amounted to a large part of the organization's administration, while the administrative control of personnel rested with the director. And although the Board was charged with the development and pursuit of a national science policy, no mechanism was provided for the implementation of whatever decisions might be made in this respect

Moreover, it was not at all clear just what was meant by a national science policy. Did this mean simply determining the overall needs of the nation as far as scientific research and education were concerned, or did it involve a composite of specific policies for the scientific affairs of Congress and the various executive agencies? Did it include an investigation and evaluation of the programs of other-frequently larger and more influential-federal agencies, and if so, by what means? In the light of these anomalies, it is understandable that, during the early years of the Foundation, little attention was paid to large-scale policy matters. Uncertain of the Foundation's place among the many federal agencies supporting research, limited by inadequate funds, and burdened with operational Juties, the Board devoted most of its energies to working out practical arrangements for carrying out its own programs. The determination of overall policy, even for the Foundation itelf. was by no means a simple matter In this respect the act had provided for a troika-like arrangement which did not make for easy sledding. Three groups clearly played a direct part in policy guidance and control of he agency-the Congress, the Execu live Branch, and the Board itself, each of which had, and still has, some measre of veto power over the FoundaIson's activities. As long as all three are in favor of a given policy or proj er, there is no problem. But if one of hem wishes to exercise a veto, it can do so. Either the Congress or the Administration can thus negate a policy promulgated by the Board.

In 1958, an executive order clarified To some extent the Foundation's extersal responsibilities by instructing it "to ecommend to the President policies

the Federal government which will trengthen the national scientific effort

furnish guidance toward defining the responsibility of the Federal governament in the conduct and support of Federal research." And in 1959, the internal situation was improved by amendmenis 163 the National Science Act

which permitted the Board to delegate authority to the director and to its executive committee to approve grants and contracts in certain situations. Yet in spite of these attempts to overcome some of the difficulties inherent in the original act, the Foundation seemed unable to fulfill the expectations of its founders.

To many the trouble appeared to lie in the Foundation's unusual structure. Complaints were heard that the NSF was "not like other Federal agencies." that it was not sufficiently responsible to or controlled by the executive branch, that it was too directly responsible to the Board. Suggestions were made that the Foundation should be put into the more regular pattern of other government agencies. For this and other reasons, the Foundation was reorganized by an act of Congress in 1962. What the reorganization plan did in effect was to push the Foundation further away from the concept which had been of prime importance to its founders-that of providing a workable mechanism by which the best scientific thinking of the country could be brought to bear on the development and pursuit of a sound science policy for the nation. By the 1962 reorganization, the Board-supposedly the representative of the nation's top scientists and educators--was placed in a curiously restricted position, both in relation to the Foundation's own operations and to its broader influence in the government's scientific affairs.

The tendency to strengthen the director's position vis-à-vis the Board had been evident in a 1959 executive order which designated him as a member of the Federal Council for Science and Technology. The act of 1962 further strengthened his position at the expense of the Board. First, he was made a full voting member of the Board. Since such an arrangement is fairly common in many universities and industrial corporations, this step was not seriously resisted by the Board. But the really curious provision of the 1962 act was that, in overhauling the executive committee to give it a more effective role in the Foundation's operations, it was specified that the director, rather than the Board chairman, should be chairman of the Board's executive committee!

The 1962 act also removed from the Foundation "so much of the function conferred upon" it by the original act -"to develop and encourage the pursuit of a national policy for the pro

motion of basic research and educa

as would

tion in the sciences enable (the director of the Office of Science and Technology] to advise and assist the President in achieving coordinated Federal policies" for this purpose. In addition, the act removed the Foundation's charge "to evaluate scientific research projects undertaken by agencies of the Federal Government" and transferred this function as well to the Office of Science and Technology. Thus the Board's opportunity for influencing federal science policy was further and severely restricted. As a matter of fact, if it had not been for the vigilance of some alert Board members, the Board would, at that time. have been stripped of all real authority and reduced to an advisory function. Discussions then took place and a compromise "truce" which lasted 3 years was the result.

The fate of the advisory committees under the provisions of the reorganization act is also significant. These committees, made up of scientists in separate disciplines, such as mathematics. astronomy, engineering, and others, had been an important communication link between the scientific fraternity and the Board. By making them responsible to the director, the 1962 act removed them from direct contact with the Board. And a later reorganization ac! (1965) abolished completely the statutory requirement for these committees. Since the committees had been removed earlier from the jurisdiction of the Board, the Board had no chance in 1965 to vote on the desirability of their statutory position.

What it all adds up to is that gradually, by successive steps, the National Science Board-originally envisioned as a largely autonomous group of leaders who were to have a powerful voice in the conduct of the scientific affairs of the nation--has become what amounts to little more than a routine committee for determining the specific awards and contracts of the National Science Foundation, with little power to enforce policy decisions. This is not to say, of course, that the larger purposes of the Foundation have, over the years. been unsuccessful The present strength of United States science speaks to the Foundation's overall achievements. Nor does it me that there has been seri

ous contention or bickering hetween the Board and the director. It is to the credit of both the director am the members of the Board that they have been able to work effectively together

in spite of the curious organizational pattern forced upon them. What it does indicate, however, is that the Board, in its efforts to carry out its responsibilities, has found itself constantly hamstrung by operational restrictions and bureaucratic encumbrances.

