ORDNANCE AND F-14 AIRCRAFT

We are also enhancing our effort to deliver ordnance accurately from a long distance, that is to say, from a standoff position, so that we don't expose our aircraft to active defenses. This is exemplified by the Condor, which has had several very successful flights. If you have not seen a telemetry picture of a Condor flight, [deleted] I would urge you to look at one. It is a very remarkable naval development. There is, of course, a request for the continued development of the F-14 and F-15 air superiority fighters, and continued support for the new homing air-to-ground ordnance.

REALISTIC DETERRENCE

Let me touch on one matter having to do with Southeast Asia. This has been a very different, difficult, and agonizing war. In the past I have talked about the problems that we faced there. They were very, very difficult. The technical community has come up with a number of solutions that not only were very critical for Southeast Asia-in fact, that in my view determined a number of the events of that war-but also have major applications to our future capabilities.

In the past I have identified the effort in our program that was applicable to Southeast Asia which, typically, amounted to about 12 percent, or over $800 million. At that time I would have said that several tens of millions of dollars were used in ways peculiar to the problems of Southeast Asia.

Now those problems of Southeast Asia have not gone away. There are still some very tough questions. So we will continue in fiscal 1972 to meet the urgent requests for Southeast Asia, but quite frankly, looking around the world, one can see that the major thrust of our research and development program is no longer toward Southeast Asia.

The capabilities that our forces need 5 and 10 years from now are not being determined primarily by problems in Southeast Asia. The situation in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, the situation in South America and in Africa, the nature of the Soviet military growthall these factors really orient our major R. & D. effort. Because the situation in Southeast Asia is going the way it is, because we have concentrated our attention there to some extent and neglected problems abroad in other areas, I am no longer identifying programs particular with Southeast Asia.

I am presenting activities in Southeast Asia in the same way I present the needs for other smaller countries that come under the Nixon doctrine. You will find them treated that way in the text.

Let me summarize what this program is going to do and also what it won't do. It will fund those programs authorized by the Congress last year in a continuing and orderly development. It provides enough incremental money in fiscal 1972 that I believe we will hold the technological edge to some extent. It will also provide for the initiation of a number of critically important programs which I believe will set the stage for the next several years.

We should all understand, however, that this request of $7.888 billion cannot, in fact, match the challenge that the Soviets pose to our

technological superiority by an apparent R.D.T. & E. commitment of an equivalent of more than $10 billion a year.

Independently of any purely fiscal considerations, we cannot yet provide technical justification for specific R.D.T. & E. responses to the Soviet challenge except in a few areas where Soviet results have begun to appear. Soviet secrecy in early R. & D. denies us the knowledge of the new Soviet direction.

Our $7.888 billion R. & D. budget request cannot totally reverse the erosion of our technological lead, but it will permit us to initiate a limited number of new programs in response to the most conspicuous Soviet challenges. It will support the policy of realistic deterrence. I would like to leave it at this point, Mr. Chairman.

VALIDITY OF RUSSIAN THREAT

Senator PASTORE. You know, the one question which has arisen here— and I am just now provoking your thinking on it, Dr. Foster, for it is not my view at all-there are some people who have the impression or the firm conviction, if I might use that expression, that it is the aggressiveness on our part in arming ourselves over the years and making improvements in our weaponry that has called for a response from the Soviet Union.

Do you have any observation to make with regard to that? Here you are, you have devoted a whole morning telling us essentially that we must do all of these things because of the Soviet threat. I am one of those who believe that the threat is there, although sometimes I can't understand the madness on both sides, because if we turned our weapons into plowshares, I think we would both be better off.

But that is a hard road. We have been walking along that road since 1946 when we tried the Baruch plan and it did not work. We have been trying ever since.

We are presently engaged in the SALT talks, but that is a very, very hard road to travel, too. I wonder what motivates them and if there is any substance to them. At some point someone has to reach the point of sanity and say, "What we have done is deterrent enough, so why should we have more?" What is your answer to that?

STRATEGIC WEAPONS

Dr. FOSTER. Senator Pastore, I think there are several points. First, in the strategic area it is very clear that each of us has enough weapons. In fact, I believe we could get by with less, considerably less. It is very clear that over the last 5 or 6 years the United States has not added to its ability to destroy the Soviet Union. During this period the Soviet Union has not only grown its own inventory of strategic systems, but has reached the point where, in my view, they are going beyond us.

They already have [deleted] times the megatonnage and payload capability in their missiles that we have.

Now, I don't hear them saying to us, "We really are going to stop this." I have not seen indications of that. I have heard a lot of that discussion in this country, but I haven't heard from the Soviets at any time a big debate about how much is enough.

When there was a discussion over whether or not we ought to have an H-bomb, I don't remember the Soviets joining in on that discussion, although in retrospect it is quite clear what they did-and without long debate. We had a long and anguished debate over a 100-megaton warhead and decided on several occasions against it. But the Soviets appear to have had no debate at all. They went ahead and developed an item and tested it. Now, this very important and critical subject, which demands every thinking man's attention, gets an airing in the free world. It does not generally get one in the Soviet Union.

What is important is the dialog with the Soviet Union.

In the last 3 years, as I have clearly indicated, the United States has turned down its effort in competition so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. It has turned down its effort in space. It has turned down its effort in the military.

After 3 years it has reached what I consider the dangerous point.

U.S. DETERRENT MILITARY POSTURE

Senator PASTORE. Would you admit this: that our whole military posture is one of deterrence?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, I believe that.

RUSSIAN MILITARY POSTURE

Senator PASTORE. Would you say the same about the Soviets? Dr. FOSTER. I don't know, sir. I think the Soviets, many of them may think that everything they have is just for the protection of their people. I think that would be consistent with what they have done. However, in this country we have an open discussion about whether or not our strategic inventory should contain equipment that can knock out his strategic inventory.

