prohibition of free organization for the defence of economic and social interests; an educational system steeped in an imposed doctrine and oriented towards adulation of a foreign country; interference with the work of representatives of religious faiths; and measures to prevent Hungarians from seeking asylum abroad. Any infringement of these restrictions and prohibitions is punished by new penal measures. The Hungarians whom the Committee heard are firmly convinced that their compatriots once more find themselves living under the threat of the concentration camp, forced residence or police surveillance and in fear of losing their means of earning a living.

783. A survey of the situation which prevailed in Hungary before the popular uprising of October 1956 and of conditions in that country since the Soviet intervention makes clear the futility of trying to establish an applicable criterion on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" which the Universal Declaration proposes to hold up before the contemporary world is too far removed from the situation in Hungary today. It is rather in the following paragraphs of the Preamble that the Declaration reveals itself:

"Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

"Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, . . .".

CHAPTER XVII. CONCLUSIONS

784. The terms of reference of the Special Committee covered a broad field, namely to report to the General Assembly of the United Nations after full and objective investigation, its findings on all aspects of the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary by armed force and by other means and the effects of such intervention on the political development of Hungary. The Committee's investigation, as has been explained, involved the study of copious documentation from various sources and in several languages, as well as the questioning of more than a hundred witnesses, whose testimony fills two thousand pages in the verbatim record. The Committee regrets that the attitude of the Hungarian Government has prevented it from basing its investigation on direct observation in Hungary, as required by the General Assembly resolution.

785. The Committee's findings relate to many aspects of the events in Hungary and are concerned with numerous points of detail that have a bearing on the origin and nature of those events. The report itself embodies the conclusions of the Committee, and these conclusions cannot be readily dissociated from the evidence which is there assembled. A summary of the Committee's findings on individual aspects of the situation in Hungary has been appended to certain of the chapters. It would, however, seem appropriate at this stage to summarize a number of conclusions drawn by the Committee from its study of the evidence as a whole. To the best of the Committee's belief, these conclusions represent the essential facts about the Hungarian uprising which are necessary to an understanding of its nature and outcome. They are as follows:

(i) What took place in Hungary in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long-standing grievances which had caused resentment among the people. One of these grievances was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR; the system of Government was in part maintained by the weapon of terror, wielded by the AVH or political police, whose influence was exercised at least until the end of 1955, through a complex network of agents and informers permeating the whole of Hungarian society. In other respects also, Soviet pressure was resented. From the stifling of free speech to the adoption of a Soviet-style uniform for the Hungarian army, an alien influence existed in all walks of life. Hungarians felt no personal animosity towards the individual Soviet soldiers on Hungarian soil, but these armed forces were symbols of something which annoyed a proud people and fed the desire to be free.

(ii) The thesis that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary and that it drew its strength from such circles and from Western "Imperialists" failed to survive the Committee's examination. From start to finish, the uprising was led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectu

als, many of whom were Communists or former Communists. The majority of political demands put forward during the revolution included a stipulation that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure and that such social achievements as the land reform should be safeguarded. At no time was any proposal made for the return to power, or to the Government, of any figure associated with pre-war days. "Facists" and "saboteurs", heavily armed, could not have succeeded in landing on Hungarian airfields which were under Soviet supervision, or in crossing the Austrian frontier, where a closed zone was shown by the Austrian authorities to the military attachés of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR;

(iii) The uprising was not planned in advance. It was the universal testimony of witnesses examined by the Committee that events took participants by surprise. No single explanation can determine exactly why the outbreak occurred just when it did. Communist spokesmen, including Mr. Kádár and the members of his present Government, have recognized the bitter grievances of the Hungarian people before 23 October. They have spoken of a "broad, popular movement" caused by the "bitterness and indignation" of the masses. Two factors would seem to have brought this resentment to a head. The first of these was the news received on 19 October of a successful move by Poland for greater independence from the USSR. This news was largely instrumental in bringing the Hungarian students together in the meetings of 22 October. The second factor was the acute disappointment felt by the people when Ernö Gerö, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, in his speech on the evening of 23 October failed to meet any of the popular demands and adopted what was considered a truculent tone towards his hearers;

(iv) Although no evidence exists of advance planning, and although the whole course of the uprising bears the hallmark of continuous improvisation, it would appear that the Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as 20 October to make armed intervention in Hungary possible. Evidence exists of troop movements, or projected troop movements, from that date on. It would appear that plans for action had therefore been laid some time before the students met to discuss their demands. The Committee is not in a position to say whether the Soviet authorities anticipated that the grievances of the Hungarian people, stimulated by events in Poland, could no longer be contained. Signs of opposition were evident before the 23rd; the Hungarian Government had reason to foresee that trouble was brewing. While the evidence shows that Soviet troops from outside Hungary were used even in the first intervention, no clause of the Warsaw Treaty provides for intervention by armed forces of the Soviet Union to dictate political developments within any signatory's frontiers;

