haracter of the verdict. It may now be hoped that this uestion, which has been a serious cause of unsettlement or so long, may be finally closed.

On the Polish frontier the method of the plebiscite as in the first draft of the Treaty only adopted in two mall areas, Allenstein and Marienwerder. The district f Allenstein was peculiar. First of all, it had not been art of the old Kingdom of Poland at the time of the artitions, but belonged to East Prussia. The Poles, owever, claimed it, because the peasantry (it was an ntirely rural district) spoke a Polish dialect. As against his, it was represented that the Masurians, as they were alled, were Protestants and had never shown Polish roclivities. Were they, therefore, to be considered Polish? Here was a definite problem, the answer to which could only be given by the people themselves; the rea was one of manageable size in which it did not ppear probable that any serious difficulties would arise, nd so it was determined that the Polish claim should be ubjected to the decision of those whom alone it directly oncerned. There was nothing hidden or mysterious or inister about this. The district was claimed by the 'oles on the ground that it was Polish. The Conference id not, and could not, know whether this claim was ustified. There were no indications of any kind availble as to what the result of the voting would be.

The case of the Marienwerder area, a comparatively mall district on the right bank of the Vistula, was ifferent, and it would probably have been wiser not to ave had a plebiscite here. What had happened was hat this area, which notoriously was predominantly erman, had in the first proposals been assigned to oland merely on the geographical ground that it ontrolled communications between Poland and Danzig; n important line of railway, the Mlawa-Warsaw line, an through it, and it included the right bank of the istula. When the proposals of the Polish Committee ere subjected to revision on the ground that they ssigned too many Germans to Poland, it was argued ith force that this decision could not be allowed to and, and that the district could only be given to Poland ith the consent of the inhabitants. They must, thereore, be consulted. The consultation was, however, as the

event proved, superfluous, for there never was any real doubt as to what the verdict would be. The plebiscite, which resulted in an overwhelming German majority, served the purpose of justifying the refusal of the original Polish claim.

In some ways the Klagenfurt plebiscite, the only one ordained under the Austrian treaty, was the most interesting. The problem was to define the frontier between Yugo-Slavia and the new Austria. There were two lines nearly coinciding with one another, either of which might have been selected, namely, the old boundary between the province of Carinthia and Carniola, or the natural frontier provided by the Karavanken mountains but, undoubtedly, a very considerable Slovene element resided in the Valley of Klagenfurt, which lies to the north of both these possible lines. While it was generally agreed that, as the boundaries were being made on ethnographic principles, the territory of Yugo-Slavia must be so extended as to include the Slavonic districts, the greatest difficulty was found in agreeing on any precise line. The problem illustrated the inconvenience of creating completely new international frontiers on a purely ethnographic basis; for any such line must cut in half the Klagenfurt basin, the whole of which was mutually interdependent, and separate many villages from the town to which they usually resorted, besides introducing complications on such matters as water supply. As no agreement on a line could be arrived at, it was determined to have a plebiscite; but in this case-and it was the only one-the regulations seem to have been open to criticism on the ground that they were rather heavily weighted against the German element. The Klagenfurt basin was divided into two divisions; the southern, which was predominantly Slav, was to vote first. If they voted for Yugo-Slavia, then the northern section, in which the German element was largest, was to vote later. It will be clear that their vote would be taken under such conditions as to prejudice the result; for by deciding to remain in Austria, the people would be subjecting them selves to serious economic disabilities. In these circumstances, the result was remarkable and interesting. The vote, even in the southern section, showed a very considerable majority for Austria. This seems to have been

gely due to attachment to old-established local conxions. The general spirit of nationality in country lages may easily be overborne by other motives. Men not wish to be cut away from old associations of ighbourhood and plunged into the unknown.

