that the Archduke was obliged to exclude Count Zich from his retinue, but, in spite of this, he would not ha a member of the Liberal party, to which he was antag= nistic, forced on him, and, rather than suffer this, decided to have no Hungarian Lord-in-Waiting accompany him, so that Hungary was not represent in his retinue at all. It was the first time for decad that the Magyars had met with opposition at Vienn they now became aware that a strong man was the who, once he came to power, would brook no interferen

By these two indications of his views and aims t Archduke had slightly raised the veils in which personality had hitherto been shrouded and had giver hint of what was to be expected of him as ruler. By 1 marriage with the Countess Chotek, which he final achieved after a long and difficult struggle, in spite the vehement opposition of the Emperor and the Cou in general, the Archduke showed that he was capał of obstinacy not only in political matters but also regard to his personal affairs, even when in conflict wi the most powerful man in the Empire. Although th alliance was dangerous and regrettable from a politic point of view, because it was calculated to rend Austrian politics, already difficult and complicat enough, more confused than ever, yet, judged from the other, the human standpoint, it did great credit to th Archduke's constancy and will-power.

It may at once be said that it proved an entire happy marriage; and the Archduke was never so co tented as when in his family circle, especially at Schlo Konopischt in Bohemia, which he had bought and fu nished with extravagant magnificence and exquisit taste. He withdrew from life at Court, not only t avoid the painful disputes as to precedence, and to spar his wife the slights to which the stiff Court etiquett would have exposed her; but also because he did no feel at ease in the atmosphere of the Court and did no get on particularly well with the other Archdukes. A Schloss Belvedere,' once the seat of Prince Eugen Savoy, he held, when he was in Vienna, his own rigidl restricted Court, which was to a certain extent, an occasionally very markedly so, a direct contrast to tha of the old Emperor. Indeed, the relations between th

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ichy Emperor and his heir were anything but friendly, not ha merely by reason of his unsuitable marriage, but also tag because the old man recognised in him an opponent is, whose energy and perseverance made themselves unpleasantly felt when any debatable question arose, and through whom his autocracy was threatened and obstructed. Had he been a younger man, the conflict between him and Franz Ferdinand would probably have become serious. As it was, however, he was too weary and broken to take up the challenge; and thus their relations continued, outwardly at least, to be more or less friendly, however strained they may have been in reality.

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If the Archduke stood in the Emperor's way, the Emperor stood no less in his, not only because his succession to the throne was deferred, but also because he was forced to look on helplessly and see how the timid policy of the old man, who avoided the solution of all serious problems for fear of possible strife, was making twit more and more difficult for him, when the time came to assume power, to straighten out the everincreasing tangle of intricate political problems, and to rende find for them even a partially satisfactory solution. The Emperor was blind to the dangers with which he and his Empire were threatened by the inflammable material which had been accumulating for years, or at any rate he refused to see them; but Franz Ferdinand saw them, and realised the enormous danger menacing the Monarchy if these explosives were not unloaded chlo in time by an expert hand. But it was such aims as these that were obstructed by Franz Josef, who would not hear of these dangerous things being handled at all. Of such a nature were the various national problems, the solution of which was growing more and more necessary; the Southern-Slav question, in particular, was becoming urgent, and also the highly complicated 1 Hungarian problem, so closely connected with it. Then there was the question of Italia Irredenta, which tended gento exacerbate the relations of the Monarchy with Italy.

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To be a powerless and inactive onlooker while the ent, ship of state became ever more and more involved in to the whirpool of national currents, must have been nerveracking to a man of such insight and energy as the

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Archduke, and must have exasperated and embitter him, especially as he had a definite political programn in view. This programme was called 'Great Austri a title adopted by a Hungarian of Rumanian origi Aurel C. Popovici, who, in his book, 'Die Vereinigte Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich,' had proposed a comple reformation of the Habsburg Monarchy on an ethn graphical basis. His view was that each nation in tl Empire should, as it were, find its soul in its own wa its boundaries being fixed on ethnographical ground and full national autonomy being accorded. But, order that this conglomeration of nations should n fall to pieces, they were to be bound together by a stroi cement; and this cement was to consist of the institutio common to all the nations of the Monarchy, such national defence, transport, currency, and trade. T central point of this Austria rediviva was, of course, be Vienna, and the diplomatic language was to be Germa not out of regard for the Germans, who were not to tal front rank by any means, but because it is a widel spoken language—an advantage that cannot be claime for the Magyar or the Rumanian tongue, any more tha for the various Slav dialects. Popovici's scheme was happy union of the ideas of federalism and centralisation and it was unquestionably capable, as no other schem had been, of satisfying the just national demands of th various nations in the Empire. This scheme appeale very strongly to the Archduke, although he did no propose to carry it out quite so radically as Popovic suggested. The complete abandonment of Crown land boundaries in favour of a purely ethnographica division was repugnant to his highly developed historica

sense.

