(b) (c) The continued deployment of Soviet Y-class sub- The Chinese have continued to make progress toward Diplomatic Context. The President has discussed develop- As the President said two years ago, the deployment of Safeguard depends on the evolution of the Soviet and Chinese threats, and the outcome of SALT. As we found in the review, the threat developments indicate that we should continue to move ahead toward the full Safeguard deployment; however, we cannot predict the outcome of SALT. The President has decided to request authorization to implement the following Safeguard program through FY 72: Continue construction at the sites at Grand Forks AFB, In 1971, start construction at the site at Whiteman AFB, Take steps toward deployment of a fourth site at either This decision reflects the following considerations: To be responsive to the threat, orderly progress on the The National Command Authorities are vulnerable to attack The initiation of a full light area defense deployment ment. In summary, the Soviet and Chinese threats to the U.S. call for moving ahead toward the full Safeguard deployment. However, we wish to exercise those restraints which we believe may enhance the chances for reaching an acceptable agreement. In short: The President's program will continue progress toward satisfying our strategic objectives. It continues progress toward defense of Minuteman pending a satisfactory agreement in SALT. It maintains an option to provide for defense of the NCA as outlined as part of one option in a U.S. SALT proposal, and it maintains the option for the deployment of area defense against small attacks at a later time. The President's program will continue progress in SALT. The proposed program does not request authorization for additional area defense sites beyond those which also protect Minuteman and the NCA. The U.S. has indicated a willingness to modify the longrange plans for full Safeguard area defense of CONUS if an acceptable arms control agreement with the Soviet Union can be reached. Our FY 1972 request for funds and authorization includes both Warren AFB and Washington, D.C. We believe that the Congress should authorize work on both sites this year, to provide the President maximum flexibility both with regard to SALT developments and the threat. I would emphasize that under this request, the FY 1972 deployment program would be limited to only one of the two locations. The Safegurd program is designed to achieve several strategic objectives. In addition, the present program provides flexibility for several SALT contingencies and possible outcomes. It does not prejudge either the decisions to be made in SALT or the possible results of SALT. Until it becomes clear that an agreement adequately constraining the Soviet threat to our retaliatory forces is attainable, the program will proceed in an orderly and timely manner. To do more could reduce the chances for success in SALT: to do less could erode our security and reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously in SALT. - We are In summary Mr. Chairman, the proposed FY 1972 Safeguard program and other related actions which we are recommending reflect the basic philosophy which President Nixon announced in making his first decision on Safeguard a measured, orderly, and sufficient pace, subject to review and modifications as developments dictate. While we proceed at a measured pace with Safeguard, we intend to keep our other options open. continuing to examine those which I mentioned last year, and are examining other concepts as well: for providing light area defense against small or accidental attacks through other means than the current full Safeguard to enhance our ability to counter the Chinese threat even if a desirable SALT agreement precludes full deployment of the current Safeguard program; through prototype development of a hard site defense to augment the Safeguard defense of Minuteman if necessary; and other potential programs that may become available in the decade ahead in both offensive and defensive areas. Our objective is to ensure that under any foreseeable circumstances we can continue to provide for the safety and security of the American people. A summary of the deployment schedule through FY 1972 for the proposed SAFEGUARD program is shown below. The $1,278 million we are requesting for FY 1972 will accommodate the funding level required for either site, excluding personnel and operation and maintenance costs. The details of the SAFEGUARD program and related ballistic missile defense activities will be discussed in detail by Department of Defense witnesses. a/ The initial defense of Washington is the same as would be provided in the full SAFEGUARD deployment and includes a single Missile Site Radar (MSR). A complete review of the U.S. Civil defense Program has been conducted by the Office of Emergency Preparedness at the direction of the National Security Council (NSC). Pending consideration of the review by the NSC, we do not propose any major changes in the civil defense funding for FY 1972. The Budget includes $78 million for this program. We will maintain current programs to identify shelters, equipment, and train civil defense volunteers. Deployment of the prototype low frequency warning transmitter will continue in FY 1972. As in previous years, a large portion of the civil defense funds will be used to assist state and local civil defense activities and finance federal emergency operations. C. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FOR DETERRENCE "the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater President's Foreign Policy In considering theater nuclear war, i.e., enemy use of nuclear weapons overseas without a direct attack on the U.S., we must recognize both the utility of all weapons systems in contributing to deterrence including the capabilities of our allies, and the limitations that influence the use of systems designed for one level of warfare in another level. Considering first the utility of strategic nuclear weapons in deterring theater nuclear war, it is clear that the existence of these forces can create uncertainty in the minds of nuclear-armed potential enemies, about how we would respond to their use of theater nuclear weapons; e.g., whether we would confine ourselves to a response in kind or would escalate further. Thus, for example, uncertainty about U.S. use of strategic nuclear weapons in rataliation if the Soviets use nuclear weapons against NATO can contribute to the deterrence of theater nuclear warfare in Europe. But, with the rough equality of U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities, reliance on strategic weapons alone is not sufficient. By the same token, but even more so, our theater and tactical nuclear weapons add to the realism of deterrence of theater conventional wars in Europe and Asia; the Soviets and Chinese Communists cannot be sure that major conventional aggression would not be met with the tactical use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a realistic Free World strategy calls for the planning of forces which are sufficient to cope with each level of potential conflict at that level. Therefore, we must plan our theater nuclear weapon posture and relate it to our conventional posture in such a way that we have a realistic option in the theater without having to rely solely on strategic nuclear weapons. In other words, we plan to maintain tactical nuclear capabilities that contribute to realistic deterrence while allowing for maximum flexibility of response in every major contingency we plan for should deterrence fail. We are currently evaluating the long-term structure of our theater and tactical nuclear programs. In the near-term, we will continue to rely on current capabilities, including theater assets, tactical aircraft, missiles, rockets, field artillery, and atomic demolition munitions. However, research and development and weapon improvement programs are planned in this area, to insure that our weapons and the associated command and control systems have both adequate capability and continue to emphasize minimum chance of accident. With such programs, we believe that we can retain or improve the essential contribution our theater nuclear forces make to our deterrent posture. D. THEATER CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR DETERRENCE If "The primary role of our general purpose forces is to deter and, if necessary, cope with external aggression. aggression occurs, the use of our forces will be determined by our interests, the needs of our allies, and their defense capabilities, which we are seeking to improve. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union's strong and balanced conventional capability enables it to project its military power to areas heretofore beyond its reach. This requires us to maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our worldwide interests." President's Foreign Policy Report A basic planning approach used to determine the approximate size of our theater general purpose forces involves estimating the capabilities of various alternative forces in several situations that could arise in the future. We plan our general purpose forces in peacetime to be adequate for simultaneously meeting together with our allies a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a minor contingency |