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ARTICLE XIII

Questions relating to the procedure and conditions for the use of Soviet forces of barrack and administrative premises, storehouses, airfields, training grounds, means of transport and communication, electric power, communal and training services, connected with the temporary stay of Soviet forces on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, are settled by special agreements of competent bodies of the signatory sides; the agreements in force on the aforementioned questions will, if necessary, be re-examined for the purpose of defining them in greater detail.

ARTICLE XIV

In case the property and facilities listed in Article XIII used by the Soviet forces are relinquished, such property and facilities will be returned to the Hungarian organs. Questions connected with the transfer to Hungarian authorities of property relinquished by Soviet forces on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, including buildings erected by the Soviet forces, will be settled by special agreements.

ARTICLE XV

For the purpose of settling current questions connected with the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Government of the USSR appoint their plenipotentiaries to deal with matters pertaining to the stationing of the Soviet forces in Hungary.

ARTICLE XVI

Within the meaning of the present agreement:

"A member of the personnel of the Soviet forces" is:

A. A serviceman of the Soviet Army;

B. A civilian who is a Soviet citizen and works in units of the Soviet forces in the Hungarian People's Republic.

"Place of stationing" is territory made available to Soviet forces, comprising places where military units are quartered with training grounds, shooting grounds and ranges, and other property used by these units.

ARTICLE XVII

For the purpose of solving questions connected with the interpretation or application of this agreement and supplementary agreements provided for by it, a Soviet-Hungarian mixed commission, to which each of the signatories appoints three of its representatives, is being set up. The mixed commission will act in accordance with rules which it will adopt.

Budapest will be the headquarters of the mixed commission. Should the mixed commission be unable to solve a question submitted to it, the question will be solved through diplomatic channels in the shortest possible time.

ARTICLE XVIII

This agreement is subject to ratification and will come into force on the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged, the exchange to take place in Moscow.

ARTICLE XIX

This agreement remains in force for the duration of the stationing of Soviet forces on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, and can be modified with the approval of the signatories.

This agreement has been drawn up in Budapest on 27 May 1957 in the Hungarian and Russian languages; both texts have equal validity. In testimony whereof, the aforementioned authorized representatives have signed this agreement and have thereto affixed their seals.

On behalf of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic: I. Horvath, G. Revesz.

On behalf of the Government of the USSR: A. Gromyko, G. Zhukov.

CHAPTER IX. BACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THE UPRISING

A. INTRODUCTION

370. "The Committee's primary concern", it was stated in the Interim Report, "is to ascertain the extent and the impact of foreign intervention, by the threat or use of armed force or other means, on the internal affairs and political independence of Hungary and the right of the Hungarian people". The Committee has accordingly been concerned in the first instance with the use of Soviet armed forces to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Various aspects of this intervention have been examined in part A of the report. In part B, the Committee turns to another aspect of the task laid upon it by the General Assembly resolution, namely the study of the effect of Soviet intervention on the internal political development of Hungary.

371. According to the statements of spokesmen for the USSR and for the Government of Mr. Kádár, as described in chapter III, that intervention was required to crush a movement of formidable strength. The Committee has rejected the allegation that this strength was drawn from sources outside Hungary. An explanation is, therefore, needed to make it clear how, in a small country, so irresistible an uprising could occur as to require the armed forces of a great Power for its suppression. In this chapter attention is paid to the causes of the uprising and the aims which it was intended to achieve. The following chapter is concerned with the actual course of events during the first part of the uprising. In chapters XI and XII, the Committee has sought to throw light on certain administrative and political changes which took place during the brief period when the Hungarian people seemed about to be liberated from the pressure of Soviet armed forces. These chapters are to be considered in relation to chapters XIII and XIV, which deal with developments after 4 November. Together, they should help to clarify those effects of foreign intervention on the autonomous political development of Hungary, upon which the Committee was instructed to report.

