must be null and void, and consequently the military action of the Soviet troops did not take place in response to a call from the legally empowered Hungarian Government."

300. The Committee examined this contention and considered that, though these views had grounds for support, particularly if it could be shown that the Chairman of the Praesidium had not relieved Premier Nagy from office prior to the announcement of the formation of the Kádár Government, it did not believe that it was of material significance for the purpose of this report to pronounce on these considerations. It suffices to call attention to the clear evidence of the circumstances in which the Government of Mr. Kádár came into being solely as the result of the military intervention.

F. CONCLUSIONS

301. Certain conclusions regarding the second Soviet intervention emerge from the evidence which the Committee has examined. In the first place, the Committee is satisfied that no well-placed observer could conclude that the Nagy Government was losing control of the situation during the first days of November. On the contrary, the formation of the Workers' Councils and the Revolutionary Councils all over the country was fast providing a substitute for the discredited machinery of Communist control. In the second place, it was the conviction of the Committee that no well-placed observer could conclude that Mr. Nagy's Government was in any serious danger from counter-revolutionary forces. The workers and students of Hungary had successfully destroyed Russian tanks from the days immediately following the demonstrations of 23 October. A week later they were in a very much stronger position than they had been to challenge any attack. Several days of intensive fighting had caused the emergence of popular leaders in many groups and had tested the hastily assembled formations of fighting workers.

302. In the Committee's view, the evidence leads to one conclusion: The Soviet withdrawal during the last days of October was no more than a temporary measure, dictated by the desire of the Soviet Army to be in a position to launch a more powerful intervention with the least possible delay. Preparations for such an intervention had been going on continuously since the last days of October.

303. It was suggested to the Committee that the Soviet Union feared the consequences to Communism which would have followed the consolidation of Mr. Nagy's reforms and were therefore anxious to attack his régime before the world could see the spectacle of a whole people united to maintain their socialist achievements without the terrors of Communist dictatorship. The Soviet authorities, it was also suggested, knew very well that an unveiled attack on the Hungarian people would call forth universal condemnation. They therefore discovered a Hungarian spokesman who would lend some colour of legality to their movements. This spokesman was Mr. Kádár. The Committee is in no position either to substantiate or to refute this thesis regarding the motivation of Soviet action. It is, however, significant that Mr. Kádár seemingly associated himself with Mr. Nagy until a late stage and the Committee has no evidence that he gave any hint of his alleged intention to break away from Mr. Nagy's Government. When Mr. Kádár announced the formation of his own Cabinet on the morning of 4 November, it is doubtful whether he had any backing among Hungarians other than that of the handful of politicians mentioned in his radio broadcast and the unquestioned loyalty of the security police. It would seem that the question of constitutional propriety hardly arises in connexion with the manner in which Mr. Kádár's Government was formed, since he himself having taken the step he did, would alone be competent to supply the facts justifying his claim that it was a Government at all. The Committee would again recall at this point that its two requests to visit Hungary, when such important questions would no doubt have been discussed, met with a pointblank refusal.

Between 20 October and 12 November, no issue of Magyar Közlony-the official gazette of the Hungarian People's Republic-appeared. The issue of 12 November contained two decrees of the Praesidium of the People's Republic. The first was unnumbered; it relieved Imre Nagy and the ministers of his Government of their offices. The second, Decree No. 28 of 1956, elected János Kádár Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' Peasants' Government and also elected seven members of the Government. Neither of the decrees

CHAPTER VIII. THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENCE AND THE UTILIZATION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN HUNGARY IN THE LIGHT OF HUNGARY'S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION

304. It appears important to the Committee, at this point of its Report, to recall the basic international instruments governing the present international status of Hungary and in particular those provisions which have been made public and which bear on the conditions of the presence and the use of Soviet armed forces on Hungarian territory. The intervention of these forces-as has been admitted by all sides-and that of sizable Soviet reinforcements from the Soviet Union and Romania, was necessary to quell the Hungarian uprising. The justifications given by the Soviet Government and that of Mr. Kádár, to the extent they find their basis in these international instruments, will also be recalled and, while no detailed legal analysis will be undertaken, the General Assembly action at its second emergency special session and at its eleventh regular session with regard to the Hungarian problem will be briefly assessed in the light of the Committee's findings as to the true character of the OctoberNovember events.

