With regard to strategic defense systems, the Soviet Union has held a commanding lead over the United States for many years. They now far exceed us in the number of air defense radar sites, command and control facilities, SAM launchers and interceptor aircraft. It is possible that they may deploy, later in this decade, an airborne warning and control aircraft with a true over-land, look-down capability and equip an advanced interceptor with a look-down, shoot-down radar/missile system. If they

do so, they could have a greatly improved area defense system in the late 1970s.

Although we are taking some steps to modernize our air defense systems, with the development of AWACS, the over-the-horizon backscatter radar, the SAM D, and possibly later an interceptor version of the F-14 or F-15, we have no plans to match the Soviet Union in terms of numbers.

While the Soviets are still ahead of us in ABM defense, we expect to have three SAFEGUARD sites in operation by the mid-1970s. The three sites thus far authorized for full deployment by the Congress will protect a portion of our MINUTEMAN forces. The Soviet ABM system, in contrast, is designed to provide an area defense for Moscow and the surrounding region. Our FY 1972 SAFEGUARD program requests authorization for deployment of an additional SAFEGUARD site to protect MINUTEMAN at Warren AFB, or to protect the National Command Authorities in Washington, D.C., depending on

the status of SALT.

As in the case of the offensive systems, the Soviets are continuing their development of improved ABM radars and interceptor missiles. And, there is still a strong suspicion among a number of our technical specialists that the Soviets may up-grade some of their SAM systems. In sum, I believe it is fair to say that the overall strategic balance, during the last five or six years, has drastically shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. Our comfortable lead has now all but vanished, and within the next five or six years we could actually find ourselves in a position of overall strategic inferiority, certainly as far as numbers of offensive delivery vehicles and megatons, and air defense systems, are concerned.

Soviet achievement of a clear-cut strategic superiority must be avoided at all costs. Aside from the military implications, such a development could also have a very important impact on our foreign policy. It could destroy the confidence of our friends and allies in the deterrent power of our strategic forces. We will pay a very high price in the effectiveness of our diplomacy if we permit the Soviet Union to achieve a clearly evident overall strategic superiority, even were that superiority to have no practical effect on the outcome of an all-out nuclear exchange.

While some question may remain as to the nature and duration of the SS-9 pause, the production of new Y class submarines is continuing at full speed in the two shipyards

involved. And, perhaps even more important, there has been no discernible slow-down in the Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and ABM development test programs.

Should the Soviets proceed with the deployment of some or all of the new or improved systems now being tested, they could, within four or five years, pose a more serious threat to our retaliatory capabilities. Yet, as long as there is hope of a favorable outcome from SALT, restraint on our part in our reactions to these potential threats is in order. But, prudence demands that we take some appropriate actions now to hedge against the possibility of a breakdown in SALT and the continuation of an across-the-board build-up of Soviet strategic power. This balance of prudence and restraint is, in my judgment, the essence of the strategic program proposed by the President for FY 1972.

For example, to hedge against the possibility that the Soviets may decide to deploy the SS-9 (with the three RVs) in sufficient numbers to pose a threat to our MINUTEMAN force, the President's budget provides for the continued deployment of SAFEGUARD and for the upgrading of the hardness of the existing MINUTEMAN silos on a wing by wing basis in step with the force modernization plan. hedge against the Soviet deployment of an even more advanced large ICBM with highly accurate MIRVS, the budget provides for the initiation of prototype development of a "hard site" ABM defense system employing a large number of small phased-array radars and modified SPRINT missiles.

As a

With regard to the Soviet SLBM threat to our bombers, the budget proposes to continue the expansion of the "satellite basing" program (with emphasis on inland bases) and a variety of other low-cost measures (e.g., a quick start capability for the aircraft) designed to reduce the take-off time. To improve the penetration capabilities of our bombers against improved Soviet defenses, the budget provides for the production and deployment of SRAM and the modification of the existing HOUND DOG missile. Advanced development would also continue on SCAD, as a hedge against the Soviet deployment of an advanced "lookdown, shoot-down" area air defense system.

Although our POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines still appear to be highly survivable, we cannot preclude the possibility that they may become more vulnerable as the Soviets continue to improve their ASW capabilities. For example,

the Soviets are believed to be working on new developments in the ASW field. Should these efforts result in new and effective ASW capabilities, they could reduce the survivability of our ballistic missile submarines in their present deployment modes. Accordingly, the budget provides for the development of techniques designed to improve the survivability of our SSBNs.

The continuation of our MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON MIRV programs, which were first presented to the Congress in the mid-1960s, will not only help to ensure the

survivability of a greater number of nuclear warheads, but will also serve as a hedge against Soviet deployment

of a new, improved ABM defense or the upgrading of some of their SAM systems to an ABM capability. And, let me remind you, that only in numbers of strategic warheads do we expect to stay ahead of the Soviet Union during the 1970s.

For modernization and as a hedge against the more distant and uncertain threats of the 1980s, the budget provides for the continued development of both the B-1 and ULMS. And, it should be noted that no decision on the scope of deployment has been made for either system. Admittedly, even some of the R&D hedge programs will

be quite expensive. But I must, in all candor, tell you that there are no easy and cheap solutions to the strategic sufficiency problem, short of an effective agreement with the Soviet Union to limit strategic armaments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, both individually and collectively, wholeheartedly support our Government's efforts to achieve such an agreement. But until that goal is attained, we believe very strongly that this nation must, as a very minimum, be prepared to do whatever is necessary to preclude the Soviets from achieving strategic superiority, now or in the future.

In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that a mix of mutually supporting strategic forces is still essential to the maintenance of our The effectiveness of US strategic offensive forces in a nuclear exchange is dependent upon many factors, several of which are highly uncertain.

deterrent.

These