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When food becomes a political weapon it is high time for the Senate of the United States to do everything in its power, at least to make the necessities of life available, on the basis of need alone, to a suffering humanity. The last principle contained in my resolution warrants the most careful and serious consideration. It reads as follows:

With a view to assuring the security of all nations, large or small, victor or vanquished, and promoting the earliest possible peace and rehabilitation of Europe and the world, the United States Senate favors the creation of a general federation of European nations at the earliest possible date, within which disarmament and economic unification will be combined with sovereign equality and cultural self-determination.

Mr. President, the most clear-cut picture of what is happening throughout Europe is to be found in a dispatch from Herbert L. Matthews, published in the New York Times of December 14, concerning the situation in Italy. He wrote as follows:

The whole set-up is unbalanced by differences of ideas between Washington and London. Our conception of war is an unusual one. Britain and Russia and other European nations see war as an instrument of politics, but for the United States it is something narrowly and purely military-to win the war and then go home. The result is that the United States is furnishing almost all the material and the money, but it is not directing their use.

Not only is the United States unable to direct the use to which its money and matériel are being put, not only are our boys bleeding and dying on the battlefields of Europe to further the intentions and designs of our allies, but it becomes increasingly apparent that our Government has not the slightest idea or purpose behind these sacrifices, other than defeating Hitler on the battlefield.

Now is the time to face boldly the question of what our intentions are toward Germany and Europe. As I see the problem, there are only four possible alternatives: (a) Europe dismembered into twenty-odd separate states.

(b) Europe dominated by Soviet Russia.

(c) Europe partitioned into British and Russian spheres of influence.

(d) Europe united in a free and peaceful federation. The dismemberment of Europe has led our generation into two world wars and already threatens a third. There is no nation in Europe that either could or would dare to have attacked its neighbor states one by one had they been united by federal ties. Europe in this modern age cannot remain broken up into twenty-odd isolated, economic units, without precipitating another world conflict. Actually, to follow such a policy through would mean that we have fought this war merely to restore totalitarian governments and states all over Europe. What is a totalitarian state, Mr. President, but that state in which its cultural, economic, and political power is under the centralized control of a sovereign government which knows and owes no higher allegiance than to itself? A dismembered Europe could not help but become again a chessboard of international intrigue, a breeding ground for revolutions, and an international booby trap in the form of a third World War.

I am sure it was never the President's intention to

rescue the peoples of Europe from Hitler's tyranny at the cost of uncounted American lives in order to turn them over to the control of totalitarian Soviet Russia.

We have only to look across the water to envision the grim prospects for ourselves and for the world if Europe becomes an unhappy hunting ground in which Britain and Russia use 350,000,000 people further to consolidate and extend either ideologies or selfish interests in a bitter struggle to partition and control Europe.

A general federation of European nations, I am convinced, will provide the only sane attempt at a solution to the crucial issues now taxing the resources of the Allies. Such a federation in which disarmament was combined with economic collaboration would constitute no threat either to Britain or to Russia. Already the Soviets are talking and working themselves toward the establishment of an Eastern European and Balkan federation while, as Gen. Jan Smuts advised the British some time ago, Mr. Churchill is trying to establish Britain's sphere of influence under the guise of a western European federation. The very idea of a general federation of European states would at least provide a nobler cause for which both Britain and Russia could strive.

There is no reason why the people of Russia and England, like the people of the United States, should not be interested in helping the suffering peoples of Europe to set up a federation of democratic republics patterned after genuinely democratic ideals, which have brought to our people more freedom, liberty, and prosperity than any other form of government has achieved in the history of the world. To those in our midst who say this cannot be done, I can only say it has never been tried.

I want to go on record again to the effect that I will do everything within my power to further America's participation in a world organization providing guaranties of security for Russia's interest and Russia's territory on the basis of international law in the event of any new threat of aggression from any countries, in exchange for the acceptance by Russia and Great Britain of the only sure way of preserving the peace of Europe and the world, and that is the setting up in Europe of a confederation of European states, or a United States of Europe, and the acceptance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter as the basis upon which all settlements that have been made or are yet to be made in Europe since September 1, 1939, are to be ultimately established.