305. The rest of the chapter will bear on the persistent demands for the complete withdrawal of all Soviet armed forces from Hungary which came powerfully to public notice during the uprising. The attempts by Mr. Nagy and his Cabinets to achieve this withdrawal by negotiation with the Soviet Union will be described on the basis of all the facts at the Committee's disposal as well as the aspirations of the Hungarian Revolution as to Hungary's future international status. The positions taken with respect to these matters by the Kádár Government and the Soviet Government since the overthrow of the Government of Mr. Nagy and the military suppression of the uprising will then be restated on the basis of their official declarations and will be followed by a few final observations. B. POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING HUNGARY'S INTERNATIONAL

STATUS

306. The Treaty of Peace with Hungary of 10 February 1947, which came into force on 15 September 1947, declared the legal cessation of the state of war between Hungary and "the Allied and Associated Powers." All Allied forces were to be withdrawn subject, however, "to the right of the Soviet Union to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria" (Article 22).

307. Close restrictions were placed in Part III of the Treaty on the armed forces and armaments which Hungary was authorized to maintain to meet "tasks of an internal character and local defence of frontiers." The total strength of the Hungarian ground forces was to be of not more than 65,000 personnel, and the air force was to consist of not more than 90 aircraft, including reserves with a total personnel strength of 5,000 (Article 12). These "Military and Air Clauses" were to remain in force "until modified in whole or in part by agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, or after Hungary becomes a member of the United Nations by agreement between the Security Council and Hungary" (Article 20).

308. A reference to Hungary's eventual membership in the United Nations was made in the Preamble to the Treaty. The initial application for membership stating Hungary's readiness to accept the obligations contained in the Charter was made by the Hungarian Government on 22 April 1947. Hungary was admitted to membership in the United Nations on 14 December 1955.

309. By a "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance" of 18 February 1948, which came into force on 22 April 1948, the Soviet and Hungarian Governments affirmed their policy of strengthening their co-operation and their adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as well as to those of mutual respect for independence and national sovereignty and noninterference in their internal affairs. Each agreed not to enter into alliances or take part in coalitions or in any acts or measures directed against the other. In addition, they agreed immediately to extend to each other military and other assistance, with all the means at their disposal, should they be "involved in hostilities with Germany or with any State associated with Germany in acts of aggression in Europe, which States might seek to renew their policy of aggression,

or with any other State which might be associated with Germany directly or in any other way in a policy of aggression" (Article 2).

310. The fact was confirmed in authoritative evidence submitted to the Committee that as from 1948 the size of the Hungarian Army was increased beyond that authorized by the Peace Treaty and that, as from that time, the Hungarian Army was furnished with equipment and weapons prohibited by the Treaty.

311. In 1956 the Hungarian Army had nine infantry divisions, two armoured "mechanized" divisions, four artillery brigades, one chemical battalion, one horse cavalry brigade, one signal regiment, one communications brigade and three heavy armoured regiments. The total strength of these forces amounted to 250,000 men. The continued formation of new units suggested that the strength of the standing army was to be further increased. The air force consisted of one fighter division composed of three regiments, each consisting of 120 planes, six single echelons amounting to one regiment with 120 planes, one air regiment with 50 planes and one fighter-bomber regiment with 37 planes. The strength of the air fighter division exceeded 500 planes. In addition to these forces, the Danube Fleet had two river brigades and the security police comprised several armed infantry regiments and armoured units.

