proceeded to occupy the premises and take over all the military stores. In Budapest, former members of the AVH attached to the Soviet troops assisted in identifying Hungarian officers who were considered to be in sympathy with the uprising. According to witnesses, these officers were immediately dispatched to the Soviet military base at Tököl and were put under arrest. Witnesses, who had themselves been deported to the Soviet Union, told the Committee that a proportion of the deportees were Hungarian officers.

613. Ferenc Münnich, Minister of Armed Forces and Public Security Affairs, in orders and appeals addressed to the armed forces between 8 and 10 November, asked the men to report to their units. These orders, however, were soon to be countermanded by the issue of other orders by which a considerable part of the standing army was demobilized. Apparently the pro-Soviet Generals of the Hungarian Staff came to realize that the Army had disintegrated, and that it was impossible to reassemble it by issuing orders and appeals. In addition, according to witnesses in a position to know the facts, the Soviet Military Command at this stage objected strongly to the reestablishment of any organization that would have the status of a Hungarian Army, as recent experience had shown that Hungarian troops were liable to turn weapons against their Soviet allies. Instead, they demanded that State Security Forces be so organized as to provide a more effective political control against the present opposition and any subversive movements that might develop in the future.

614. Dr. Münnich, in his Instruction for the implementation of the "Officers' Declaration" issued on 12 November, ordered all officers of the Hungarian Army who agreed with the Declaration and desired to pursue their military career to sign the document. Those who refused to sign or "disagree with the Declaration, or want to be disarmed for any other reason" would cease within twenty-four hours to be part of the active Hungarian Army. The instruction further established committees of five to seven officers to decide doubtful cases of officers who had signed the Declaration but who, having "participated with arms on the side of the enemy", could not remain in the Army. Witnesses estimated that, as a result of this Instruction, perhaps 80 percent of the Hungarian officers have been separated from the forces. Of the remaining 20 percent who signed the Declaration, it is said that a considerable number did so for family reasons.

46

615. One of the first pronouncements of Mr. Kádár, following the cessation of hostilities on 11 November, was that past mistakes would not be repeated. As a proof of his intentions, he declared that the liquidation of the AVH would be completed. The day before, however, a new security organization had been established, known as the "R" group which was to serve as an adjunct of the regular police, ostensibly to protect the people from being "molested by criminals." "Security Forces Regiments" were also established, whose task would be to patrol the cities, collect arms and prevent any disturbance of order. The press also announced the formation of various other security groups; thus in all there were the "Security Force Regiment", the "R" groups, "mixed action" groups, "factory guards", the "Frontier Guard," the "Home Guard" and the "Militia." These forces, with the exception of the factory guards became, and still continue to be, following certain mergers, the foundation upon which the Kádár Government must rest. Witnesses have explained how these forces, under whatever title they may have been known, were fostered by the Soviet Military Command, and worked closely with Soviet troops in the repression of armed or passive resistance. There is evidence that these security groups were staffed, at least to a considerable extent, by former members of the AVH. some cases, the groups also included members of the NKVD, who were seen on duty wearing Soviet, and in other cases Hungarian, uniforms. The function of these groups was to discover any centers of resistance, to make home arrests of individual suspects and to act as guides and interpreters for the Soviet troops wherever it was necessary to exercise armed force.

In

616. The Soviet Military Command, having achieved its primary objective which was the overthrow by force of Premier Nagy's Government, had, indeed, to rely on the personnel of the disbanded AVH as the only group in Hungary whose loyalty and interests lay on the side of the Soviet Union. Mr. Kádár, who came to power as a result of the Soviet military intervention, was presumably selected as Premier partly because his own imprisonment might encourage the people to believe that there would be no return of Rákosi's methods and of his terror weapon, the AVH. It is possible that the Soviet authorities

believed that the Hungarian people, following the military defeat, would submit to the new order under Mr. Kádár, and that through him a new equilibrium might be reached that would satisfy certain minimum political and strategic requirements of the Soviet Union. Developments, however, after 4 November showed that the Hungarian people were not prepared to co-operate with any Government which would not, or could not, satisfy their two basic demandsthe withdrawal of the Soviet troops and free elections. Resistance continued in the form of persistent strikes, deputations with demands that were ab initio unacceptable, passive demonstrations, manifestoes and the intermittent appearance of guerrillas. In consequence, the mopping up operations of the Soviet troops at the end of the fighting became an organized system of armed repression.

