Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies WinBeating Goliath examines the phenomenon of victories by the weak over the strong--more specifically, insurgencies that succeeded against great powers. Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation. He does not disparage the critical importance of will, strategy, and strong-side regime type or suggest that external assistance guarantees success. Indeed, in all cases, some combination of these factors is usually present. But Record finds few if any cases of unassisted insurgent victories except against the most decrepit regimes. Having identified the ingredients of insurgent success, Record examines the present insurgency in Iraq and whether the United States can win. In so doing, Record employs a comparative analysis of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces' performance against the Iraqi insurgency. Make no mistake: insurgent victories are the exception, not the rule. But when David does beat Goliath, the consequences can be earth shattering and change the course of history. Jeffrey Record's persuasive logic and clear writing make this timely book a must read for scholars, policymakers, military strategists, and anyone interested in the Iraq War's outcome. |
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Стр. 15
Insurgent prospects improve against weak dictatorships and strong democracies,
however. The former may in fact be weaker than the supposedly “weak” insurgent
side, or at least not in possession of a strategically significant measure of ...
Insurgent prospects improve against weak dictatorships and strong democracies,
however. The former may in fact be weaker than the supposedly “weak” insurgent
side, or at least not in possession of a strategically significant measure of ...
Стр. 16
Furthermore, while democracies are inclined to fail in protracted small wars, they
are not disposed to fail in others types of wars. In a nutshell, then, the profound
answer to the puzzle involves the nature of the domestic structure of democracies
...
Furthermore, while democracies are inclined to fail in protracted small wars, they
are not disposed to fail in others types of wars. In a nutshell, then, the profound
answer to the puzzle involves the nature of the domestic structure of democracies
...
Стр. 19
Does relative immunity from traditional blood costs of combat increase the
political staying power of democracies in small wars? For the United States,
which has led the technical and tactical casualty minimization revolution, the
evidence is ...
Does relative immunity from traditional blood costs of combat increase the
political staying power of democracies in small wars? For the United States,
which has led the technical and tactical casualty minimization revolution, the
evidence is ...
Стр. 20
First, democracies “are thought to be especially vulnerable to coercive
punishment. Domestic critics and international rivals, as well as terrorists, often
view democracies as 'soft,' usually on the grounds that their publics have low
thresholds of ...
First, democracies “are thought to be especially vulnerable to coercive
punishment. Domestic critics and international rivals, as well as terrorists, often
view democracies as 'soft,' usually on the grounds that their publics have low
thresholds of ...
Стр. 22
But democracies, at least since World War II, have displayed limited tolerance for
overseas wars against determined insurgents waging protracted irregular combat
. Such conflicts have rarely engaged the democracies' vital interests, and with ...
But democracies, at least since World War II, have displayed limited tolerance for
overseas wars against determined insurgents waging protracted irregular combat
. Such conflicts have rarely engaged the democracies' vital interests, and with ...
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Содержание
1 | |
23 | |
Vietnam Perspectives | 67 |
War Without Politics | 103 |
Search and Destroy | 117 |
6 Conclusion | 131 |
Notes | 139 |
Glossary | 159 |
Bibliography | 161 |
Index | 175 |
About the Author | 180 |
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administration Afghanistan al Qaeda Algeria American army’s Arreguin-Toft artillery asymmetric conflicts attacks Baathist British Bush casualties China Chinese Communist Clausewitz colonies conventional military counterinsurgency decisive defeat Defense democracies democratic effective enemy enemy’s external assistance factors failed fight firepower foreign help France French Goliath guerrilla warfare Hanoi Ibid Indochina insurgency’s intervention invasion Iraq War Iraq’s Iraqi insurgency irregular warfare JEFFREY RECORD leadership Lebanon Mack Malayan Malayan Emergency Merom militarily military forces military operations military victory Nationalist North numbers outcome PAVN Pentagon People’s percent population protracted Qaeda regime regular Saddam Shia side’s South Vietnam Soviet Union Soviet-Afghan Soviet-Afghan War Spanish strategy strength stronger side success Sunni Arab superior tactical terrorism terrorist Tet Offensive threat tion troops U.S. Army U.S. combat U.S. forces U.S. military United University Press Viet Vietcong Vietminh Vietnam War Vietnamese Vietnamese Communists waging war’s Washington weaker side weapons withdrawal York