The general conclusion seems to be that the plebiscite y be a valuable political instrument when certain aditions are fulfilled, but that it is not a method for iversal application. In Allenstein, in Marienwerder, Klagenfurt, in Slesvig, it was possible to put a clear ue before the electors, and the result was a conclusive swer. In each case, therefore, we may hope that the sult will be finally to eliminate what might otherwise ve continued a standing issue between two nations. Allenstein and in Klagenfurt a claim was made by e Poles and the Yugo-Slavs respectively for certain rritory. The only ground on which it could be pported was the nationality of the inhabitants; and, e appeal having been made to them, the rejection was finitive. In Slesvig a similar claim was made, and e answer was equally clear. Up to a certain line ere was an overwhelming Danish majority, beyond at line an equally overwhelming German majority. is possible, therefore, now to draw a frontier which may be hoped both parties will accept, just because is just. This result could never have been obtained less every care had been taken that the plebiscite ould be conducted with strict impartiality. The nduct of the Commissions appears in these cases to ve been above suspicion, and it ought to have the ect of removing a deal of causeless and unwarranted asure of the Allied Powers. They have shown that ey were capable of rising to the position of impartial bitrators.

On the other hand, the method is one which cannot used with advantage where the issue is not simple t complex, and there is always the danger that it may ve the problem in a worse state than before. For if result shows that the two parties are very evenly anced, that the districts which choose one nationality another are inextricably intertwined, then the task drawing the frontier is more difficult after the voting n it would have been before; and the whole process Vol. 286.-No. 468.

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of agitation, which is an insuperable accompaniment to all popular decisions, necessarily increases, often to a dangerous extent, the passions which it was hoped would be allayed.

It clearly would not be desirable at this moment, when the final decision is still in suspense, to discuss the Upper Silesian problem. It may, however, be justifiable and useful to make observations on certain points connected with it. The decision to have a plebiscite here was part of the revision of the Treaty which took place at a very late stage. The original proposal had been to assign to Poland absolutely the larger part of the German district of Upper Silesia, including as it did the very valuable mining and industrial district which is situated on the Polish frontier. This decision was made

on grounds similar to those on which the rest of the Polish frontier was determined. It was based purely on a minute examination of all the available evidence as to the language and race of the inhabitants. German statistics and all German books of reference showed that in this district there was a very large Polish element which in some parts amounted to 80 or even 90 per cent. It is not the case, as has been said, that this is the result of the recent industrial development. As with nearly all Germany east of the Elbe, the original population was purely Slavonic; in many parts it has now become thoroughly Germanised; but here on the Polish frontier, in a district situated between the two Slavonic States of Bohemia and Poland, the process of Germanisation has been very slow. Peasants and landowners alike were of Slavonic origin, and the language spoken, though not identical with the written language of educated Poles, is a Polish dialect; it is not more different from standard Polish than Plattdeutsch is different from standard German. It is important to place this on record; for there is no reason to doubt that the original decision was one arrived at by a careful and honest investigation of the problem.*

This decision was challenged by the Germans, partly

But paper statistics are a dangerous guide. It is said that the German school statistics were too favourable to the Poles, because the school teachers who had charge of Polish-speaking children received a higher salary.

because the possession of this country was necessary to Germany and the general economic convenience of Europe, but, in particular, because it had not been Polish for 500 years, and there was no reason to believe that, even if a majority of the population were ethnographically Polish, they therefore would desire to be separated from Germany. These considerations clearly could not be ignored. After all, there was an essential difference between Upper Silesia and the other Prussian Provinces of Poland. Germany had, historically at any rate as against Poland, a good title. The country had been Bohemian; it had been merged with Austria only in consequence of the election of the Duke of Austria to the dignity of King of Bohemia; and historically Bohemia, now Czecho-Slovakia, had a stronger claim to it than Poland. It had been acquired by Prussia as the result of the Seven Years' War, and from that time onwards Prussian sovereignty had been universally recognised. The question whether economically the coal mines were of more importance to Poland or to Germany had, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the matter at all. The agreed conditions of the peace did not give the Allies the right to sever from Germany any territory unless it was in accordance with the particular cases specified in the Fourteen Points, or with the general principles put forward by President Wilson. They would only be justified in doing so, that is, if the population was indisputably Polish, or if this was the wish and for the benefit of the population concerned. Was the population indisputably Polish? It is well known that President Wilson considered that the evidence showed that it was. But if the fact was challenged, it would clearly have been a misuse of the power which the Allies possessed to refuse to allow an appeal to the only authority by which the question could be decided that is, to the people themselves. This was the view taken by the British Government and accepted by the Council of Four.

When once the decision to have the plebiscite had been taken, it was of course incumbent on all concerned to insure that it should be held under such conditions that the result would be a free and unbiassed expression of the genuine wishes of the population. This was not