D. RELATIONSHIP OF WORKERS' COUNCILS AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES

617. The most significant evidence of the reality of Soviet control is to be found in the dealings of Soviet Military Commanders with the Workers' Councils. An essential element of the Soviet Military Commander's Order No. 1 issued on 6 November was his call to the workers to resume work. In the weeks following the revolution, negotiations between the Workers' Council and the Soviet Command centred mostly around this question. In some instances, however, specific incidents occurring in the city were taken up by the Workers' Councils with the Soviet Commander, who was asked to intervene. The Greater Budapest Workers' Council was in continuous communication with the Soviet Commander of Budapest.

618. On several occasions, leaders of the Workers' Councils were summoned to Soviet headquarters and called to account for the failure of the workers to resume work. A meeting between the Soviet Military Commander and leaders of the Workers' Councils of the 11th District of Budapest took place on 8 November, and a number of witnesses testified that this conversation took place in a strained atmosphere. The workers' delegates declared that they had certain demands to make before work would be resumed; these demands, which reflected the sixteen-point programme of 23 October, were read out. The answers of the Soviet Commander were, according to a witness, given an obdurate tone: in so far as workers had not resumed work in the factories, the members of Workers' Councils and other fascist revolutionaries would be taught a lesson; workers who did not report for work would be locked out of factories and removed to a place "where they would have ample time to think about starting work again"; Mr. Nagy and Mr. Maléter would not be taken back into the Government, because they were imperialist agents. They would go elsewhere, but not into the Government; there would be no secret elections, and Hungarians would never again have an opportunity to put the revolutionaries back into power; things would be done differently, as in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Commander then stated that he expected the Workers' Councils to use their influence to encourage the resumption of work within two or three days; otherwise members of Workers' and Revolutionary Councils would be put to work themselves.

619. On another occasion, according to testimony, the Soviet Commander summoned the representatives of the Central Workers' Council of Csepel to his headquarters and told them that workers who refused to resume work would be "removed". The workers' delegation answer, however, that work would not be resumed "in the shadow of arms or in the presence of foreign troops", and demanded that Soviet troops be withdrawn from the factory. After a certain amount of discussion, the Soviet Commander agreed that the armoured troops should leave the factory, but that if work was not resumed within twenty-four hours after their leaving, the factory would be reoccupied. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, about 20 per cent of the workers resumed work.

620. Witnesses have testified about a considerable number of interventions by Soviet armed forces in the proceedings of the Workers' Councils. The meeting place at Ujpest, where delegates of the Workers' Councils were to meet on 13 November to set up the Greater Budapest Workers' Council was surrounded by twenty Soviet tanks, and it was only after lengthy conversations with the Soviet Commander that the meeting was authorized to take place elsewhere. On 15 November, at another meeting of workers delegates held at the headquarters of the Tramcar Workers' Union at Akácfa Street, Soviet troops surrounded the building, entering during the proceedings from both sides of the room. The meeting continued, and after three hours the Soviet officer in charge announced that it had been a misunderstanding, and the troops left. On 16 November, at a meeting of

workers' representatives of twenty-eight of the largest factories in Budapest at the Iron Workers' headquarters, six Soviet soldiers, armed with submachine guns, surrounded the place; the meeting then broke up. It was reported by witnesses that one or two Soviet officers were continuously present at meetings of the Central Workers' Council of Csepel. The first time they appeared, the Council protested, but was told that the Soviets were there only as observers, as they wished to learn how these councils functioned, not having similar councils in the Soviet Union. Later, the officers said that their intention had been to protect the workers against "ill-intentioned fascist imperialist agents". The presence of the Soviet officers was then debated, and the workers answered that, as a matter of principle, they did not wish outsiders to be present at their meetings; nevertheless, if the officers wanted to attend, the Council would be happy to tell them of the problems which faced the workers. On occasion, the Soviet observers were asked questions in the course of such meetings. Thus, when the Council was discussing the withdrawal of Russian troops, they turned to the Soviet colonel present and asked him about it. The colonel answered that his information was that the moment work was resumed, troops would be withdrawn from the territory of Hungary.

621. Numerous clashes between factory workers, Soviet forces and the militia were reported to the Committee. Russian troops participated in the attempted arrest of the workers' leaders in the Danubia factory and in the actual arrest of the Chairman of the Workers' Council of the Ganz and Mavag factories. At the mining centre of Salgótarján, in the course of a miners' demonstration, Soviet troops and militia opened fire. Those among the demonstrators who were armed returned the fire, and there was a large number of casualties. For a time after the dissolution of the Greater Budapest Workers' Council on 9 December, Soviet pressure on the Workers' Councils seems to have continued. At Csepel and in other places, the Soviet authorities did not refrain from open threats and demanded to know the names and addresses of members of the Council.

F. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY

622. When Soviet troops reached the Parliament Building on the morning of 4 November, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and his Staff established their headquarters in the very offices that had been vacated earlier that same morning by Premier Nagy. Various witnesses who visited Mr. Kádár at different times after 11 November have reported that the Parliament Building, both outside and inside, looked like a Soviet military stronghold. Soviet tanks protected the entrances to the buildings; at the entrances themselves, Soviet Army and NKVD personnel checked the credentials of all who sought admittance, while inside, in the halls and corridors, many Soviet officers were to be seen, Witnesses explained that, during the meetings they held with Mr. Kádár, there were usually one or two people present, who apparently acted as observers, while remaining silent throughout the proceedings. Witnesses also told the Committee that around 17 November, when the Greater Budapest Workers' Council was pressing Mr. Kádár for the withdrawal of Soviet troops as a condition for the resumption of work, General Grebennik enlightened them on the situation as follows: "You have to understand that it is not the Kádár Government which is in control here, but the Soviet Military Command, and it has the power to force the Hungarian workers to return to work". When a delegation from the Köbánya district of Budapest visited Mr. Kádár to ask him to intervene with the Soviet Military Commander to stop the deportation of workers, Mr. Kádár is reported to have said to them in private: "Don't you see there are machine-guns at my back?".

623. Evidence given to the Committee has illustrated the dependence of Mr. Kádár's Government on Soviet support and the limitations on the exercise by it of independent power. Upon Mr. Kádár's return on 6 or 7 November after his visit to Moscow, he held a meeting with Zoltán Tildy and certain other nonCommunist political personalities to discuss the possibility of their joining his Government. The Committee received testimony to the effect that they accepted but that, when the question was submitted to the Soviet Military Commander, the latter immediately replied with a categorical refusal.

624. One of the many difficulties confronting Mr. Kádár at the time of his appointment was that the various elected bodies, such as Revolutionary Councils, Workers' Councils, trade unions, student unions and professional societies that visited him in Parliament made a point of stating that they did not consider him and his Government as being legally in power. There were numerous reports

in the Hungarian press and on the Budapest radio between 16 and 23 November indicating that the representatives of these groups were pressing for the return to power of Premier Nagy. On one occasion, Mr. Kádár was forced to state that, as soon as Premier Nagy left the Yugoslav Embassy, negotiations would be undertaken to change the structure of the Government.

625. The degree to which the Government of Hungary reflects autonomous political evolution within the country is also seen in the somewhat abortive efforts towards the reactivation of the Hungarian Communist Party. When Mr. Kádár came to power, his Government represented a political Party that had disintegrated the previous week. The Central Committee of the Party-the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party--dissolved itself on 28 October. Following Mr. Kádár's declaration on 30 October that the Party had failed, the more prominent Hungarian Communists whose faith was still unshaken decided to make a fresh start. For this purpose, they established the Preparatory Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. The seven members of this Committee, which was intended to link past practice with the future reformed Communist movement, have all, with the exception of Mr. Kádár, been considered enemies of the State following the second Soviet intervention,

626. Many witnesses declared that Mr. Kádár had difficulty in finding people who would join his Government. They testified that many leading Communists had trusted Premier Nagy and had accepted his stand on the major political issues, while others again, during the uprising, had undergone a change of heart and refused to be associated with the Communist movement any longer. Mr. Kádár thus found himself with only a few associates and with a party machinery that could not operate.

627. Mr. Kádár's Government had to try and reassemble the rank and file of the Party and to deploy it in key positions. In the provinces and, to some extent, in the capital, this was done by using former members of the AVH who came out of hiding or were liberated from prison by the advancing Soviet troops. The various local administrators, Government officials and trade union leaders who had not sided with the uprising and had consequently been ejected from office by the Revolutionary Councils, were reinstated in their former positions. Witnesses testified, however, that this was no solution, as so many of the former officials had broken away from the Party during the uprising that many essential posts had to remain vacant. In the industrial town of Dunapentele, for example, with the exception of the AVH and one or two Army officers, everyone had sided with the uprising. A similar situation existed in a number of other towns. The Government was therefore often unable immediately to remove from office even its declared enemies. Evidence has been received that Borsod County (Miskolc area) was administered independently up to January 1957 with few, if any, ties with the central Government.

628. Repressive measures by the Soviet Military Command helped to solve this problem. By 17 November when under-production by factory workers and miners amounted to a sit-down strike, the Soviet Military Command, with the AVH, arrested many of the leaders in the factories and mines. As vacancies were created in the Workers' Councils, they were filled by persons designated by the Government.