When the Archduke's preference for the Great Austria programme became known in Hungary-Popo vici's book had been placed on the index there- th public, naturally, were not too well pleased, and looked forward to his accession with increasing anxiety; for a essential condition of this programme was the trans formation of Hungary in accordance with a nationalist sentiment. But it was common knowledge that nothing enraged the Magyars more than any rash attempt to interfere with the political ideal of the Magyar

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er National State.' The Czechs, on their side, were no more enamoured of a 'Great Austria' than the Magyars, train spite of the fact that a rigid division between them Tigi and the Germans in the Sudetes region would have put a Ligte satisfactory end to the vexatious disputes about language. For they too had a nationalist ideal-the Bohemian constitutional principle, which would not admit of the division of Bohemia into two territories, in one of which the Czech language, and in the other German, should be spoken. On the other hand, Popovici's scheme met with all the more sympathy from the peoples of Hungary who were oppressed by the Magyars, and from the Slovaks, Rumanians, and Croats, who saw in the Archduke their future saviour.

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In foreign politics Franz Ferdinand turned his attention first of all to Italy. He was under no illusions as to what the Monarchy might expect from this ally,' and believed that the latter was only lying in wait for the moment when she could take the Monarchy unawares ider and attack it, of course with the help of another Power. Italy's expedition to Tripoli gave him, indeed, a foretaste of what awaited the Monarchy at Italy's hands under certain conditions, and must have strengthened him in at his feeling of distrust and resentment. It was not surherprising, therefore, that the official political attitude of of the the Monarchy in regard to Italy enraged him, for this attitude was in keeping with the Emperor's desire for peace at any price. The Archduke did not conceal his displeasure from Count Aehrenthal, the chief representative of this conciliatory policy; and, as the Count his obstinately persisted in it, there were some sharp disrisputes. In the eyes of the public it was Count Aehrenthal

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and the Chief of Staff, Baron Conrad, who were in Te opposition, but behind the scenes it was, in fact, the or Emperor and the heir apparent who were in conflict. At first Franz Ferdinand was obliged to give way, for Conrad was forced to retire, and Aehrenthal continued to hold office and to carry out his policy. But the Archduke was not the man to admit defeat for long; a ion year later, Conrad was again Chief of Staff, and Aehrennoth thal's hour would undoubtedly have struck had not a mp higher power removed him from office for ever.

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The leading Vienna papers sided, of course, with

Aehrenthal in this dispute, and were never weary assuring their public that Italy was the Monarchy's be friend, that aggression was far from her intentions, ar that the Italian danger was a bogey set up by the clerg and by ambitious generals so as to mislead the publ and to conceal their own sinister designs. These peop -they called them the 'War Party' in public, b referred to them privately as the 'Belvedere Party recognising the Archduke to be their moving spirit—hɛ in view, so they said, nothing less than the invasion ar annihilation of Italy, in order to reinstate the Pope temporal power on her ruins. And, since the undi criminating masses are always ready to believe the mo improbable lies, they swallowed this bait readily enoug and thought the Archduke was really an agitator and fool, who was ready to plunge the Monarchy into wɛ for the sake of the Pope. As a matter of fact, Fran Ferdinand, in spite of his energetic nature, was by n means of a warlike disposition. He gave proof of th at the time of the annexation crisis (1908) when, in spit of a favourable opportunity-Russia was still disable by the Japanese war and Italy would not have dared t attack the Monarchy single-handed-he could not mak up his mind to seize his advantage and settle the accoun with Serbia.

As regards Germany, Franz Ferdinand was certainl in favour of maintaining the alliance, but not on th terms of German supremacy. Germany's dominatin influence in this alliance must have been a thorn in th flesh for a man of such strong individuality; and there i no doubt that, if he had ascended the throne, he would have taken good care to put an end to Austria-Hungary' tutelage to Germany. No real intimacy, such as the official press persisted in proclaiming so emphatically ever existed between him and the Emperor Wilhelm their characters differed too widely for that. reserved nature, averse from all theatrical display, must have been repelled by the Emperor's boisterous

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I published a full account of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy in this Review in January 1911 under the title 'Austria-Hungary and Italy'; this article pleased the Archduke so much that he wished to have it made known in Austria, whereupon I published a second article to the same effect in the 'Oesterreichische Rundschau.'