(v) The demonstrations on 23 October were at first entirely peaceable. None of the demonstrators appear to have carried arms, and no evidence has been discovered that any of those who voiced the political demands or joined the demonstrators had any intention to resort to force. While disappointment at Mr. Gerö's speech may have angered the crowds, it would hardly of itself have sufficed to turn the demonstration into an armed uprising. That this happened was due to the action of the AVH in opening fire on the people outside the Radio Building. Within a few hours, Soviet tanks were in action against the Hungarians. This appearance of Russian soldiers in their midst not as friendly allies, but as enemies in combat, had the effect of still further uniting the people;

(vi) Obscurity surrounds the invitation alleged to have been issued by the Hungarian Government to the Soviet authorities to assist in quelling the uprising by force. Mr. Nagy has denied, with every appearance of truth, that he issued this invitation or was even aware of it. Since Soviet tanks appeared on the streets of Budapest at about 2 a. m. on 24 October, it would have been impossible for him to have addressed any official message to the Soviet authorities, since he held no Government post at the time when the tanks must have received their orders. An invitation may have been made privately by Mr. Gerö, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or Mr. Hegedüs, the Prime Minister. The Committee, however, has had no opportunity of seeing a text of such an invitation, or of considering the exact circumstances in which it may have been issued. Until further information comes to light, it would be wise to suspend judgement as to whether such an invitation was issued at all.

Similar considerations apply to the invitation which is alleged to have been addressed to the Soviet authorities before the second intervention on 4 November. Mr. Kádár had remained a member of Mr. Nagy's Government when the latter was reconstituted on 3 November and the Committee is unaware of his having given any recorded indication of his disapproval of Mr. Nagy's policies. Mr. Kádár's movements at this time are not fully known, and he cannot be considered to have substantiated his own claim to have called, in the name of the Government for Soviet help. In any event, there is abundant evidence that Soviet preparations for a further intervention, including the movement of troops and armour from abroad, had been under way since the last days of October. Mr. Kádár and his Ministers were absent from Budapest during the first few days after he formed his Government, and administrative instructions to the people of Hungary were issued by the commanders of the Soviet troops;

(vii) When Mr. Nagy became Prime Minister, he was not at first able to exercise the full powers of that office. Only when the grip of the AVH was loosened by the victory of the insurgents was he able to take an independent stand. By this time, the real power in Hungary lay with the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils, which had sprung up spontaneously in different parts of the country and had replaced the collapsing structure of the Communist Party. Mr. Nagy, though himself a Communist of long standing who had lived for many years in the USSR, invited non-Communists into his new Government, and listened to the demands of various Revolutionary and Workers' Councils. It would appear that Mr. Nagy himself, like the country at large, was somewhat taken aback by the pace of developments. However, seeing that his countrymen were united in their desire for other forms of Government and the departure of Soviet troops, he threw in his lot with the insurgents. By this action, he obliterated the impres sion which he had created while still under the domination of the AVH, and he became a symbolic figure in the uprising, although he had not instigated it, and was never its actual leader;

(viii) The few days of freedom enjoyed by the Hungarian people provided abundant evidence of the popular nature of the uprising. A free press and radio came to life all over Hungary, and the disbanding of the AVH was the signal for general rejoicing, which revealed the degree of unity achieved by the people, once the burden of fear had been lifted from them;

(ix) There were a number of lynchings and beatings by the crowds. These were, in almost all cases, confined to members of the AVH or those who were believed to have co-operated with them;

(x) Steps were taken by the Workers' Councils during this period to give the workers real control of nationalized industrial undertakings and to abolish unpopular institutions, such as the production norms. These were widely resented as being unfair to workers and also a reflection of popularly suspected secret trade agreements with the USSR, which were said to make heavy demands on the Hungarian economy for the benefit of the Soviet Union. During the days of freedom, while negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities for the withdrawal of Russian troops, attempts were made to clear up the streets of Budapest and life was beginning to return to normal. The insurgents had agreed to amalgamate, while maintaining their identity, in a National Guard, which would have been responsible, with the Army and Police, for maintaining order;

(xi) In contrast to the demands for the re-establishment of political rights put forward during the uprising, is the fact that basic human rights of the Hungarian people were violated by the Hungarian Governments prior to 23 October, especially up to the autumn of 1955, and that such violations have been resumed since 4 November. The Committee is convinced that the numerous accounts of inhuman treatment and torture by the AVH are to be accepted as true. On the evidence, it is also convinced that numbers of Hungarians, including some women, were deported to the Soviet Union and that some may not have been returned to their homes. These deportations were designed to break the back of the revolution. Action taken by the Hungarian people in their spontaneous uprising suc ceeded in ridding them for a few days of the apparatus of police terror. This democratic achievement of a united people was indeed, threatened by a form of "counter-revolution" and it was to this that it succumbed. However, the "counter-revolution" consisted in the setting up by Soviet armed

forces of Mr. Kádár and his colleagues in opposition to a Government which enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people of Hungary;

