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And only when we realise the human inevitableness of this righteous indignation against the cruelty of the world can we feel the divine pathos which breaks out in the yearning invitation.

'And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him that heareth say, Come.

And let him that is athirst come:

Whosoever willeth let him take the Water of Life freely.'

The words belong in their setting only to the future Golden Age when persecution and opposition shall have ceased; it is the task of the Christian consciousness to transfer them to the world as it is and to sublimate the desire for vengeance and a dramatic destruction of evil into the effort to win the sinner to the Kingdom of God with the divine message of a love that never faileth and which hopeth and believeth all things for all men.

Apart from details, it is the outstanding service of Dr Charles' book that he has brought out the dramatic power and unity of the Apocalypse. In the commentary before us he writes as a scholar for scholars. The linguistic and textual discussions and the technical details of interpretation will be a mine of information for students. They give the grounds on which his conclusions are based, and the work is rounded off by very full indices. He and his publishers are to be congratulated on the production of such a work under difficult conditions of printing and publishing. But they would confer an equal benefit on the ordinary reader if they could be persuaded to issue a much smaller edition of the Commentary embodying the new translation and rearrangement of the text, printed in such a way that it could be read as literature, and accompanied by just such extracts from the introduction and notes as would give the average man the right way of approach and the necessary explanation of difficulties and obscurities.



1. The Treaty of Saint-Germain, signed Sept. 10, 1919. Treaty Series No. 11 (1919), Cmd. 400.

2. The Treaty of Trianon, signed June 4, 1920. Treaty Series No. 10 (1920), Cmd. 896.

3. The Treaty of Neuilly, signed Nov. 27, 1919. Series No. 5 (1920), Cmd. 522.


4. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed Aug. 10, 1920. Series No. 11 (1920), Cmd. 964.


THE object of this article is to examine some of the problems bound up with the Balkans, and in particular to discuss the post-war position in that Peninsula as I found it during a comprehensive tour made at the end of last year. Before embarking on this task, however, let me remind my readers that various events which have taken place since the outbreak of the European conflagration—particularly the disappearance of AustriaHungary-have extended the district in question, or more correctly, the Balkanised zone, not merely as far as the Rivers Danube and Save, but up to the Baltic on the north and to the frontiers of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy on the west. This means that, whilst I shall only touch upon the foreign policies of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, I must refer in detail to the situations prevailing in Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, and Albania-situations directly influenced by the Treaties of Peace made by the Allies with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as respectively listed above. Besides these documents there are the Treaties for the protection of Minorities, signed by the Allies with the Serbo-CroatSlovene State, with Roumania,t and with Greece.‡ There is, too, the unpublished Treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, and Czecho-Slovakia relative to the confines of those States, signed at Sèvres on Aug. 10, 1920. The British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan and the small States are the signatories; and its provisions take the new States in order, define their


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frontiers, and recognise their sovereignty within thos frontiers.

The truth about the Balkans can only be realise after a brief allusion to two idealistic conditions which were desirable of realisation in the documents by which the war has been terminated. There was the necessity for establishing a barrier between Germany and the Near East a barrier which at one time might possibly have been created by one of two distinct policies. The first of these was represented in Mr Wilson's tenth 'Point,' where he said that 'The peoples of Austria Hungary... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.' Whilst securing to the various nationalities concerned some form of govern ment with the consent of the governed, the Dual Monarchy would then have remained at least more or less intact, the present economic crisis in Central Europe would have been avoided, and, with the possible disap pearance of Germanic influence, an anti-Prussian barrier might have been established. For better or for worse, this policy was not adopted, and we, therefore, come to the second alternative, which entailed the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the attempted creation of a Balkan barrier largely to the south and east, but partly lapping over into that former Empire. The Allied decision in favour of this policy was made clear in Mr Wilson's reply, sent to Vienna on Oct. 18, 1918, wherein the President of the United States said that he was 'no longer at liberty to accept the mere autonomy of these peoples as a basis for peace,' and that the United States had already recognised the existence of Czecho-Slovakia and of Jugo-Slavia. Whether one approves or disapproves of this decision, which was probably unavoid able in the circumstances, it must have had, and still must have, its bearing upon the fulfilment of the second Allied obligation; namely, the obligation to endeavour to establish peace upon the principle of nationalities, and to redistribute the various territories in dispute upon a basis sufficiently just to be a safeguard against future wars. This is the case because, whilst the abovementioned recognition of Czecho-Slovakia and of Jugo Slavia was itself in conformity with the formula of nationalities, once it was determined to gratify the

