Background Briefing
Saigon

March 21, 1971

Gentlemen: This is another one of our background briefings of which we've held a few recently. The ground rules for this one will be as they have been in the past, that is backgrounder attributed only to military sources, and please no embellishment of that. In other words, not intelligence sources, or anything beyond military sources. Q: No, U.S., A: Military sources,

correct.

The presentation this afternoon will be in three parts. It will be led off by the J-2 briefer, who will give an update from the J-2 point of view. He will be followed by Assistant Deputy J-3, giving a more complete view of the Lamson operation. Following this there will be some opportunities for questions and answers. Are there any questions on the ground rules?

J-2 Briefer: Gentlemen, the purpose of this briefing is to provide you with an update on the progress of Operation Lamson 719 and Operation Thoan Thang 0171, and a summary of enemy reactions to date. According to all indications, Operation Lamson 719 has succeeded in disrupting vital portions of the enemy's logistical system, capturing or destroying significant quantities of supplies and inflicting considerable damage on enemy units within the area of operation.

At the beginning of February, the enemy was primarily concerned with maintaining the flow of supplies through the Lao Panhandle. Enemy endeavors were particularly concentrated on moving goods through Tschepone Ban Dong and southward on Route 92. Despite these attempts, enemy input of supplies to Laos in early February, were substantially behind last years record, and throughput into the RVN and Cambodia was minimal. This condition can be attributed to allied air interdiction, harrassments of LOCS and increased consumption by enemy administrative units and screening forces of the Lao Panhandle.

To prevent loss of the vital link in his only remaining line of communication, the enemy reacted strongly in an attempt to counter Operation Lamson 719. The enemy significantly increased the strength of combat forces in the Lamson 719 area of operations. The current force comprises elements of 11 regiments. The reported enemy losses during the operation to date are over 11, 000 killed. When compared to friendly losses, the ratio is.at least 10 to 1 in favor of the friendly forces. In terms of units, it is estimated that at least 8 regiments have suffered casualties equivalent to one or more of these battalions. The enemy has lost the equivalent of 13 of the 33 maneuver battalions organic to the 11 regiments committed.

The ongoing operation has compounded the enemy's already considerable logistical problem through loss of supplies and disruption of the logistical system in the Lad Panhandle. The following list of supplies are examples of those captured or destroyed during Lamson 719, and highlight the impact of the enemy losses to date:

In terms of food, some 1, 550 short tons (primarily of rice)

More than 4, 400 individual weapons

Better than 1, 600 crew served weapons

Over 780 short tons of ammo

55 confirmed tanks

A related form of supply loss is increased consumption. Deployment of additional enemy troops to resist allied interdiction activity resulted in greatly increased food requirements and ammo expenditures by VC and NVA units committed to the area. These losses while considerable, do not clearly reveal the extent to which Lamson 719 has disrupted the enemy's logistical campaign. Even more serious for the enemy is the reduction of his capability to move supplies through the T schpone and Ban Dong area and southward along Route 92, which has been interdicted by friendly forces. No traffic has been noted on Route 92 through Ban Dong, since 10 February. The enemy has tried to compensate by using Route 14 and 920, but he has periodically encountered interference here as well, both from ARVN forces and allied interdiction. Traffic on this bypass road has continued at a reduced rate. The enemy has diverted some trucks to Route 23. This road, however, is not developed, passes through more open terrain and would require deployment of additional forces for adequate protection for convoys and installations.

Another, significant long-term effect of the ongoing operation involves enemy casualties among experienced personnel in units that have been operating those logistical systems in previous years. Loss of trained rear service personnel will further degrade the enemy's capability to move supplies through the Lao Panhandle. Current analysis indicates that operation Lamson 719 has seriously disrupted enemy supplies. Throughput for RVN and Cambodia is quite low, only 1/5 of the throughput achieved at this time last year. With the dry season, well over half gone, the enemy will probably experience considerable difficulty in meeting his current logistical goals.

To the South, in Cambodia, ARVN forces initiated Operation Thoan Thang 01 on 4 February. The operation encompasses three principal areas in Chup/Dambe, Snuol and the Parrots Beak area. Prior to the initiation of the operation the Chup/Dambe and Snuol areas comprised the southern terminus of the enemy's Mekong supply corridor. This complex served as a transshipment point for movement of supplies west and south in Cambodia, and east into the COSVN portion of Vietnam. In addition, the area straddled known enemy infiltration routes into South Vietnam.