Mr. President, allow me to invite attention to the fact that the idea of a federation of Europe is not new with me. It was advocated, if you please, by Briand, of France, and Von Schuschnigg, of Austria. Even Mr. Churchill, in 1930, wrote for the Saturday Evening Post an article in which he said that a United States of Europe could do no harm, but should be helpful to Europe, to the United States of America, and to Germany. I am not sure of the exact words which Mr. Churchill used, but I have stated their substance.

I am unwilling, however, to commit this country to a world organization which will seek to enforce an unjust peace upon the people of Europe; a peace which will throw hundreds of millions of people into slavery and degradation; a peace which is contrary to every precept of common decency; and a peace which is contrary to every principle which has ever been enunciated in this country from its inception. This is not what the American people were told they were fighting for; this is not what the American boys are dying for. If we expect to maintain a democratic republic in this country, to say nothing of fighting for it in foreign countries, we must now let it be known that our leaders insist upon our allies keeping their promises, and that we, in turn, keep faith with them and with the boys who are dying upon foreign soil.

Mr. President, I want to straighten out the matter of

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"discredited minorities," whose views, we are told, "have been overwhelmingly rejected by their fellow citizens of every party."

I do not know just to whom the Secretary of State had reference when he used the words "discredited minorities," whether he had reference to the people of my State or not. But surely, unless the people have changed their minds considerably since 1940, I am not representing a minority, because I carried every city and county in the State, and received twice as great a majority of votes as did the President himself. Not only was that true in

1940 but it was also true in 1934.

I have made the statement again and again that the demand for "unconditional surrender" has been a mistake. Not only have I said this but so have thousands of other people of high intelligence and of the class you would call "interventionists," if you please, or "internationalists." I believe that the continued use of the brutal, asinine boast of "unconditional surrender" is costing thousands upon thousands of American lives, is contributing to the deterioration of Allied unity, and threatens to lay the foundations for such an impossible situation in Europe, that a third world war cannot possibly be averted. For many long months I have been supported in my conviction that this outcome is certain by statements issued from every quarter.

MR. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
MR. WHEELER. I yield.

MR. LUCAS. The Senator has made the statement that the continuation of the demand for unconditional surrender is, in his opinion, costing thousands upon thousands of lives.

MR. WHEELER. Yes; that is my opinion.

MR. LUCAS. What does the Senator suggest in lieu thereof?

MR. WHEELER. I suggest that the Allies should state their peace terms to the German people just as President Woodrow Wilson stated his Fourteen Points.

MR. LUCAS. In his resolution recently submitted the Senator advocates "the adoption of a universal bill of rights to safeguard the inalienable rights of every individual regardless of race, class, or religious belief." MR. WHEELER. Of course.

MR. LUCAS. I presume that the Senator was not using that expression in the sense of its applying to the world. MR. WHEELER. I used it in the sense of its application to the world, and I should like to see it adopted by every country on the face of the globe, including Russia.

MR. LUCAS. I wondered if the Senator meant to apply it to the world, how he would enforce a universal bill of rights or how he would enforce any of the proposals he has included in his resolution. There is nothing in any of them which suggests the use of force.

MR. WHEELER. If the Senator is familiar with the resolution and has read it, he would know what it proposes is to have the United States Senate go on record as favoring the things it sets forth. I felt, and feel now, that if the United States Senate went on record as favoring these things, it would have a profound effect upon Russia and I hope it would have a profound effect upon England, and the British Empire.

On February 22, 1944, the Times, of London, said-and I should like to call the attention of the Senator from Illinois to this:

Unless shattered and dismembered Europe can find some new vision that looks forward rather than back, some leadership bold enough to survey her needs and problems as a whole, the civilization will surely perish. To blot out Germany from among the nations of Europe would be neither practical nor morally acceptable to the civilized world. Germany cannot be allowed to become a cancer at the heart of the European organism.

The London Times is probably the most influential publication in England and is generally recognized as speaking for the British Foreign Office.

On March 26, 1944, the Archbishop of Canterbury and free church leaders in England offered an eight-point program for peace and a warning against "breaches of basic human rights in dealing with Germany." Said they:

We must not lend ourselves in a mood of vengefulness to breaches of basic human rights or the punitive measures against the entire German people, which will be repudiated as unjust by later generations or will permanently frustrate hopes of peace and unity in Europe.

On June 1 Pope Pius XII, who, I presume, was speaking for a "discredited minority," declared:

No just peace can be reached if the victor would by force of arms dictate the terms. A just policy has to give the defeated nation a dignified place.

On June 26 Mr. Raymond Moley wrote:

The trouble with unconditional surrender as an objective is that few Americans or Britons really believe that surrender can be without conditions, while to Germans the slogan means that there will be no distinctions in punishment among the elements in Germany. To them it means that the Nazi party, the army, and the mass of the people are to suffer equally, which can have no effect beyond tying together 80,000,000 Germans in a desperate unity.

On July 29 the London Economist carried the following warning:

Unconditional surrender is becoming a policy of drift, of wait and see, of reliance on what may turn up. But the drift of events may carry Germany, Europe, and the grand alliance itself to a very different conclusion from the one the Allies desire. It may carry them to a military stalemate or prolonged fighting, and then to divided counsels and Allied disputes. No policy for Germany means no policy for peace.

Of course, in the mind of the Secretary of State, the London Economist speaks for a "discredited minority." MR. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? MR. WHEELER. I yield.

MR. WILEY. I inquire if, to the Senator's knowledge, the term "unconditional surrender" has ever been defined by the President or anyone else in this country?

MR. WHEELER. The President has not defined it, to my knowledge.

Mr. WILEY. I am wondering if now the President and Stalin and Churchill should define the conditions and say there could be no other conditions, if that would not be equivalent to unconditional surrender, and drastic, although the terms might be quite lenient.

Mr. WHEELER. I cannot answer that, I will say to the Senator.

In the same month of July the National Opinion Research Center of Denver University polling the 48 States on the subject of whether Americans should help to put Germany back on her industrial feet, even at the cost of continued rationing at home, reports that 64 per cent or nearly a two-thirds majority of the American people, believe we should follow this course. The research center comments:

They hold this view because, in the long run, this country would benefit from such a policy, and because the announcement that such help would be forthcoming might speed the German surrender.

I presume that 64 per cent, according to the National Opinion Research Center of Denver University, represents a "discredited minority."

I quote from a war correspondent of the New York Sun, Gault MacGowan, who wrote as far back as August 14:

Our terms to Hitler are unconditional surrender, and only

that prevents a military demand for an armistice. Despite the drastic bombings of German cities, the destruction of thousands of German homes and buildings and the anxiety of the German people to see the end of the war, the Gestapo won't let them demonstrate for peace or raise a questioning voice against their Fuehrer's unchallengeable wisdom. Such are my impressions of the situation tonight. It is no longer a military problem but a political one.

Not only has this man said that, but I have talked with military leaders in this country who have said identically the same thing.

Life magazine on August 21 carried the same message from John Scott, a Time and Life correspondent:

The future looks blacker day by day but those inside Germany who want peace and not national suicide are hindered rather than helped by the Allies. The Anglo-American attitude is still expressed by our determined adherence to the unconditional surrender formula, with which has been coupled a reluctance to make any concrete promise to any German opposition group. As a result, the complaint is made that any opposition group attempting to overthrow Hitler and make peace with western powers has no basic program on which it can talk convincingly to the German people. The Russians on the other hand, indirectly offer the German people that Germany won't be destroyed and that the German Army won't be destroyed. It has resulted in a pro-Russia orientation among a growing number of Germans who, all other things being equal, would be much more inclined to be proAnglo-American and pro-democratic.

༽.ཀརཱལིཐཾ ཟམhan༡༩ 1944 མཤདལ ཤ Mr TX objectionable; but the able Senator proposes them as an alternative to unconditional surrender.

MR. WHEELER. No. The Senator is entirely mistaken. MR. PEPPER. That is what the resolution says. MR. WHEELER. The Senator is trying to put words in my mouth, which I will not permit him to do.

MR. PEPPER. I read from the resolution of the able Senator. I did not quote his words.

MR. WHEELER. The resolution is not in lieu of unconditional surrender. I have repeatedly stated, and I now repeat, that I am not suggesting a negotiated peace. I have so stated to the Senator from Florida, and he knows that I have made that statement on the floor of the Senate time and time again.

What I am suggesting is that the President, Mr. Churchill, and the other Allied leaders state their terms to the German people, as suggested by Dorothy Thompson, by the London Times, by the London Economist, by the Nineteenth Century and After, and by members of

"unconditional surrender," and who made a speech for the President during the last campaign, wrote as follows:

There are two conditions under which Germany, as an entity, can surrender. The first is to make clear that a GerA many will be left which is economically capable of life. Germany that is deindustrialized or loses its industrial provinces or is overcrowded by the evacuation of ten to twenty million Germans into a truncated Reich will be more incapable of sustaining life than Puerto Rico. The second condition under which Germany could surrender is: She could become the ward of an already established world organization, operating along clear and established principles. The surrender of a nation must mean the merging of one's identity, but it cannot happen unless some larger identity exists. A Germany conquered by four powers but not surrendered to any one thing is no answer.

Of course, Dorothy Thompson spends much time in Europe. She knows more about Germany than probably almost any Member of the Senate. I now wish to read extracts from an article by Dorothy Thompson which appeared in the Washington Evening Star of January 8, 1945:

There have been three major political errors in this war, all arising out of the first one-the discounting of the Atlantic Charter. The second was the interpretation that has accumulated around unconditional surrender; and the third, the failure to produce any reasonable policy for a post-war Europe. And what our own Government and some of our publicists

At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference in Casablanca early in 1943 the President "ardently urged the adoption of an unconditional-surrender policy by the Allies," Sulzberger informs us. "Mr. Churchill was reluctant to support such an out-and-out statement . . . . It was felt that this would tend to negate the moral effect of the Allies' aerial bombings of Germany by stiffening the Germans' morale."

Of course, Mr. President, when I made my statement I expected that at any time I disagreed with my friend, the Senator from Florida, I would be charged by the internationalist crowd, which was so anxious to take us into this war, with doing something to injure the war effort. But, so far as I am concerned, I can "take it," and nobody will stop me from expressing my honest views upon this floor by a statement that by doing so is to help Goebbels. I am not interested in helping Goebbels; I am not interested in helping Churchill. I am interested only in helping the boys who are dying upon the battlefields of Europe.

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

FEBRUARY 11, 1945

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea.

In addition to the three heads of government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State;

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the President;

Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President; Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;

General of the Army George C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army;

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet; Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;

Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;

Major General L. S. Kuter, U.S.A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces;

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;

Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;

Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors.

"discredited minorities," whose views, we are told, "have been overwhelmingly rejected by their fellow citizens of every party."

I do not know just to whom the Secretary of State had reference when he used the words "discredited minorities," whether he had reference to the people of my State or not. But surely, unless the people have changed their minds considerably since 1940, I am not representing a minority, because I carried every city and county in the State, and received twice as great a majority of votes as did the President himself. Not only was that true in

1940 but it was also true in 1934.

I have made the statement again and again that the demand for "unconditional surrender" has been a mistake. Not only have I said this but so have thousands of other people of high intelligence and of the class you would call "interventionists," if you please, or "internationalists." I believe that the continued use of the brutal, asinine boast of "unconditional surrender" is costing thousands upon thousands of American lives, is contributing to the deterioration of Allied unity, and threatens to lay the foundations for such an impossible situation in Europe, that a third world war cannot possibly be averted. For many long months I have been supported in my conviction that this outcome is certain by statements issued from every quarter.

MR. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
MR. WHEELER. I yield.

MR. LUCAS. The Senator has made the statement that their devotion to it, without suppon c ́rrom abroaa.

Mr. President, I desire now to quote from a recent statement made by a Belgian exile, Mr. G. Jensen, who has been through all the horrors and sufferings of this war.

Mr. Jensen was not a candidate for the Senate, subject to popular election by the people, but he went through all the horrors of this war. He said:

Unconditional surrender of Germany means chaos for Europe. All those who knew the German people just before the war know that Germany will never give in. She will fight to the bitter end if no just peace proposals are made. The German people are fighting with the spirit that was Britain's in 1940.

Judging by all the lessons of history, the next last war will be one between the Anglo-Saxon world and Russia, and nothing on earth will prevent an injured Germany from seizing her chance at that moment.

It should by now be clear to everyone that the politicians who started this war and pretend to be leading it have themselves become the slaves of the destructive powers they have let loose, and are no longer in a position to control them. How in such circumstances dare they talk about controlling the future of the world for years to come?

Unless people everywhere wake up and themselves take control of their future, they will be deceived again and again by those who pretend to be leading them and willfully mislead them.

Victory is the most dangerous of poisons. Only a just and righteous peace can save humanity in the next generation from a new and far worse calamity.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President-

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MCMAHON in the chair). Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from Florida?

Mr. WHEELER. I yield.

Mr. PEPPER. I am not quite clear concerning the statement about the politicians who started this war. Was that a quotation?

Mr. WHEELER. That was a quotation.

Mr. PEPPER. The quotation is from whom?

Mr. WHEELER. From Mr. G. Jensen, a Belgian exile. I suppose he is talking about Mr. Hitler as a politician; I suppose he is talking about Mr. Stalin as a politician; I suppose he is talking about all of us as politicians.

The London Times is probably the most influential publication in England and is generally recognized as speaking for the British Foreign Office.

On March 26, 1944, the Archbishop of Canterbury and free church leaders in England offered an eight-point program for peace and a warning against "breaches of basic human rights in dealing with Germany." Said they:

We must not lend ourselves in a mood of vengefulness to breaches of basic human rights or the punitive measures against the entire German people, which will be repudiated as unjust by later generations or will permanently frustrate hopes of peace and unity in Europe.

On June 1 Pope Pius XII, who, I presume, was speaking for a "discredited minority," declared:

No just peace can be reached if the victor would by force of arms dictate the terms. A just policy has to give the defeated nation a dignified place.

On June 26 Mr. Raymond Moley wrote:

The trouble with unconditional surrender as an objective is that few Americans or Britons really believe that surrender can be without conditions, while to Germans the slogan means that there will be no distinctions in punishment among the elements in Germany. To them it means that the Nazi party, the army, and the mass of the people are to suffer equally, which can have no effect beyond tying together 80,000,000 Germans in a desperate unity.

On July 29 the London Economist carried the following warning:

should be the peace aims of this country upon which hostilities should cease, because in the early part of his resolution, on the first page, as I have it before me, the Senator uses this language:

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States, in order to affirm our faith in the uncompromised principles of the Atlantic Charter, and in the integrity of its coauthors and 35 or more signatories, and in order that the ideals which sustain and guide our role in the present conflict shall continue to strengthen a victorious hope in the hearts of the suffering peoples of the world, a noble magnanimity of purpose within the United Nations, and an enduring bulwark of unity among the people of these United States; and in order to avert the further loss of the lives of hundreds of thousands of American boys as well as those of our allies, the wastage of our natural resources and the further break-down of the moral fiber of our people.

Proposes the following statement of peace aims believing them to represent the aspirations of the American people and the essential features of a just and lasting peace:

1. The adoption of a universal bill of rights to safeguard the inalienable rights of every individual regardless of race, class, or religious belief.

2. The assured survival and extension of democratic principles and institutions and the preservation here of our American way of life.

3. The immediate creation of a United Nations political council to provide for the democratic settlement, in harmony with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, of territorial questions that have arisen in Europe and that may arise elsewhere.

4. Free plebiscites under international supervision in all liberated countries to choose their own form of government and leadership, the time and procedure to be determined by the United Nations political council.

5. The immediate creation of a United Nations economic and social council "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security."

6. With a view to assuring the security of all nations, large or small, victor or vanquished, and promoting the earliest possible peace and rehabilitation of Europe and the world, the United States Senate favors the creation of a general federation of European nations at the earliest possible date, within which disarmament and economic unification will be combined with sovereign equality and cultural self-determination.

that prevents a military demand for an armistice. Despite the drastic bombings of German cities, the destruction of thousands of German homes and buildings and the anxiety of the German people to see the end of the war, the Gestapo won't let them demonstrate for peace or raise a questioning voice against their Fuehrer's unchallengeable wisdom. Such are my impressions of the situation tonight. It is no longer a military problem but a political one.

Not only has this man said that, but I have talked with military leaders in this country who have said identically the same thing.

Life magazine on August 21 carried the same message from John Scott, a Time and Life correspondent:

The future looks blacker day by day but those inside Germany who want peace and not national suicide are hindered rather than helped by the Allies. The Anglo-American attitude is still expressed by our determined adherence to the unconditional surrender formula, with which has been coupled a reluctance to make any concrete promise to any German opposition group. As a result, the complaint is made that any opposition group attempting to overthrow Hitler and make pcace with western powers has no basic program on which it can talk convincingly to the German people. The Russians on the other hand, indirectly offer the German people that Germany won't be destroyed and that the German Army won't be destroyed. It has resulted in a pro-Russia orientation among a growing number of Germans who, all other things being equal, would be much more inclined to be proAnglo-American and pro-democratic.

194A ཤད་བ Mr W objectionable; but the able Senator proposes them as an alternative to unconditional surrender.

MR. WHEELER. No. The Senator is entirely mistaken. MR. PEPPER. That is what the resolution says. MR. WHEELER. The Senator is trying to put words in my mouth, which I will not permit him to do.

MR. PEPPER. I read from the resolution of the able Senator. I did not quote his words.

MR. WHEELER. The resolution is not in lieu of unconditional surrender. I have repeatedly stated, and I now repeat, that I am not suggesting a negotiated peace. I have so stated to the Senator from Florida, and he knows that I have made that statement on the floor of the Senate time and time again.

What I am suggesting is that the President, Mr. Churchill, and the other Allied leaders state their terms to the German people, as suggested by Dorothy Thompson, by the London Times, by the London Economist, by the Nineteenth Century and After, and by members of

"unconditional surrender," and who made a speech for the President during the last campaign, wrote as follows:

There are two conditions under which Germany, as an entity, can surrender. The first is to make clear that a Germany will be left which is economically capable of life. A Germany that is deindustrialized or loses its industrial provinces or is overcrowded by the evacuation of ten to twenty million Germans into a truncated Reich will be more incapable of sustaining life than Puerto Rico. The second condition under which Germany could surrender is: She could become the ward of an already established world organization, operating along clear and established principles. The surrender of a nation must mean the merging of one's identity, but it cannot happen unless some larger identity exists. A Germany conquered by four powers but not surrendered to any one thing is no answer.

Of course, Dorothy Thompson spends much time in Europe. She knows more about Germany than probably almost any Member of the Senate. I now wish to read extracts from an article by Dorothy Thompson which appeared in the Washington Evening Star of January 8, 1945:

There have been three major political errors in this war, all arising out of the first one-the discounting of the Atlantic Charter. The second was the interpretation that has accumulated around unconditional surrender; and the third, the failure to produce any reasonable policy for a post-war Europe. And what our own Government and some of our publicists

At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference in Casablanca early in 1943 the President "ardently urged the adoption of an unconditional-surrender policy by the Allies," Sulzberger informs us. "Mr. Churchill was reluctant to support such an out-and-out statement . . It was felt that this would tend to negate the moral effect of the Allies' aerial bombings of Germany by stiffening the Germans' morale."

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Of course, Mr. President, when I made my statement I expected that at any time I disagreed with my friend, the Senator from Florida, I would be charged by the internationalist crowd, which was so anxious to take us into this war, with doing something to injure the war effort. But, so far as I am concerned, I can "take it," and nobody will stop me from expressing my honest views upon this floor by a statement that by doing so is to help Goebbels. I am not interested in helping Goebbels; I am not interested in helping Churchill. I am interested only in helping the boys who are dying upon the battlefields of Europe.

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

FEBRUARY 11, 1945

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea.

In addition to the three heads of government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State;

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the President;

Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President; Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion;

General of the Army George C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army;

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet; Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;

Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator;

Major General L. S. Kuter, U.S.A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces;

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;

Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;

Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors.

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