a housewives' panic. Stores and shops put up prices in the fear of a prospective scarcity; and at the same time thousands of householders in hysterical alarm gave orders for stores of provisions as if they were in immediate danger of a state of siege. There was also some apprehension founded on the nervousness of foreign shippers. The Government promptly came to the rescue with schemes for financial relief and the State insurance of hulls and cargoes. In addition, the Home Office took in hand the question of the food supplies. There were conferences with the representatives of the principal retailers; and measures were discussed for regulating prices. To meet the difficulties caused by the abnormal conditions, maximum retail cash prices were recommended; and the importation of sugar, one of the necessities of every household, was placed in the hands of a Royal Commission. Since then, however, the Government's vigilance appears to have relaxed until quite recently. There was no organised effort to deal with the transport difficulties which have been one of the factors in high prices. Congestion on the railways and at the docks, resulting from the requirements of the War Office and the Admiralty, has been the means of holding up ordinary goods traffic; and the scarcity of shipping tonnage and the resultant higher freights, together with a shortage of labour and extraordinary requisitions for the feeding of the Allied armies, have been other weighty influences in making food dearer.

In order to release ships for the importation of necessary foodstuffs, Orders in Council were issued in November giving effect to special steps for securing an adequate supply of shipping tonnage to be available in case of necessity. These orders prohibit British ships from carrying cargo from one foreign port to another foreign port unless licensed to do so, and give the Government power to requisition ships for the carriage of food supplies and other necessaries. The need for some system of organisation grew out of the withdrawal of a vast volume of the world's shipping-not less than 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 tons-from the carrying trade. Whether the effect of the first of the two Orders in Council will be beneficial or injurious it is too soon to say. Some of the leading authorities on shipping are

inclined to think that their enforced withdrawal from that class of trade will only open the door to competitors, and that, once relinquished, it cannot be recovered. Considering that we possess nearly one half of the world's tonnage-more, indeed, than that if speed be taken into calculation-there does not seem to be much ground for apprehension, although the results of the new policy on the trade of rival countries will have to be carefully watched. The immediate purpose of relieving the shipping congestion will doubtless be achieved, and not a day too soon, when we hear of 6000 Welsh coal-miners being idle because coal exports are held up by lack of shipping. Another kind of congestion-that at the home ports-has seriously interfered with distribution; and a Committee was appointed to deal with it in November. A remedy for this particular difficulty was all the more urgent because it was an essential preliminary to any organisation of the mercantile shipping industry.

It is quite clear, though, that shortness of supplies has not been the only, or the main, cause of high prices. Here are the official figures of stocks of provisions at Liverpool on Aug. 1, 1915, and a year before:

There was a corresponding increase in the stocks in the London docks. Take, for instance, cheese, which rose from 90,416 boxes in July 1914 to 185,878 boxes in last July. At the two principal ports, therefore, the stocks had more than doubled, yet the average price of cheese rose from 8d. to 1s. 2d. a lb., and the cheapest quality still shows an advance of about 25 per cent. Somebody must have been making a fine thing out of it.

After the first rapid rise of food prices in August 1914 there was a partial reaction, and by Sept. 12 they were approximately only 10 per cent. above the level of the previous July. Since then there has been another and

a general advance. The household food budget a couple of months ago was 26 per cent. more than it was at the corresponding date of 1914; that is to say, the cost of food had risen 43 per cent. since just before the war. The better qualities of meat, fish, eggs, butter, bacon and cheese are fetching prices that must be a severe tax to people of small incomes. Fish, in particular, is 100 per cent. dearer in the big towns, granulated sugar is 97 per cent. dearer, fresh eggs 77 per cent., chilled beef (flank) 70 per cent., frozen mutton (breast) 68 per cent., household flour 39 per cent., tea 50 per cent., bread 40 per cent., bacon 32 per cent., and fresh butter 31 per cent. Not only food, but coal, drugs, woollen goods, and rents in munition areas, have risen. It is fortunate that industrial activity enables so many of the workingclasses to earn good wages with which they can pay the increased prices without too severe a strain. Mr McKenna, speaking in the House of Commons a little while ago, said: The fact is, the consuming power of the nation, notwithstanding the increased taxes, appears to be as great as ever.'

How long it may be possible to tell this flattering tale nobody knows. It may yet become necessary to put heavier taxes on tea and tobacco and to gather other household commodities into the fiscal net, with additional cost to the unhappy consumer. An extension of the war areas may make new and urgent demands upon our shipping, and neutralise, or at any rate lessen, the benefits contemplated by the new Orders in Council. We must not delude ourselves into the belief, or even encourage the hope, that the worst of our troubles are over, and that the rough places are suddenly going to be made smooth. There is no sign that the war is nearing its end, or that the pace of war expenditure will slacken. The dead weight of our debt must soon go very far beyond its present total of 2,000,000,000l., and the annual interest far beyond 80,000,000l. There can be no pause in the energy or expenditure of the Allies until victory, decisive and complete, is achieved; and no shrinking from sacrifice must interfere with this sacred duty.

Britain's position as the world's monetary centre makes it inevitable that the greater part of the immediate financial burden should fall upon her shoulders. While

it is difficult to anticipate with any confidence what is going to happen in the next year or two, one thing is at least certain, namely, that we ought to be organising with a view to the development of our export trade directly the opening occurs. The almost daily reminders to 'concentrate on the war,' excellent though their object is, have the characteristic British fault of belittling, or pushing into the background, other important duties. We are late in nearly every enterprise we undertake, and more than once we have been too late. Putting every ounce of our strength and will into the war need not prevent a diligent study of the commercial map with the object of planning future action. Perhaps we ought to say 'present action,' for surely, if figures ever had any lesson to teach, this is the case with those of our foreign trade. It is a lesson of vital interest not only to the present generation, but to those who will come after. For on the growth of her industrial enterprise and manufacturing exports the future of Great Britain depends. Germany is wide enough awake, and is already preparing schemes for the recapture of her lost foreign trade. What are we doing? Mr Asquith has assured the House of Commons that 'a great deal of preliminary investigation is taking place,' and that he is fully alive to the urgency of exploring these problems by skilled experts in advance. This is, so far, encouraging, for if we sit down and fold our hands and wait till the war is over we may find that the golden opportunity has been lost. To win the war is not enough; we must be ready to take occasion by the hand' and win in the more prosaic fields of Peace and Commerce.

H. J. JENNINGS.

Art. 6. SOUTH AFRICA AND HER GERMAN NEIGHBOUR.

1. Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military Expedition against German South-West Africa (April 1915). [Cd. 7873.] Wyman.

2. Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression (April 1915). [Cd. 7874.] Wyman.

3. Report on the outbreak of the Rebellion and the policy of the Government with regard to its suppression [U. G. 10. 15]. Pretoria, 1915.

4. The Germans and Africa. Their aims on the Dark Continent, and how they acquired their African colonies. By Evans Lewin. Cassell, 1915.

5. The Afrikander Rebellion. South Africa to-day. By J. K. O'Connor. Allen & Unwin, 1915.

THERE is one remarkable contrast between the attitude of Great Britain and that of South Africa before the outbreak of war in Europe. In England hardly any one expected war; in South Africa the Government appear to have been fully alive to the dangers. The Blue Book on the subject issued from Pretoria opens with the phrase, 'With many in this country (as elsewhere throughout the world) it had become an accepted belief that war between the two countries-England and Germany-was inevitable, and that at no distant date they would be engaged in a deadly struggle for supremacy.' Nor did South Africans fail to acquaint their friends in England with the grounds which led them to this conclusion, so that proposals were made during the sittings of the Imperial Conference of 1911 for co-operation between London and Pretoria should an emergency arise. General Smuts was appointed Minister of Defence, and carried through the Cape Town Parliament a carefully drafted Defence Bill, which has admirably served its purpose. The war, therefore, found South Africa ready, first of all, to release the British troops stationed at Cape Town, then to suppress a serious rebellion, and finally to beat a German army in South-West Africa.

The Protectorate known as German South-West