Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies WinBeating Goliath examines the phenomenon of victories by the weak over the strong--more specifically, insurgencies that succeeded against great powers. Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation. He does not disparage the critical importance of will, strategy, and strong-side regime type or suggest that external assistance guarantees success. Indeed, in all cases, some combination of these factors is usually present. But Record finds few if any cases of unassisted insurgent victories except against the most decrepit regimes. Having identified the ingredients of insurgent success, Record examines the present insurgency in Iraq and whether the United States can win. In so doing, Record employs a comparative analysis of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces' performance against the Iraqi insurgency. Make no mistake: insurgent victories are the exception, not the rule. But when David does beat Goliath, the consequences can be earth shattering and change the course of history. Jeffrey Record's persuasive logic and clear writing make this timely book a must read for scholars, policymakers, military strategists, and anyone interested in the Iraq War's outcome. |
Результаты поиска по книге
Результаты 1 – 5 из 7
Стр. 1
In seeking the common cause that explains the stronger side's loss to the weaker,
Andrew Mack, in his pioneering 1975 assessment, “Why Big Nations Lose Small
Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” argued that the answer lay in ...
In seeking the common cause that explains the stronger side's loss to the weaker,
Andrew Mack, in his pioneering 1975 assessment, “Why Big Nations Lose Small
Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” argued that the answer lay in ...
Стр. 3
Because the outcome of the war can never be as important to the outside power
as it is to the indigenous insurgents who have staked their very existence on
victory, the weaker side fights harder, displaying a willingness to incur blood
losses ...
Because the outcome of the war can never be as important to the outside power
as it is to the indigenous insurgents who have staked their very existence on
victory, the weaker side fights harder, displaying a willingness to incur blood
losses ...
Стр. 13
for time, they necessarily take longer to resolve so long as weak actors continue
to have access to sanctuary and social ... Indirect defense via irregular warfare is
in most cases the only sensible strategy for the weaker side because a direct ...
for time, they necessarily take longer to resolve so long as weak actors continue
to have access to sanctuary and social ... Indirect defense via irregular warfare is
in most cases the only sensible strategy for the weaker side because a direct ...
Стр. 14
But if the stronger side can pick the wrong strategy, so too can the weaker side.
Positional warfare is the stronger side's best game, and for the weaker side to
attempt to play that game, or at least play it prematurely, is to invite impalement
on ...
But if the stronger side can pick the wrong strategy, so too can the weaker side.
Positional warfare is the stronger side's best game, and for the weaker side to
attempt to play that game, or at least play it prematurely, is to invite impalement
on ...
Стр. 23
The weaker side's possession of superior will and strategy is hardly a
guarexternal assistance may be required to convert superior will and strategy.
antee of success. Even the weaker side needs material resources. Substantial.
23 2. The Role ...
The weaker side's possession of superior will and strategy is hardly a
guarexternal assistance may be required to convert superior will and strategy.
antee of success. Even the weaker side needs material resources. Substantial.
23 2. The Role ...
Отзывы - Написать отзыв
Не удалось найти ни одного отзыва.
Содержание
| 1 | |
| 23 | |
Vietnam Perspectives | 67 |
War Without Politics | 103 |
Search and Destroy | 117 |
6 Conclusion | 131 |
Notes | 139 |
Glossary | 159 |
Bibliography | 161 |
Index | 175 |
About the Author | 180 |
Другие издания - Просмотреть все
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
administration Afghanistan al Qaeda Algeria American army’s Arreguin-Toft artillery asymmetric conflicts attacks Baathist British Bush casualties China Chinese Communist Clausewitz colonies conventional military counterinsurgency decisive defeat Defense democracies democratic effective enemy enemy’s external assistance factors failed fight firepower foreign help France French Goliath guerrilla warfare Hanoi Ibid Indochina insurgency’s intervention invasion Iraq War Iraq’s Iraqi insurgency irregular warfare JEFFREY RECORD leadership Lebanon Mack Malayan Malayan Emergency Merom militarily military forces military operations military victory Nationalist North numbers outcome PAVN Pentagon People’s percent population protracted Qaeda regime regular Saddam Shia side’s South Vietnam Soviet Union Soviet-Afghan Soviet-Afghan War Spanish strategy strength stronger side success Sunni Arab superior tactical terrorism terrorist Tet Offensive threat tion troops U.S. Army U.S. combat U.S. forces U.S. military United University Press Viet Vietcong Vietminh Vietnam War Vietnamese Vietnamese Communists waging war’s Washington weaker side weapons withdrawal York
Библиографические данные
| Название | Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win |
| Автор | Jeffrey Record |
| Издатель | Potomac Books, Inc., 2007 |
| ISBN | 1597970905, 9781597970907 |
| Количество страниц | Всего страниц: 180 |
| Экспорт цитаты | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |