As I myself had taken the lead in bringing these proposals forward and eventually in securing their adoption, I am not prepared to accept suggestions from any quarter that, although we had suffered so much injury and ill usage at Italy's hands in the days of Mussolini's power, Great Britain has fallen behind other victorious powers in taking a generous view toward Italy or that we nourish any design of power politics which involve Italy. (Churchill referred to a sentence he had used in a recent speech that we had no need of Italy and said this was wrested from its context.)

As a matter of fact, it was merely a reply which I was bound to make to suggestions in some quarters of the United States press that we were embarking on some power politics, whatever they may be, in the Mediterranean. I am glad to say that the facts I am now setting forth have been explicitly accepted by the United States, or at any rate in all responsible quarters, and that this view was thoroughly endorsed by the President and by Mr. Stettinius and I received quite definite assurances that no complaints of any kind were or are professed against us which would call for any reply on my part such as certainly would be forthcoming.

Our two nations can therefore proceed on their joint task in Italy, which in the future will be burdened with many new complications and difficulties, but at any rate we can proceed in closest confidence and unity.

We look forward to Italy's return under a truly democratic regime to a community of industrious and peaceloving people. In her efforts to help herself Italy can count on British good-will and on Allied good-will. She can count also upon such material aid as is at our disposal and she will certainly continue to receive her fair share.

I said some time ago that Italy would have to work her passage home. She has some way to go yet. It would be less than just if I did not pay tribute to the invaluable services, the full tale of which cannot be told, of the Italian men and women in the armed forces, on the seas, in the countryside and behind the enemy lines in the north which are being rendered steadfastly to the common

cause.

New difficulties may be cast upon us when the great districts in the north are cleared and when the problem of feeding the great masses for whom we shall then become responsible is cast upon us, and the Provisional Government itself may be called upon to undergo changes as a consequence of the greatly increased constituency to which it will become responsible as a result of the liberation. The Foreign Secretary and I thought it would be becoming as well as convenient and agreeable that we should also see the two rulers who had made long journeys to come to Egypt at the President's invitation and that we should pass under friendly review with them the many matters with which we have common concern.

It was our duty also to pay our respects to King Farouk of Egypt and we thought it right to seek a talk with the President of Syria in order to calm things down as much as possible in the Levant. It should not be supposed that anything in the nature of general conference on Middle East affairs took place. The mere fact that the Regent of Iraq and the Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordania were not upon the spot should make this perfectly clear.

Any conference would naturally include such authorities. There was no question of shaping a new policy for the Middle East but rather to make those friendly, personal contacts by which public business between various states is often helped.

I must at once express our grief and horror at the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister, with whom the Foreign Secretary had a long and cordial interview only a few days before he fell victim of the foul blow.

His death is a serious loss to his Government and country. The sympathy of Great Britain for the widow and family of the late Prime Minister of Egypt has of course, been expressed, not only in telegrams from the Foreign Office but also by various personal visits of our Ambassador. I am sure the House will associate itself with those expressions.

There is little doubt that security measures in Egypt require considerable tightening and above all that the execution of justice upon the men proved guilty of this political murder should be swift and exemplary.

The Egyptian Government have, we feel, acted rightly and wisely in declaring war upon Germany and Japan and to sign unanimous declarations. We did not press the Egyptian Government at any time to come into the war and indeed on more than one occasion in the past our advice had been to the contrary. There were evident advantages in sparing the populous and famous cities of Egypt from wholesale bombardment

The Egyptian troops have during the war played an important part. They have maintained order throughout the Delta and guarded many strong points and depots and in all kinds of ways have been of assistance to our war effort, which has once again proven successful in sheltering the fertile lands of the Delta from all assaults by foreign invaders.

We have had every facility from the Egyptians under our treaty of alliance, and successive Egyptian Prime Ministers and Governments have given us support in a manner which we deemed most effective. Egypt is an associate power and she should take her rightful place as a future member of the world organization and as one of its founders when the occasion is reached at San Francisco at the end of April.

We are also glad to welcome Turkey into the ranks of the United Nations. Turkey declared herself firmly on our side by the treaty of alliance in 1939 at a time when gathering dangers were only too apparent.

As I explained to the House on a former occasion, Turkey became conscious of unexpected military weaknesses after war had started in earnest on account of the decisive influence of new weapons with which she was quite unprovided and which we were not in a position to supply. As these weapons exercised a dominating effect upon the modern battlefield the Turks felt that they could no longer confide their safety to their renowned infantry and artillery of the last war. We did not, therefore, for a long time press for a Turkish declaration of war. It was not until after the Teheran Conference that we felt the moment had come when Turkey could enter the struggle without great imprudence.

The Turkish Government did not feel able to do so at that time, but they have aided us in various ways which it would not be profitable to recount and we have never had the slightest doubt where their hearts lay. They also will be welcomed by Great Britain into the ranks of the United Nations and I do not consider that the tie renewed between our two countries after the disaster of the last war has been in any way impaired.

I was greatly interested in meeting King Ibn Saud, famous ruler of Saudi Arabia. I had the honor of entertaining this most remarkable man at luncheon at the Fayoum Oasis. I expressed to him the thanks of Great Britain for his steadfast, unswerving and unflinching loyalty to our country and to the common cause which never shone more brightly than in the darkest hours of the day of mortal peril.

Although we did not reach a solution of the problems of the Arab world and of the Jewish people in Palestine, I have hopes that when the war is over good arrangements can be made for securing the peace and progress of the Arab world and generally of the Middle East and

that Great Britain and visitors who are taking an increasing interest in those regions will be able to play a valuable part in proving the well-known maxim of the old free trader "all legitimate interests are in harmony." My discussions with the Emperor of Ethiopia raised no serious difficulty because agreement for the next two years had already been reached as a result of the mission to Ethiopia which Lord de La Warr had just completed with much patience and address.

It was satisfaction for me to see for the first time in the flesh Haile Selassie, that historic figure who pleaded the cause of his country amid the storms of the League of Nations. He was the first victim of Mussolini's thirst for power and conquest and he was also the first to have restored his ancient throne by the heavy exertions of our British and Indian armies in the far-off days of 1940-41. Finally, we had the pleasure of a long discussion with President Shukri of Syria in which we did the utmost to enjoin a friendly attitude toward the French and to encourage the negotiation of a suitable settlement with the French, affecting not only Syria but also Lebanon.

I must make clear the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and Lebanon and in relation to our French allies. The position is governed by a settlement made in 1941 in which the independence of these Levant states was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time and ever since His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant states.

We trust these states will be firmly established by the authority of a world organization and that French privilege will also be recognized. However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian and Lebanon independence or French privilege. We seek both and do not believe they are incompatible.

Too much must not be placed, however, upon the shoulders of Great Britain alone and we have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States have recognized and favor Syrian and Lebanon independence, but do not favor any special positions for any foreign countries.

All these and many other matters affecting the Middle East are necessary subjects for a peace conference at which we must resolutely strive for a final settlement and a lasting peace between all states and races comprised in the Middle East and the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean.

On my way back from the Crimea to say good-by to the President at Alexandria the Foreign Secretary and I stopped at Athens. I must say from my point of view this was the high spot of the whole journey.

I cannot help recalling the grim conditions of our visit only seven weeks before, when guns were firing and bullets continually struck the wall and people were killed and wounded in streets not far away.

The contrast between these violent scenes and the really rapturous welcome we received from vast crowds of delighted citizens was one of the most vivid and impressive and agreeable experiences of my life. [Cheers.] Peace reigned over this beautiful, immortal city. Its citizens were wild with joy. His Beatitude the Archbishop was seated in the regency firmly grasping the reins of power.

Together we drove through crowds on the streets lined by the first installment of the new national Greek Army until I found myself called upon to address what was incomparably the largest and most enthusiastic gathering that in my very long experience of such demonstrations I have ever seen.

There is no subject in which the policy of His Majesty's Government has received more complete vindication. [Cheers.] Nor has there been any on which greater prej

udice and misrepresentation have been poured out against them in the United States.

[Replying to an interjection Mr. Churchill said, "and with some assistance from this side."]

All this was done with a wanton disregard of ill effects produced on the spot and encouragement given to the resistance of terrorists in Greece. I am sure we rescued Athens from a horrible fate and I believe the Greek people will long acclaim our actions, both military and political.

Peace without vengeance has been achieved. A great mass of arms has been surrendered. Most of the prisoners and hostages have been restored. The great work of bringing in food and supplies has resumed its former activity. Public order and security are so established that UNRRA is about to resume its functions. [Laughter.]

The popularity of British troops and those who have guided the course of policy, such as Mr. Leeper and General Scobie, is unbounded, and their conduct continues to receive the approbation of His Majesty's coalition Government. I could, however, by no means lead the House to suppose our difficulties are over. The Greek national Army has still to be formed and to be effective to maintain impartial order. The Greek budget has to be balanced in some way or other.

The drachma has to be restrained within reasonable limits. Raw materials have to be provided to enable industries of various kinds to get to work in Athens, where there are considerably more than 1,000,000 people. The sense of unity and responsibility has to grow stronger. with the Greek people. Here I must remark that the future of Greece is in their own hands. The Greeks must not expect that the whole process of their restoration can be accomplished by British labors or American assistance.

The Foreign Secretary remained a day longer in Athens than I did and he was at pains to bring home to Greek authorities the fact that, now that political stability had been achieved, financial and economic problems must take first place and that the burden and responsibility are upon the Greek Ministers and that they must on no account sit back and leave these tasks to foreigners.

I am sorry if those remarks should in any way detract from the great kindness and enthusiasm with which I was received a little time ago, and if my words cause pain I'm not entirely sorry for it.

The intense political activity of the Greek mind must continue to give way to practical problems. As soon as possible they must reach that election, fair, free and unfettered, in a secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage, to which everyone is looking forward and which alone can regulate and adjust all that has been done.

I look forward in the greatest confidence and particularly welcome with the Greek Government that Russian, British and American observers shall be free on the spot to make sure the will of the people will find complete and sincere expression. So much for that episode, on which we have had so many exciting, even momentarily heated, debates in recent times.

I thank the House very much for their courtesy and attention. I refer, before sitting down for a moment or two, to the conference as a whole and in relation to the grave matters which I mentioned before the interval wherein the House indulged me.

It was the custom of the conference at Yalta to hold its meetings of the heads of the three Governments and their Foreign Secretaries in the late afternoon and sit for several hours each day. Here important issues were deployed and measures, both in agreement and on which there were differences, were clearly revealed.

I remember particularly one moment when a prolonged silence fell upon our small body and was maintained for

or think of international relations. I received a steady stream of messages from Washington, I might say from not only the executive branch with all its departments, but also from the legislative branch in its two departments; and except where radio silence was necessary for security purposes I could continuously send messages any place in the world; and, of course, in a grave emergency we could even have risked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimean Conference with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace. There were two main purposes in this Crimean Conference: The first was to bring defeat to Germany with the greatest possible speed and the smallest possible loss of Allied men. That purpose is now being carried out in great force. The German Army, the German people are feeling the ever-increasing might of our fighting men and of the Allied armies; and every hour gives us added pride in the heroic advance of our troops in Germany on German soil toward a meeting with the gallant Red Army.

The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an international accord that would bring order and security after the chaos of the war, that would give some assurance of lasting peace among the nations of the world. Toward that goal a tremendous stride was made.

At Teheran a little over a year ago there were longrange military plans laid by the Chiefs of Staff of the three most powerful nations. Among the civilian leaders at Teheran, however, at that time there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. No political arrangements were made, and none was attempted.

At the Crimean Conference, however, the time had come for getting down to specific cases in the political field. There was on all sides at this Conference an enthusiastic effort to reach an agreement. Since the time of Teheran, a year ago, there had developed among all of us— what shall I call it?-a greater facility in negotiating with each other that augurs well for the peace of the world; we know each other better.

I have never for an instant wavered in my belief that an agreement to insure world peace and security can be reached.

There were a number of things that we did that were concrete, that were definite; for instance, the lapse of time between Teheran and Yalta without conferences of. representatives, of civilian representatives of the three major powers, has proved to be too long-14 months. During that long period local problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia.

Therefore, we decided at Yalta that even if circumstances made it impossible for the heads of the three governments to meet more often in the future, we would make sure that there would be more frequent personal contacts for exchange of views between the secretaries of state and the foreign ministers of these three powers.

We arranged for periodic meetings at intervals of 3 or 4 months. I feel very confident that under this arrangement there will be no recurrencies of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world-wide co-operation and collaboration.

When we met at Yalta, in addition to laying out strategic and tactical plans for the complete and final military victory over Germany, there were other problems of vital political consequence.

For instance, first there was the problem of the occupation and control of Germany after victory, the complete destruction of her military power, and the assurance that neither Nazi-ism nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and civilization of the world. [Applause.]

Secondly, again for example, there was the settlement of the few differences that remained among us with respect to the international security organization after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. As you remember, at that time and afterward, I said we had agreed 90 per cent. That is a pretty good percentage. I think the other 10 per cent was ironed out at Yalta.

Thirdly, there were the general political and economic problems common to all of the areas that would be in the future, or which have been, liberated from the Nazi yoke. We over here find it very difficult to understand the ramifications of many of these problems in foreign lands, but we are trying to.

Fourth, there were the special problems created by Poland and Yugoslavia.

Days were spent in discussing these momentous matters, and we argued freely and frankly across the table. But at the end on every point unanimous agreement was reached. And more important even than the agreement of words, I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together. [Applause.]

We know, of course, that it was Hitler's hope and the German war lords' hope that we would not agree that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of Allied unity, a crack that would give him and his fellow gangsters one last hope of escaping their just doom. That is the objective for which his propaganda machine has been working for many months. But Hitler has failed. [Applause.]

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united-not only in their war aims but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united, to be united with each other-and with all peace-loving nations so that the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality.

The Soviet, and British, and United States Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings with each other. They conferred frequently with Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and with me on the problem of co-ordinating the strategic and tactical efforts of the Allied powers. They completed their plans for the final knock-out blows to Germany.

At the time of the Teheran Conference, the Russian front, for instance, was removed so far from the American and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategic co-operation was possible, there could be no tactical, day-by-day co-ordination. They were too far apart. But Russian troops have now crossed Poland. They are fighting on the eastern soil of Germany herself; British and American troops are now on German soil close to the Rhine River in the west. It is a different situation today from what it was 14 months ago. A closer tactical liaison has become possible for the first time in Europe. That was something else that was accomplished in the Crimean Conference.

Provision was made for daily exchange of information between the armies under the command of General Eisenhower on the Western front and those armies under the command of the Soviet marshals on that long Eastern front, and also with our armies in Italy-without the necessity of going through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington or London as in the past.

You have seen one result of this exchange of information in the recent bombings by American and English aircraft of points which are directly related to the Russian advance on Berlin.

From now on, 'American and British heavy bombers will be used-in the day-by-day tactics of the war. We have begun to realize, I think, that there is all the difference in the world between tactics on the one side and strategy on the other-day-by-day tactical war in direct support of Soviet armies as well as in the support of our own on the Western Front.

They are now engaged in bombing and strafing in order to hamper the movement of German reserves, German materials to the Eastern and Western fronts from other parts of Germany or from Italy.

Arrangements have been made for the most effective distribution of all available material and transportation to the places where they can best be used in the combined war effort-American, British, and Russian.

The details of these plans and arrangements are military secrets, of course; but this tying of things in together is going to hasten the day of the final collapse of Germany. The Nazis are learning about some of them already, to their sorrow, and I think all three of us at the conference felt that they will learn more about them tomorrow, and the next day, and the day after that. [Applause.]