372. In any study of the causes of the uprising, attention is necessarily focussed on the penetration of Hungary by strong Soviet influence over a period of years. This influence was felt in the life of every Hungarian citizen. It dictated the foreign language he was to study at school, it obliged Hungary to accept unfavourable trade agreements with the USSR which adversely affected his standard of living, and it maintained, on the Soviet model, the apparatus of a secret police under the shadow of which he lived. It was precisely against such conditions that the Hungarian people fought. Resentment at alien influences was present in criticisms of the régime voiced before October 1956. The first protest by Hungarian writers concerned the Soviet doctrine of Party allegiance in literature. Similarly, one of the first demands of the students was for the abolition of Russian as a compulsory language in schools. An understanding of the Hungarian uprising calls for recognition of these political, economic and cultural influences or pressures against which the demonstrators of 23 October protested.

373. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section draws attention to certain features of Hungarian life under Communist rule which evoked discontent and to the form which that discontent assumed before October 1956. The second section depicts the general character of the uprising and analyses its objectives in the light of the resolutions and manifestos issued on the eve of the uprising. The chapter ends with a description of the institution -the AVH-which more than any other factor was responsible for the transition from political demonstration to actual fighting.

374. It will be seen that the reforms demanded by various groups differed in points of detail. The spontaneous nature of the uprising, its scattered character and its lack of leadership worked against a predetermined pattern. Nevertheless, a broad identity of purpose underlay the demands of different participants. It is not suggested that all of the grievances mentioned were present as factors influencing the behaviour of every participant in the demonstrations or in the fighting. Broadly speaking, however, those who took part in the Hungarian uprising did so with a clear idea of what they were opposing at the risk of their lives. All of them refused to tolerate the continued intervention of a

B. THE BACKGROUND OF THE UPRISING

375. No spokesman for the Hungarian Government has ever affirmed that all was well in Hungary before 23 October. On the contrary, official sources have repeatedly stated that a serious situation had been allowed to develop and that the Hungarian people had many reasons for resentment. Attention has been drawn to the Hungarian White Book, The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary, which did not hesitate to describe Rákosi's policy as "criminal" and which declared that it had aroused "deep indignation and a broad popular movement".

376. If a régime can be described as "criminal", there cannot be much cause for surprise that a people which has been obliged to live under it for years should eventually bring its resentment into the open. Some of the leaders who subsequently condemned the aims of the uprising were among those who voiced the bitterest criticism of Hungarian conditions. Thus, speaking on 1 December 1956, István Dobi, Chairman of the Praesidium, made the following comment: "If in this country people have reason to complain against the inhuman character of the régime which was swept away on 23 October-and everyone knows that there was cause enough for bitterness-then the villages had many times more reason to complain than the towns. It would be difficult to say which was bigger-the stupidity or the wickedness of the Rákosi régime's rural policy." On 8 November, Sándor Rónai, Minister of Trade in Mr. Kádár's Government, was speaking of "the unscrupulous, sinful policy of Rákosi and his clique". Mr. Kádár himself was the author of a number of strongly worded criticisms of the régime. "I can affirm, speaking from personal experience," he said in a broadcast on 11 November, "that there is not a single man or leader in Hungary today holding State or Party office, who would wish to restore the old mistaken policy or methods of leadership. But, even if anyone should still wish to restore the old methods, it is certain that there is no one capable of doing this; for the masses do not want the return of the old mistakes, and would relentlessly sweep from power any leader who might undertake such a task."

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377. Even by opponents of the uprising or by those who subsequently became opponents of it, the situation before 23 October is therefore described as tense and potentially dangerous. Some of the complaints voiced against the régime were associated with the Stalin cult. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR held in Moscow early in 1956 had set in motion a trend away from this cult and towards a measure of liberalization of the Communist system. The impact of these new slogans was at once felt in Hungary, as in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Efforts were made within the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party to carry some of the new doctrine into effect. The process, however, was considerably slowed down through the influence of Mátyás Rákosi, First Secretary of the Central Committee and closely identified both with Soviet methods and with the Stalinist cult. A resolution adopted by the Central Committee in March 1956 denounced Stalin and hailed democratization, but re-emphasized the need for collectivization of agriculture-an unpopular measure with the peasants-and for the priority of heavy industry over the production of consumer goods—an unpopular measure with workers and Hungarians generally. It also reiterated earlier condemnations of Imre Nagy, who had kept the sympathy of large numhers of people and whose return to power was one of the first demands put forward at the October meetings.