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aspirations of these peoples, it became necessary to establish them upon a basis enabling them to exist and to play their part in support of an anti-German policy, even if that basis carried with it infringements of some of the tenets enunicated during the war. Equally well, the Allied attitude towards Roumania and, to a less extent, towards Poland, follows as a natural consequence; for, as these countries are requisite as part of the antiPrussian barrier, it was probably advisable to reward them in a way not strictly justified by the avowed objects for which the war was fought.

Whilst it only came into existence in the late summer, and after the signature of the larger treaties now under consideration, reference should be made here to the Little Entente, intended as an Allied bulwark in Central and Eastern Europe. This arrangement, though perhaps for the moment more or less still-born, may yet be of considerable significance in its relation to Germany, to Russia, and to the Balkanised States. Here we find that Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia have signed a definite alliance, which, though defensive in nature, is aimed directly at Hungary.* Over and above this alliance, Roumania is believed to have gone so far as to arrive at some sort of an understanding with one or both of these countries-an understanding supposed, at least in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, to include a condition that the return of a Habsburg to Hungary is to be considered as & casus belli. When I was in Central Europe just before Christmas, the delay, following these arrangements, seemed to be due to the fact that if the actual Alliance is to be enlarged beyond its original limits of CzechoSlovakia and Jugo-Slavia, then it should include not only Roumania, but also Poland, and perhaps Greece as well. Such an enlargement had its difficulties; for, whilst nobody can forecast the future development of events in Greece, until quite recently the relations between CzechoSlovakia and Poland were such as to place obstacles in the way of these two countries arriving at an arrangement destined to commit either party to a war for the

* The terms of this Alliance, signed on Aug. 14, 1920, were published n the 'Gazette de Prague' for Nov. 13 1920, and in 'The Contemporary Review' for January 1921.

benefit of the other. During the last few weeks, however, France, who has always encouraged the new Entente, seems to have had a renewed success in that direction; for the Franco-Polish Agreement* and the Roumano-Polish Military Convention would appear to further the construction of this diplomatic edifice from a slightly different angle.

Coming to a detailed discussion of the situations prevailing in each of the Balkan countries, we find that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, usually called Jugo-Slavia, has an approximate area of 90,000 square miles, and an approximate population of nearly 13,000,000 souls. It is, therefore, the second largest State to fall within the confines of this article. Occupying the north-west corner of, and extending beyond, the strict confines of the Balkans, the new Triune Kingdom came into existence as a result of the decision of a representative National Assembly, held in Zagreb in October 1918, which declared the independence of the Southern Slavs from the Dual Monarchy, and as a consequence of a subsequent proclamation, issued by a Congress held at Neustad in November 1918, to the effect that a union had taken place between the formerly Austro-Hungarian Provinces and Serbia, and that Prince Alexander had been appointed Regent of the new State. The situation created by these events was subsequently recognised in documentary form by the Treaties made between the Allies and Austria and Hungary, and Jugo-Slavia received further areas of territory from Bulgaria.

Once the principle of the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy is accepted, and as the question of Macedonia, which was Serbian before the war, forms no part of the present discussion, I think, with certain comparatively minor exceptions, that the inclusion within Jugo-Slavia of her present territories is fair and satisfactory. Speaking generally, and for the moment ignoring Montenegro, that inclusion results from the declared wishes of the inhabitants, and constitutes an adequate reward for Serbia in that most of the Slavs domiciled in this part of Europe have joined hands and because she has secured access to the Adriatic. As to the

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* For the text of this Agreement see The Times,' Feb. 22, 1921.

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