312. In accordance with the Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955, which came into force on 27 July 1955 and which brought to an end the occupation of Austria, the last Soviet units left Vienna on 19 September 1955. On 14 May 1955, one day before the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, the Governments of the Soviet Union and of Hungary, together with those of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Romania, concluded the Warsaw Treaty of "Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance". This Treaty, which came into force on 6 June 1955 for a minimum period of twenty years, and which in the wording of its preamble was said to have been motivated by the creation of the "Western European Union" and the entry of a re-militarized Western Germany into the "North Atlantic Bloc", reiterates the fidelity of the parties to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and their desire to strengthen and promote their friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance. Article 1 contains the undertaking of the parties, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. Both the Preamble and Articles 8 affirm the mutual respect of the parties for their independence and sovereignty, and of non-interference in their internal affairs. Article 3 provides for immediate consultations whenever, in the opinion of any of the parties, there has arisen the threat of an armed attack on one or several of them, "with a view to providing for their joint defence and maintaining peace and security". Article 4 states that in the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several parties by any State or group of States each party "shall, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective selfdefence, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, afford the State or States so attacked immediate assistance individually and in agreement with the other States parties to the Treaty, by all the means it considers necessary, including the use of armed force". Consultations are provided for as to "the joint measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security", and notification to the Security Council is prescribed of the measures taken, which are to be stopped as soon as "the Security Council takes the necesary action to restore and maintain international peace and security". In Article 7 the parties declare that their obligations under existing international treaties are not at variance with the provisions of the Treaty.

313. By Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty, the parties agree on the establishment of a Joint Command for their armed forces, "which shall be allocated by agreement between these Parties, and which shall act in accordance with jointly established principles". The Article further states that the Parties "shall likewise take such other concerted action as may be necessary to reinforce their defensive strength, in order to defend the peaceful labour of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and afford protection against possible aggression”.

314. Simultaneously with the conclusion of the Treaty, the contracting parties announced their decision to appoint Marshal I. S. Koniev of the Soviet Union as Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces and provided that "the Ministers of Defense and other military leaders of the signatory States are to serve as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces". The "decision" also stated that the "disposition of the Joint

Armed Forces in the territories of signatory states will be effected, by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence".

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315. Such were the legal provisions, made public and of which the Committee had knowledge, on which was based the presence of USSR armed forces on Hungarian territory. The Committee was informed that before the October events the Second and Seventeenth Soviet mechanized divisions were stationed in Hungary, with a strength of about 20,000 men and 600 tanks.

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316. In the course of the meetings of the Warsaw Conference immediately preceding the signature of the Treaty, Mr. N. A. Bulganin, in a statement delivered on 11 May 1955, indicated that the conclusion of the Treaty was occasioned by "the heightened threat to the security of our countries caused by the aggressive measures of the Western Powers", and that the "co-ordinated measures" envisaged for the parties were "necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and to provide defence against possible aggression". He stated: "Blocs created by imperialist States are based on the principles of domination and subordination. Such is the nature of blocs which serve the interests of their sponsors-the big imperialist Powers. These Powers drag small countries into the aggressive military alignments they form in order to secure manpower and additional vantage grounds and military bases. . . . The draft Treaty submitted for our consideration is based on entirely different principles. The domination of one state or nation over another is a principle alien to our countries, our peoples and our social system. Our draft Treaty proceeds from the principle of respect for the national sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of others, which forms the basis of the foreign policy of all the states represented here. The draft Treaty submitted to this Conference fully accords with the objects and principles of the United Nations Charter".

...

317. These ideas were fully echoed by Mr. András Hegedüs, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary," who, speaking at the Conference, referred particularly to "the guarantee given in the Treaty that in the event of aggression, the contracting parties will immediately assist the parties attacked with all the means at their disposal". He stated that "We shall be able to defend, and shall defend, the treasure we so long lacked and therefore prize the more highly-the liberty of our people and the independence of our country".

C. APPLICABILITY OF THESE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO THE SOVIET

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

318. The announcement broadcast from Budapest at 9 a.m., on 24 October, stated that "The dastardly armed attack of counter-revolutionary gangs during the night" has created an extremely serious situation. The governmental organs were unprepared for these attacks and "they have therefore applied. for help to the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty. In compliance with the Government's request, the Soviet formations are taking part in the restoration of order. At the 582nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 19 November 1956, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Shepilov, read the text of a telegram apparently received by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 24 October from the Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic-whose name he did not mention by which the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic requested the Government of the Soviet Union to send troops to Budapest "to put an end to the disturbances that have taken place in Budapest, restore order quickly and create conditions favourable to peaceful and constructive work". Mr. Shepilov then stated that the "Soviet Union could not, of course, refuse to respond to the request of a friendly State for help".

