mony and evidence, which Members may possess, and assisting it in securing such information;

4. INVITES the Secretary-General to render the Committee all appropriate assistance and facilities;

5. CALLS UPON all Member States promptly to give effect to the present and previous resolutions of the General Assembly on the Hungarian problem;

6. REAFFIRMS its request that the Secretary-General continue to take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly.

636th plenary meeting, 10 January 1957.

CHAPTER II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING

A. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE 22 OCTOBER 1956

47. Immediately after the Second World War, the Hungarian people sought to give expression to their political views. A general election was fought in 1945 by six political parties, authorized by the Allied Control Commission. Five of these won seats in Parliament. The Smallholders emerged with 245 seats. the Social Democrats with sixty-nine, the Communists with seventy, the National Peasants with twenty-three and the Democratic Party with two. The four major parties formed a coalition, but Communist influence steadily asserted itself. By 1948, leaders of the non-Communist parties had been silenced, had fled abroad or had been arrested, and in 1949, Hungary officially became a People's Democracy. Real power was in the hands of Mátyás Rákosi, a Communist trained in Moscow. Under his régime, Hungary was modelled more and more closely on the Soviet pattern. Free speech and individual liberty ceased to exist. Arbitrary imprisonment became common and purges were undertaken, both within and outside the ranks of the Party. In June 1949, the Foreign Minister László Rajk, was arrested; he was charged with attempting to overthrow the democratic order and hanged. Many other people were the victims of similar action. This was made easier by the apparatus of the State security police or AVH, using methods of terror in the hands of the régime, which became identified with Rákosi's régime in the minds of the people.

48. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR early in 1956 encouraged a movement within the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party which aimed at a measure of democratization and national independence and a relaxation of police rule. In March 1956, Rákosi announced that the Supreme Court had established that Rajk and others had been condemned on "fabricated charges". This official admission that crimes had been committed by the régime had profound repercussions in Hungary. It was followed in July by the dismissal of Rákosi and, early in October, by the ceremonial reburial, in the presence of a large crowd, of László Rajk and other victims of the 1949 trials. Rákosi was succeeded as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party by Ernö Gerö. From the date of Rákosi's fall, the Hungarian people looked for a softening of the régime. Associated in their minds with better days was the former Premier, Imre Nagy, whose period of office from 1953 to 1955 had been marked by a loosening of the controls imposed earlier by Rákosi. Nagy had also been attacked as a deviationist and, while he had escaped trial, had been expelled from the Party and divested of all his offices. His name continued to stand for more liberal policies in the minds of many Hungarian Communists, who wished for his return to public life.

49. The first protests against the dictatorial régime of the Party were voiced by certain Hungarian writers, as early as the autumn of 1955. Articles published by these writers concerned mainly the doctrine of Party allegiance in literature and interference with creative writers and artists by Party spokesmen and bureaucrats. Although a number of writers were arrested, the scope of these protests gradually widened to take in other grievances of the Hungarian people. In the summer of 1956, the foundation of the Petöfi Club provided a new forum for discussions, which were often critical of the régime. This Club was sponsored by DISZ, the official Communist Youth Organization and its debates were mainly attended by young Communist intellectuals.

50. On 19 October, the Minister of Education, Albert Konya, announced certain changes as a result of requests put forward by Hungarian students.

One of these was an undertaking to abolish the compulsory teaching of Russian in schools. This announcement was followed by student manifestations in Szeged and other towns, during which various demands of a more far-reaching character were discussed and adopted. Also on 19 October, news of Poland's move towards greater independence of the USSR was received in Hungary with enthusiasm. Friendship between the two peoples had been traditional for centuries.

51. Although Soviet troops are said to have been called in to deal with disorders that began during the night of 23-24 October, there is evidence that steps were being taken by the Soviet authorities from 20-22 October with a view to the use of armed force in Hungary. On 20-21 October, floating bridges were assembled at Záhony on the Hungarian-Soviet frontier. On 21-22 October, in neighboring areas of Romania, Soviet officers on leave and reserve officers speaking Hungarian were recalled. On 22 October, Soviet forces in Western Hungary were observed moving towards Budapest.

B. MEETINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

52. On the day before the holding of mass demonstrations, namely 22 October, a number of student meetings took place in Budapest. At the most important of these, held by students of the Building Industry Technological University, the students adopted a list of sixteen demands which expressed their views on national policy. These demands contained most of the points put forward during the uprising itself. They included the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops, the reconstitution of the Government under Imre Nagy, who had meanwhile been re-admitted to the Communist Party, free elections, freedom of expression, the re-establishment of political parties, and sweeping changes in the conditions both of workers and peasants. It was learnt during the meeting that the Hungarian Writers' Union proposed to express its solidarity with Poland on the following day by laying a wreath at the statute of General Bem, a hero of Hungary's War of Independence of 1848-49, who was of Polish origin. The students thereupon decided to organize a silent demonstration of sympathy on the same occasion.

53. Early next morning, the students' demands had become known throughout Budapest. Witnesses speak of an atmosphere of elation and hopefulness. Radio Budapest referred to the planned demonstration, but later announced a communiqué prohibiting it from the Minister of the Interior. The ban was, however, lifted during the early afternoon, when the demonstration was already under way. Thousands of young people took part in it, including students, factory workers, soldiers in uniform and others. A similar demonstration took place at the statute of Petöfi.

54. Standing beside the statue of General Bem, Péter Veres, President of the Writers' Union, read a manifesto to the crowd, who also listened to a proclamation of the students' sixteen demands. Most of the crowd afterwards crossed the Danube to join demonstrators outside the Parliament Building where, by 6 p. m., between 200,000 and 300,000 people were gathered. Repeated calls for Imre Nagy eventually brought the former Premier. Mr. Nagy addressed the crowd briefly from a balcony of the Parliament Building.

55. There had so far been nothing to suggest that the demonstration would end in any other way than by the crowds' returning home. An episode, however, at 8 p. m. greatly embittered the people. The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Ernö Gerö, had returned that morning from a visit to Marshal Tito, and the public was eagerly awaiting a speech which he was to broadcast at that time. The general hope was that he would take account of the popular demands voiced by the students and would make some conciliatory announcement in connection with them. The speech, however, made none of the hoped-for concessions and its whole tone angered the people. At the same time, another crowd had taken it into their own hands to carry out one of the students' demands, namely that for the removal of the great statue of Stalin. Their efforts caused it to overturn at 9.30 p. m., by which time resentment was being freely expressed over Mr. Gerö's speech.

56. On the evening of 22 October, some of the students had sought to have their demands broadcast by Budapest Radio, in order to bring them to the attention of the people as a whole. The censor had been unwilling to broadcast the demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and for free elections, and the students had refused to allow incomplete publication. The following day, some of the students went from the Bem statue to the Radio Building, with

the intention of making another attempt to have their demands broadcast. A large crowd gathered at the Radio Building, which was guarded by the AVH or State security police. The students sent a delegation into the Building to negotiate with the Director. The crowd waited in vain for the return of this delegation, and eventually a rumour spread that one delegate had been shot. Shortly after 9 p. m., tear gas bombs were thrown from the upper windows and, one or two minutes later, AVH men opened fire on the crowd, killing a number of people and wounding others. In so far as any one moment can be selected as the turning point which changed a peaceable demonstration into a violent uprising, it would be this moment when the AVH, already intensely unpopular and universally feared by their compatriots, attacked defenceless people. The anger of the crowd was intensified when white ambulances, with Red Cross license plates, drove up. Instead of first aid teams, AVH police emerged, wearing doctors' white coats. A part of the infuriated crowd attacked them and, in this way, the demonstrators acquired their first weapons. Hungarian forces were rushed to the scene to reinforce the AVH but, after hesitating a moment, they sided with the crowd.

57. Meanwhile, workers from Csepel, Ujpest and other working-class districts learnt of the situation by telephone. They seized trucks and drove into Budapest, obtaining arms on the way from friendly soldiers or police, or from military barracks and arms factories known to them. From about 11 p. m., the Radio Building was under attack with light arms and, at midnight, the radio announced that clashes had taken place at "various points" in the city. During the early hours of 24 October, the demonstrators seized the Radio Building, but were driven out of it again. At the offices of the Communist Party newspaper, Szabad Nép, other AVH guards opened fire on unarmed demonstrators. Later, insurgents who had obtained arms overcame the AVH and occupied the newspaper offices.

58. While fighting was in progress at the Radio Building, the first Soviet tanks made their appearance in Budapest at about 2 a. m. on 24 October, and were soon in action. However, no official announcement was made of the Soviet intervention until 9 a. m.

