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In the March 8 issue of the same magazine, the Russians again have a two-page ad on the TU-144. And the caption reads, “If you are doing business in the worldwide aerospace market, do not make a purchasing decision before contacting us."

I assure you that the Russians, the French and the British are neither frivolous nor foolish. They intend to sell their planes in the world market. The president of a foreign airline recently told me that he would buy the British-French Concorde only if the United States fails to build the SST, otherwise, he would wait for the American SST. The reason was that he wanted the whole family of planes in his airline to come from one nation, and for that reason he is willing to wait for the American SST. If we do not build the SST, however, that foreign airline president knows that families of airplanes will be available from other nations.

Without the SST, this country will be unable to provide a complete family of planes. Our share of the world aircraft market will deteriorate. It is hardly necessary for me to repeat what this will mean in terms of the Nation's economy—50,000 jobs directly related to SST production and a $22 billion impact on balance of trade over a 12-year period spanning the 1980's.

Our SST, incidentally, is designed to fly 400 m.p.h. faster than the Concorde or the TU-144 and to carry more than twice as many passengers. Our aircraft is more attractive to the airlines as a revenue earner than either of our competitors and would therefore maintain U.S. leadership not only for this plane, but for the entire family of planes.

AIRLINE'S SUPPORT OF SST Let me, at this point, answer directly the questions frequently raised about the real interest of our Nation's airlines in our SST program. We have received letters of support for the SST from every major American airline. Many of these airlines are now making their positions known publicly.

By the conclusion of these hearings, I am confident that there can be no question remaining concerning the airline industry's support of our SST program, and their reasons for that support.

SST FOR THE COMMON PEOPLE

Later in these hearings, I understand you will have the opportunity to see a Soviet film glorifying the development of the TU-144. I have seen this Allm, and one quote from the narrative bears repeating, particularly in the light of some of the comments we have heard this morning. Ýhe Russians emphasize that their aircraft is, and I quote them, "for us” for the common man, for the common people.

Now how ironic it is that the Russians make their pitch to the com, mon people, while we have been hearing that an American SST will be for only a small number of supposedly privileged people.

Just the other day, someone brought to my attention a 1909 article, entitled “The Panama Canal as a Business Venture.” The question was posed, and I quote, “What does the building of the Panama Canal by the United States mean to the citizens of the country?" And the article concluded. "The proper answer would seem to be as follows: An enor

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mous sum, probably amounting to at least one-half billion dollars, is to be taken from the pockets of two generations of taxpayers, in order to confer a slight benefit on the shippers of merchandise between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans."

Mr. Chairman, even though those words were spoken some 52 years ago, there is a very familiar ring to them.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS

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My next point concerns the environmental aspects of this program, which have generated perhaps the most heated controversy. First, let me put our program in perspective. We plan to build two test planes, not a fleet, as some would have you believe. We have an ongoing program of environmental research, Never in the history of aviation, or for that matter, any other mode of transportation, has a new machine been subjected to the amount of pre-flight study, research, planning and evaluation as our two SST prototypes. We are confident that enlightened American technology can overcome any problems that might develop. After all, a country which can send men to the moon, at the same time it preserves the Everglades Park in Florida, a country that transmits color TV pictures from space, at the same time it says "no" to super-highways through historic sites, can be counted on to overcome possible problems with the SST. But I want to reiterate one thing I have said, again and again, and I mean it sincerely: If testing of the two prototypes, or the concurrent environmental research, show that the SST will do irreparable harm to our environment, I would do everything within my power to insure that a United States SST does not fly in commercial service, and this is & commitment I make on behalf of this administration.

All evidence indicates that our SST's now in development can fly within our increasingly stringent environmental limits. But we must complete the prototype program and conduct sufficient tests to be

sure.

PERCENTAGE COMPLETION

Finally, the last major point that must be emphasized is that this program is now more than two-thirds complete. We are nearing our goal, of providing two flying prototypes, which will verify for us as nothing else can the technical, economic, and environmental viability of the supersonic transport. The final answers in all these areas simply can't be deterinined by more study, more component testing, or more ivory tower discussions. The only way to tell what needs to be done before such an aircraft can be flown commercially is to fly the prototypes, and conduct an extensive test program.