319. As to the second intervention of Soviet troops, Mr. János Kádár declared on 4 November that "the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers-Peasant Government requested . . . the Soviet Army Command to help our nation in smashing the sinister forces of reaction and to restore order and calm". At the 582nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, Mr. Shepilov referred to this applica

35 Reference should now be made to the Agreement of 27 May 1957 between Hungary and the USSR, the text of which is annexed to this chapter.

tion to the Soviet Union "for assistance in beating off the attack by the forces of fascism and in restoring order and normal life in the country", and added "let me admit openly that this was not an easy problem for the Soviet Government to deal with. We fully realized the difficulties which inevitably arise when the armies of one country are being used in another. The Soviet Union, however, could not remain indifferent to the fate of friendly Hungary".

320. The official explanations formulated by the USSR and Kádár Governments for the Soviet military interventions in Hungary have been summarized in their broader context and in greater detail in chapter III of this report. The basic points of their argument, as officially stated in the United Nations and elsewhere, were that on 23 October (Mr. Kádár and his spokesmen seldom refer to the exact nature of the first request for Soviet intervention), and again on 4 November, "anti-democratic elements" brought about serious disturbances of public order and created "the danger of a non-democratic fascist-type system opposed to social progress coming into being". Exercising the sovereign right of a State "to take through its government any measures it considers necessary and proper in the interest of guaranteeing the State order and the peaceful life of the population", the Hungarian Government has "called for the assistance of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Defence Treaty so as to avoid further bloodshed and disorder and to defend the democratic order and people's power. With this step the Government warded off anarchy in Hungary and the creating of a situation which would have seriously imperilled peace and security" As to the Nagy Government, it had collapsed and its communications to the United Nations had no legal force. As these occurrences had no effect on international peace and security, and related to events with Hungary, or only to the application of an international treaty "under the exclusive purview of the Hungarian and Soviet Governments and of the other Member States of the Warsaw Treaty"," the United Nations could not intervene or even consider the matter by virtue of paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter.

37

321. While the latter was the only provision of the United Nations Charter mentioned, two provisions of other international instruments were referred to in the statement of the Soviet and the Kádár Governments' position. Firstly, that of Article 4 of the Hungarian Peace Treaty which created an obligation for Hungary not to permit in the future "the existence and activities of organizations of a fascist-type on Hungarian territory, whether political, military or para-military"; secondly, that of Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty providing for "concerted action" by the contracting parties "necessary to re-inforce their defensive strength, in order to defend the peaceful labour of their people, guar antee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and afford protection against possible aggression".

322. In the course of the lengthy debates which the Security Council and the General Assembly devoted to the Hungarian question, these and other arguments were abundantly discussed by representatives of Member States. The provisions of Article 2 of the Hungarian Peace Treaty guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms, including political rights, to the Hungarian people; the principles and the character of the Warsaw Treaty as a defensive arrangement against an external aggression; the unacceptability of the position that armed forces stationed in a foreign country by virtue of a defensive alliance against outside aggression might be used to quell popular movements aiming at a change of government or of régime; the protests against the Soviet intervention and demands to the Soviet Union and to the United Nations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces put forward by the properly constituted Government of Imre Nagy; the doubtful constitutional nature of the Kádár Government at the time of its call for Soviet military assistance-all these arguments were invoked against the thesis of the Soviet Government and the Kádár Government, together with the Charter provisions on sovereign equality of Member States, the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and those of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter prohibiting the threat or use of force against the political independence of any State. All these considerations led to the solemn declaration by the General Assembly in resolution 1131 (XI) of 12 December 1956 that "by using its armed force against the Hungarian people, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is violating

57 Memorandum of 4 February 1956 transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the Secretary-General for distribution to Members of the United Nations