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378. While the Government showed no disposition to modify its attitude on Mr. Nagy, Rákosi took a step on 27 March 1956 which was bound to have great repercussions throughout the country. He announced that investigations had led the Supreme Court to establish that the entire Rajk trial, as well as others connected with it, had been based upon "fabricated charges" made by LieutenantGeneral Gábor Péter and his associates in the AVH, who were said to have abused their power." This pronouncement by the Supreme Court was followed by a re-examination process in the course of which some 300 "baselessly convicted" people were released from prison, most of them having been members of the Party and some having occupied leading positions in it. The statement about Rajk revealed how one of the most publicized actions of the Rákosi Régime had

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Népszabadság, 2 December 1956.

Szabad Nép, 15 March 1956.

been a travesty of justice and of law. From the mouth of its most powerful leader, the régime stood convicted of shedding innocent blood. Three weeks later, Rákosi made his first public admission of "mistakes" committed under his régime. The first step was a cleansing of culture by writers themselves.

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379. These developments encouraged certain writers and other intellectuals to press criticisms of the régime which they had been courageous enough to voice since the autumn of 1955. At that time, Communist writers like Gyula Hay and Tibor Déry had begun to speak out against the Soviet doctrine of Party allegiance in literature and against continual interference by Party bureaucrats in literature and in art. Many members resigned from the Executive Committee of the Writers' Union in protest against the "anti-democratic methods which paralysed the cultural life of the country"-to quote Tibor Déry's memorandum, which is said to have been the first manifestation of organized opposition in Hungary. Reiteration by the Central Committee of its "unquestionable right" to dictate to authors served only to widen the breach.“

380. Hungarian writers have always wielded great influence with the people and these literary protests were followed sympathetically by the reading public. It was not long before the writers found themselves, by the very fact of protesting, drawn closer to the Hungarian people as a whole. Moving from literary and artistic grievances, they began to express the dissatisfaction and longings of the average citizen.

381. It was in this situation that the Polish workers in Poznan rose in revolt at the end of June 1956. Repercussions were immediate in Hungary. Despite Party appeals, the workers hurriedly organized manifestations to show their solidarity with the Poles, a solidarity which can be traced through hundreds of years during which both peoples have struggled to preserve their identity. Witnesses told the Special Committee that, in their opinion, developments in Poland in 1956 had exercised a greater influence upon the Hungarian people than any other external event since the death of Stalin.

382. The main organs for writers' criticisms of the régime were the Hungarian Writers Union and its review, the Irodalmi Ujság (Literary Gazette). In April 1956 the General Assembly of the Writers' Union, meeting to elect its new executives, rejected the official list of candidates supplied by the Party and, by large majorities, chose others. Thus the official Party candidate for the post of Secretary-General was defeated by 100 votes to 3, and in his stead a poet who formerly belonged to the National Peasant Party was elected. Other writers unfavourable to the régime, including Pál Ignotus and Lajos Kassák, were elected members of the Presidential Council of the Union.

383. While the Writers' Union was becoming a forum to which anybody could bring his grievances, it was not the only one of its kind. During the late spring of 1956, young intellectuals, writers, journalists and composers belonging to the league of Working Youth (DISZ), the Communist youth federation, established the Petöfi Club. This was destined to play a great part in focusing the criticisms of Hungary's young intellectuals. Discussions took place at the Club on a wide variety of political, economic and social topics, and even cadets from the Military Academies eagerly took part in them. The main purpose of the Petöfi Club was said to be to enlighten the Hungarian people on national affairs after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Although older Communists and intellectuals belonged to the Petöfi Club, it was mainly a meeting place for the younger generation. On 24 June, the Party newspaper, Szabad Nép, called the Petöfi Club a valuable forum and said that it would be good for Hungary's leaders to take part in its debates.

