Africa was founded on certain treaties with the Bastaards, Hereros, and other natives, which were arranged by German missionaries, of whom the best known was a Pastor Büttner, who earned for himself the high-sounding title of 'Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the German Emperor.' Great Britain had recognised Germany's claims on the coast in 1884, and her protectorate over the hinterland in 1890; but the inexperienced German colonists and their rulers soon found difficulties in the management of the native tribes. In 1893 Hendrik Witboi broke out into rebellion; and in 1896 the Hottentots and Hereros rose in arms because the Germans refused to respect the natives' rights over land. Gradually, however, the blacks were dispossessed and driven back to less fertile districts, while anger and thirst for revenge filled their breasts. After the Boer war there arose still graver unrest among these natives. The Hereros' Chief had been persuaded to dispose of his tribal lands to some German speculators; and, although this transfer was contrary to native law and custom, the German authorities desired to enforce the bargain so as to have land for German immigrants. The Hereros presented a touching petition to the German Governor, begging that all their lands remaining to them should be set aside in reserves, as is done in parts of British South Africa. The Government accepted the proposal in theory but not in practice; and some very irregular methods were adopted for inducing the ousted native to become a manual labourer.

When, therefore, the great war broke out between the Germans aad the Hereros, it was a cruel and bloody business. The natives began, as has always been their way in such cases, with an endeavour to exterminate the Germans by killing men, women and children; and reprisals of a gruesome character were thought necessary by the Germans. In spite of these reprisals, nothing would induce the Hereros to surrender. Proclamations of all sorts were issued; clemency and threats were tried; rewards were offered to other native tribes to capture the Herero Chief; the Herero women and children were driven away into British territory. At last the trouble and expense compelled the attention of the Reichstag. The Germans were then employing a well-equipped army

of 19,000 trained men with machine-guns and vast quantities of war stores. Debates took place at Berlin as to whether the expenditure was justified; and to all objections one reply was given which soothed all criticism, viz. that a possible war with England had also to be considered, so that military railways must be constructed and military stores piled up, to meet all emergencies.

It is difficult to say whether the Government were only excusing themselves for their failure to effect a reasonable settlement with the natives, or really had in mind even then a military expedition against Cape Colony. However that may be, the German Government was unable to conquer the Hereros. The native leaders would cross the borders into British territory, and from our side of the frontier they carried on a guerilla warfare which broke the spirit of the German soldiery. In 1907 the German Emperor found himself compelled to appeal to England for assistance against the natives; and the Colonial Office took the view that it was our duty to help the German Empire against the African native. They appealed to Cape Colony to send the Cape Police along the borderland; and in a short time the Herero leader, Marengo, was captured by Major Elliott, who was decorated by the Kaiser in honour of his exploit. This was surely evidence of our willingness to live at peace with Germany in South Africa. The Herero war caused unrest among our own natives, who were also disturbed by the Chinese miners, so that General Botha at the Imperial Conference (1907) proposed to our War Office a scheme whereby the British garrison should co-operate with civilians in case of trouble. Lord Methuen was then sent out to settle details; and this was the germ of the Union Defence Act (1912).

During the Boer war some of the Republicans had escaped across the frontier and urged Germany to come to the aid of their kinsmen. Had any one been able to form a coalition against this country, the request might have been granted; but attempts in this direction failed, and Germany had solid reasons for remaining neutral. The Boers were vexed that the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger turned out to be a mere scrap of paper, but the local German colonists showed much kindness to the refugees; and there was plenty of work for them.

Among the Boers, however, there was never any widespread encouragement for the proposition of the Pan-Germans that they should effect a political entente with their Teutonic kinsmen in Germany. Religion was a far more powerful incentive to action among the Boers than race. The Huguenot element remained; and the Huguenots were never Germans. What the Boers understood was independence; and the old Batavian Government of Cape Colony had, therefore, quite as much difficulty in controlling them as the subsequent British Government. But the Africander had no desire to substitute government from Holland, and still less from Berlin, for that of Great Britain. There was, moreover, far greater community of religious thought between the Boers and Scotland than between the Boers and Holland; and even to-day the young Africander predikant is more disposed to take his theology from Presbyterian Scotland than from the modern Dutch School.

After the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902 a further party of farmers, who had never taken the new oath of allegiance, trekked over the frontier to German ground. Germany recognised the advantage of increasing the population of the colony, so the movement was encouraged; and the result was the formation of a considerable Dutch colony within German territory. These new-comers kept up constant communication with their kinsmen in British territory, although hundreds of miles separated them from their old homes; and they continued to speak the Taal and to keep their old religion. At that time it was expected that the Anglo-Dutch feud, which was settled at Vereeniging, would blaze out again. All the clever German publicists foretold this and calculated on it. A reconciliation between the British and Dutch races was outside their purview; for history does not record that Germany has yet rallied to herself nationalities over whom she has established her sovereignty. They completely failed to observe that the vast majority of South Africans had made up their minds that the time had come to put an end to the grievous differences between two races which have so much in common. The forces which marched against the Germans in SouthWest Africa were about equally divided between English and Dutch, and there were no politics in camp. They

lost 250 men killed during the campaign, of whom half were of British and half of Dutch extraction.

Among the unreconciled Africanders who found refuge in German South-West Africa was a friend of General De Wet, one Solomon G. Maritz, who had fought against us with some distinction in the North-Western Districts of Cape Colony during the Boer war. When the Hereros rose in rebellion against the hated rule of the Germans, Maritz took service under the Kaiser, organised the German transport, and secured the assistance of a number of competent Boers for this purpose. This brought him into close touch with the German Government and with other Boers who were settled in German territory. After the capture of Marengo, the Herero Chief, Maritz went back to the Orange Free State, which had by this time acquired its new constitution; and he now joined the Police Force. His aptitude earned him a commission on the staff of the Active Citizen Force, so that in 1912 he passed through the Military Training School at Bloemfontein, where he first began to prepare schemes for South African Independence.

Before this, however, he had been an extreme partisan of the Hertzog movement; and political influence gained for him in 1913 the command of his old district, in the north-western part of the Cape Province, where he had fought for the Boers and whence he could visit both his German and Free State friends. Maritz seems to have avoided taking any oath of allegiance; his view was that the Treaty of Vereeniging was not binding, because it was forced on the Boers against their will. He brooded on the 22,000 Boer women and children who died in the unfortunate Concentration Camps; and he maintained that the three million pounds voted to the Boers by the terms of the Peace Treaty had not been fairly administered by the Crown Colony Government, and that the Jingo section in England' were opposed to the national aspirations of the Africanders.

At this time General Beyers, who was at the head of the Defence Force, made repeated and urgent recommendation that Maritz should receive the appointment of Lieut. Colonel in command of the Union Forces on the German frontier; and his wish prevailed. From

the very beginning of the war, Maritz seems to have been in correspondence with the Germans; and he subsequently admitted that for two years and a half he had been in communication with them. Like General Beyers, Maritz was tremendously impressed with the military arrangements of the Germans-their preparedness and their elaborate supply of arms and ammunition. He believed England no match for Germany; and, as he had fought against us and alongside the Germans, it must be admitted that he was not without experience. He seems to have been convinced that the Union Defence Force could not face the German regulars. His chief friend was one P. J. Joubert, who had fought by his side in the Boer war and who also owned a farm in German South-West Africa, whence he too visited the Free State. On the border Joubert was regarded as a German spy, yet Maritz appointed him Staff Captain.

At first all was quiet along the frontier, and Maritz seems to have recognised that everything depended on keeping up cordial relations between the Germans and Dutch-a game which the Germans play badly. So long as General Hertzog could preach peace and expound the sin of removing your neighbours' landmark, there was a large party, including some of the English, who acquiesced in the view that no great advantage would accrue by attacking the German Protectorate. But a tricksy demon possessed the Germans. Prostrating themselves, as is their wont, before their national god Ordnung, they issued a regulation that all whites living in the south of their territory should pack up and move their cattle and belongings to the north. An Africander family named Liebenberg did not comply with the order, but preferred to move over into British soil. The Germans insisted that they must stay in the Protectorate, and were stupid enough to send a police force to prevent their leaving. The Africanders gave the patrol a warm reception; they fired and drove the police away and then safely crossed the frontier into Union territory. Maritz permitted the German police to follow them across, but to no purpose, for the Liebenbergs got clear away. This invasion of Union territory by German police in search of South African farmers really put the fat in the fire; Vol. 225.-No. 446,

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