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Ministries to go on working with a minimum staff. Desire for efficiency, fear of being caught short in emergencies, reluctance to part with brains which may be wanted later, desire to offer terms of employment at least as good as those offered by competitors-all these motives tend towards inflation, and some measure of external control is indispensable. Suggestions which appear to be valuable have recently been put forward by Lord Haldane's Committee, and in greater detail by the Committee on Staffs, but their discussion would take us too far. In connexion, however, with the question of staff, a few words must be said regarding the mental attitude known as departmentalism. It is a fact of human nature that men who are working with a common object tend to develop a common spirit; and esprit-decorps is nearly the greatest asset a Ministry can possess. But it has dangers as well as advantages; and its degeneration into departmentalism is in the long run fatal to efficiency. The term scarcely requires definition. The public are quick to recognise the evil when the officials of a Ministry think first of themselves and their traditions, ignore outside opinion, and appear to act on the principle that the country was made for their convenience. The regulation of this corporate spirit and tradition is among the most important functions of the administrators at the top; the 'wise Chief' is eminently the man who knows how to direct it into the worthiest channels, and prevent its extension along dangerous lines. His action in this matter cannot be reduced to formal principles, but it is a matter of experience that departmentalism develops most readily in small establishments; and this consideration is of real importance in regard to the question of the proper size of individual ministries.

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So far we have dealt with the internal affairs of the Ministry; what can be said concerning its relations with the public? The old tradition is undoubtedly one of secrecy; and Never give your reasons' is a maxim which must have been impressed on the majority of administrators. But this attitude may fairly be described as obsolescent. The transaction of business through elected agencies means that the action of the Ministry may have to be justified before the local public, while the Vol. 285.-No. 467.

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provision of advisory councils at headquarters, an innova tion the extension of which is recommended by Lord Haldane's Committee, brings the general public in, and puts the Ministry in close touch with the knowledge and experience of those sections of the community which are most directly affected by its activities. Councils of vary ing types are common in several European countries and it may perhaps be said that the principle of associa tion between the public and the administration is well on the way to general acceptance, and that in future the absence of such association will have to be justified by special circumstances affecting a particular Ministry. It may be added that the need for association is probably greatest in the case of those Ministries which have to protect individuals against the action of powerful business combinations, a new branch of administration which is being pioneered effectively in the United States, and the need for which is just beginning to be felt in this country.

We have now to consider the relations between the Ministries, which have so far been treated as independent units. The time is past when a single Ministry could control the business of even a small State; differentiation began at an early stage of development, and has proceeded sometimes at haphazard, sometimes on a more or less definite plan, until it has become possible to base on experience a statement of the principle on which the spheres of ministries should be distinguished. The discussion of this subject is one of the most interesting portions of the Report of Lord Haldane's Committee; and nearly every administrator of experience will accept the conclusion that the allocation of functions must be based on the services to be performed, rather than on the classes to be dealt with. The State requires a Ministry of Education, not a Ministry for Children; a Ministry of Employment, not a Ministry for the Unemployed.

Working on these lines the Committee reduce administrative activities to ten main heads: 1. Finance, 2. Defence, 3. External Affairs, 4. Research and Information, 5. Production, Transport, and Commerce, 6. Employment, 7. Supplies, 8. Education, 9. Health, and 10. Justice, though it is recognised that the volume of work may involve the formation of two or more Ministries under a

single head. Any one who wishes to know what the haphazard growth of Ministries may involve need only read the Committee's account of the administration of justice in this country, with its lurid description of the functions of the Lord Chancellor. Organisation which is inefficient in this particular matter increases seriously the need for co-ordination between Ministries whose spheres either overlap or leave debateable ground unoccupied ; but, however perfect the allocation of functions may be, the need for co-ordination will still exist, and provision to meet it is an essential part of an administrative system. The principle may be laid down that the desired result should be obtained where possible by consultation; and the Report of Lord Haldane's Committee recommends in certain cases the creation of standing joint bodies for this purpose. Failing agreement, however, the co-ordination must be effected by superior authority; and, as things now stand in this country, this can be done only by the Prime Minister or by the Cabinet as a whole. The extent of the need may be studied in the Reports of the War Cabinet, which bring out very clearly the importance of the administrative functions of a body whose primary business is the formulation of policy.