There will be no respite from these attacks. We will not desist for one moment until unconditional surrender. [Applause.]

You know, I have always felt that common sense prevails in the long run-quiet, over-right thinking. I think that is true in Germany just as much is it is here. The German people as well as the German soldiers must realize that the sooner-the sooner they give up and surrender-surrender by groups or as individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to reestablish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

We made it clear again at Yalta, and I now repeatthat unconditional surrender does not mean the destruction or enslavement of the German people. The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta Declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta Declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them. They are working at it day and night, for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins-to deceive their people into continued and useless resistance.

We did, however, make it clear at the conference just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany-and the administration of the four zones will be co-ordinated-co-ordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of the representatives of the four nations.

Unconditional surrender means something else. It means the end of Nazi-ism. [Applause.] It means the end of the Nazi Party and all of its barbaric laws and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence in the public, private, and cultural life of Germany.

It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is speedy and just-and severe.

It means the complete disarmament, of Germany; the destruction of its militarism and its military equipment; the end of its production of armament; the dispersal of all its armed forces; the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Germany will have to make reparations -reparations in kind for the damage which it has done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind-in plants, in machinery, in rolling stock, in raw materials-we shall avoid the mistakes that we and other people-other nationsmade after the last war, the demanding of reparations in the form of money which Germany could never pay.

We do not want the German people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objective in handling Germany is simple—it is to secure the peace of the rest of the world now and in the future. Too much experience has shown that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive warfare. [Applause.]

These objectives will not hurt the German people. On the contrary, they will protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on them before, and which Hitlerism is now imposing upon them again a hundredfold. It will be removing a cancer from the German body politic, which for generations has produced only misery, only pain, for the whole world.

During my stay in Yalta, I saw the kind of reckless, senseless fury and terrible destruction which comes out of German militarism. Yalta on the Black Sea had no military significance of any kind. It had no defense.

Before the last war it had been a resort-a resort for people like the Czars, and princes, and aristocracy, and the hangers-on. However, after the war, after the Red Revolution, and until the attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler a few years ago, the palaces and the villas of Yalta had been used as a rest and recreation center by the Russian people.

The Nazi officers took over the former palaces and villas for their own use. The only reason that the so-called palace of the former Czar was still habitable when we got there was that it had been given-or he thought it had been given to a German general for his own property and his own use. And when the rest of Yalta was destroyed, he kept soldiers there to protect what he thought had become his own personal villa.

When the Red Army forced the Nazis out of the Crimea almost a year ago last April, it was found that all of the palaces were looted by the Nazis, and then nearly all of them were destroyed by bombs placed on the inside. Even the humblest of the homes of Yalta were not spared.

There was little left of it except blank walls, ruins, destruction.

Sevastopol that was a fortified port about 40 to 50 miles away-there again was a scene of utter destruction of a large city and great navy yards and great fortifications. I think less than a dozen buildings were left intact in the entire city.

I had read about Warsaw and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coventry, but I saw Sevastopol and Yalta! And I know there is not room enough on earth for both German militarism and Christian decency. [Applause.]

But to go on with the story which I hope to do in under an hour of equal importance with the military arrangements at the Crimean Conference were the agreements reached with respect to a general international organization for lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. There was one point, however, on which agreement was not reached. It involved the procedure of voting-of voting in the Security Council. I want to try to make it clear by making it simple. It took me hours and hours to get the thing straight in my own mind and many conferences.

At the Crimean Conference, the Americans made a proposal a proposal on the subject which, after full discussion, I am glad to say was unanimously adopted by the other two nations.

It is not yet possible to announce the terms of it publicly, but it will be in a very short time.

When the conclusions reached with respect to voting are made known I think and I hope that you will find them fair-that you will find them a fair solution of this complicated and difficult problem-I might almost say a legislative problem. They are founded in justice, and will go far to insure international co-operation for the maintenance of peace.