It is not strange therefore that the Board has been regarded in some quarters as an ineffective body, nor that it has been charged with neglecting some of its basic duties. No reports have been separately issued by the Board. although until the last few years the Board chairman has contributed statements to the annual report of the director. But the Board's neglect in this respect can be at least partially explained by the fact that it has never been empowered to have a staff of its own, and although the suggestion has been made that it depend for its staff work on the regular Foundation personnel, this has not proved very practical. These people are part of a line organization headed by the director, and work for the Board is regarded by them as temporary additional duty, with a low priority. They have other duties and cannot be expected to serve two masters. Thus on many occasions, the Board's effectiveness has been seriously limited by its inability to get the facts on which it can base the policies it is responsible for.

On other occasions, where the facts are available and a policy has been formulated, the suggestions or directions of the Board have not been implemented. For example, the problem of what percentage of the cost of the research projects supported by the Foundation should be paid by the colleges or universities concerned has long been under discussion. On this question, there has never been, to all appearances, a firm Board policy. Yet the Board did direct that some fraction of the support of these projects should come from the university, and when the matter was discussed in Congress, it was suggested that this fraction be of the order of 5 percent. But this, as one of our congressmen has pointed out, is far too simple, and instead the country's research effort finds itself entangled in provisions which are complex, inequitable, and whose reasons for existence seem to be such a dark secret that they cannot be shared with the universities (2).

As mentioned before, the suggestion has been made on a number of occisions that. since the Board's position is so obviously an anomalous one, it

476

might be advisable to simply make it, by legislative action, a purely advisory body. This suggestion has been vigorously resisted, on what appear to me to be very solid grounds. It seems to me that the original purposes of the Board are at least as important today as they were when the Foundation was established. Indeed, the nation's expanding research activity seems today to be more in need of capable direction than ever before. And it seems eminently desirable that this direction should come from the men whose technical competence and rational judgment have fitted them to make the decisions necessary for a sound science policy-men who are intimately familiar with the discov. ery and application of knowledge and who are willing to contribute a substantial portion of their time to the performance of an important public

service.

Indeed it seems to me very likely that, if the National Science Board were to be further stripped of its authority and be made a purely advisory body, it would be impossible to get the same calibre of men to serve on it. As an advisory board. it would lose even the vestige of influence in national affairs that has been left to it. I cannot help but feel that whatever steps are taken by Congress to reorganize the National Science Foundation, they should be taken in the direction of strengthening the Board's role rather than diminishing it. The national policymaking role of the Board should be clarified not only in relation to the Foundation it. self, but also in relation to the Office of Science and Technology, the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Federal Council for Science and Technology, the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Academy of Engineering. All of these groups can play an effective part in a national science program, but they can do so only with well-defined responsibilities and clearly understood assignments.

And there would be real advantages in restoring to the National Science Board some of the authority that, either by default or intent, it has gradually lost. The National Science Board has been made up, over the years, of men who to a large extent are as objective in their judgment and as conscientious in their decision-making as could be found anywhere. Their essential loyalty is not to the Congress, or to the Administration, but to science itself. More

over, they are appointed by the Presi dent, with the consent of the Senate. for 6-year terms, which means that at least six of them span a 4-year preșidential term. They are, in short, better qualified to carry out the task that men like Vannevar Bush envisioned for them than almost any other group that could be named. What they need is a clarification of their duties, an assurance of adequate authority, and as much freedom as possible from bureaucratic pressures and entanglements.

The legislation currently being considered for revamping the Foundation is a short step in the right direction: at least, it leans the right way. To some extent it supports the Board's own suggestion that the Board should "establish and be responsible for the policies and programs of the Foundation." At least it states specifically that the Board should "determine policy."

Yet it seems to me that many of the problems of the past could be alleviated if the Board were given a more clear-cut mandate, not only to estab lish policies but to determine programs as well, and to be made responsible for seeing that the programs really carry out the policies. It is for this reason that the Board by unanimous vote proposed the wording referred to above, wording which in my opinion was intended to mean (i) that the Board should establish the purpose and nature of the various individual programs sup ported by the Foundation; (ii) that the Board should exercise a continuing gen. eral surveillance of the awards made under such programs: (iii) that the Board should be empowered to modify or terminate such programs when in its judgment they no longer appear to serve the national interest adequately. and (iv) that the director bring to the Board those applications for grant or contract funds which raise matters of policy or of the interpretation of pol icy. In addition, the Board should ob viously choose its own chairman, oper ate its own executive committee, appoint its own functional committees on the basis of practical needs, and be assigned a small staff to aid in neces sary research and report-writing.

Yet even if all this were done. the question still arises as to who really runs the Foundation. The matter of administrative discipline is sometimes raised. Should Board members be permitted to raise questions publicly without approval of the Executive Branch, the Bureau of the Budget. or the President's Scientific Adviser? Or if

SCIENCE, VOL 156

the Board promulgates a policy which it thinks is in the best interests of the country, should approval be obtained from the Executive Branch before such a policy is announced?

Some Board members object to the constraints of this sort of administrative discipline, and at least in the past have felt that prior approval of this type should not be required. It might be reasoned that the director-who is a presidential appointee, who is on the federal payroll, and who is making a

career of federal service-is obviously subject to administrative discipline. But does the same reasoning apply to Board members? In fact, the question of giv. ing testimony before a congressional committee itself has been raised. Must Board members offer only "approved" testimony? If so, this would seem to seriously weaken the Board's voice in terms of the purposes for which it was established. In my opinion, the nation would best be served by making that voice stronger. Unless some provisions

are made to really strengthen the National Science Board, we are likely to witness a gradual shift of the control of national science policies and programs from the scientific community to the bureaucracy-with a consequent weakening and distortion of the whole scientific effort.

Reference and Note

1. V. Bush, Science-The Endless Frontier, 1945, reprinted by the National Science Foundation, Washington, DC. (1960)

2. I have commented more fully on this matter in my letter to Science 185, 1489 (1967).