(xii) Following the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, there has been no evidence of popular support for Mr. Kádár's government. Mr. Kádár has successively abandoned most of the points from the revolutionary programme which he had at first promised to the Hungarian people. On the central question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, he has moved from complete acceptance of the nation's wishes to a refusal to discuss the subject in present circumstances. Against the workers, he has proceeded step by step to destroy their power and that of the Workers' Councils. Capital punishment is applicable to strike activities. The processes of justice have been distorted by the institution of special police and special courts and by the ignoring of the rights of the accused. The Social Democratic Party has again been forcibly liquidated. General elections have been postponed for two years. Writers and intellectuals are subjected to repressive measures. The Hungarian workers have shown no sign of support for Mr. Kádár's Government or for the prospect of continuous Soviet occupation. Only a small fraction of the 190,000 Hungarians, mostly young people, who fled the country have accepted his invitation to return. The peasants have reason to be grateful to Mr. Nagy for his attitude towards collectivization of agriculture and forced deliveries of farm produce;

(xiii) In the light of the extent of foreign intervention, consideration of the Hungarian question by the United Nations was legally proper and, moreover, it was requested by a legal Government of Hungary. In the matter of human rights, Hungary has accepted specific international obligations in the Treaty of Peace. Accordingly, the Committee does not regard objections based on Paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter as having validity in the present case. A massive armed intervention by one Power on the territory of another, with the avowed intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the country must, by the Soviet's own definition of aggression, be a matter of international concern.

ANNEX

LIST OF MATERIAL RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY &

A. UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTATION

1. Documentation of the Security Council and the General Assembly

2. Proceedings of the Security Council and the General Assembly

3. Documentation of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary:

(a) Records of the proceedings

(b) Classified extracts from hearings of witnesses. Nos. 1-2

(c) Documentation prepared for the Committee

4. United Nations-Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, April 1957, Vol. XI, No. 4

5. Publications of the Economic Commission for Europe:

(a) Economic Survey of Europe in 1955 (E/ECE/235)

(b) Economic Survey of Europe in 1956 (E/ECE/278)

(c) Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 8, Nos. 1-3, May, August and November 1956; Vol. 9, No. 1, May 1957

B. DOCUMENTS OF HUNGARIAN ORIGIN

6. Documents issued before the uprising

(a) Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian Gazette). The Official Gazette of the Hungarian People's Republic. Index for Nos. 1-57, 4 January-29 June 1956; 1 June-20 October 1956, Nos. 48-92

(b) Budapest Statisztikai Zsebkönyve (Statistical Handbook of Budapest) 1956, published by the Central Statistical Office of Hungary, 1956

7. Documents issued by the Kádár Government

(a) Magyar Közlöny: 12 November-29 December 1956, Nos. 93-106; 5 January-3 February 1957, Nos. 1-15

(b) Some official Hungarian statements (4 November 1956-9 May 1957): (i) Programme of the Revolutionary Workers' Peasants' Government, as announced by Mr. János Kádár on 4 November 1956

84 NOTE: This is not a bibliography of the Hungarian Revolution but a list of documentation made available to the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.

(ii) Declaration of the Revolutionary Workers' Peasants' Government of the Hungarian Peoples Republic, 5 January 1957 (“Major Tasks")

(iii) Current Problems and Tasks. Resolution adopted by the Provisional Central Committee, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 26 February 1957

(iv) Speech by Mr. Istvan Dobi, Chairman of the Praesidium of the Hungarian People's Republic, before the Hungarian National Assembly, 9 May 1957

(c) Publications of the Central Statistical Office (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal) of Hungary:

(i) Fontosabb adatok az 1956 október-decemberi időszakról (More important data relating to the period of October-December 1956) Budapest, 15 January 1957-81 pages

(ii) Statisztikai Szemle (Statistical Review) Vol. XXXIV, November-December 1956, Nos. 11-12

(d) The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary. Published by the Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic ("White Book") (Vols. I and II)

(e) "Siege of Radio Budapest: 23 October 1956." Articles in Népszabadsag, 22-28 January 1957 (Translated from Hungarian)

(f) Hungarian Review. Published by the Publishing House Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest. March 1957

8. Hungarian Newspapers

(a) Published before the uprising:

(i) Hétfői Hirlap (Monday News) 22 October 1956

(ii) Irodalmi Ujsag (Literary Gazette). The organ of the Hungarian Writers' Union. 1955: July 23, 30; August 6; September 3, 10; October 8, 23; November 2; December 24, 31. 1956: January 7, 14, 21; February 4, 25; March 3, 10, 17, 24, 31; April 7, 14, 21, 28; May 5; June 2, 9, 16; August 25; September 1, 8, 15, 29; October 6; November 2

(iii) Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation). The organ of the People's Patriotic Front. 20 June 1956.

(iv) Népszava (People's Voice). The organ of the National Council of Hungarian Trade Unions. 9 September 1956

(v) Szabad Ifjuság (Free Youth). The organ of the League of Working Youth (DISZ). 18 October 1956

(vi) Szabad Nép (Free People). The organ of the Hungarian Workers' Party. 30 June-31 December 1955; 1 January-22 October 1956 (vii) Társadelmi Szemle (Sovial Review). The scientific organ of the Hungarian Workers' Party. September 1955 (b) Published during the uprising:

85

3 November

31 October

29, 31 October; 2 November

27 October

30 October