384. Two meetings of the Club are indicative of its interest in political questions and of the growing emotional tension in Hungary. On 18 June, the Club discussed the rehabilitation of László Rajk, and welcomed Rajk's widow "with stormy applause". A week later, on 27 June 1956, between 5,000 and 6,000 people standing in the streets listened by loudspeaker to a meeting at which the Club raised the question of Imre Nagy for the first time in public. This meeting went on throughout the night and turned into an almost riotous demonstration against Rákosi and his régime, criticisms being endorsed even by men hitherto regarded as reliable Party members.

68 Szabad Nép, 19 May 1956.

04 Pravda, 11 December 1955.

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Magyar Nemzet, 20 June 1956.

6 Subsequently the Central Committee condemned the Petöfi Club for "anti-Party views".

385. It was not only in the towns that dissatisfaction was being expressed. In the periodical Béke és Szabadság (Peace and Freedom), the Stalin prizewinner Tamás Aczél, described the profound spirit of distrust of the régime which he encountered among the peasants." One witness told the Committee how the Irodalmi Ujság containing critical articles was sold out even in country districts. Peasants came by cart to one bookseller, gave him 100 forints a copy, the normal price being one forint, and took the review away to their village to be handed from one family to another.

386. Two other developments during the months preceding October created a great emotional reaction in Hungary. These were the dismissal of Rákosi on 18 July, after a meeting of the Central Committee attended by A. I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR," and the ceremonial reburial on 6 October of László Rajk and other victims of the 1949 trials.

387. The departure of Rákosi was hailed as likely to portend a complete break with the old régime and with its unpopular policies—a hope strengthened four days later by the news that General Mihály Farkas, former Minister of Defence, a highly unpopular figure, has been expelled from the Party. These hopes were not, however, realized by the actions of Ernö Gerö, Rákosi's succesor as First Secretary of the Central Committee. Although he appointed an anti-Rákosist, János Kádár, to the Politburo, Gerö also brought back József Révai, ideological chief during the Rákosi era, and Imre Horváth, another friend of Rákosi, whom he made Foreign Minister.

388. The reinterment of László Rajk on 6 October took place when the Hungarian public had had time to observe the Gerő régime at work and to see how few of the hoped-for changes had come about. Many thousands of people gathered for the ceremony, and there were widespread demonstrations of sympathy for Rajk and the other victims. Less than a week later, it was announced that General Farkas had been arrested, together with his son Vladimir, LieutenantColonel of the AVH, for having "violated socialist principles"."" A call for a public trial of Farkas was prominent among the students' demands on the eve of the demonstrations.

389. This demand that Farkas should be called to account is typical of the lack of confidence felt by students and others in the willingness of the Gerö administration to take the steps for a real break with the past which were felt to have become urgent. A glance backward over the year 1956 in Hungary leaves the impression of an element of hopefulness, tending to disappointment as the rehabilitation of Rajk and the dismissal of Rákosi both failed to bring about far-reaching changes. Even the announcements on 14 October that Mr. Nagy had been readmitted to the Party, and on 18 October that he would be reinstated in his University Chair, failed to allay suspicions, since he was not invited to join the Government. The reburial of Rajk had brought an emotional element into the situation and had already collected crowds around the symbolic figure of his widow. The practice of mass demonstration had thus been effectively started in Budapest.

390. Less than a fortnight later came the first news of Poland's move towards greater independence. This, more than any other single event, was the catalyst for which Hungarians had been, half consciously, waiting. The developments on 22 October in Poland evoked great enthusiasm among Hungarian students and kindled further hopes of liberalization. The official radio broadcast messages of congratulations to Poland, and the Press did little to moderate the general excitement. It was stressed that the trend towards democratization unmistakably enjoyed the full support of the broad masses of the Polish people, and in particular that of the workers." Coming together to show their support for Poland as much as for any other reason, the students found themselves demanding specific changes for which the nation had hoped since July, when Rákosi had lost power.

391. It remains to link these elements in the thinking of the students and the demonstrators with two other facts which must be borne in mind, if the situation on 23 October is to be understood. One of those facts is the continued presence

87 9 and 16 May 1956.

Szabad Nép, 19 and 21 July 1956.

Szabad Nép, 12 October 1956.

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