being limited by the perspicacity of the hustings &its legislative competence restricted by the conditio presidential veto, the Reichstag seems destined in future to play only such a part as it has played in past; that is to say, its task will be the facilitating public business by heedless support of the Administrat or the impeding of it by doctrinaire criticism and facti opposition. It may be that, in spite of congenital def and adverse circumstances, the new Reichstag will pr equal to the task of controlling executive action i restraining executive ambitions, but in favour of st a conclusion the most plausible argument is that unexpected always happens.'

There is, however, another body set up by the c stitution from which it would seem that greater thi are hoped. That is the Supreme Court, which authorised to deal in the way of judicial considerat and decision with matters of State. Before this tribu the President, the Chancellor, or a Minister of State n be arraigned if the Reichstag should proceed to impeachment. The same judicial body is to decide, case of a conflict of authority, between the State & any of the Lands, or in a dispute of that sort betwe two or more Lands among themselves. Its decision to be invoked in controlling the action of a Land Gove ment if such a subordinate government neglects t remonstrances addressed to it by the Central Gove ment. Its jurisdiction extends not only to the decisi of purely legal questions, but in certain specified matt it even covers points of administration. Thus, to tat one example, the Bavarian and Württemberg post a telegraph systems are to be taken over by the State tle year. But, if the executive authorities concerned cann agree upon the terms of the transfer, their difference to be referred to the Supreme Court for its award. T organic law governing this institution is to be passed the Reichstag; and, until the Supreme Court itself duly constituted, a provisionally appointed body, call a Senate, consisting of seven members, to which the Reichstag appoints four and the Court of ordina jurisdiction appoints three, is to exercise its functions.

While the constitution of this High Court, and als that of the Courts of ordinary jurisdiction, are left t

subsequent legislation by the Reichstag and the various Landtags, as the case may be, the makers of the constitution have taken measures to secure the independence of the courts so constituted. The clauses relating to the appointment of judges have been taken and, in large measure, taken textually, from the provisions of the old Imperial Constitution in reference to that matter. Thus, judges are to be appointed for life; they are irremovable except as a result of a judgment against them by brother-judges, and are declared independent and subject only to the law. In this respect, therefore, the Republic may be expected to carry on the tradition of the Imperial Courts. Certain guarantees for the personal fitness of candidates for judicial office may indeed be found to have been given up; for the appointment of new judges is vested without express conditions in the President, but the status of the judge, when appointed, is to be at least equal to that which he enjoyed under the Empire.

A strong executive and an independent judiciary are the striking features of the new German constitution, while the third element, the Legislature, enjoys, as has been seen, very limited authority. Nominally the legislative power is lodged in the hands of the Reichstag; but, as all its decisions are liable to be challenged by a Referendum, it is difficult to say where the legislative authority actually resides. The Reichstag can deliberate and decide provisionally, but the disapproval of either the President or of the Reichsrath may render its decision liable to be subjected to a plebiscite. If a plebiscite is taken, the people can decide, but they cannot deliberate. An arrangement by which one body deliberates and another decides seems more likely to be productive of effort than of result. In any case a people acting under such limitations, whether through representatives with restricted powers or by a direct vote 'Aye' or 'No,' is not likely to make head against a powerful Administration. Personal changes on a large scale have been effected by the German revolution, but the depositary of power would seem to be, under the new constitution as under the old, not the German people, nor the elected representatives of the German people, but the German bureaucracy.

Among the institutions projected for the future of Germany is one the action of which will be followed with great interest by foreign observers. Art. 165 of the constitution calls upon the workmen and employés of industry to co-operate with owners in taking and administering measures for promoting the advancement and development of productive efficiency. With this object the organisations of both employers and employed are to be represented on industrial councils to be established in industrial centres and on a Central Industrial Council to be set up for the entire State. This Central Council is to be formed with powers. limited to the care of industry, but powers, within those limits, very similar to those entrusted to the Reichsrath in respect of the local government interests. Thus, the Industrial Council is to be consulted by the Government upon all important measures within its province which the Government brings before the Reichstag; and its advisory powers include the right to lay its views before the Reichstag, even in opposition to the Government's proposals, and to submit, independently of the Government, not only its views but also projects of its own origination. This council is therefore intended to bring expert knowledge to bear at close quarters upon the discussions of social and industrial questions in the Reichstag, and to do officially and in set form for the German legislator what is unofficially and spontaneously done both in Germany and elsewhere by the press of the country. That any council will be able to supersede the press as the instructor of the public and of the legislature seems improbable; but it will be interesting to see what relations spring up between the Industrial Council and the press. Will the Council be able to present a more comprehensible or competent view of the situation discussed than that given by the press? Will the Council lead or be led by the press? Will it fall under the domination of factions or cliques? Will its advice be sagacious and publicspirited, or will it be the expression of narrow views and jarring interests? It would be foolish to prognosticate the upshot of the German experiment, but it will be of great importance to observe it.