D. THE ARMED UPRISING

59. Before referring to the Russian troops, Budapest Radio had announced at 8:13 a. m. that Imre Nagy had been recommended to be the next Chairman of the Council of Ministers, at a night meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party. Half an hour later came a statement that summary jurisdiction had been ordered, and this was read by the announcer as "signed by Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers." Only after this, at 9 a. m., was it reported that the Government had “applied for help to the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary". No indication was given as to the manner in which this alleged application was made. In spite of the skilful manner in which the radio presentation of developments gave the impression that Mr. Nagy was responsible for decisions, some, remembering his opposition to arbitrary measures and his fight for the relaxation of the régime, suspected a fraud. Moreover, Mr. Nagy had no official status the day before. If the appeal for help had, indeed, come from him, it was realized that the Soviet forces from Cegléd and Székesfehérvár could not have arrived in Budapest by 2 a. m. on the 24th.

60. The first shots at the Radio Building marked the beginning of a hardfought five-day battle, in which the people of Budapest found themselves in combat with Soviet armour and with the AVH. The ordinary police sympathized with the insurgents, giving them weapons or fighting at their side. Certain units of the Hungarian Army fought as such on the side of the insurgents, but the Army as a whole disintegrated from the start of the uprising. Wherever they could succeed in doing so, Hungarian soldiers handed over weapons and ammunition to their fighting compatriots and, in very many cases, deserted, individually or in groups, to their ranks. However, in general, the senior officers were pro-Soviet and the insurgents mistrusted them. There was no single instance recorded of Hungarian troops fighting on the Soviet side against their fellow countrymen.

61. The freedom fighters, most of whom were workers, with a proportion of students, usually fought in small groups, although some of them occupied strongholds such as the Corvin Cinema. A frequent weapon used against Russian tanks was the "Molotov cocktail", a loosely-corked bottle filled with gasoline, which exploded when thrown against a tank. Such improvised meth

ods proved highly effective against the power of Soviet armour, which found it difficult to manoeuvre, especially in narrow streets, and to compete with the mobility of the young Hungarian fighters, who included some not yet out of childhood. The Soviet mechanized forces were also hampered by insufficient infantry support and inadequate food supplies. There was evidence that some of the Russian soldiers disliked the task assigned to them. Those who had spent some time in Hungary had often established friendly relations with the people, many of whom could talk to them in Russian. There were a number of cases of fraternization with the Hungarians.

E. REVOLUTIONARY AND WORKERS' COUNCILS

62. Most of the available Soviet forces had been dispatched to Budapest and, meanwhile, there was comparatively little fighting in the provinces. Here, the first days of the uprising saw a transfer of power from the Communist bureaucracy to the new Revolutionary and Workers' Councils. In most cases, these Councils took over without opposition, although some incidents were reported during this process. These Councils represented a spontaneous reaction against the dictatorial methods of the régime. The Revolutionary Councils took over the various responsibilities of local government. There were also Revolutionary Councils or Committees in the Army, in Government departments and in professional groups and centres of activity such as the radio and the Hungarian Telegraph Agency. Members of the Councils were usually chosen at a meeting of those concerned. They were intended to prepare for the setting up of a genuinely democratic system of government. The Councils also put forward various political and economic demands, calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free and secret elections, complete freedom of expression and the abolition of the one-party system. The most influential of these bodies was probably the Transdanubian National Council, which represented the people of Western Hungary. Using the Free Radio Station at Györ, this Council demanded that Hungary should renounce the Warsaw Treaty and proclaim her neutrality. Should its demands not be accepted, it proposed to set up an independent Government.

63. The Workers' Councils were set up in a variety of centres of work, such as factories, mines, industrial undertakings and so so. They also put forward political demands and wielded conisderable influence. However, their principal purpose was to secure for the workers a real share in the management of enterprises and to arrange for the setting up of machinery to protect their interests. Unpopular measures such as that of establishing "norms" of production for each worker, were abolished. The emergence of Revolutionary and Workers' Councils throughout Hungary was one of the most characteristic features of the uprising. It represented the first practical step to restore order and to reorganize the Hungarian economy on a socialist basis, but without rigid Party control or the apparatus of terror.

F. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

64. A serious episode occurred on 25 October, which greatly embittered the people and turned popular sympathy away from Mr. Nagy, whose part in the alleged invitation to the Soviet troops remained obscure. Soviet tanks guarding the Parliament Building, in which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers had his offices, opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, in support of the AVH. This massacre, in which many people lost their lives, shocked the nation. The Hungarian people did not know at this time that Mr. Nagy was detained at the Communist Party Hedquarters when the Russian tanks were firing on the unarmed crowd.