Our Secretary of Defense makes a decision that we will not deliberately obtain such a capability. As a fact our inventory items are then changed. We do not procure weapons that will deliberately take out his deterrent. But I see no such trend on the other side.

Rather, it is just the reverse. We see a trend to emphasize a very large missile which, in the strategic field, is destabilizing. We see it armed with three warheads, which makes no sense from the point of view of attacking populations, but only makes sense from the point of view of attacking our deterrent.

Senator PASTORE. But if the Russians had what we have, and we were in the position of the Russians, would we not ourselves be trying to perfect something more exotic? Isn't there something to that? The reason that they are progressing now results from their concept being a little more modern than our own, because we stood still for a long time.

Consider their navy, for instance. They have a modern navy as compared with our own. Ours is an old Navy. We have not been building ships. For example, we built our Nautilus long ago. They came into the field after us, and, naturally, they took advantage of all the modern improvements that could be made.

Because we were there first, as you said, we are a little bit older, too.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, that is quite true. Senator Pastore, I really have the greatest desire to have a success in the SALT discussions. I think this is the mechanism whereby we have an opportunity to let good judgment prevail in the interest of the people around the world.

Senator PASTORE. In that respect, I am afraid the unknown quantity is Red China. As long as Red China is progressing, I think you will find a little reluctance, both on the part of the Russians and I daresay even on the part of our own country, to do exactly what should be done for world peace, unless the Red Chinese join in as well as the other big powers of the world-because the Red Chinese are going to progress just as the Russians have come along. Just give them time.

Here you are: If we and the Russians agree, we will have neutralized ourselves against Red China. I think that is where I see much of the difficulty in these SALT talks. That is the reason why they are progressing very, very slowly.

I think perhaps Russia has reached the point now where she would like to put some of her money into developing domestic programs, too. But there you are: She thinks she has us to worry about and she has Red China to worry about and we have the same worries. We have the same worries, indeed.

Dr. FOSTER. Senator, we have been saying that to ourselves for 20 years. It has not happened yet. I wish it would happen soon.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THURMOND

Senator PASTORE. Senator Thurmond has submitted some questions. Will you please be good enough to provide the answers for the record? Dr. FOSTER. I shall be glad to do so.

(The questions and answers follow :)

ANTICIPATED RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT OF MIRV: NECESSARY U.S. ACTION TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY

Question: When the Soviets deploy their MIRV—and I have no doubt that they eventually will do so-what type of reaction will be necessary by the U.S. to maintain our deterrence credibility?

Answer: If a threat should develop which is more severe than can be handled by Safeguard and the silo hardening efforts I have described, there are still further moves we could take. One of these, hard site defense for silos, I have also described. In addition to this we can resort to some form of mobility for Minuteman, including the alternative of shelter basing. There is also the additional possibility of quantitative expansion of our forces. At present, I would prefer not to be more specfic than this.

POSSIBLE SECOND ATTEMPT BY RUSSIA TO PLACE MISSILES ON CUBA Question: If the Soviets should attempt to place land based missiles in Cuba in 1975, as they did in 1961, how would you speculate that the resulting crisis would be resolved based on forecasted U.S.-Soviet strength levels?

Answer: This is a matter which lies within the province of the President, and I would prefer not to speculate on it.

DISTINCTIONS IN REALISTIC DETERRENCE POLICY AND U.S. POLICY OF PAST FEW

YEARS

Question: Today our policy is one of "realistic deterrence." In what terms would you describe our policy of the last few years, and how does "realistic deterrence" differ?

Answer: Let me point out first that I believe this question is covered very thoroughly in Mr. Laird's Defense Report, and I cannot do it proper justice in only a few words. I would say, however, that realistic deterrence has its roots in the "Nixon Doctrine." It recognizes, first, that previous concepts of the U.S. as the world policeman are not realistic or desirable; that the achievement by our friends and allies of a capability and sense of purpose to provide for their own defense-particularly insofar as manpower is concerned-is not only in the U.S. interest, but will also serve better to deter aggression of the kind experienced in Southeast Asia. Secondly, it recognizes the continuing need for the U.S. to maintain a "sufficient" strategic force to serve to deter general nuclear war.

These two basic factors, with the free nations of the world working in partnership for peace, and each bearing its proportionate share of the burdenparticularly for its own defense against what one might call "conventional" aggression-form the essential elements of realistic deterrence.

REQUISITE U.S. ACTIONS IN EVENT OF FAILURE OF STRATEGIC ARMS

LIMITATIONS TALKS

Question. Dr. Foster, based on your projections do you feel that sometime in the 1970's we will reach a point where the power balance will place us in an unacceptable position?

Answer. There is a possibility that, if present trends persist, such a condition may come to pass. As you know, we have tried very hard to refrain from an arms race. We are engaged now in SALT negotiations which seek to achieve a limitation of forces. Should this fail to materialize within a reasonable length of time, then I believe we must face up to possible further steps for preservation of our security. This might entail quantitative as well as qualitative improvements of our strategic forces designed to forestall a situation such as you postulate.

AX AIRCRAFT

Question. Dr. Foster, what do you estimate the AX would cost in the 1975 time frame if it goes to production with the all-weather and night vision capability not figured into present costs?

Answer. The estimated unit flyaway cost of the AX is approximately [deleted] including escalation, based on a buy of [deleted] aircraft with procurement funding beginning in [deleted]; this does not include all-weather and night vision capability. Since the equipment needed to provide that capability has not been defined, and the force levels that would possess this capability have not been determined, no estimate of incremental costs can be made at the present time.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator PASTORE. The subcommittee will recess until 9:30 in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., Wednesday, March 24, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, March 25.)