penetrate Soviet ABM defenses, even if part of our missile force were destroyed.

Including MIRV, several major programs for the improvement and modernization of our land-based missile force are now underway, with a total funding requested of $839 million. The budget includes $591 million to procure MINUTEMAN IIIs toward a total planning objective of 550 missiles. The force modernization program includes upgrading MINUTEMAN silos against nuclear blast and radiation effects, in order to reduce their vulnerability. This program will be coordinated with the replacement of MINUTEMAN I by MINUTEMAN III missiles to complete both the silo upgrading and MINUTEMAN III deployment programs efficiently. The Budget also includes funds to continue the program of reducing the vulnerability of the MINUTEMAN II missiles to nuclear radiation effects while in flight. The MINUTEMAN III missiles currently being produced are already designed to withstand these effects. In addition, we will continue the Command Data Buffer Program, which will permit more rapid and remote retargeting of MINUTEMAN III missiles.

In addition, we are planning steps to preserve this portion of our strategic offensive forces through the deployment of active ballistic missile defense. I will discuss this program and its relation to our overall planning in a later section.

We are continuing to convert POLARIS submarines to carry the POSEIDON MIRV missile. The POSEIDON development test program was completed in June 1970 with 14 successes in 20 firings. In addition, through February 1971, there have been eight production missiles fired from submerged submarines. The first POSEIDON-equipped submarine will deploy this spring. The Budget includes $803 million to convert more submarines, procure more missiles and provide long lead items for conversions planned next year. ing for the POSEIDON submarine conversion program should be completed in FY 1974.

Fund

In addition to these programs now in progress, we must also make preparations to carry out long-range modernization programs to provide adequate strategic offensive forces in the 1980's. We believe that the best near-term approach is to do design studies and preliminary engineering development of a number of systems without committing ourselves to produce any of them.

In this way,

we will preserve the flexibility to capitalize on opportunities as they appear, counter threats which may emerge in the future, and respond to changes emerging from SALT.

The two most significant of our on-going long-range developments are the Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) and the

B-1 intercontinental bomber. The ULMS program now underway will provide the option to augment or eventually modernize the seabased portion of our missile forces. Work is proceeding deliberately so as to preserve options on performance characteristics and to shorten the lead time for deployment should this become necessary in the future. Although our continuing investigations have resulted in no immediate concern about

the survivability of our POLARIS and POSEIDON submarines at sea, we are continuing our active program for SSBN defense. Of course, no system can be guaranteed to remain invulnerable indefinitely and we are aware that the Soviets are working on new ASW techniques. However, our investigations have also persuaded us that the expanded operating area permitted by the long range of an ULMS missile could offset possible anti-submarine threats which might develop during the late 1970's or beyond. Since continued development work on ULMS preserves our flexibility to respond to a possible future degradation in the effectiveness of any of our strategic systems, it is an important factor in our future strategic force planning. The Budget contains $110 million, primarily for continued technical trade-off studies, preliminary submarine and facilities design, and design work on the power plant and navigation, guidance, fire control, and launcher systems.

The Budget also includes $370 million to continue engineering development of the B-1 intercontinental bomber. This aircraft is designed to modernize the aging B-52 fleet. The B-1 is being designed to enhance survivability in all modes of operation through faster reaction, increased resistance to overpressure, faster flyout times, higher speeds and lower altitudes during penetration, reduced IR and radar cross sections and greatly increased ECM capabilities; it is being designed for increased conventional capabilities as well. The B-1 is being developed in such a manner as to minimize the concurrence of development and production. This will permit a B-1 operational capability by the early 1980's if we choose at a later date to proceed into production.

The B-1 engineering development contract with North American Rockwell is a "Cost Plus Incentive Fee" contract with no provision for a buy option. I want to emphasize that we will not commit the B-1 to production before development is completed. The program provides for seven basic milestones. At the present time, the only fixed date is a September 1974 first flight time, but a contract change proposal is being prepared to move the first flight time ahead to April 1974 and to eliminate two test aircraft. The Preliminary Design Review and the System and Engine Design Validations are scheduled for FY 1972.

We plan to continue our investigations of Advanced Ballistic Re-entry systems (ABRES) and technology, and are requesting $87 million in FY 1972 for this effort.

b. Air Defense

During FY 1972, we will make certain additional reductions in the current air defense forces, primarily with reductions in surface-to-air missiles, but we will maintain our aircraft early warning capability and will continue research and development to provide effective bomber defenses. The major change planned

for these forces in FY 1972 is a reduction in the number of NIKE-HERCULES missile batteries.