In January, enemy forces deployed in base areas along the border had the mission of interdicting LOCS which supported ARVN operations in Cambodia and of conducting harrassment attacks in western MR 3, RVN, in an effort to discourage the ARVN from expanding ground operations into Cambodia. The enemy's reaction to Thoan Thang 071 indicates the seriousness with which

he viewed the operation. In recent months he avoided significant contacts with ARVN forces in Cambodia. For example, AR VN intervention to assist FANK in clearing Route 7 in December and Route 4 in January met only token resistance by the enemy.

At the onset of the current operation, however, enemy reaction was strong and determined. The scope of his reaction in Thoan Thang has included both battalion sized ground attacks and intense stand-off attacks by fire.

In the Chup/Dambe area the level of combat was relatively high in February, but has slackened since early March. The enemy has deployed his forces in an attempt to meet and block ARVN moves. In February, he moved three regiments to the vicinity of Dambe on Route 75. Of major significance in Operation Thoan Thang 071, is the enemy personnel losses. The enemy has lost about 4, 400 men killed in action to date. When compared to friendly losses to date, the loss ration is about 11 to one in favor of allied forces. As a result, of repeated and heavy contact with AR VN forces, it is estimated that the equivalent of 9 battalions of the 27 under strength maneuver battalions that constitute the 9 committed regiments have been rendered ineffective for combat.

It is too soon to accurately assess the impact of OP Lamson and Thoan Thang on the enemy's capability. It was several months after the allied cross border operations in May and June of 1970 before the complete picture of his predicament became clear. There are several facets of the current operations that would indicate that the enemy's plans have been disrupted. The enemy's short term objectives are to wage protracted warfare in Cambodia, RVN, while attempting to reconstitute and expand his sole remaining line of communication in the Panhandle and in North Eastern Cambodia.

Operation Lamson has caused the enemy to divert supplies intended for southern Indo China just to defend its LOC, and has dilluted his direct efforts to achieve his goal in the South. Heavy commitment of enemy units in the Lamson 719 and Thoan Thang 01 areas resulted in diversion of forces which the enemy could have been using elsewhere in Cambodia and RVN. Furthermore, the heavy personnel losses inflicted upon the enemy in Lamson 719 has materially reduced his capability to conduct tactical operations on any significant scale within MR 1 in RVN. This has always been the area of his greatest force density.

In Cambodia, Operation Thoan Thang 01/1 caused the enemy to shift from protracted warfare tactics to main force activities. The resulting personnel losses have been much higher than in recent months and probably represent an unplanned for degradation of his future tactical capability.

In conclusion, by seizing the initiative in the Lao Panhandle and Cambodia, ARVN has disrupted enemy logistical operations during the current dry season and preempted enemy plans for the winter/spring campaign. Disruption of

enemy logistical activities and erosion of his combat strength in his base areas will materially affect the enemy's future capabilities to conduct offensive operations in both Cambodian and the RVN. While at the same time enhancing the Vietnamization program providing additional time for the development and improvement of FANK forces and permitting continued withdrawal of American forces from the RVN.

(End of J-2 Briefing).

J-3 Assessment: The purpose of this briefing is to describe some of the key aspects of the current operation and situation. Highlights will be the interdiction program; Operation Lamson 719; Operation Thoan Thang 01; the Mekong River Convoys, and helicopter support.

Interdiction Program: An extremely effective interdiction campaign has been under way to isolate enemy forces in the RVN from outside support. This campaign is being waged by air force conducting strikes in Laos, Cambodian and the border regions of Vietnam; naval forces in coastal waters, including border areas, and ARVN ground forces conducting cross border operations in Cambodia and most recently in Laos.

The Naval interdiction campaign and the denial of the port of Kompong Som to the enemy on 18 March 1970, has made the enemy totally dependent on the overland lines of communication through Laos. After an intensive terrain study, four choke points in the Laos lines of communications were selected as the most difficult to by-pass. Heavy concentration of both B-52 and TAC air sorties have been placed in these choke points, resulting in considerable reduction in the amount of supplies being shuttled into the RVN and Cambodia. As an example of the effect of the interdiction program, nearly 14,000 trucks have been destroyed or damaged since October of last year.

