see them. With all of the different party groups working in different directions, doesn't that tend to make reelection of the President more difficult?

Mr. CALIFANO. Well, sir, it does make it more difficult but I think the groups you are talking about are really very small minorities. I think television contributes more to the problem of reelecting the President in the sense it gives such enormous coverage to these minority groups.

Senator BAYH. For several years one of those small minorities got a high percentage of the votes, 15 percent in the last election.

Senator FONG. Senator McCarthy, for example, in New York is quoted to the effect that dissident party groups do favor more than two parties

Mr. CALIFANO. Well, it is obvious it doesn't make it any easier to be President and the reason I have been so hesitant in answering this is that Richard Scammen, the former Chief of the Census Bureau, took me through an elaborate presentation recently that showed that if the Democrats had a fourth party running against them on the left and it would enhance their chances of electing a President_in 1972. Election of a President is so much of a numbers problem between the votes and the electoral college that I don't think I am qualified to answer that.

Senator FONG. Your testimony centered on the time it took to implement the President's program you evidently feel that 4 years is too short a time period for him to really implement his program because of the processes that must evolve before a program can be implemented. You said that 6 years gives him time to really put his program into effect.

Isn't it a fact that the real basis of the problem of effectuating a President's policy lies in the President's not having the majority of Congress on his side? Isn't that a very, very big factor in not being able to implement his program?

Mr. CALIFANO. Yes. Absolutely, Senator. That is an enormous problem. There is no question about that. It may even be more important than how long his term is.

Moreover, it may not even be simply having party control of the Congress. There was a difference, for example, in the 89th Congress when we had what I would call a liberal majority in the House and not simply a Democratic majority and the 90th Congress, when we retained the Democratic majority but did not have the liberal majority in the House as far as the social programs we were trying to pass. So that is an enormous problem too.

Senator FONG. A President of the opposition part to the majority in Congress would find it very difficult to implement his programs even if he had a 6-year term, wouldn't he?

Mr. CALIFANO. Yes.

Senator FONG. So the real answer is if he really wants to accomplish things, is he better get a Congress that is in accord with his policy and programs.

Mr. CALIFANO. He will need that plus more than 4 years. He will need both in my judgment.

Senator FONG. As evidenced by the Economic Stabilization Act, the Congress didn't want to take the onus of imposing a wage and price

freeze so it shoved it onto the President. The President said he did not want it. But he got the power and he used it. In fact, he used the power he was given with such force that it made him very, very strong. It made Secretary Connally a very strong man in enabling him to tell the foreign governments that you have to do this or you have to do that, otherwise the 10-percent excise tax will be applied.

That is the kind of power we need to talk

Mr. CALIFANO. Yes.

Senator FONG (continuing). And without that kind of power we couldn't talk?

Mr. CALIFANO. That is correct. I think that any President needs the kind of power that Congress has given him in the economic area.

Senator FONG. Especially in dealing with foreign affairs where you have to deal with foreign tax policies, excise problems, trade balances, where you have to talk tough to the people who import things into the country, you have to have the power to be able to implement your policy.

Heretofore, no Secretary had that kind of power of implementation. But, with the Economic Stabilization Act giving that power to the President, the President now can say there will be imposed a 10-percent excise tax on all imports and he talks with tremendous force. He is now able to accomplish things.

This is the type of power that you are talking about for the President; is it not?

Mr. CALIFANO. Yes, sir. It is.

Senator FONG. I agree with you that that is the only way we can be effective. If he does not have this kind of power, a President can only talk very, very softly because he doesn't know whether Congress will stand in back of him or not.

Mr. CALIFANO. Yes.

Senator FONG. Don't you think that a President who is limited to one term, without any possibility of a second term, will not have the same effectiveness in dealing with foreign nations? They would know that in 2 years or so he would be going out of office. They would wait for his successor to come on the scene; would they not?

Mr. CALIFANO. I think, you know, there are nations that would wait depending on whether they thought the successor was likely to be more help to them or not to be of help to them.

You know, in President Johnson's book, he discusses the problems of contacts made with South Vietnam's Embassy and the extent to which they were led to believe that if they took a much tougher line vis-a-vis Humphrey, they would get a much tougher line if President Nixon were elected.

I think that kind of possibility is always going to be present. But I think the foreign governments are going to have to make a judgment themselves as to whether or not the new person they think is going to be elected would be of help to them. We have that problem now if a man run for 4 years at the end of his term.

So, I don't think the 6-year term, if it is not a repeatable term, aggravates that problem any more than it already exists today.

Senator FONG. Former Secretary Clifford thinks we shouldn't have a limitation of two terms of 4 years each. What do you say to that?

Mr. CALIFANO. I get concerned because, as I indicated a little bit. in the statement, about the enormous power a man has in the office of President and putting him in that office for 12 years or even longer

concerns me.

I mean, as much power as the Presidential office has in terms of this country and the world today, I would certainly not be in favor of leaving the 4-year term and lifting the restriction on two 4-year terms beyond three such terms.

Senator FONG. Thank you.

Senator BAYH. I think this is perhaps the wrong forum to debate some of the economic issues raised by my friend from Hawaii. They were raised in the context of legitimate power of the President.

But perhaps we could ask you: Should there be a distinction between the power and the willingness to use it? There is a distinction there because the power to place the 10-percent excise tax had been available for a number of years and was there for the President to use for a period of time and so were the wage-price freeze opportunities.

I tend to concur with the Senator from Hawaii that we need to have strong Presidential leadership. We need to have a strong man who will use whatever power the Congress gives him; do we not?

Mr. CALIFANO. At the right time and in the right way.

Senator BAYI. Do you have any thoughts relative to Tugwell who is going to testify here today who suggests a referendum after a period of time?

Would you have any thoughts on the pros and cons of a referendum, say in the middle of a 6-year term?

Mr. CALIFANO. That would result in recalling the President? Senator BAYH. Yes. I think Mr. Tugwell's thought is that if you don't get about 40 percent he would be recalled.

Mr. CALIFANO. No. It is a new thought to me. I haven't really thought that through.

Senator BAYH. Well, you can let us have your thoughts later. You have been very kind and very patient to let us have the benefit of your expertise. It has been very helpful and I appreciate it very much. Mr. CALIFANO. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF REXFORD G. TUGWELL, FORMERLY AN ADVISER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, NOW ASSOCIATED WITH THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, SANTA BARBARA, CALIF.

Senator BAYH. Mr. Tugwell, you have been very patient. You agreed to be last but I see one of our witnesses is late. The second witness is fogged in. Would you testify now please.

Mr. Rexford G. Tugwell in 1966 joined the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and prepared a completely new idea for reorganizing the whole constitutional structure.

I appreciate the special effort you have made to come in from California.

You might care just to summarize your statement instead of reading your statement or present your testimony as you see fit.

Mr. TUGWELL. I think we should be spared the reading of the paper and perhaps I will just speak about one or two of the main points.

Senator BAYH. All right. The statement at this point will be inserted in full in the record.

(Statement of Rexford G. Tugwell, in full, follows:)

STATEMENT OF REXFORD G. TUGWELL-COMMENT ON A PROPOSED
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The resolution being discussed has to do only with confining future Presidents to one six-year term. It is so certain, however, that such a change would affect the whole governmental system that a general examination of consequences is called for. If such an amendment should be adopted, the President would no longer be a political leader; the professed object of the longer single term is his separation from partisanship. His influence on legislation would be reduced; his support of legislators in their constituencies would no longer be available. Even his executive powers would be weakened; departmental heads would look to selected Congressmen for their appropriations.

If these are the probable results, it is appropriate to inquire whether the change, if adopted, would not necessitate other changes in the governmental system. Who, for instance, would become the majority party's leader? Who would initiate and push important legislative projects? Who would become the domestic policy maker?

If it is intended to make the President Chief of State, relieving him of responsibilities inconsistent with this duty, those other responsibilities must be assumed by some other persons or agencies. If it is presumed that they will fall to the legislative branch, it hardly needs to be argued that neither the House nor the Senate is at present organized to assume them. Each would need to be strengthened with this in view.

If, as may be suspected, such proposals as this really originate in a conviction that the President has accumulated more power than can wisely be used by one person, it will merely fractionalize that power if it is passed to those who are not in a position to use it. It will not make that power less necessary. The national decisions to be taken, are, or should be, so comprehensive that public policy as a whole becomes an accurate assessment of needs together with the available resources; also, in these days, power must be so lodged that it can be used promptly and effectively.

Unless what will inevitably follow from a reduction in Presidential powers is carefully considered, the resulting situation may very well be worse than the present unsatisfactory one. National weakness in an unfriendly world might well lead to disaster.

It is no more than reasonable to suggest that what is complained of about the Presidency is in large part the result of permissiveness on the part of the Congress. The most extreme example of this is what occurs whenever there is an emergency. The Congress, recognizing its inability to share in meeting such situations, simply resolves that the President may meet them as seems to him necessary. It is only afterward, if the emergency goes on for some time, that it tries to recover some of the powers it has abdicated. These are weak efforts, however and every such incident leaves the President with more facilities for governing than he had before.

It has been noted by critical observers that there always seem to be legislative proposals affecting the Presidency, but that there are seldom any serious ones concerning the legislative branch. If at first this seems strange, it may be reflected that the usual way of amending the Constitution begins with a resolution passed by two-thirds of both Houses. Such majorities are difficult to convince that reforms of the bodies they belong to are really necessary. It is especially hard to convince the legislative elders whose positions are secure.

Election from districts in the House of Representatives, it is pointed out, owes its origin to an additive theory more appropriate to the eighteenth century than to the twentieth. This assumption that if representatives of varied interests meet and bargain with each other, projects good for the whole will emerge, is reminiscent of Adam Smith and other philosophers when things were simpler. For a vast and complex organization such as government has by now become, it operates to prevent the emergence of calculated national policies.

Added to this disability of Representatives, there are almost continuous campaigns for reelection, assiduous attention to constituents' interests and serious differences in experience and influence caused by long or short service from safe or risky districts, and it will hardly be disputed that the seniority is perhaps the worst of all ways of ensuring that legislative power will be used wisely.

As for the Senate, it has fewer but still serious disabilities for the responsibilities to be taken from the President by the proposed change in his term. Senators have no more constitutional reason for concentration on national rather than local interests than have members of the House. This is not to say that its members willfully or systematically neglect these interests. It is, however, only factual to recognize that they must give much of their time and effort to local matters. They also have constituencies.

There is a story often repeated about one Senator-who later became President-that a colleague reproached him for never showing much interest unless something for Massachusetts was in question. He is supposed to have answered "And what's the matter with that?" The general approval of such a reply is an indication of what is wrong the the notion that Senators are in a situation to make effective use of the powers it is proposed to take from the President.

Members sometimes seem to forget that the Senate was a compromise reached at the convention of 1787 in order to placate the smaller states whose politicians were afraid of losing their influence. A hundred and eighty-four years is a long time for a compromise, not particularly liked by anyone to have persisted.

Why should not the Senate propose its own reconstitution as a necessary prerequisite to sharing the President's unique power? His overwhelming advantage is that he and he alone represents all the millions of American voters and may legitimately speak for them. This serves to intimidate others who represent only a small fraction of those millions. It always will, so long as it remains true.

The proposal to make the President Chief of State and relieve him of many political and administrative duties may well be necessary but not unless corollary and simultaneous changes are made to lodge the powers he will lose where they can be efficiently used.

Much of the uneasiness about American government does undoubtedly arise from the conviction that Presidents have accumulated too many powers and have repeatedly used them to make unwise commitments. The most conspicuous example of this has been the deploying of the armed forces abroad. This has been done by five successive Presidents (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon) without official consultation with anyone. It is undeniable that this accumulation has occurred and that some disastrous undertakings have resulted. This more than anything else has caused the criticisms and the suggestions that the President's powers be limited.

The more drastic of these suggestions would require constitutional amendment. For instance, there would be needed such a redefinition of this power as Commander-in-Chief as would prevent such ventures as intervention in Lebanon and Santo Domingo and, even more conspicuously those in Southeast Asia.

It has been argued that this could be accomplished by the Supreme Court. The Court, accepting an appropriate appeal, might interpret the Constitutional clause to mean that the President may do no more than command the armed forces in missions previously designated by the Congress. There was some argument about this in the convention of 1787. The words "declare war" were deliberately substituted for "make war." This was presumably to inhibit the invasion of the Commander-in-Chief's authority. Very possibly it was not anticipated that declarations would sometime become as obsolete as eighteenth century armament. Wars have been going on almost continuously for twenty-five years and none of them has been "declared."

To ask the Court for such a determination of Presidential power as would limit deployment to that authorized by the Congress would also be to ask it for a redefinition of Congressional powers. Since ours is a government of separate, if interdependent branches and since the court is one of those branches, such a decision would be an assertion of the right of one to define the powers of the others. There is no clear direction for this from the document itself; and the court has been properly reluctant to define the powers of the other branches. It is enjoined to make "interpretations," but "interpretation" is one thing, and "enlargement" quite another; it may indeed very easily become legislation. Such a superficially easy way out of the present dilemma would be in fact an unfortunate modification of the separation principle. Perhaps also, the Court has considered the problem of lodgment if the President should be constricted.

Other suggestions have equal difficulties most of them constitutional. Requiring that the President should submit to some sort of confrontation presumably legislative before reaching a serious decision affecting national policy, would affect his position as Chief Executive as well as Commander-in-Chief. The Framers