65. On the same day, the insurgents derived some encouragement from the news that Ernö Gerö had been replaced as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party by János Kádár. The following day Mr. Gerö sought the security of Soviet tanks-and later Soviet territory. The former Premier, András Hegedüs, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, also fled from the Communist Headquarters.

66. Mr. Nagy was now free to move to the Parliament Building. On 27 October, he formed a Government into which he invited both Communist and nonCommunist Ministers. These included Zoltán Tildy, former Head of State, Béla Kovács, former Secretary-General of the Independent Smallholders, and Ferenc Erdei of the National Peasants. The non-Communists, however, were serving in a personal, non-party capacity and several "Stalinists" were retained.

67. With the departure of Messrs. Gerö and Hegedüs, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party announced that the Government would start negotiations with the USSR for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces. On 28 October, Mr. Nagy's Government ordered a cease-fire. Fighting stopped largely on the insurgents' terms. Apart from the successful adoption of guerilla tactics by the fighters, larger groups of the insurgents had withstood Soviet tanks in strongholds such as the Corvin Block. At the Kilián Barracks, Hungarian Army units had fought successfully against repeated attacks under their leader, Colonel Pál Maléter, who had gone over to the insurgents after being sent with instructions to fight against them.

G. MR. NAGY CLARIFIES HIS POSITION

68. On the same day when Mr. Nagy's Government ordered a cease-fire, the Prime Minister announced that he would abolish the AVH, after the restoration of order. Popular resentment against the AVH was so universal and so deep that Mr. Nagy was obliged to take this decisive step on the following day, 29 October. As a result, he was himself freed for the first time from the control of the AVH, acting on behalf of the Communist hierarchy. The fall of a régime for which, in all Hungary, only the AVH was prepared to fight, followed as an inevitable consequence. On 30 October, Mr. Nagy announced that the Cabinet had abolished the "one-party system". Speaking in the name of the Communist Party, Mr. Kádár, still First Secretary of its Central Committee, agreed with this step to avoid, as he said, "further bloodshed". Zoltán Tildy, former leader of the Smallholders Party, announced that free elections would be held throughout Hungary. Representatives of both the Smallholders and National Peasants entered the Inner Cabinet in which they had, between them, as many posts as the Communists. A post was set aside for a Social-Democratic nominee.

69. Once the AVH had been disbanded, Mr. Nagy felt free to explain his actions on and immediately after 24 October. A series of statements was made by himself, or on his behalf, in the press and on the radio. The most important of these declared that Mr. Nagy had not signed any decrees asking for Soviet military intervention or proclaiming summary jurisdiction. It was also stated that he had not subsequently approved of the invitation to the Soviet forces. These clarifications and the political steps taken by Mr. Nagy served to dispel popular doubts regarding his attitude towards the uprising, and his popularity rapidly returned.

70. Although a cease-fire had been ordered on 28 October, a few isolated skirmishes took place after that date, but the cease-fire became fully effective by the time the new Cabinet took office on 30 October. That same day saw the beginning of a withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Budapest. The general expectation was that negotiations for their complete withdrawal from Hungarian territory would soon attain their objective. A number of revolutionary organs, the new political parties and newspapers beginning to appear on the streets all joined the Government in its efforts to stop the last manifestations of lawlessness which had occurred. A fact reported by many credible witnesses, however, was that no looting occurred, although numerous shop windows had been destroyed and goods of value, including even jewellery, lay untouched within reach of passers by. Hundreds of buildings in Budapest had become ruins as a result of the gunfire, and thousands more were severely damaged, although some areas of the city had suffered little.

71. The days that followed the cease-fire, up to 4 November, saw the people of Budapest take the first steps to clear away rubble and broken glass, to restore order and to bring life back to normal conditions. It was generally agreed that everyone would resume work on Monday, 5 November. The disbanding of the AVH and the renewed confidence in Mr. Nagy, together with the victory of those who had fought in the uprising, combined to create a general feeling of wellbeing and hopefulness, which impressed all observers. On 2 November the Government called on members of the AVH to report to the authorities, in order to appear before a screening commitee and, by the next day, great numbers of the former security police were reporting to prosecutors' offices. Meanwhile, political prisoners whom they had detained and tortured were released by the people. The most celebrated political prisoner to regain his freedom was Cardinal Mindszenty, who returned to Budapest and broadcast to the nation. When the prisons were opened, some common criminals also appear to have been freed. On 1 November, the freedom fighters, while maintaining their identity,