629. Witnesses maintained that, among the 200,000 who are now claimed by the Government to be members of the Party, a considerable proportion joined solely for pecuniary reasons and could not be relied upon by the Government in an emergency. It was stated before the Committee that, in certain cases, a factory group or group of factories was told that it had to increase its quota of Party members. For the purpose of avoiding the imposition of persons from outside, the workers decided that they would fill the quota by drawing lots from among the staff in the factory.

F. THE ABDUCTION OF PREMIER IMRE NAGY

630. A most conclusive sign of the inability of the Hungarian Government to maintain its sovereign independence against Soviet intervention was the abduction of Mr. Nagy. When Premier Nagy left the Parliament Building on the morning of 4 November, he told other members of his Cabinet that he was going to the Soviet Embassy to protest personally against the Soviet military attack. However, instead he sought asylum at the Yugoslav Embassy in the company of his son-in-law, Dr. Ferenc Jánosi, and was followed by the other Communist member of his Government, Géza Losonczy. Within a few hours Messrs. Ferenc Donát, Gábor Táncos, Sándor Haraszti, György Fazekas, János Szilágyi, Szilárd

Ujhelyi, Miklós Vásárhelyi and Mrs. Julia Rajk, together with fifteen other women and seventeen children, came to the Yugoslav Embassy seeking asylum. 631. According to a report issued by the Yugoslav News Agency Tanjug, dated 25 November, certain negotiations had taken place on 2 November between Zoltán Szántó, one of the Members of the Provisional Committee of the new Socialist Workers' Party of Hungary, and a member of the Yugoslav Embassy, with regard to the possibility for him and some other Hungarian Communists to seek refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, should this prove to be necessary. The next day the Yugoslav Ambassador stated that in principle he would grant asylum, if this were requested.

632. Negotiations were under way between 11 and 22 November in which the Yugoslav Government and Mr. Kádár sought to settle the problem connected with the granting of asylum to Premier Nagy and his group. The Yugoslav Government proposed that (a) the Government of Mr. Kádár should provide a written guarantee that Premier Nagy and his group would be allowed to return freely to their homes or, if this were not possible, that (b) the persons in question would be permitted to proceed freely to Yugoslavia, where they would be granted asylum.

This

633. In the course of the conversations that were held in Budapest between Mr. Dobrivoje Vidić, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and Mr. Kádár, the latter, while accepting the above proposals of the Yugoslav Government had also suggested as an alternative solution that Premier Nagy and his group should seek refuge in Romania. proposal was communicated by Mr. Vidić to Premier Nagy and his group, who ruled it out as unacceptable. The question was again submitted to Mr. Kádár on the basis of the original alternative proposals. Mr. Kádár seems to have agreed to this orally on 16 November. However, the next day he set new conditions. These were that Premier Nagy and Mr. Losonczy should resign from their positions in the Government, that they should declare themselves in sympathy with the efforts of the Hungarian Worker-Peasant Government, that they should offer a self-criticism of their earlier activities, and that they should guarantee not to undertake any steps against the activity of the Hungarian Government. Mr. Kádár also requested that Premier Nagy and Mr. Losonczy should seek asylum in one of the socialist countries, until conditions in Hungary became normal. These proposals were refused both by Premier Nagy and by the Yugoslav Government, which declared that it could not agree to release the group in question on the basis of special terms which were exclusively of domestic concern to Hungary. Witnesses who had been in contact with Premier Nagy while he was in the Yugoslav Embassy have testified that they learned from him that he had rejected an offer to go to Romania.

634. In the letter of the Yugoslav Government dated 18 November addressed to Mr. Kádár, it was specifically stated that the Yugoslav Embassy would agree to the departure of the group from the premises only upon the receipt of the written guarantee of Mr. Kádár, in his capacity as President of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, that Premier Nagy and his party would be granted safe conduct to proceed freely to their respective homes. Mr. Kádár, in his reply to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia dated 21 November, stated:

"In the interest of terminating the matter, the Hungarian Government, agreeing to the proposals contained on page 3, section 8 of the letter of 18 November 1956 addressed to me by the Yugoslav Government, hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes."

AS

635. The next day, 22 November, at 6.30 p. m., a bus arrived at the Yugoslav Embassy. This bus had been placed at the disposal of the refugees by Mr. Münnich, Minister of the Armed Forces and of Public Security Affairs. the group was boarding the bus, Soviet military personnel arrived and insisted on entering it. Thereupon, the Yugoslav Ambassador asked two Embassy officials also to accompany the group, to make certain that Premier Nagy and the party reached their homes as agreed. The bus was driven to the city Headquarters of the Soviet Military Command, where the two Yugoslav officials were ordered by a Soviet Lieutenant-Colonel to leave. Under an escort of Soviet armoured