We are now almost 10 years along this path. The U.S. Government has invested more than $860 million out of a total investment of $1.3 billion. Private industry-contractors and airlines—has presently invested more than $246 million out of its comunitted total investment of $403 million. We have accomplished too much, invested too much, and are too near our goal to let this all go down the drain with nó tangible results. And the figures that you quoted earlier, Mr. Chairman, are particularly correct, that it would not cost a great deal more

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money to have us actually get all of the information we need, in order to determine where we go from there, than it would to terminate the contracts. And, as a matter of fact, I would, as one American citizen, prefer that our Government, prefer that our scientists, prefer that our engineers, make determinations as to whether or not this is environmentally acceptable, rather than leave it to foreign governments to make that decision for us.

This year, we are asking for $290 million, which represents approximately 3 percent of our total Department budget. Funding at Jesser levels will increase total costs, and increase development time. With significantly decreased funding, the experienced teams of scientists, designers, and engineers working on this program would be disbanded. Thus, the program would suffer irreparable damage. The team of subcontractors would undoubtedly be dissolved and the U.S. Government would be faced with contract termination costs. To save the few dollars this year would, in my opinion, be counterproductive. This is a program which, unlike many others, is on schedule within cost and faces no insurmountable technical problems. We cannot and should not disrupt it by shaving off a few dollars in the name of economy. That, Mr. Chairman, would truly be false economy.

This is the moment of decision for this program, and in a larger sense for this Nation's entire attitude toward the advancement of technology. As we stand on the threshold of commercial supersonic flight, we can decide either to keep or throw away this country's aviation leadership. We can decide to shrink from our responsibility to find the real answers on environmental effects, or we can conduct the necessary flight tests to find solutions. And this decision rests with you in the Congress.

And I would remind the committee, Mr. Chairman, that even at current production rates, no commercial U.S. SST's, as has been pointed out, will be moving down the runways until late 1977 or 1978. We can't afford to further delay this program. We already know, for example, that the stoppage of this program now, combined with the anticipated substantial sales losses from our total family of aircraft

, would result in total work force reductions, it is estimated, of about a half million of our work force, by 1978. Now I didn't say 50,000, or 150,000, I said 500,000. Not on the basis of the SST alone, but on the basis of the fact that we would not be able to sell a full family of planes, as this one foreign airline president said to me, and others I know feel the same way.

The annual adverse impact on balance of trade would total up to $1.5 billion per year.

SUMMARY

To sum up, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we are in the process of building two of the best airplanes ever conceived by the most capable aeronautical experts in history. We are well down the road to construction of those prototypes, and a large segment of the American economy is at stake. A key segment of our future transportation is at stake. The American aviation industry is at stake. The U.S. technology is being called to account, and yet, may not be allowed to find answers, if the prototypes are not built.

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Gentlemen, I submit that this committee, and this Congress, should support progress, should encourage logical and reasonable testing, and should support the continuation of the SST program at the most efficient pace practicable.

(Secretary Volpe's prepared statement follows:) Mr. Chairman, the Supersonic Transport Development Program has endured a penetrating national scrutiny. Never in the history of this nation has a technological advancement been so critically assessed by government, by scientists, by political leaders and by the American people.

I applaud that kind of careful evaluation. And, I would like to consider myself among the vanguard that has weighed development of the SST against all possible detrimental effects. I am confident that this Administration's decision to continue the SST program is a correct one, and an essential one. As you and the Committee enter this latest phase of your deliberations over this program, Mr. Chairman, I once again want to say that I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to present the reasons for that decision.

Before getting to that presentation, however, I would like to make a personal observation. It is that the national debate over the SST program is one of the healthiest exercises in democracy that I have seen. Everyone has benefitted from that debate. Our program is now far superior to that originally envisioned. The nation is far more informed and involved than ever before.

Unfortunately, we have reached the point in these discussions where little of substance has not been said before. It now seems that the catch phrases and slogans and the more sensational and scary scientific testimony are all that remain which is new "news".

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to proceed to the real issues before us.

I am here today to ask that this vital development program be advanced to fruition. I am here to seek your approval for the continued funding of the development of two supersonic transport experimental test planes-two prototype aircraft against which performance claims can be measured and environmental concerns weighed. I request your approval of a funding level for fiscal year 1971 which will allow completion of the program on its planned schedule at minimum cost. RELATIONSHIP OF PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH

To begin, I want to clear up all confusion concerning the relationship between our prototype development program and our environmental research efforts. The two are inexorably related. This is a package program aimed at providing all the information necessary to make a commercial production decision.

That means that we must know every technological and engineering ramification of the SST in flight. It means that we must know every environmental ramification. And while many of these environmental answers can be provided through basic research, they must be related to the actual test plane before any fully confident decision can be made on commercial production.

The SST program provides a unique opportunity for technological development in concert with technological assessment. We must build the prototypes and undertake the environmental research.

For example, our research indicated some time ago that sideline noise would be a problem. We didn't stop the program because of it, however. And now, through continued technological development, that problem is being solved. I am convinced that continued prototype development, together with the accompanying research, can resolve all the environmental concerns that have been expressed.

I have spent enough years in public life to know that charges of impending disaster are inevitable in any new program which stretches man's abilities to exist on this earth. There were cries of disaster or economic upheaval whenever new devices were introduced into our society. Brigadier General “Chuck" Yaeger, first test pilot to break the sound barrier in 1947, was told by "experts" before his historic flight that he would “disintegrate" or become a "vegetable" or that his bone marrow might demineralize."

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That is not to say that some of the concerns expressed are not legitimate and valid. We have recognized these. As a matter of fact, our entire SST research program is designed to test such concerns under the scrutiny of our best research and technology.

As you know, I have taken and will continue to take strong positions against any transportation program or project which threatens to cause irreparable damage to our citizens on environmental, social, or economic grounds. I am not one to pursue technical advancement for its own sake. What we have with the SST is a well balanced program of progress which is planned to prevent any adverse side effects.

Now, let me point out specifically why I feel this to be the case.

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PRODUCTIVITY First, there is no question that the SST will be the most productive aircraft ever built in the history of the world. It will do the work of three of the new tri-jets or about two of the big 747's. This will have the very real effect of providing our airlines with a more efficient aircraft to meet the continuously increasing demand for air transportation. The operation of an aircraft which will do more work per unit of cost can only result in a more solid financial base for the airline industry as a whole. I might add here that this same attribute of higher productivity will also make a major contribution toward reducing the crowding of our skies, because fewer planes will be needed to meet air travel demands.

TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP Second, the SST development program represents the advance cutting edge of civilian flight technology. In this field, you either win or your're not in the race at all. You stay out in front or you drop far behind. The United States is currently leading in aerospace technology. It is just inconceivable to me that this country would purposely forfeit first place in the area of civil aviation.

ECONOMIC VIABILITY This technological leadership leads directly to my third point. And that is the economic viability of the SST, and in fact our entire airframe industry. Unless we maintain our lead, our competitors will quickly take the market away from us. I would remind you 3 that the Russians and the British and French are breathing down our necks. The British-French Concorde is fying. A second gen: eration Concorde may already be on the drawing boards. The Russian TU-14 is flying. What more warning do we need than the two-page ad in a recent issue of Aviation Week magazine. This ad, as you can see, shows the Russian “family of airplanes"—led by the supersonic TU-144.

In the March 8 issue of the same magazine, the Russians again have a two-page ad on the TU-144. And the caption reads, “If you are doing business in the worldwide aerospace market, do not make a purchasing decision before contacting us."

I assure you that the Russians, the French and the British are neither frivolous nor foolish. They intend to sell their planes in the world market. The President of a foreign airline recently told me that he would buy the British French Concorde if we fail to build our SST. The reason was that he wanted the whole fam. ily of planes in his airline to come from one nation, and for that he is willing to wait for the American SST. If we do not build the sst, however, that foreign airline president knows that families of airplanes will be available from other nations.

Without the SST, this country will be unable to provide a complete family of planes. Our share of the world aircraft market will deteriorate. It is hardly necessary for me to repeat what this will mean in terms of the nation's economy -50,000 jobs directy related to SST production and a $22 billion impact on balance of trade over a 12-year period spanning the 1980's.

Our SST, incidentally, is designed to fly 400 mph faster than the Concorde or the TU-144 and to carry more than twice as many passengers. Our aircraft is more attractive to the airlines as a revenue earner than either of our compeititors and would maintain U.S. leadership not only for this plane, but for the entire family of planes.

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