a more

A point of passing but immediate interest is raised by

the question: How is the constitution affected by the 1 Treaty of Versailles? The answer is that the Treaty has in language been respected, but in substance opposed. Thus, the 178th Article includes a provision to the effect that 'the provisions of the Versailles Treaty signed on the 28th June, 1919, are not disturbed by the constitution.' But, on the other hand, Art. 112 provides that 'no German may be handed over to a foreign Government for prosecution or punishment,' thus negativing the 228th Article of the Treaty, which provides for the handing over of war criminals for trial by the Allies. On this point the constitution-makers have prevailed, for the Entente Powers have agreed to abate the demand for handing over, in consideration of a German undertaking that a Court for dealing with these criminals shall be set up in Germany. Another Article provides for the interests of those persons when arraigned before the German Court, for Art. 116which is emphasised in the document by the circumstance that it is headed by a rubric in Latin which reads nulla pœna sine lege-lays down that any action can only be followed by punishment if the liability to punishment was expressly laid down by law before the act was committed.' Without cavilling at the success of the German legislators-for the two principles which they have acted upon are undeniably sound-it must be admitted that the Weimar Assembly has in this particular defeated the diplomatists at Versailles.

Another possible breach of the Treaty seems to be contemplated by Art. 61, which provides for the representation of German Austria in the Reichstag after her union with the German Commonwealth. It seems to have been with special reference to this clause that the German Representatives at Versailles on Sept. 22, 1919, signed a declaration that all provisions of the constitution which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty are null and void. If so, the declaration is entirely illusory, for the clause is not, in terms, in contradiction with the Treaty at all. The rights which it confers upon ill German Austria take effect only if she accedes, and after her accession to the Commonwealth, a condition which takes it out of the scope of the declaration; and indeed the Treaty itself provides that the Union of Germany

and German Austria may be hereafter sanctioned by the League of Nations. On the other hand, the two articles which refer to the War Criminals are clearly in conflict with the Treaty, but, as they are to be carried out by German officials, it is quite unimportant what view the Entente jurists may take of their validity. One of them has been already conceded, and, as to the other, it is certain that, whether the article of the constitution itself is valid or not, the sentiment which the Germans have thrown into a Latin dress will be held to justify the law. In fact, the use of a Latin rubric in connexion with this clause of the constitution-to all the others German rubrics are prefixed-may reasonably be supposed to be a cleverly thought-out vindication of the refusal of the German people to punish the men who fought for them or to permit them to be punished. The maxim is of old and acknowledged authority in German strafrecht, and will carry weight even in wider circles.

The translation of this document which has been issued by His Majesty's Stationery Office suffers, as official translations very commonly do, from the inattention of the translator to the significance of what he was translating. It would seem to have been the work of a scholar to whom the words are more familiar than the ideas, and consequently his choice of synonyms is often unfortunate. The translations of the words' Reich' and 'Land' seem to have been made very much at hazard. For no obvious reason Reich' is rendered by 'Federation,' to which it is in no strict sense equivalent. It is quite true that the secondary sense in which alone the word 'Federation' could be the equivalent of Reich' is familiar in such a phrase as the Federation of British Industry,' used as the name of a particular society. But the word is only used when the society so named is constructed on a federal basis. It is therefore an unfortunate choice of a word for designating the new German body politic, for the question whether it, like the Russian Republic of Federated Soviets, is a federa tion or, like the French Republic, a unitary state, is a question hotly discussed and has been decided, so far as it is decided at all, in favour of the unitary state. The advocates of a Federation in the Weimar Assembly