We have thus arrived at the apex of the administrative pyramid, and we find ourselves confronted with the problem of the constitution of the ultimate organ of government, or, as we say in this country, the problem of the Cabinet. That problem has many sides, and all that can be attempted here is to state certain considerations of the administrative order which are relevant to its solution, but are not by themselves conclusive. In the first place it is generally recognised that an administrator differs from a statesman, not so much in specific quality as in emphasis. Given the requisite knowledge of the facts, it is easy to classify the great majority of public men on one side or other of the dividing line; and the growing complexity of affairs points to the need for some advance towards specialisation of function in accordance with this recognised diversity. In the second place, while each separate Ministry very properly claims a voice in the Cabinet or other ultimate authority, all are agreed in demanding from it a reasonable degree of

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promptness and vigour; nothing is more demoralising to a body of administrators than to be kept waiting indefinitely for guidance in regard to the policy to be carried out. Experience appears to indicate that in highly organised States some development of existing arrangements is required to satisfy these claims. Even when the number of separate Ministries has been reduced to the minimum, a Cabinet including all the Ministers remains too large for administrative efficiency; and in the light of recent history the alternatives seem to be progressive inefficiency, the informal development of some effective organ within the Cabinet, or a definite breach with tradition. The War Cabinet constituted such a breach, but the conditions attending its institution were so exceptional that it cannot be entirely relied on as a precedent for more normal times.

So much, however, may be said, that the administrative considerations which have been advanced would be satisfied by a Cabinet consisting of a small number of members, some without portfolio' as the phrase goes, others representing groups of Ministries, and responsible individually for co-ordination within the group. To take a concrete example, the British Cabinet might consist of the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, some of the 'great officers of State' such as Privy Seal, and members in charge respectively of (a) Defence, (b) External Affairs, and (c) the internal Ministries arranged in two or three groups. There would then be a body large enough for counsel but not too large for vigour, and one to which each Ministry would have access, not indeed directly but through the appropriate member; while among the members as a body the emphasis would be upon statecraft rather than specialised administrative ability, which would find its principal scope in the charge of individual ministries. Whether such a body would be justified by the principles of political science, and whether it would be possible from the standpoint of practical politics, are questions with which this article does not profess to deal; a concrete instance is stated as an example of the type of ultimate authority indicated by progressive administrative theory. It may, however, be observed that the grouping of Ministries for this purpose has been advocated of late in various quarters, and that

there appears to be a strong body of opinion behind the proposal so far as the Defence Ministries are concerned.

I have kept to the last the extensive group of what are known as 'Service Questions.' The literature of this topic is voluminous, and it would be impossible to state in a few words the principles which have been formulated by the various Commissions on the Public Services, but stress must be laid on the fact that the central problem is to provide an adequate incentive. In earlier stages of development much reliance was placed on the economic. motive which dominates so many private activities-the hope of immediate personal gain. But the practice of entrusting administrative duties to farmers of the revenue has lost its vogue; the retention of fees by officials survives only in some minor departments; and it is now generally agreed that the incentive to efficiency must be found in the career which the public service offers when viewed as a whole. This statement will be found to cover most of the hotly contested questions regarding salaries and pensions, promotion, the grant of honours and the like, but we must pass these questions by, and can glance only at the result which follows from the offer of a reasonably attractive career. Speaking very broadly, such an offer tends to secure a high average of competence, marked by assiduity rather than initiative; and, while very exaggerated views of this defect are commonly expressed, there is little doubt that the chief weakness of the system is the danger of 'staleness at the top.' Various partial preventives of this danger are known in practice, such as the enforcement of retirement at a fixed age, or the introduction of a fresh mind, as when a Governor is sent out to an Indian province, or a politician is appointed Minister at home; but their operation is neither uniform nor certain, and it does not appear to be probable that any safeguard of universal efficacy can be devised.

The danger is greatest in cases where every official is required to start at the bottom of the ladder; and the recognition of this fact is prominent among the reasons for the formation of corps d'élite, consisting of men of exceptional attainments, employed almost from the outset on dignified and responsible duties, and entitled

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