Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies WinBeating Goliath examines the phenomenon of victories by the weak over the strong--more specifically, insurgencies that succeeded against great powers. Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation. He does not disparage the critical importance of will, strategy, and strong-side regime type or suggest that external assistance guarantees success. Indeed, in all cases, some combination of these factors is usually present. But Record finds few if any cases of unassisted insurgent victories except against the most decrepit regimes. Having identified the ingredients of insurgent success, Record examines the present insurgency in Iraq and whether the United States can win. In so doing, Record employs a comparative analysis of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces' performance against the Iraqi insurgency. Make no mistake: insurgent victories are the exception, not the rule. But when David does beat Goliath, the consequences can be earth shattering and change the course of history. Jeffrey Record's persuasive logic and clear writing make this timely book a must read for scholars, policymakers, military strategists, and anyone interested in the Iraq War's outcome. |
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Стр. 3
The insurgents can pose no direct threat to the survival of the external power because . . . they lack an invasion capability. On the other hand, the metropolitan power poses not simply the threat of invasion, but the reality of ...
The insurgents can pose no direct threat to the survival of the external power because . . . they lack an invasion capability. On the other hand, the metropolitan power poses not simply the threat of invasion, but the reality of ...
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Where the war is perceived [by the metropolitan power] as “limited”—because the opponent is “weak” and can pose no direct threat—the prosecution of the war does not take automatic primacy over other goals pursued by factions within the ...
Where the war is perceived [by the metropolitan power] as “limited”—because the opponent is “weak” and can pose no direct threat—the prosecution of the war does not take automatic primacy over other goals pursued by factions within the ...
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Chances for victory are virtually nonexistent against powerful and ruthless dictatorships, which are not answerable to public or parliamentary opinion and are accustomed to violence and the threat of violence in getting what they want.
Chances for victory are virtually nonexistent against powerful and ruthless dictatorships, which are not answerable to public or parliamentary opinion and are accustomed to violence and the threat of violence in getting what they want.
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When confronted simultaneously with great-power and insurgent threats, they will look first to secure themselves from the former and in so doing may compromise or even sacrifice their ability to defeat the latter.
When confronted simultaneously with great-power and insurgent threats, they will look first to secure themselves from the former and in so doing may compromise or even sacrifice their ability to defeat the latter.
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Содержание
| 1 | |
| 23 | |
Vietnam Perspectives | 67 |
War Without Politics | 103 |
Search and Destroy | 117 |
6 Conclusion | 131 |
Notes | 139 |
Glossary | 159 |
Bibliography | 161 |
Index | 175 |
About the Author | 180 |
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administration Afghanistan al Qaeda Algeria American army’s Arreguin-Toft artillery asymmetric conflicts attacks Baathist British Bush casualties China Chinese Communist Clausewitz colonies conventional military counterinsurgency decisive defeat Defense democracies democratic effective enemy enemy’s external assistance factors failed fight firepower foreign help France French Goliath guerrilla warfare Hanoi Ibid Indochina insurgency’s intervention invasion Iraq War Iraq’s Iraqi insurgency irregular warfare JEFFREY RECORD leadership Lebanon Mack Malayan Malayan Emergency Merom militarily military forces military operations military victory Nationalist North numbers outcome PAVN Pentagon People’s percent population protracted Qaeda regime regular Saddam Shia side’s South Vietnam Soviet Union Soviet-Afghan Soviet-Afghan War Spanish strategy strength stronger side success Sunni Arab superior tactical terrorism terrorist Tet Offensive threat tion troops U.S. Army U.S. combat U.S. forces U.S. military United University Press Viet Vietcong Vietminh Vietnam War Vietnamese Vietnamese Communists waging war’s Washington weaker side weapons withdrawal York
Библиографические данные
| Название | Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win |
| Автор | Jeffrey Record |
| Издатель | Potomac Books, Inc., 2007 |
| ISBN | 1597970905, 9781597970907 |
| Количество страниц | Всего страниц: 180 |
| Экспорт цитаты | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |