agreed to be amalgamated into a National Guard whose members would be the only Hungarians, apart from the Army and police, authorized to bear arms.

72. On 3 November, the Government was again reconstituted. Several Communists were dismissed, some of them having been ousted from their offices by the staff of their respective Ministries. Three Ministries each were allotted to the Communists, the Social Democrats, the Independent Smallholders, and two to the Petofi Party. The parties of the coalition were the same which in 1945 had received the blessing of the Allied Control Commission, on which the USSR was represented. Imre Nagy was now the head of a caretaker Government. The people regarded him as a good Hungarian who could be entrusted with the organization of the free general elections on which all Revolutionary and Workers' Councils had insisted, and as a suitable negotiator with the Soviet leaders on the withdrawal of Russian troops and on future relations with the USSR. One of the most trusted leaders of the Revolution, now Lieutenant General Pál Maléter, had become Minister of Defence. Reassuring statements were issued by various leaders regarding the policy to be followed. A Minister of State, Ferenc Farkas, himself a member of the National Peasant Party, announced that the four parties were unanimously agreed to retain from the socialist achievements everything which could be used in a free, democratic and socialist country, in accordance with the will of the people. It was made very clear that the condemnation of the old system which the uprising represented would not affect those reforms under which ownership of the land and industrial undertakings had been transferred. The peasant parties did not agree on all issues with the Social Democrats, but they also were solidly opposed to the restoration of large estates, as they were to the forced collectivization and obligatory deliveries of produce imposed by the Communist regime.

73. The Communist Party itself realized that a drastic overhaul of its methods would be necessary to regain the confidence of its disillusioned supporters. At about 9:50 p. m. on 1 November, Mr. Kádár read over Budapest Radio a message from the Preparatory Committee of what was to be a reformed party under the name of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. He spoke of the uprising in which "the Communist writers, journalists, university students, the youth of the Petöfi Club, thousands of workers and peasants, the veteran fighters who had been imprisoned on false charges, fought in the front line against the Rákosi despotism and political hooliganism." The new party would defend the cause of socialism and democracy, "not by slavishly imitating foreign examples, but by taking a road suitable to the economic and historic characteristics of our country...". Mr. Kádár appealed to the "newly formed democratic parties" to "overcome the danger" of intervention from abroad by consolidating the Government. The people of Hungary had proved their intention unflinchingly to support the Government's efforts aimed at the complete withdrawal of the Soviet forces. "We do not want to be dependent any longer; we do not want our country to become a battlefield."

H. DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY

74. On the morning of 1 November, Mr. Nagy took over direct responsibility for foreign affairs. He told the Soviet Ambassador that he had received authoritative information on the entry of new Soviet military units into Hungary. This, he informed the Ambassador, was a violation of the Warsaw Treaty and the Hungarian Government would denounce the Treaty if the reinforcements were not withdrawn. Later that day, the Soviet Ambassador stated that the Soviet troops had crossed the border only to relieve those troops who had been fighting and to protect the Russian civilian population in Hungary. He said that the Soviet Government was ready to negotiate a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops and suggested that two delegations be appointed, one to discuss political, and the other technical, questions associated with the withdrawal. At 2:00 p. m. Mr. Nagy telephoned the Ambassador and informed him that new Soviet troops had crossed the frontier within the last three hours. For this reason, effective immediately, Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty. At 4:00 p. m., the Council of Ministers, which included Mr. Kádár, approved this action without dissent and, at the same meeting, adopted a Declaration of Neutrality for Hungary. At 5:00 p. m., the Council of Ministers invited the Soviet Ambassador to a meeting and informed him of these decisions. The same news was conveyed by the Hungarian Government to various heads of diplomatic missions in Budapest, who were also told of a request by Mr. Nagy to the United Nations, asking for the aid of the four Great Powers in defence of Hungary's neutrality.

At 7:54 p. m., Mr. Nagy broadcast to the Hungarian people the Declaration of Neutrality. His statement ended with the words: "We appeal to our neighbors, countries near and far, to respect the unalterable decision of our people. It is indeed true that our people are as united in this decision as perhaps never before in their history. Working millions of Hungary! Protect and strengthen with revolutionary determination, sacrificial work and the consolidation of order, our country-the free, independent, democratic and neutral Hungary”.

I. SOVIET FORCES INTERVENE AGAIN

75. While news came in of the massing of Soviet armoured forces, negotiations continued for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. By the afternoon of 3 November, agreement appeared to be near and only certain technical details of the withdrawal remained to be settled. A Hungarian delegation consisting of the Minister of Defence, now General Maléter, the Minister of State Ferenc Erdei, the Chief of Staff General Kovács, and Colonel Szücs was invited to settle these details at the Soviet Military Command at Tököl near Budapest, at 10 p. m. The Hungarian negotiators attended a banquet given in their honour by the Soviet military representatives at Tököl. It was nearly midnight when the party was interrupted by the arrival of General Serov, Chief of the Soviet Security Police, who entered the room accompanied by NKVD officers and ordered the arrest of the Hungarian delegation.

76. Communication having been interrupted between Mr. Nagy's Government and General Maléter, considerable anxiety was felt at the Parliament Building regarding developments. During the night, the gravity of the position was emphasized by numerous telephone calls received in the Parliament Building. These came from industrial districts surrounding Budapest and from various Revolutionary Councils in the provinces. They all reported that Soviet forces, in battle formation, were steadily advancing, and the Revolutionary organs asked urgently for permission to oppose them by force of arms. It has been estimated that some 2,500 Soviet tanks and 1,000 Soviet supporting vehicles were in Hungary by 3 November. All strategic centres, airfields, railroads and highways had been brought under Soviet control. Mr. Nagy, however, gave specific instructions not to open fire on the Russian troops, since he understood that a successful outcome of the negotiations for withdrawal of the Soviet troops was still expected. These instructions were not changed until news was received that Mr. Kádár had set up another Government, whereupon Mr. Nagy summoned a Cabinet meeting at which it was decided to resist the Soviet troops by force of arms. At 5:20 a. m. Mr. Nagy announced over Budapest Radio that Soviet troops had attacked the capital "with the obvious intention of overthrowing the legal Hungarian democratic Government". He declared that that Government was at its post and that the Hungarian troops were in combat. Battles were, in fact, being fought on the arterial roads at the approaches to Budapest. Notwithstanding the overwhelming power of the Soviet forces, barricades hastily erected by the Hungarian fighters presented a first obstacle to the Russian advance. The Hungarian Army, the National Guard, and groups of freedom fighters, mostly equipped only with light weapons fought side by side against the advancing tanks. Shortly after 8 a. m. Budapest Radio broadcast its last message before going off the air. This was an appeal to the writers and scientists of the world to help the people of Hungary. By that time, Soviet armoured units had broken through the defences of Budapest and were in control of the Danube bridges, the Parliament Building and the Central telephone exchange.

J. MR. KÁDÁR FORMS A GOVERNMENT

77. At 5:05 a. m., only a quarter of an hour before Mr. Nagy broadcast news of the second Soviet intervention, another radio station had announced the formation of a Government by Mr. Kádár. The announcement consisted of an open letter signed by Mr. Kádár and three other former members of the Nagy Government. They declared that they had left that Government on 1 November, because of its inability to fight the "counter-revolutionary danger". In order to defeat "fascism and reaction", they had established the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. At 6 a. m. Mr. Kádár's voice was heard over the same wavelength announcing the composition of his Government. He declared that reactionary elements were seeking to overthrow socialism in Hungary and to restore the capitalists and landowners to power. The new Government, he said, had requested the help of the Soviet troops to defeat these

78. Mr. Kádár gave no explanation of his change of attitude since his broadcast supporting Mr. Nagy on the night of 1 November. There is no evidence that he had taken any steps to dissociate himself from Mr. Nagy's policies or to resign from his Government. It is known that he visited the Soviet Embassy after his broadcast on the night of 1 November, but he was present at negotiations with representatives of Revolutionary Councils the following day. If the circumstances in which he constituted his Cabinet are obscure, so also are his movements and those of his fellow Ministers at the time. According to witnesses, Mr. Kádár was in Moscow early in November and he and his Ministers made no public appearance in Budapest until they took the oath of office on 7 November. The controlling authority in Hungary was the Soviet Military Command, which issued orders to the Hungarian people regarding the surrender of arms, circulation in the streets, the supply of food and other matters falling within the province of civil administration. There is no evidence to suggest that any Hungarian group opposed the actions of Mr. Nagy which, in most cases, merely reflected what the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils had insisted upon from the outbreak of the uprising. All the evidence shows that the Soviet troops fought alone against the Hungarians. With the exception of former members of the AVH and a small number of former Party officials, no Hungarians, whether organized or unorganized, fought on the Russian side. Many of the new Soviet troops brought into Hungary for the second intervention came from distant regions of Central Asia. Many believed that they were in Egypt, with the mission of fighting the Anglo-French "Imperialists". It would seem that the Soviet authorities had more confidence in troops who had had no opportunity to be affected by European associations and who might be counted upon to behave with indifference to the attitude of the Hungarian people.

79. After the Soviet forces had occupied Budapest, local resistance continued in various centres. Bitter fighting went on until Tuesday evening, 6 November, when most of the Hungarian fighters ran out of ammunition. Some centres within the city continued, however, to resist until the 8th and in the outlying industrial districts fighting went on until the 11th. Heavy destruction and considerable loss of life were caused by the Soviet armed forces, which often directed gunfire into buildings lining the streets. During this second armed intervention by Soviet forces, the fiercest fighting took place in working class suburbs of Budapest, such as Ujpest and Csepel Island. The workers at Csepel refused several Soviet calls to surrender and held out until the evening of 9 November, despite the use of artillery against them from various directions, supplemented by aerial bombardment. At the important industrial centre of Dunapentele, formerly Sztálinváros, the workers showed an equal determination to resist the Soviet troops. On 7 November, during an all day battle, they repelled a Soviet attack from three directions using a large armoured force, self-propelled guns and tactical airforce. Eye witnesses described how the factory workers, with the Hungarian officers and men of the local garrison, were entirely united, irrespective of party or religious affiliation. Only former members of the AVH, it was said, dissented from the policies of the Revolutionary Council.

K. THE ABDUCTION OF MR. NAGY

80. When Mr. Nagy's Government was overthrown by Soviet armed force, it was the Russian commanders, and not Mr. Kádár's Government, who assumed control. The fate of Mr. Nagy and his immediate entourage soon showed the inability of the Hungarian Government to maintain its sovereign independence against Soviet intervention. Mr. Nagy left the Parliament Building at about 6 a. m. on 4 November and sought asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy. Later in the day, other leading Hungarians, including the widow of László Rajk, with fifteen women and seventeen children, sought asylum in the same building. During negotiations between the Yugoslav Government and Mr. Kádár that took place in November, the Yugoslav Government proposed that Mr. Kádár should provide a written guarantee that Mr. Nagy and his party would be allowed to return freely to their homes or, if this were not possible, to go to Yugoslavia. A suggestion by Mr. Kádár that the Nagy party should seek refuge in Romania was rejected by Mr. Nagy. Other demands by Mr. Kádár's Government considered unacceptable by Mr. Nagy were that he should resign from his position in the Government, should offer a self-criticism of his activities and should declare himself in sympathy with Mr. Kádár's Government. Eventually, the Yugoslav Government wrote to Mr. Kádár that it would agree to the departure of Mr. Nagy and his friends only if Mr. Kádár, as President of the Hungarian Govern

ment, guaranteed in writing that the party would be granted safe conduct to proceed freely to their respective homes. In his reply, Mr. Kádár confirmed in writing that the Hungarian Government did not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities.

81. The next day, 22 November at 6:30 p. m. a bus arrived at the Yugoslav Embassy to take the party to their homes. Soviet military personnel arrived and insisted on entering the bus, whereupon the Yugoslav Ambassador asked that two Embassy officials should accompany the bus, to make certain that Mr. Nagy and his party reached their homes as agreed. The bus was driven to the Headquarters of the Soviet Military Command, where a Russian Lieutenant-Colonel ordered the two Yugoslav officials to leave. The bus then drove away to an unknown destination escorted by Soviet armoured cars.

82. In a note verbale, the Yugoslav Government condemned the Hungarian action as "a flagrant breach of the agreement reached." The note declared that Mr. Nagy and his party had refused to go to Romania and it condemned the Hungarian action as completely contrary to the generally accepted practices of international law. Notwithstanding this reaction, Mr. Kádár's Government announced publicly that Mr. Nagy and some of the colleagues who had sought refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy had gone to Romania in accordance with a request they had submitted previously to be permitted to go to the territory of another socialist country.

L. SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION

83. The action of the Soviet Military Command in intervening in an arrangement between Mr. Kádár's Government and the Yugoslav Embassy illustrates the degree of his subordination to the Soviet forces. Having taken over Hungary by armed intervention, the Soviet authorities were compelled by reason of the administrative vacuum to administer a country whose popularly supported Government they had overthrown. The Soviet-installed Government of Mr. Kádár commanded no following in the country, with the exception of individual members of the former AVH, a few senior officers of the Hungarian Army and a small segment of former Communist Party officials, who had been dismissed during the uprising. Having broken the armed resistance of the Hungarian people in a massive attack, the Soviet authorities found themselves facing the passive resistance of the Hungarian population. This was particularly marked in the case of the workers who had borne the brunt of most of the fighting. In the industrial and mining districts, they steadily maintained their demands. 84. Finding themselves confronted by this nation-wide resistance, the Soviet Military Command began by resorting to mass arrests. Many of the people thus apprehended had not been directly involved in the fighting. In numerous cases, the captives were not transferred to the Hungarian authorities, but were crowded on trains or in trucks and deported, under Russian escort, to the USSR. In some instances, because of action by the Hungarian resistance and the railway workers, it was found necessary to run the trains entirely with Russian personnel. No accurate figures exist regarding the numbers of Hungarian citizens deported, but these certainly run into thousands. By January 1957, some of these had been returned to Hungary, but it would appear that a considerable number still remain in the USSR.

