that even the great powers, while they would probably want to make some forces available for use anywhere, that there would be some understanding whereby they would at least supply the preponderant force in the areas of their proximity.

I know that many of our Latin-American friends expect that we will, for instance, supply the bulk of any military contingent that is to operate in this hemisphere. Some of them are very much opposed to having the European contingents operate in this hemisphere, and if that view should be carried out, it might very well make provision for the fact that certain powers in Europe would not have contingents available in this hemisphere for use. That is a possibility.

But this whole matter must be explored much more fully than was the case at San Francisco. This has all got to be worked out by military people, and when that treaty comes back here it will impose problems considerably more difficult than those that are imposed by the ratification of this Charter. There are a number of problems still ahead which will raise problems, as I say, more difficult than are raised by the Charter itself.

The question of these military contingents, the possible question of fixing by statute the area within which the President can act without the authority of Congress, or a system perhaps whereby there would be joint action or joint control by the Congress and President; the question of what territories, if any, will be put under the trusteeship system-those are problems that you are going to have to work with in the future, and they will raise difficulties which are greater than any that are raised at the present time.

But the fact that there are difficulties concerned is no reason for not taking the first step. There are always going to be difficulties ahead, and when you solve the first batch, there will be a new crop around the corner.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Dulles, in connection with the questions just raised by Senator Austin, I want to ask you whether you interpret the terms "special agreement or agreements" to be synonymous with the word "treaty" as we understand it?

Mr. DULLES. I do.

Senator MILLIKIN. Mr. Dulles, throughout this whole hearing, strangely enough, there has been no estimate made of the amount of armed forces, the over-all employment of armed forces that might be required to operate under this Charter, and I should like to bump one or two thoughts against you and get your reaction to it.

As I see it, until the job of policing our defeated enemies is turned over to the organization contemplated by the Charter, and when you consider where the remaining possible fields of disturbance in the world may be, it seems to me that the initial force to support this plan would be nominal-let us call them-police forces. I wonder if you would go along with me that far to start with. Then I can see that as, if and when the job of policing our defeated enemies is turned

over to this organization there might be an expansion of power needed in this organization.

Mr. DULLES. Senator, I claim to be an international lawyer but I am not an international general. I am glad as an amateur to give a reaction to your remarks.

Senator MILIKIN. Give me your amateurish reaction.

Mr. DULLES. My opinion is that the amount of military force required to make up these contingents ought to be very small for as far as anyone can predict reasonably ahead. As you point out, the force required to control Germany and Japan will not be supplied for a considerable period of time, at least, by the Security Council, and its military contingents.

In the second place, it will not be necessary to supply military contingents to deal with any one of the five major powers. So you eliminate at once five permanent members of the Council and the defeated enemy states. You can use your imagination and take any one of the most formidable remaining states, and then you can figure on the amount of force that would be required to keep that country under control.

And then you perhaps divide that into five, at a liberal estimate; but it could be divided more than that because it will be more than the five great powers that will be providing contingents, and the result which you get is that what would need to be supplied by any one power would seem to me to be very small. I think so the more because of the fact that in my personal opinion it will hardly be necessary at all to use this force for more than a demonstration. For if in fact the five permanent members of the Council are agreed to combine against any other state or group of states that can be thought of, that very fact will in itself serve to keep that state in order.

In other words, for as long a time as can be predicted ahead, there is no state or group of states which is going to stand up against the combined will of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, China, and at least two other nations.

Senator MILLIKIN. I think that is a very constructive contribution. There is just one other facet of that which I would like to develop. It seems to me that in the phase that you are talking about you havelet us call it a policing problem, and later on you might come to a real war problem, and that draws a logical distinction between where the power might lie in this country to order troops into action as against one or the other of those two contingencies; in other words, it seems to me that possibly we can preserve and effectuate the constitutional power of the Congress and the power of the President depending upon the nature of the problem. The policing powers traditionally exercised by the President might possibly be kept in him, and the war powers might be kept in Congress, thus preserving in symmetry all of the constitutional powers of the Congress and the President.

Mr. DULLES. That is precisely what I referred to, Senator, in the first portion of my remarks when I said it seems to me foolish to be arguing now about this military contingent when nobody in the world. has the slightest idea what it is. It may be just a few bombers; it might be half of the Air Force or half of the Navy of the United States, although I do not see why it should be; but it might be.

Now, when the matter must be dealt with as an internal domestic problem, it seems to me it will depend very greatly upon knowing

T

what it is we are talking about. If we are talking about a little bit of force necessary to be used as a police demonstration, that is the sort of thing that the President of the United States has done without concurrence by Congress since this Nation was founded.

On the other hand, if this is going to be a large volume of force which is going to put a big drain on the resources of the United States or commit us to great and costly adventures, then the Congress ought to have a voice in this matter. But as it stands today I don't know, and no one of you gentlemen can know, what it is we are talking about.

Senator WILEY. Do you agree with the conclusions of the Secretaries of War and the Navy that there is nothing in the provisions of this Charter with relation to trusteeship that would prejudice America's right to any of the strategic islands we have recovered in the Pacific?

Mr. DULLES. I agree wholly with that. There is an expressed provision which says that the question of what territories shall be put under trusteeship and under what terms shall be subsequently decided.

As far as this Charter is concerned, there is, I suppose, an expectation that has been created by the trusteeship. system that something will come in under it. We have built. a beautiful house here and everybody expects someone to live in it; but as far as any legal obligation is concerned, there is no reason whatever why any nation is bound to put any territories under trusteeship.

That is the reason why in what I have said elsewhere and here today, I have attached far more importance to the general declaration of colonial policy which applies to all colonial areas and attached relatively less importance to the trusteeship system.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, you are rather close to Governor Dewey. I do not have it here, but somewhere in the press I noticed a statement I will try to procure it-that he approves of the Charter and its early ratification. Are you authorized to say that he did make such a statement?

Mr. DULLES. I am. I reported to him quite fully when I came back from San Francisco and went over the Charter fully with him, and when he went to the conference at Mackinac he there made a very strong statement not only urging ratification of the Charter, but urging it very promptly without reservations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dulles. You have made a very fine statement and one which the committee appreciates and one to which it will give proper consideration in dealing with the Charter. Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point I want to insert in the record a resolution adopted by the Conference of Governors at Mackinac Island. It appears in the Congressional Record at page 7459. (The resolution referred to is as follows:)

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The attainment of world peace has ever been the aim of civilized peoples. The recent San Francisco Conference has produced a charter, representing the determination of fifty peace-loving nations, that war be prevented.

We, as governors, declare our belief that the people of the several States are whole-heartedly in favor of the entry of the United States into this proposed international organization for world security.

We believe that the San Francisco Charter lays a firm foundation upon which continued progress toward justice and permanent peace can be made. No more worth-while achievement could be realized by freedom-loving men and

women,