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There have been three major operations since last July Operation Cuu Long 4402, Lamson 719, and Thoan Thang 01. The Cuu Long Operation was terminated 25 February. The latter two operations Lamson 719 and Thoan Thang 01 are still in progress. Lamson has been one of the three major RVNAF cross border operations and has been a milestone in the development of the RVNAF. For the first time he conducted a multi-division operation against a strong and determined enemy and is an indication of the SVN's concern over the enemy's use of border sanctuaries of the Laos operation. He has maintained a daily average of 22 maneuver battalions in Laos to insure disruption of the enemy's base system.

The enemy's massive use of AAA and artillery has been a significant factor of the operation. Of great significance also in the operation is that the RVNAF is penetrating an area which had been controlled for years by the enemy. There has been significant gains from this operation. The RVNAF, without U. S. advisors, faced their sternest test to date and acquitted them

selves against an aggressive enemy.

The estimates of enemy killed exceed 11, 000. Large amounts of supplies have been destroyed or captured, major damage has been inflicted on his LOC and his timetable for offensive operations has been set back for a considerable period. Collaterally, the RVNAF success has had impact on the NVA by effectively demonstrating that the RVNAF is capable of mounting a multidivision operation, attacking the enemy in strongly held positions and destroying a considerable portion of his caches in the area.

Inso far as the Vietnamization program is concerned, Lamson has enhanced security, provided a greater chance for rural development and community defense to succeed, and has improved the environment for orderly Vietnamization and continued U. S. troops withdrawals.

The objective of Operation Thoan Thang 071 in Cambodia is the destruction of enemy forces primarily in the Chup Plantation area which is known to be a base area for a large number of enemy troops. It is near the southern terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and is used for storage areas and distribution points for supplies going into the Cosun area and (inaudible) area of Cambodia. This operation is a logical followon to Thoan Thang 70/2 which was conducted from July 1970 to February of this year. This kept Route 1 open between Vietnam and Leak Nuong, disrupted the free flow of enemy personnel and supplies bound from the plantation area, north of Route 7 and resulted in over 2,000 enemy being killed in the 6-1/2 months operation. Thoan Thang 0171 is characterized by heavy fighting and heavy casualties particularly in the Chup/Dambe area. The operation is progressing generally according to plan. Although, the U. S. is supporting the operation with air assets, a larger share is being carried by RVNAF. For example, the VNAF has flown considerably more TAC air sorties and helo sorties than has the U.S.

In the sixth weeks of current operations, Route 7 has been open from the Vietnam border west to Tong Le Bet and is being secured with FANK assistance. The enemy's traditional como liaison route, traffic to Kratie, Chhlong, Komgang Trabek, has been severely disrupted. The enemy has been forced to retain major elements of two divisions north of Route 7, thus reducing the threat to Kompang Chamand other areas west of the Mekong and MR 3 and MR 4. Most significantly, heavy casualties have been inflicted on the enemy. As the J-2 has pointed out, the numbers of 4, 400 enemy killed in action, while the ARVN has sustained less than 400 KIA and 2,000 WIA.

In regard to Mekong river convoys, to maintain supplies in Phnom Penh and to thwart the enemy's desire to cut off this city, a joint combined Mekong River Convoy operation is being carried out by Cambodian and Vietnamese Naval and ground forces, supported by U. S. and Vietnamese air forces. Since its inception 17 January, there have been 10 convoys. Although the enemy has attempted to halt the operation only one vessel of the 44 cargo ships has been sunk. The convoys have successfully supplied Phnom Penh with 2,800 tons of military equipment and 15, 000 tons POL. It is planned to increase the convoy rate shortly to allow for stockpiling.

Helo operations in Laos have provided the mobility necessary for success while facing exceptionally concentrated AAA weapons. One example of successful large scale air mobile operation took place on 7 March 1971, when 2 battalions were inserted into a LZ in 37 minute period by a total of over 150 lift helos and gunship escorts, with only one helc receiving damage from enemy fire. Units engaged in supporting Lamson 719 have flown 57,900 hours and 145, 700 sorties during the period 29 January to 11 March. A total of 135,200 passengers and 26, 200 tons of cargo were carried and gunships were credited with 1, 500 (KBA) killed by air.