85. In an effort to win popular support, Mr. Kádár announced that the policy of his Government would include the implementation of various demands put forward during the uprising. These included raising the workers' standard of living, factory management by Workers' Councils and the abolition of compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce by the peasants. These promises, however, failed to satisfy the Hungarian people, who continued to press for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections and the return of Mr. Nagy. Since 23 October, industrial production had been completely disrupted in Hungary and the position continued to deteriorate after 4 November since the workers refused to resume work until the Government gave evidence that it would meet their demands.

86. As in the time of Mr. Nagy's premiership, the Workers' Councils were still the principal channels through which such demands were conveyed to Mr. Kádár's Government. The outcome of the negotiations was wholly unsatisfactory to the Councils. On 14 November, the factory Councils established the greater Budapest Workers' Council in order to present a united front. Until its abolition on 9 December, this Council strove to reach an agreement with Mr. Kádár and his Government. It became clear from the Government's attitude

that it was in no position to satisfy the workers' demands. Meanwhile, in order to secure control of the country, new security forces were organized, including many former members of the AVH. Through arrests of members of Workers' Councils and through the infiltration of trusted Party members into key posts, the power of the Councils was steadily undermined. When the Greater Budapest Workers' Council declared a forty-eight-hour protest strike to take place on 11 and 12 December, the Government issued a decree to abolish all Workers' Councils above factory level. Decrees were also issued instituting the death penalty for a large category of offences, including participation in strikes.

87. Hungarian factories had remained practically idle for nearly two months. Electric power plants had produced only a minimum amount of electricity due to the slow-down strike of the Hungarian coal miners. However, the weapon of passive resistance by the Hungarian workers could not be employed indefinitely. Dire necessity had enforced a resumption of work by mid-December, when the Hungarian workers found themselves in factories and coal mines which contained a novel element-the presence of Russian soldiers.

M. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

88. Other steps taken by Mr. Kádár's Government to establish control over the Hungarian people include the opening on 20 December of a State Information Office to control the press. The few newspapers which started out as “independent" were gradually prevailed upon to reproduce the official line. The Revolutionary Council of Intellectuals was dissolved on 9 December and the Writers' Union, which had branded the Soviet intervention in Hungary as a "historic mistake", was disbanded on 21 April. The Petöfi Club also ceased to function and Hungarians were without any forum where they could exchange ideas. All hope of a coalition Government vanished although, in negotiations between Mr. Kádár and the major democratic parties, the latter made it clear that they accepted public ownership of the means of production and were willing "to defend the socialist achievements." By the beginning of 1957, nonCommunist organizations had, in effect, been excluded from any role in public life. It was officially stated that the Social Democratic Party will not be allowed to function, while leaders of the Smallholders Party have retired from public life and the Petöfi Party has virtually dissolved itself. The mandate of the present Hungarian Assembly was due to expire on 17 May 1957. However, this mandate has been extended for two years by amendment to the Constitution, thereby depriving the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental political right to participate in the function of Government through elected representatives of their own choice.

N. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

89. The mandate given to the Special Committee by the General Assembly was to carry out a full and objective investigation on all aspects of Soviet intervention in Hungary by armed force and by other means and on the effects of such intervention on the political development of Hungary. In carrying out this mandate, the Committee studied a rich documentation supplied by Governments and obtained from other sources, while it closely questioned more than a hundred witnesses, representing every stratum of Hungarian society, whose testimony fills 2,000 pages in the verbatim record. The General Assembly asked that investigations should be pursued in Hungary also, but the attitude of the Hungarian Government did not allow the Committee to carry out this part of its mandate. The Committee has summarized its conclusions as to the essential facts about the Hungarian uprising under thirteen points. The essence of these conclusions is as follows:

(i) What took place in Hungary was a spontaneous national uprising, caused by long-standing grievances. One of these was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR;

(ii) The uprising was led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many of them Communists or former Communists. Those who took part in it insisted that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure, and that the land reform and other social achievements should be safeguarded. It is untrue that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary or that it drew its strength from "Imperial