Even if we successfully conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement, we may need to modernize our air defenses in the late 1970's. Therefore, the Budget includes research and development funds for two key systems: $3.6 million for the CONUS Over-theHorizon radar (OTH-B) and $145 million for the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

The CONUS OTH-B radar system will provide distant, allaltitude detection of approaching aircraft. Tests now being conducted should provide by mid-1972 performance data needed to decide whether to construct an operational system.

AWACS will provide the capability to detect and track lowor high-flying aircraft against the surface clutter over land or sea. It is now in engineering development, and two prototype radars are being prepared for flight testing in military versions of the Boeing 707 commercial jet aircraft. We expect the tests to be completed in late 1972. We can then select the better system, and decide in light of circumstances at that time whether to proceed with the final stages of system development.

A future air defense system will require an improved interceptor that possesses a "look-down/shoot-down" capability, greater time on station at AWACS operating ranges, and improved fire power. Both the Navy F-14 and Air Force F-15 now under development are capable of being adapted to fulfill the mission of a new air defense manned interceptor, and we expect to examine closely the feasibility of using one of them for this mission. Army surface-to-air missile system (SAM-D) currently under development could also play a significant role in CONUS air defense.

The

c. Missile Warning and Space Systems

Early warning of ICBM attack will continue to be provided by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars and the "forward scatter" OTH radar system. The seven radars of the 474N system will give limited early warning of SLBM attack. Development of the satellite early warning system is continuing. The FY 1972 Budget includes $187 million to deploy this new advanced system, which will complement our radars in providing early warning of ICBM, SLBM and Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) launches, and continue development work on follow-on systems. The system will greatly improve the overall capability of our warning network, especially against both ICBM and SLBM launchers.

We will continue to maintain an active anti satellite defense capability. Satellite tracking and identification will continue to be provided by the existing USAF Spacetrack system and the Navy's SPASUR system; both tied into the North American Air Defense Command and supported by the Space Defense Center for continuous space cataloguing.

d. Ballistic Missile Defense

The Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System has been and continues to be designed to achieve several objectives against a combination of Soviet and Chinese threats. They include:

"Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces
against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

Defense of the American people against the kind of
nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be
able to mount within the decade.

Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks
from any source."

Last year I told the Congress that ". . . without the Safeguard increment provided by this [FY 1971] budget, we would be faced now with the hard decisions about adding immediately to our offensive systems rather than being able to await hoped for progress in SALT." I further noted in discussing Safeguard several other important points:

SPUTNIK

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That the impact of technological surprise for example, can lead to expensive crash responses unless we face and make important national security decisions in a timely manner.

That Safeguard may not be sufficient to cope with all
possible threats, but that it can serve as a core for
growth options to defend Minuteman as well as providing
the basic four-site coverage.

That we were pursuing other concepts, including Mobile
Minuteman (on land or afloat), further hardening of
Minuteman silos, and shelter based Minuteman, through
FY 1971 R&D programs to provide other approaches to
the Minuteman survivability problem.

And that if the threat development warranted, I would
not hesitate to recommend accelerated development of
ULMS.

Before turning to a discussion of this year's proposed Safeguard program, let me note that we have moved forward in this budget on both the ULMS and the B-1 development programs, and we are continuing to examine other options as well. With regard to deployment options, we are requesting funds to exercise only one in FY 1972, to start the increased hardness program for Minuteman silos. Our philosophy has not changed: we are pursuing moderate programs, preserving our flexibility with regard to both SALT and the threat, and keeping our options open for the future.

This year a complete and comprehensive review was conducted in accordance with the President's commitment of March 14, 1969. The review of Safeguard included:

Technical Progress.

The technical and deployment progress of

Safeguard has been satisfactory. The Spartan and Sprint
missiles under control of the Missile Site Radar deployed at
Meck Island have successfully intercepted ICBM targets. Of
ten systems tests to date, eight have been successful, one
partially successful, and one unsuccessful.

Threat. The threat is discussed in detail in Chapter III and the Tables. In summary:

(a)

There has been an unexplained slowdown in deployment of
current Soviet ICBM models, but tests of modifications of
the SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13 have continued. Even at current
ICBM levels, qualitative force improvements, to include
MIRVS, could pose a threat to the survivability of
U.S. land-based ICBMs unless defensive measures are
taken;